What changed

B100451/2025

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus, five years after the fraudulent presidential elections

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus, in particular those adopted since the fraudulent presidential elections of 2020,

– having regard to the UN Charter,

– having regard to the joint statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commissioner for Enlargement of 9 August 2025 on the fifth anniversary of the fraudulent presidential elections in Belarus,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 17 September 2025 on the joint strategic military exercise ZAPAD-2025,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,

– having regard to the statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 February 2024 on parliamentary and local elections and of 1 August 2024 on the release of a number of political prisoners, and the statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 8 August 2023 on the third anniversary of the fraudulent presidential elections,

– having regard to the Geneva Conventions,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Belarus of 12 October 2020 and 19 February 2024 and to the European Council conclusions on Belarus of 22 October 2021,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the Letter of Intent on Cooperation between the European Parliament and the Belarusian Democratic Forces, signed on 3 May 2024,

A. whereas following the fraudulent 2020 presidential elections and the subsequent brutal crackdown on democratic forces, civil society activists, free trade unions, independent media and peaceful protesters, which continues to this day, Parliament did not recognise the results of the election nor Aliaksandr Lukashenka as the legitimate leader and President of Belarus;

– having regard to the Luxembourg Solutions on addressing the specific challenges faced by Belarusians in exile, adopted on 6 and 7 June 2024 under the auspices of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,

B. whereas the Lukashenka regime has intensified repression in the country since 2020, ensuring that there are no registered opposition parties or independent organisations remaining; whereas none of the past six presidential elections in Belarus have been deemed free or fair; whereas international observers, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), have accused Lukashenka of exploiting administrative powers to manipulate votes and ensure his victory;

– having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur of 22 April 2025 on human rights developments in Belarus between 1 April 2024 and 31 March 2025, and to the report of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of 25 March 2024 on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and in its aftermath,

C. whereas since the 2020 fraudulent elections, nearly 2 000 civil society groups, including non-governmental organisations and labour unions have been shut down; whereas over 40 media outlets have been recognised as ‘extremist formations’, effectively criminalising their activity in Belarus;

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment and other international human rights instruments to which Belarus is a party,

D. whereas while dozens of political prisoners were released in recent months, the crackdown on dissidents continues with frequent arrests and trials following on from politically motivated charges; whereas there are over 1 200 political prisoners in Belarus and a total of 4 198 persons have been recognised as political prisoners since 2020;

– having regard to the resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 24 June 2025 entitled ‘Legal and human rights issues in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine’, which holds Aliaksandr Lukashenka responsible for the illegal transfer of Ukrainian children to Belarus,

E. whereas torture and other ill-treatment remain commonplace in Belarusian penal institutions, with perpetrators at all levels enjoying impunity for their crimes; whereas political prisoners are known to suffer harsher treatment in custody, with high-profile prisoners often not allowed contact with their family and lawyers, forced to remain in punishment cells for extended periods and refused adequate healthcare; whereas the over 175 female political prisoners are often singled out for abuse and humiliation, including by means of a so-called shame cage in women’s penal colonies; whereas they are also routinely threatened with the loss of custody of their children and having their medical problems ignored; whereas the Belarusian authorities refuse to allow international monitors and independent observers into its prisons;

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

F. whereas the UN confirmed that over the past four years, several political prisoners have died in custody or shortly after being released worn down by inhumane conditions in jail; whereas these political prisoners, including Ales Pushkin and Valiantsin Shtermer, lost their lives in retaliation for exercising their civil and political rights, including the rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;

A. whereas more than five years after the fraudulent presidential elections of 9 August 2020 and the ensuing brutal crackdown on peaceful pro-democracy protests, the human rights situation in Belarus remains critical; whereas the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka has, with Russian support, conducted a relentless campaign of repression against peaceful protesters, democratic leaders, lawyers, journalists, athletes, artists, trade unions, religious leaders, civil society actors and others;

G. whereas the LGBTI+ community in Belarus continues to face harassment, including arbitrary arrests; whereas in an effort to copy Russia’s brand of discriminatory propaganda legislation, Belarus has conducted further attacks against the LGBTI+ community; whereas in 2024 Belarus updated its official definition of pornography by adding ‘non-traditional sexual relations and/or sexual behaviour’, clarifying that it included, among other things, consensual same-sex and bisexual relationships; whereas a draft law currently under consideration proposes introducing a fine or imprisonment for up to 15 days for ‘dissemination in any form of information aimed at shaping citizens’ perceptions of the attractiveness of homosexual relations, sex change, childlessness, or recognising paedophilia as acceptable’, with the inclusion of paedophilia in the same list as LGBTI+ and childlessness as a deliberate manipulation;

B. whereas the mass mobilisation of Belarusian citizens in 2020 represented an unprecedented demand for democracy, justice and human rights and was met with systemic human rights violations, including mass arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and at least a dozen confirmed deaths of peaceful protesters; whereas the victims include Vitold Ashurak, Alena Amelina, Raman Bandarenka, Valery Bohdan, Hanna Kandratsenka, Tamara Karavai, Vadzim Khrasko, Mikalai Klimovich, Aliaksandr Kulinich, Ihar Lednik, Uladzimir Krysionak, Mikita Kryucou, Andrei Padniabenny, Artsyom Parukau, Ales Pushkin, Dzmitry Sarokin, Siarhei Shchatsinka, Dzmitry Shlethauer, Valiantsin Shtermer, Dzmitry Stakhouski, Kanstantsin Shyshmakou, Aliaksandr Taraikouski and Aliaksandr Vikhor, whose deaths exemplify the regime’s contempt for human life and fundamental rights;

H. whereas on 11 September 2025, it was revealed that 52 prisoners of the Belarusian regime, who had received a presidential pardon under an agreement brokered between Belarus and the US, had been forcibly transferred to Lithuania; whereas Mikalai Statkevich refused to cross the border to Lithuania and walked back to Belarus from the neutral zone, where he was reportedly followed by masked Belarusian policemen; whereas reports later emerged in the media indicating that he had been returned to the penal colony where he had been serving his prison sentence, though the Belarusian authorities have not confirmed this; whereas this action by the Belarusian authorities has been strongly denounced by UN Special Rapporteur on Belarus Nils Muižnieks and other UN human rights experts;

C. whereas none of Belarus’s past six presidential elections were free or fair, including the sham elections of 26 January 2025, which were conducted amid arrests and repression; whereas the Lukashenka regime maintains an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, suppressing political dissent, muzzling freedom of expression and preventing peaceful assembly; whereas the sham elections were not observed by any official missions from any democratic countries, and the European Parliament and like-minded partners did not recognise them;

I. whereas many exiled Belarusians reside in the EU; whereas restrictions on renewing Belarusian documents from outside Belarus have left exiles in legal limbo, unable to apply for residency documents or conduct any other administration that requires valid national identification;

D. whereas the 31-year authoritarian regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka has been characterised by the systematic repression of political opponents and dissent, including the enforced disappearance of Lukashenka’s critics; whereas Lukashenka remains in power largely through the loyalty of the establishment and the security forces, and with significant political, economic, propaganda and security support from the Russian Federation;

J. whereas the EU has progressively imposed restrictive measures against Belarus following the fraudulent 2020 presidential elections, disproportionate violence against peaceful protesters, opposition representatives and journalists, and continued human rights violations; whereas these measures were last extended until 28 February 2026; whereas most recently, in July 2025, the Commission adopted new sanctions in view of Belarus’s complicity in Russia’s war against Ukraine;

E. whereas, according to the Human Rights Center ‘Viasna’, over 8 900 individuals have faced politically motivated charges since 2020, with over 1 200 political prisoners still detained, many of whom are being held in poor conditions that put their lives at risk; whereas 96 cases of political repression were recorded in September 2025 alone, with 77 individuals being recognised as political prisoners that month;

K. whereas on 4 April 2025, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution renewing the mandate of Nils Muižnieks, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, for a period of one year, and extending for the same period the mandate of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, chaired by Karina Moskalenko;

F. whereas several political prisoners have died in custody or soon after being released as a result of the inhumane conditions they endured in prison; whereas international organisations, including the OHCHR, have documented systematic human rights violations, including torture, arbitrary detentions, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, enforced disappearances, forced labour, denial of medical care, restricted access to visits by lawyers and family members, solitary confinement, persecution on political or national grounds, deportation, and suppression of fundamental freedoms; whereas the penitentiary system functions as a network of slave-labour camps, with prisoners, including political detainees, being forced to work in unsafe and degrading conditions;

L. whereas the regime in Belarus continues to aid Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, with Belarus hosting Russian troops and drones, participating in joint military drills, and allowing Russian nuclear weapons on its territory, violating non-proliferation norms;

G. whereas female political prisoners, of whom there are over 175, face targeted abuse, humiliation and threats of losing their children, while international monitors are barred from prisons;

M. whereas the Belarusian regime is actively copying the Russian state policy of destroying Ukrainian identity through systematic indoctrination and re-education of Ukrainian children; whereas human rights organisations reported 2 219 cases of forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to Belarus; whereas the Belarusian and Russian regimes are exploiting these Ukrainian children for propaganda purposes;

H. whereas the regime employs mass surveillance, censorship and disinformation, targeting both domestic audiences and the EU; whereas ‘extremism’ is the most common pretext for prosecuting political prisoners, and the regime’s ‘list of extremists’ now includes more than 5 800 people; whereas the judiciary, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies have been instrumentalised to commit human rights violations and crimes against humanity;

1. Continues to stand in solidarity with the people of Belarus; reiterates its non-recognition of the election of Aliaksandr Lukashenka as president of Belarus, and denounces the continuing repression of democratic forces, free media and civil society through politically motivated show trials and transnational repression;

I. whereas at least five political prisoners are still being held incommunicado, namely Viktar Babaryka, Maksim Znak, Uladzimir Kniha, Aliaksandr Aranovich and Mikalai Statkevich; whereas Maria Kalesnikava was long held incommunicado, with a letter from her recently reaching the outside world for the first time in 2.5 years; whereas Andrzej Poczobut, a journalist and a member of the Union of Poles in Belarus, who has serious health problems, was sentenced to multiple years in prison and remains imprisoned under harsh conditions, in an isolation cell; whereas Andrzej Poczobut is one of the finalists for Parliament’s 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought; whereas Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski is being subjected to forced labour and punishments while imprisoned, while being denied essential medical care;

2. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners in Belarus, including Maria Kalesnikava, Mikalai Statkevich, Ales Bialiatski, Andrzej Poczobut and Maksim Znak; condemns the regime in Belarus for its total disregard of human rights and of the rights to freedom of assembly and association; calls on the regime to end all forms of repression, persecution and intimidation without delay;

J. whereas Lukashenka ‘pardoned’ over 200 political prisoners in 2024 in an attempt to have certain Western sanctions lifted, yet political arrests continued, with at least 1 721 convictions on political charges in 2024 alone; whereas the regime continued to release prisoners in 2025 but also arrested many others, using detainees as bargaining chips to extort concessions from Western countries; whereas the political prisoners who were released have shared accounts of torture;

3. Condemns the Belarusian authorities for inhumane treatment and torture of detainees; demands that the authorities supply information about the detainees’ situation, provide necessary medical treatment and allow access to the detainees for lawyers, family members and the International Committee of the Red Cross; takes the Belarusian authorities to account for the health and well-being of all Belarusian prisoners;

K. whereas Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a laureate of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize, was released on 21 June 2025 after more than five years of imprisonment and solitary confinement, along with 13 other political prisoners; whereas 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate Mikalai Statkevich, who was among those released, refused to cross the border to Lithuania, was imprisoned again and is being held incommunicado;

4. Welcomes the recent release of political prisoners, but warns that the cycle of repression continues because although over 100 political prisoners were released through pardons this year, hundreds of new political prisoners were put behind bars;

L. whereas the UN Special Rapporteur on Belarus has noted the systematic purging of civil society organisations since 2020, targeting human rights groups, independent trade unions, political parties and religious organisations; whereas nearly 2 000 civil society groups, including non-governmental organisations and labour unions, have been shut down; whereas the Lukashenka regime employs anti-extremism laws to obstruct independent media, most of which are now labelled ‘extremist’; whereas, according to the Belarusian Association of Journalists, 33 media representatives, including journalists, reporters and bloggers, are currently imprisoned, 83 media workers have been prosecuted over the past five years and over 400 remain in exile ; whereas independent media, such as Belsat TV, Charter 97, Nexta, Radio Racyja, Radio Svaboda and Nasha Niva, provide essential information and platforms for democratic voices;

5. Welcomes the work of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and leader of the Belarusian democratic forces, and reiterates its support for structured cooperation with the Belarusian democratic forces, as formalised by the letter of intent signed on 3 May 2024; reaffirms its support for the United Transitional Cabinet and the Coordination Council as the democratic representatives of the people of Belarus, and commends their active participation within the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly, including through the dedicated Working Group on Belarus; calls on the Commission and the Council to maintain and expand political, technical and financial assistance to these structures and to Belarusian civil society, media and human rights defenders;

M. whereas the Lukashenka regime has been marked by the deliberate destruction of the national identity of Belarusians, including their language and culture; whereas since 2020, more than 6 000 teachers have lost their jobs as a result of repression, more than 50 have been imprisoned, and education in the Belarusian language is being dismantled amid the increasing militarisation of schools; whereas higher education institutions and academics in exile are being intimidated and labelled ‘extremist organisations’;

6. Calls on the Commission, the Member States and the international community to redouble efforts to free political prisoners in Belarus; calls on the EU delegation in Minsk to follow the cases of political prisoners as closely as possible; calls for immediate and independent investigations into all deaths in custody of political prisoners since 2020; recognises the US administration’s successful efforts to free a number of political prisoners; reiterates at the same time that a normalisation of relations cannot be extorted through trade in human lives and freedom, nor as long as Belarus remains a brutal dictatorship and willing co-aggressor against Ukraine;

N. whereas under Lukashenka, more than 250 people sentenced to death have been executed; whereas Belarus remains the only country in Europe and Central Asia to retain the death penalty, with its scope expanded in 2022 to include vaguely defined acts of terrorism and in 2023 to include ‘treason against the state’;

7. Expresses deep concern over the growing repression of the LGBTI+ community, as Belarus follows the example of Russia and Georgia in suppressing visibility of the LGBTI+ community in society, in total violation of its international obligations; urges the Belarusian authorities to discard Article 19.16 on ‘propaganda of homosexual relations, sex change, childlessness, paedophilia’ of the draft law on amending the codes on administrative violations, and to fight propaganda promoting child abuse and paedophilia without seeking to discredit LGBTI+ communities and free choice in family planning;

O. whereas more than 500 000 Belarusians have fled the country since 2020, with some continuing to face persecution and intimidation from the Lukashenka regime, including through trials in absentia, threats from the security forces and pressure on relatives, confiscation of property and other restrictions; whereas restrictions on renewing Belarusian documents from outside Belarus leave exiles in legal limbo; whereas returning to Belarus is dangerous, as many of those who have returned since 2020 have been convicted on politically motivated charges; whereas the Belarusian regime is among the top ten perpetrators of transnational repression;

8. Considers the Belarusian regime to be complicit in the Russian militarisation of Ukrainian children; calls on the International Criminal Court to launch an investigation into the displacement, indoctrination and militarisation of Ukrainian children by the Belarusian regime, and to issue arrest warrants for: Aliaksandr Lukashenka, Sergey Glazyev, the secretary of state of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, Mikhail Mishustin, Russian Prime Minister and the chair of the Union State’s Council of Ministers, Dmitry Mezentsev, Russian politician and former secretary of state of the Union State, and Aliaksei Talai, the Belarusian paralympic athlete and head of the Aliaksei Talai Foundation, which has been central to the project of displacing Ukrainian children to Belarus; calls for the EU, Member States, and like-minded partners to create a single international mechanism to facilitate the return of Ukrainian children to Ukraine from Belarusian territory;

P. whereas freedom of religion and belief in Belarus continues to deteriorate; whereas Belarusian clergy members and believers face systematic pressure, including criminal and administrative prosecution, raids on places of worship, and branding of independent religious initiatives as ‘extremist formations’; whereas several members of the Christian clergy remain behind bars for their religious work, including Siarhei Rezanovich, Andrzej Juchniewicz, Henryk Okołotowicz, Grzegorz Gaweł and Aleh Loika;

9. Reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States to simplify the procedures for those fleeing Belarus for political reasons to obtain visas and residence permits, and urges them to prepare common rules and procedures to deal with cases of statelessness and to provide support for those Belarusians residing in the EU whose identity documents are about to expire and who have no means of renewing them without returning to Belarus;

Q. whereas the LGBTQ+ community in Belarus continues to face harassment, including arbitrary arrests; whereas in an effort to copy Russia’s brand of discriminatory propaganda legislation, Belarus has conducted further attacks against the LGBTQ+ community; whereas a new draft law proposes imprisonment for sharing information on LGBTQ+ issues, childlessness or ‘recognising paedophilia as acceptable’, posing a serious risk of mass censorship and harassment; whereas including paedophilia in the same list as LGBTQ+ and childlessness is a deliberate manipulation;

10. Calls on the Member States to ensure that the efforts to document and ensure accountability for international crimes committed by the Lukashenka regime are continued at UN level with a strengthened examination by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of the human rights situation in Belarus, by providing full support to the Group of Independent Experts on the Human Rights Situation in Belarus, and by preserving the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Belarus for continued scrutiny over ongoing human rights violations; stresses to this end the importance of collecting evidence of potential international crimes and of providing further authoritative legal qualification under international law of continuing grave abuses with a view to advancing accountability;

R. whereas in recent years, the Lukashenka regime has stepped up pressure on the staff of Western diplomatic missions accredited in Belarus and on other foreigners in the country;

11. Echoes the OHCHR recommendation for further accountability through national proceedings based on accepted principles of extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction and calls on the Member States to ensure sufficient resources for the investigation of universal jurisdiction cases;

S. whereas, despite persecution and threats, Belarusian democratic leaders in exile continue their work with courageously, advocating for human rights and representing the aspirations of the Belarusian people for a free, democratic and independent Belarus; whereas the European Parliament and the Belarusian democratic forces remain committed to restoring democracy through free and fair elections, the rule of law and European integration;

12. Highlights the crucial role played by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus and the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus in documenting violations and maintaining international attention on the plight of political prisoners, civil society and victims of repression in Belarus; stresses the need for continued cooperation between the European Union, the United Nations, and international human rights mechanisms to ensure accountability for crimes committed by the Belarusian authorities; calls on the UN Human Rights Council to extend the mandates of both the Special Rapporteur and the Group of Independent Experts beyond 2026, in order to guarantee the uninterrupted continuation of their vital work in monitoring, reporting, and supporting future accountability processes for human rights abuses in Belarus;

T. whereas the Lukashenka regime has enabled Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine by giving Russian forces access to Belarusian territory and supplying them with ammunition, fuel and other supplies; whereas Article 133 of the Belarusian Criminal Code provides that mercenary activity is punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment, yet no Belarusian fighting for Russia has been convicted of this offence since 2014; whereas the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil increases regional instability and threatens European security; whereas the Lukashenka regime, with Russian assistance, circumvents certain sanctions through preferential market access and the use of Russian infrastructure;

13. Calls for the extension of the EU’s sanctions regime against Belarus, which is set to expire at the end of February 2026, and urges the Commission to further expand targeted sanctions against those individuals responsible for human rights abuses and the erosion of democracy and the rule of law in the country;

U. whereas the Belarusian people overwhelmingly oppose Russia’s war against Ukraine, a stance which has helped to limit Belarus’s direct involvement in the conflict and demonstrates the Belarusian nation’s commitment to peace, independence and European values;

14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations, the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly, the representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces, and the authorities of Belarus.

V. whereas, according to the US State Department’s 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report, Belarus is one of the main hubs for human trafficking and continues to inflict forced labour on Belarusians and foreign citizens; whereas the Belarusian authorities have transferred more than 2 400 unaccompanied children from vulnerable Ukrainian communities to Belarus, placing them in institutions where many have been subjected to ‘re-education’ and military training; whereas the Belarusian regime is actively copying Russian policies to destroy Ukrainian identity through the indoctrination of Ukrainian children;

W. whereas Belarusian children are being groomed for military service under the guise of ‘patriotic education’, with thousands taking part in military-patriotic club activities; whereas the rhetoric of ‘patriotic education’ conceals the militarisation of minors, their training in the use of combat weapons and their indoctrination with pro-Russian narratives;

X. whereas the Belarusian regime has further aligned itself with the Russian Federation; whereas from 12 to 16 September 2025, Belarus held the Zapad 2025 joint strategic military exercise with Russia, the first such exercise since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; whereas on 12 September 2025, Poland was forced to temporarily close all border crossings with Belarus, citing concerns over a possible escalation;

Y. whereas Belarus assists attempts by Russia and other actors to destabilise the EU and undermine European aspirations among the EU’s neighbours; whereas Belarusian and Russian instructors in Serbia trained over 150 pro-Russian activists from the Republic of Moldova to destabilise Moldova after the recent elections there; whereas Moldova has refused entry to 195 Russian and Belarusian athletes and activists, including Dzmitry Shakuta, one of the suspects in the murder of Belarusian democratic activist Raman Bandarenka;

Z. whereas Belarus continues to instrumentalise migration at its borders with Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, deliberately gathering migrants and forcing them to move towards the EU’s external borders; whereas Belarus is experiencing an acute labour shortage as a result of repression, arbitrary detention and forced emigration; whereas the Lukashenka regime has concluded agreements with non-EU countries with the alleged aim of attracting labour; whereas these arrangements exacerbate the risk of migration being instrumentalised against the EU; whereas following Lukashenka’s return from Moscow in September 2025, the Belarusian regime stepped up its hybrid actions regarding the instrumentalisation of migration to destabilise the EU; whereas the regime has also facilitated or tolerated incursions of drones and weather balloons from Belarusian territory into neighbouring EU Member States, endangering aviation and forcing the closure of airports, thereby posing a threat to the security and economies of these countries;

AA. whereas the intelligence services of Czechia, Hungary and Romania dismantled a Belarusian spy network operating under diplomatic cover, which allowed it unrestricted movement within the EU;

AB. whereas the Astravets nuclear power plant, located on the border between Belarus and Lithuania, has been plagued by problems, and Belarus is now planning to build a nuclear waste dump near the Lithuanian border; whereas the Lukashenka regime also plans to build a second nuclear power plant in the east of the country to supply electricity, including to Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine;

AC. whereas the EU has mobilised EUR 170 million since 2020 to support Belarusian civil society, independent media and victims of repression, and has imposed targeted sanctions on Belarus in response to the 2020 fraudulent elections, human rights violations, and Belarus’s complicity in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including trade restrictions and sanctions on 310 individuals, among them Lukashenka, and 46 entities;

AD. whereas the announced cuts in US support for Belarusian independent media and non-governmental organisations could lead to some organisations losing all their funding; whereas European partners have only partly filled the gap;

1. Reaffirms its strong condemnation of the repression in Belarus and its firm solidarity with all those who continue to fight the Lukashenka regime’s massive and systematic repression in the country; reiterates its demand for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons, along with compensation and the restoration of their rights; condemns the instrumentalisation of the judiciary, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies to commit human rights violations and crimes against humanity;

2. Expresses grave concern about the situation of political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Viktar Babaryka, Andrzej Poczobut, Mikalai Statkevich, Valiantsin Stefanovic, Maksim Znak, Marfa Rabkova, Uladzimir Labkovich, Anastasiya Loika, Iryna Takarchuk, Yana Pinchuk, Mikalai Bankou, Andrei Navitski, Henrykh Akalatovich, Uladzimir Kniha, Pavel Seviarynets and others, many of whom face severe health issues without access to proper medical care and are enduring isolation, ill-treatment and torture; reiterates its calls on the Belarusian authorities to respect detainees’ rights, provide medical care, and grant access to lawyers, families and international organisations;

3. Reiterates its call for the EU and the Member States to support political prisoners and their families, including by demanding proof of political prisoners’ whereabouts, requesting their release, simplifying the procedures for obtaining visas and identity documents, and providing rehabilitation and other support; calls on the EU Delegation and the Member State embassies in Belarus to continue observing and monitoring the trials of political prisoners wherever possible; calls for immediate and independent investigations into all deaths in custody of political prisoners; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States to simplify the procedures for obtaining visas and residence permits for those fleeing Belarus for political reasons, prepare common rules and procedures to deal with cases of statelessness, as well as to provide support for those Belarusians residing in the EU whose identity documents are about to expire and who have no means of renewing them without returning to Belarus;

4. Reiterates that it does not recognise Aliaksandr Lukashenka as the legitimate president of Belarus and reaffirms its support for the Belarusian democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and for the democratic aspirations of the Belarusian people; calls for the EU and its Member States to work with non-EU countries to strengthen the policy of the non-recognition of Lukashenka as Belarus’s president; stresses the importance of sustained EU engagement with Belarusian democratic actors, ensuring that their efforts have political, financial and security support;

5. Reiterates its previous calls for new, free and fair elections to be organised under international observation by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); stresses that any election held in the current atmosphere of fear and repression and in breach of all international standards cannot be considered free and fair;

6. Warns against Lukashenka’s instrumentalisation of political prisoners to extort concessions from the West; notes the release of dozens of political prisoners and encourages the EU, the United States and other like-minded partners to continue working for the effective release of all political prisoners in Belarus while further increasing pressure on the regime; reiterates that each time prisoners have been released, others have subsequently been taken into captivity; expresses serious concern over the lifting of the US sanctions imposed on the Belarusian airline Belavia after the 2021 Ryanair flight hijacking, noting that Belavia is complicit in the instrumentalisation of migration;

7. Commends the resilience of Belarusian civil society and the Belarusian democratic forces; reiterates its solidarity with the people of Belarus and its support for their legitimate aspirations for a democratic and European future, and remains committed to working with Belarusian democratic forces, civil society and independent media for the benefit of the people of Belarus;

8. Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to support Belarusian democratic forces, civil society, students, researchers, journalists, trade union leaders, exiled professionals and others, including by providing them with visas, scholarships, grants, networking opportunities and measures to ensure their safety; calls for independent media to be guaranteed systemic and multi-year assistance, including funding, and for the capacity-building of key democratic structures to be strengthened, including the Office of the Elected President Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the United Transitional Cabinet, the Coordination Council, and democratic political parties;

9. Calls for the EU and international organisations to formalise the representation of the Belarusian democratic forces in international forums such as the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; commends the active participation of the United Transitional Cabinet and Coordination Council within the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly, including through the dedicated Working Group on Belarus;

10. Calls on the Member States to urgently counter and put an end to the alarming level of transnational repression conducted by the Lukashenka regime, including on the territory of the EU; expresses concern about the abuse of Interpol arrest warrants by the Lukashenka regime to bring about the extradition of political opponents from non-EU countries; calls, therefore, on the countries concerned not to extradite Belarusian citizens who have fled the regime and who may face persecution on their return to Belarus; calls for the EU and its Member States to raise the abuse of international arrest warrants with Interpol; stresses the importance of protecting exiled Belarusians from persecution by the Lukashenka regime and of ensuring that they can access legal residence and employment in the EU;

11. Demands that the Belarusian authorities cease the criminalisation of journalism, end the harassment of journalists both within Belarus and in exile, and halt intimidation of their family members; strongly condemns the authorities of Belarus for blocking independent media, restricting access to the internet, and arresting journalists and bloggers, which contravenes international standards of press freedom; call for the release of all jailed journalists, including Katsyaryna Andreeva;

12. Condemns the persecution of the Polish minority group in Belarus and its representatives, including decisions aiming to shut down Polish schools and eliminate education in the Polish language, as well as the deliberate destruction of Polish cemeteries and heritage;

13. Deplores the fact that the repressive measures in Belarus have expanded to include attacks on religious freedom through the adoption of the law on freedom of conscience and religious organisations, which grossly violates the fundamental right to freedom of religion, conscience and belief; urges the Lukashenka regime to immediately halt the persecution of religious communities and churches;

14. Urges Belarus to commute all death sentences, impose a moratorium on capital punishment and move towards its permanent abolition;

15. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to continue investigating human rights abuses and crimes against humanity in Belarus and to support measures to hold those responsible to account, including through extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the Lithuanian Government’s referral of the situation in Belarus to the International Criminal Court in connection with the perpetration of transnational crimes against humanity; encourages the Member States to join the proceedings initiated by Lithuania before the International Court of Justice concerning Belarus’s instrumentalisation of migration; welcomes the unity and solidarity shown by the EU and the Member States in addressing the multifaceted threats that the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka poses to the EU;

16. Welcomes the continued documentation of human rights violations by Belarusian non-governmental organisations such as Viasna; commends the work of Belarusian independent media in promoting freedom of expression, and emphasises the need to preserve their records for future judicial proceedings; calls for the EU and its Member States to provide concrete support for civil society organisations and human rights defenders working to collect and preserve evidence of the Lukashenka regime’s abuses and crimes against humanity, and to assist in transmitting such documentation to the competent international bodies, including the International Criminal Court;

17. Calls for the Member States to ensure that efforts to document and ensure accountability for international crimes committed by the Lukashenka regime are continued at UN level with a strengthened examination by the OHCHR of the human rights situation in Belarus, by providing full support to the UN Group of Independent Experts on the Human Rights Situation in Belarus, chaired by Karinna Moskalenko, and by preserving the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Belarus, Nils Muižnieks, for continued scrutiny of ongoing human rights violations; stresses the need for continued cooperation between the EU, the UN, and international human rights mechanisms to ensure accountability for crimes committed by the Belarusian authorities; calls on the UN Human Rights Council to extend the mandates of both the Special Rapporteur and the Group of Independent Experts beyond 2026, in order to guarantee the uninterrupted continuation of their vital work in monitoring, reporting, and supporting future accountability processes for human rights abuses in Belarus;

18. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the Lukashenka regime’s involvement in Russia’s unjustified, illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine; considers that the Lukashenka regime has become an accomplice in the crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine; considers the Belarusian regime to be complicit in the Russian militarisation of Ukrainian children; calls on the International Criminal Court to launch an investigation into the displacement, indoctrination, and militarisation of Ukrainian children by the Belarusian regime; calls for the EU, its Member States and other relevant bodies to support, in any way necessary, Bring Kids Back UA, the initiative of the President of Ukraine to secure the return of Ukrainian children to Ukraine;

19. Expresses deep concern over Russia’s growing influence in Belarus, which threatens its existence as a sovereign state; denounces the militarisation of Belarusian territory by Russia, including though military exercises such as Zapad, and warns that the deployment of nuclear-capable systems undermines Europe’s security; requests increased funding for educational, cultural and identity-preserving projects that safeguard the Belarusian language, culture and national identity while combating the falsification of Belarusian history by the Lukashenka regime, and the Kremlin and its proxies;

20. Expresses deep concern over the growing repression of the LGBTQ+ community, as Belarus follows the example of Russia and Georgia to suppress any visibility of the LGBTQ+ community in society;

21. Urges the EU and international partners to strengthen sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for the evasion of sanctions, the undermining of democracy and the rule of law, repression, human rights violations and crimes against humanity and for Belarus’s participation in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, while also closing sanctions loopholes; calls for the EU to impose sanctions on Belarusian entities and individuals responsible for the forced labour of political prisoners and on goods produced through such forced labour; calls on all EU-based companies to exercise particular diligence and terminate their relations with any Belarusian suppliers that use forced labour in their supply chains, suppress the civil and political rights of their employees or openly support the Lukashenka regime; reiterates its calls on EU and Western companies to cease their activities in Belarus;

22. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to impose targeted sanctions on intermediaries and enablers who knowingly evade Belarusian fertiliser sanctions, and on any persons or entities leasing production facilities, re-branding, re-packaging or falsifying the origin of Belarusian fertiliser, providing financing or insurance, or otherwise facilitating transit; urges stronger enforcement and enhanced cross-border information-sharing; notes the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s findings on EU routing and Lukashenka’s recent push to expand the use of crypto-assets and tokenisation as a sanctions workaround;

23. Calls for the EU and its Member States to launch thorough investigations into, and dismantle, Belarusian and Russian spy networks in the EU and the candidate countries, and stresses, once more, the need to impose restrictions on Russian and Belarusian diplomats in the Schengen area;

24. Calls for the EU and the individual Member States to further formalise the representation of Belarusian democratic forces within the EU by supporting them in opening offices across European capitals and allowing them to issue provisional documents to exiled Belarusian citizens;

25. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Union / High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the representatives of Belarusian democratic forces and the Belarusian de facto authorities.