What changed

B100437/2025

B100419/2025

European Parliament resolution on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and on Russia, in particular those adopted since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on 19 February 2014,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of international law,

– having regard to the Council document of 4 June 2025 entitled ‘Call for common actions in response to Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSS) jamming and spoofing threats’, which outlines proposals and responses for addressing GNSS interference,

– having regard to Articles 42(7) and 24(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,

– having regard to the white paper entitled ‘White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030’ and to its resolution of 12 March 2025 thereon,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 17 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument, adopted on 27 May 2025,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 5 March 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (‘EDIP’) (COM(2024)0150),

– having regard to the State of the Union address delivered on 10 September 2025 by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to the European Parliament,

– having regard to the statement of 10 September 2025 by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones,

– having regard to the speech by Polish Deputy Prime Minister Radosław Sikorski delivered at the UN Security Council emergency session on 22 September 2025,

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas of 22 September 2025 on the violation of Estonian airspace, delivered at the UN Security Council emergency session,

– having regard to the statement by the North Atlantic Council of 23 September 2025 on recent airspace violations by Russia,

– having regard to the statement by Commissioner Andrius Kubilius of 26 September 2025 following the high-level videoconference on eastern flank defence cooperation,

– having regard to the remarks by Council President António Costa on 1 October 2025 at the press conference following the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Russia has been waging an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, in a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law and international humanitarian law as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949; whereas this constitutes a direct threat to Europe’s security and stability;

A. whereas intrusions into NATO’s and the EU’s airspace, blamed on Russia, have been occurring since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and have recently reached an unprecedented scale, raising questions about whether Russia is attempting to test NATO’s resolve or divert its attention and resources from the war in Ukraine;

B. whereas in recent years, Russia has repeatedly engaged in acts of hybrid warfare inside EU territory, including cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and electoral interference, weaponisation of energy and sabotage of critical infrastructure, as well as in military provocations, including violations of airspace by fighter jets and long-range strike drones;

B. whereas recent specific incidents include a large-scale violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones on 10 September 2025, when approximately 20 Russian drones flew deep over the countryside before being shot down by NATO jets or crashing, marking the first direct military engagement between NATO and Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion;

C. whereas in recent weeks, Russian incursions close to and into European airspace have intensified, affecting several EU Member States and NATO allies situated along the EU’s eastern and northern borders;

C. whereas on 19 September 2025, three armed Russian MiG-31 aircraft violated Estonian airspace for 12 minutes, and Russian fighter planes violated the security zone over a Polish drilling platform in the Baltic Sea;

D. whereas on 19 September 2025, three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets violated Estonian airspace for 12 minutes, disregarded communications from NATO F-35 pilots scrambled from the Baltic Air Policing Mission at Ämari Air Base, and were ultimately escorted back into international airspace;

D. whereas Romania and Latvia also reported that Russian drones had violated their airspace in September 2025, and Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Lithuania, France, Germany and Belgium experienced coordinated drone incursions over or near civilian and military airports or military facilities, causing temporary airport closures;

E. whereas on 25 September 2025, Hungarian Gripen jets were scrambled from Lithuania to intercept a formation of five Russian fighter jets that were flying near NATO airspace without complying with international flight safety regulations; whereas the aircraft were visually identified west of the Latvian coast before being escorted out of NATO airspace;

E. whereas the recent series of drone incursions across the Baltic Sea region demonstrate a significant hybrid threat to the safe and effective implementation of the Single European Sky initiative;

F. whereas on 9 September 2025, around 20 Russian drones that had been launched from within Russian territory violated Polish airspace over the course of seven hours; whereas three of these drones were shot down by Polish and NATO defences; whereas in early July 2025, Polish investigators revealed that wreckage from Russian drones shot down in Ukraine contained 4G modems fitted with SIM cards from Polish and Lithuanian mobile operators, which demonstrates that Russia is testing network connectivity in Europe in a deliberate strategy to prepare for operations within NATO airspace;

F. whereas it is suspected that the drones are being launched from vessels, including those belonging to the Russian shadow fleet operating in the Baltic Sea to circumvent sanctions;

G. whereas on 13 September 2025, a Russian drone violated Romanian airspace near the Danube River for 50 minutes during strikes on nearby Ukrainian targets;

G. whereas European leaders have cast these incidents as deliberate provocation orchestrated by Russia, viewing them as part of a pattern of reckless and irresponsible behaviour by the Russian authorities;

H. whereas bothNATO allies, including Poland and EstoniaEstonia, invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty infollowing thethese spaceincursions; ofwhereas aEU weekMember inStates responsediscussed tothese unequivocalincursions Russianduring provocations;meetings of their permanent representatives;

I. whereas European NATO allies decided to launch an ‘Eastern Flank Watch’ in response to the latest Russian provocations, underscoring the EU and NATO’s commitment to collective defence against conventional and hybrid threats and enhancing the security and stability of the region; whereas the President of the Commission mentioned the Eastern Flank Watch in her 2025 State of the Union speech;

I. whereas NATO launched the Eastern Sentry military activity to bolster its air defence posture along the entire eastern flank following the Polish incident, and Finland, Sweden and Denmark participated in the Protective Fence 25 exercise to strengthen defence capability and readiness from dispersed formations;

J. whereas following the informal meeting of the European Council on 1 October 2025, Council President António Costa underlined that Europe’s borders will only be secure if all of Europe’s borders are secure, calling for a comprehensive 360-degree approach to European security and border protection;

J. whereas the security of Ukraine is interlinked with European, transatlantic and global security, and Russia aims to divert NATO’s attention and resources away from supporting Ukraine towards defending its own territory;

K. whereas between 22 September and 6 October 2025, incursions by drones of unknown origin disrupted critical infrastructure in Denmark, Norway, Germany and Belgium, including international airports and military bases; whereas NATO has launched operations to strengthen the security of Europe’s eastern and northern regions, namely the Baltic Sentry Operation, initiated in January 2025 to safeguard critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea and enhance maritime situational awareness in response to sabotage incidents attributed to Russian hybrid warfare, and the Eastern Sentry Operation, launched on 12 September 2025 to bolster NATO’s posture along the entire eastern flank, reinforce capabilities and strengthen deterrence and defence, including through effective air defence;

K. whereas some NATO countries, including Poland, have warned they are ready to shoot down Russian aircraft entering their territory, while NATO emphasises that decisions on whether to engage intruding aircraft are based on available intelligence regarding the threat posed, including intent and armament;

L. whereas the violation of national airspace is a serious breach of sovereignty and international law;

L. whereas the United States’ stance on the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is unpredictable, making the EU and its Member States Ukraine’s primary strategic allies and necessitating a stronger, unified European response to defend EU citizens, regional stability and international peace; whereas EU-US cooperation in the area of security and defence remains crucial and should be strengthened; whereas effective deterrence of Russian aggression necessitates robust security guarantees, coordinated collaboratively by the EU and the United States;

M. whereas the EU is an unprecedented political and institutional project founded on the values of peace, democracy, solidarity and the rule of law, and has achieved peace for all its Member States since its foundation;

M. whereas air defence systems to provide protection against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are based on kinetic action or electronic countermeasures, in particular jammers, to interrupt drone control and/or cause the aircraft to land;

1. Expresses its full solidarity with Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Finland, Romania and Estonia and with all other Member States exposed to Russia’s military provocations and acts of hybrid warfare;

N. whereas for the protection of the informal meeting of EU Heads of State or Government on 1 and 2 October 2025 in Copenhagen, the Danish authorities prohibited all civilian drone flights in Danish airspace from 29 September to 3 October; whereas several Member States supported Denmark in providing these security measures for the meeting;

2. Condemns in the strongest terms Russia’s military and hybrid provocations against the EU and its Member States, in particular the incursions of drones and fighter jets into EU airspace; declares that Russia bears full and unequivocal responsibility for the actions that took place in Polish, Estonian and Romanian airspace, which are escalatory, carry the risk of miscalculation and endanger lives; believes that these actions are part of a pattern of clear escalation of hostile and aggressive actions close to or within EU borders, which also include multiple acts of hybrid warfare, such as attacks on critical infrastructure, assassinations, cyberattacks and electoral interference; believes that these actions carry the risk of miscalculation and endanger lives, and constitute a deliberate test of the EU’s readiness and resolve and of NATO’s deterrence and operational readiness; rejects any dismissal of such actions as accidental, given their scale and their repeated occurrence across multiple Member States; states, therefore, that the Russian Federation poses a deliberate, systematic and ongoing threat to the security, resilience and sovereignty of the EU and its Member States, and that urgent, decisive and unified EU action must be taken in response, closely coordinated with NATO;

O. whereas the statement by Council President António Costa on 1 October 2025 following the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government clearly indicates a willingness to improve interoperability of capabilities as well as strong commitment to the flagship Eastern Flank Watch, including through the capability coalitions coordinated by the respective leading countries, and the EU ‘drone wall’ initiative;

3. Reiterates that protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States is a fundamental principle of the EU, and underlines the need for an immediate, firm, united and proportionate response to protect the EU’s citizens and critical infrastructure; urges the Member States, in this regard, to employ all military and non-military tools necessary to defend the EU and its citizens and territory and deter all threats from all directions, in full compliance with international law; calls on the Member States to review, in coordination with NATO allies, the rules of engagement for all types of threats to ensure they are adequate to respond to the most innovative threats;

P. whereas the recent airspace incursions demand a bold response and a comprehensive approach in the upcoming defence readiness roadmap 2030;

4. Underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States remain firmly committed to the rules-based international order and to all diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace for Ukraine, in full respect of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, thus contributing to the security of the whole continent; calls, in this regard, for the Member States and the EU to closely and effectively coordinate their diplomatic initiatives in multilateral organisations, including the United Nations, in order to counter Russia’s systematic breaches of international law and to strengthen collective efforts to uphold peace, security and international justice:

Q. whereas the process of building fully fledged multilayered airspace defence should have started after the illegal annexation of Crimea; whereas decisions, financing, procurement and acquisition, and operability take time;

5. Calls on the Member States to quickly set up joint projects, starting with the Eastern Flank Watch, for an effective layered air defence system for the EU that is capable of detecting and intercepting all incoming airborne threats from outside the EU; underlines that multi-layered defence is essential for protecting citizens and critical infrastructure, but also for deterring threats and, ultimately, for safeguarding the EU’s role as a global actor upholding peace, human rights and the rule of law;

R. whereas it would be crucial for Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia to have fully fledged EU UAV capability along NATO’s eastern flank and the Black Sea region; whereas such capability would require significant European defence-related investment under the current and the next multiannual financial frameworks (MFF);

6. Acknowledges the increasingly prominent role of drones in modern warfare and their significant impact on battlefield dynamics, as well as their role as a tool for hybrid warfare for both state and non-state actors, and underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive and adaptive strategy to counter, in particular, evolving military and hybrid drone threats; welcomes, in this regard, all concrete projects intended to fill capability gaps in the areas of drone and anti-drone warfare, create a multi-layered, deep zone of technologically advanced systems with interoperable anti-drone capabilities for detection, tracking and neutralisation, and develop the capacity to engage ground targets leveraging drone technology for precision strikes, supported by the necessary ground-, cyber- and space-based assets; urges the Member States and the Commission to urgently work on such projects and communicate a clear timeline for their implementation, and invites them to consider using the European Defence Projects of Common Interest framework to set up the projects; recognises the need for cross-sector collaboration between the defence, cybersecurity and research communities in order to develop holistic strategies that integrate the latest digital and cyber defence technologies; highlights the need to expand such capabilities to cover all EU territory, particularly the areas around critical infrastructure and populated areas; notes the ambitious deadline mentioned by Commissioner Andrius Kubilius for the completion of a ‘European drone wall’;

S. whereas there is an urgent need for measures to strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to enhance the EU’s defence industrial production capacity, strengthen the competitiveness of the European defence industry and secure the supply of defence products;

7. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to urgently increase investments in security and defence in order to close all capability gaps, establish strong deterrence and provide adequate support to Ukraine, ensuring that the EU and its Member States are equipped to address all threats, from hybrid and cyber threats to conventional military challenges, and that planning, research, development, procurement and management of capabilities are all done jointly and through a European lens; stresses, therefore, the importance of using these investments to stimulate joint action at European level, including with Ukraine, in order to improve the efficiency of public spending, enhance interoperability and boost the EU’s strategic autonomy, instead of perpetuating the present state of market fragmentation, divergent and incompatible capabilities, wasteful investments and external dependencies;

T. whereas continued effort and investment are needed to support technological innovation and research in defence to support the EDTIB and European strategic autonomy;

8. Calls on the Commission to adapt its defence and defence industrial policy instruments to ensure that they are fit for purpose, addressing first and foremost the EU’s pressing capability gaps, including against acts of hybrid warfare, and ensuring that planning, research, development, procurement and management of capabilities are increasingly done through a European lens; further calls on the Commission to align their work programmes with the capability planning exercises of the EU and its Member States;

1. Strongly condemns Russia’s reckless and escalatory actions of violating the airspace of EU Member States and NATO allies Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, as well as the deliberate drone incursions aimed at critical infrastructure in Denmark, Sweden and Norway; is convinced that every Member State has the right to shoot down Russian aircraft as a proportionate and legitimate response to incursions into its airspace;

9. Calls on the Member States to urgently accelerate the expansion of European drone and anti-drone development and production capacities, including through the Security Action For Europe (SAFE) instrument; calls on the Commission to propose an EU drones package focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, which should contain a strategy to use existing instruments to stimulate research and development and the localisation of critical supply chains and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts that is fit for the present threat scenario; calls for increased investments focusing on the integration of next-generation digital technologies into drone and anti-drone defence systems to enhance their resilience, scalability and efficiency;

2. Considers that the deliberate disruption, by Russian foreign agents, of the EU’s air traffic, critical services and infrastructure, and of the functioning of the political institutions of the EU and the Member States using UAVs constitutes a serious violation of applicable international norms and poses a serious threat to EU citizens and to peace and security in Europe;

10. Urges the EU and its Member States to set out operational procedures and mechanisms for the event that a Member State triggers Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, and to ensure coherence between Article 42(7) and NATO equivalents;

3. Welcomes the decisive response by NATO forces, including the interception and escorting of Russian fighter jets out of Estonian airspace, and the shooting down of Russian drones over Poland; fully supports NATO’s efforts to reinforce its capabilities and strengthen its deterrence and defence posture, including through the launch of Operation Eastern Sentry;

11. Underlines that these or further hostile acts by the Russian Federation will not deter the EU and its Member States from their enduring commitment to continuing to support Ukraine in its legitimate defence against Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression; recalls that Ukraine’s security contributes to that of Europe as a whole and stresses Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence against Russia’s brutal war of aggression;

4. Calls on the Council and the Commission to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia in order to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other neighbouring countries; calls on the Council, along with its American partners, to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia, and to apply a similar sanctions policy to all enabling states, including Belarus, Iran and North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities supplying dual-use goods and military items essential for the manufacturing of drones and missiles; calls for targeted sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the circumvention of sanctions by malicious non-EU entities based in the EU;

12. Reiterates its call on all Member States to immediately provide additional military assistance and to engage in the joint procurement of additional capabilities for Ukraine, in particular ammunition for air defence and artillery; urges restrictions to be lifted on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets on Russian territory as these are used to launch attacks against Ukraine’s population and critical civilian infrastructure and, increasingly, to launch drones that enter the EU’s airspace; believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will play a crucial role in influencing future aggressive action by Russia in Europe and beyond;

5. Calls on the Commission and the Council to develop an ‘escalation ladder’ of EU responses to hybrid warfare waged by Russia or any other non-EU country against the Union in terrestrial, aerial, maritime and digital domains; points out that frameworks of this kind will provide options for EU retaliatory measures matching the severity and intensity of hostile activities undertaken against the EU;

13. Calls on the Member States to actively cooperate with Ukraine and establish synergies with it, particularly in the fields of air and missile defence and drone and counter-drone warfare, acknowledging its groundbreaking operational expertise and advanced capabilities, and thus strengthen both European and Ukrainian defensive capabilities; supports bilateral and regional initiatives in these fields, such as the one set up between Romania and Ukraine with regard to drones, as a way to harness Ukraine’s expertise and strengthen Europe’s collective security;

6. Stresses that a range of hybrid activities which Russia has undertaken against the EU amount to state-sponsored terrorism, even if they fall under the threshold of armed attack; underscores, therefore, the need to apply the available legal frameworks for combating terrorism to Russia’s hostile activities, which violate EU Member States’ territorial sovereignty, undermine the integrity of their institutions and directly threaten the safety of the civilian population;

14. Further calls on the Member States to formalise cooperation and set up structures to facilitate the exchange of lessons learned, technical knowledge and best practices, including within the framework of the EU and NATO; recommends, in particular, establishing structured mechanisms to facilitate ongoing knowledge-sharing on drone and counter-drone technologies and in the area of cybersecurity; recommends the establishment of structured mechanisms for ongoing knowledge-sharing, particularly in the rapidly evolving fields of digital defence and cyber capabilities; invites the Member States to consider engaging in training missions in Ukraine in order to fully absorb the expertise and innovative techniques possessed by the Ukrainian armed forces;

7. Condemns Russia for jamming and spoofing GPS signals in the Baltic Sea region and other areas, which poses serious safety risks for civilian aviation and undermines navigational reliability; recalls that the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization demanded that Russia fulfil its international obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation and ensure that the disturbances cease immediately; calls on the Council and the Commission to take appropriate measures to exert sufficient pressure on Russia to stop these malign activities and to take the steps needed to restore the stability of navigation systems throughout the EU;

15. Urges the Commission and the Member States and their defence industries to support, invest in and partner with the Ukrainian defence industry in order to make use of the full potential of production capacities in Ukraine in the most efficient way, in line with the ‘Danish model’; further urges the Member States and their defence industries to make additional investments, set up joint ventures, and develop partnerships with Ukraine for the joint development of defence products in the EU, particularly in the areas of drones, counter-drone technologies and long-range strike capabilities;

8. Calls for revision of the EU’s capability planning process; is convinced that the headline goal process should cover not only crisis management but also collective defence, including the full capability spectrum under the national and international capability objectives; considers that the EU should consider capability apportioning requirements for its Member States, reflecting NATO’s model; believes that such a process could be carried forward within the framework of a European defence semester;

16. Urges all beneficiary Member States to devote a significant part of their SAFE Defence Investment Plans to assistance for Ukraine in the forms of procurement for, in and from Ukraine; highlights the advantages of investing in battle-tested, effective capabilities for the effective defence of both Ukraine and the Union;

9. Believes that the recent incursion into the EU’s airspace is a catalyst for rapid and thorough advances in domains such as intelligence sharing, common logistics and the harmonisation of security and defence procurement; calls for advances towards a European command-and-control structure that not only manages crises in line with the common security and defence policy (CSDP), but also serves as the equivalent of NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE); notes that, to avoid duplication, such a structure should complement SHAPE and would provide proper resources to the EU Military Staff (EUMS);

17. Welcomes NATO’s decisive and proportionate response to the recent airspace violations by Russian military aircraft and drones, noting that this response involved a careful assessment of the threats posed and a calibrated reaction to ensure the protection of European citizens, territory and critical infrastructure without unnecessary escalation;

10. Stresses the need to set up joint command-and-control centres for any future UAV or counter-UAV initiative; underlines the need to train operators and staff as well as conduct drills; underlines the need to fully integrate any UAV capability into the conventional air defence forces;

18. Welcomes the launch of NATO-led operations to strengthen security in Europe’s eastern and northern regions, including the Baltic Sentry Operation to protect critical undersea infrastructure and enhance maritime situational awareness, and the Eastern Sentry Operation to bolster NATO’s posture along the eastern flank, strengthen capabilities and ensure effective deterrence and air defence; recognises the need for similar efforts in the Black Sea region, including the EU’s strategic approach and the establishment of the Black Sea Maritime Security Hub, in order to enhance maritime safety and security for Member States bordering both maritime areas;

11. Highlights the need to support the Member States along NATO’s eastern flank and the Black Sea region in developing capabilities for intelligence gathering and the detection and tracking of threats originating beyond the EU’s external borders, such as hybrid operations, attacks on critical infrastructure, instrumentalised migration or drone incursions, with a view to boosting the EU’s situational awareness and capability to effectively anticipate threats; points out that such capabilities should include drone surveillance systems and other technologies allowing for aerial surveillance in EU border regions;

19. Calls for increasingly close cooperation between NATO and the EU to take advantage of the complementary roles of both organisations to strengthen Europe’s defence and deterrence; underlines the need for a strong, precisely defined, European pillar within NATO, able to act autonomously from, and in complementarity with, NATO, turning the transatlantic alliance into a more equal partnership and providing the Member States with an increased range of actions for territorial defence;

12. Calls on the Member States and the European Defence Agency (EDA) to urgently consolidate the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project entitled Integrated Multi-Layer Air and Missile Defence System (IMLAMD), especially against the threat posed by low-cost UAVs; insists that European investment in long-range precision weapons systems and enhanced air defence is crucial to ensure deterrence and reduce the risk of Russia exploiting vulnerabilities; calls on the Commission to address this domain in the upcoming defence readiness roadmap 2030;

20. Calls for enhanced coordination, unity and solidarity between the Member States and their allies, including within NATO, for the monitoring, interception and neutralisation of hostile drones, including through joint training and exercises and the exchange of operational intelligence;

13. Calls on the Commission to work closely with the European Investment Bank Group and the EDA on ensuring a comprehensive approach combining capability development and funding; calls on the Member States to significantly increase the staff and budget of the EDA to facilitate adequate and timely capability development and joint procurement; notes that the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence as well as the 14 capability development priorities and the eight strategic enablers and force multipliers in the EU capability development plan are stepping stones to defence readiness;

21. Calls for the EU and the Member States to adopt a comprehensive approach to defence, recognising that security extends beyond military assets and encompasses defence against acts of hybrid warfare; stresses that unless the vulnerabilities undermining citizens’ trust in institutions and democracy are addressed, the EU risks being unstable and weak despite its military strength; urges the development of defence investment plans in a way that also strengthens social cohesion within and among regions and Member States;

14. Welcomes the EU drone wall initiative as announced by Commission President von der Leyen, Commissioner Andrius Kubilius and Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas; invites the Commission to present a detailed implementation plan; welcomes also the Eastern Flank Watch initiative announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her State of the Union address on 10 September 2025; calls on the Commission to update Parliament on this initiative as soon as possible;

22. Urges the Commission and the Member States to include responses to acts of hybrid warfare in their complete programme for a genuine European defence;

15. Urges the Commission to present a comprehensive plan on how to support European UAV and drone wall capabilities through EU (co-)funded actions; calls on the Commission to present a coherent plan at the European Council meeting on 23-24 October 2025;

23. Reiterates the importance of enhancing collective resilience against evolving hybrid threats and cross-border challenges in the protection of citizens and critical infrastructure, in particular through enhanced cybersecurity and underwater surveillance capabilities; supports stronger coordination and capacity-building via EU instruments such as the Hybrid Threats Centre of Excellence, rescEU and the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre to ensure the rapid deployment of expertise, the continuous monitoring of threats and comprehensive preparedness planning across Member States, with a specific focus on infrastructure exposed to targeted hybrid attacks; urges the Member States to finance the establishment of the Cyberdefence Coordination Centre to provide the EU with a platform for joint situational awareness and intelligence sharing; stresses the importance of fostering innovation in research and development, particularly in areas such as autonomous systems, data combination and cybersecurity to ensure that the EU’s defence capabilities remain ahead of emerging threats, including hybrid threats;

16. Calls on the Commission to swiftly process any requests from Member States regarding voluntary adaptation of their national recovery and resilience plans to meet the funding requirements of UAV capability development;

24. Urges the Commission, in close coordination with Member States, to take immediate and concrete measures to address GNSS interference, including deliberate jamming and spoofing, in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions by strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure, enhancing the protection of civil aviation and maritime safety, developing more robust satellite navigation services that are resistant to interference and establishing action plans across domains such as space, aviation, maritime, and telecommunications to avoid duplication of efforts;

17. Stresses the need for enhanced maritime surveillance and coordinated legal measures to address the use of commercial vessels as platforms for hybrid attacks such as drone attacks against critical infrastructure; believes that the new operational dimension of hybrid warfare requires the integration of maritime security and counter-UAV strategies;

25. Welcomes the Member States’ actions against the Russian ‘shadow fleet’; urges further action against the shadow fleet using the full scale of legal possibilities to halt, obstruct or impede its operations, highlighting the risks posed to critical infrastructure through sabotage or unsafe maritime practices and its potential recent involvement in the launch of drones targeting critical infrastructure; urges coordinated sanctions by the EU and international partners against all shadow fleet vessels, and more effective implementation and enforcement of existing sanctions; reiterates its calls for the publication of a comprehensive list of all shadow fleet vessels:

18. Calls on the Commission to fully engage with the representatives of UAV manufacturers in the Member States, including with manufacturers of dual-use UAVs and satellites;

26. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to engage in strategic communication to guarantee that citizens have reliable and trusted channels to inform themselves about risks and protective measures, and to ensure that disinformation campaigns seeking to exploit these incidents are countered;

19. Calls for the supply of raw materials to be strengthened and diversified further, in view of the expansion of UAV manufacturing, and highlights, in this context, the importance of the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, which serves as a starting point for comprehensive, cohesive and strategic action; stresses the strategic importance of the EU’s partnerships with Ukraine, Canada and Latin America;

27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

20. Underlines that UAV technological evolution requires flexibility and rapid upgrades, which need to be facilitated by future EU initiatives; notes that the EU is likely to favour sophisticated, expensive and cutting-edge solutions that often come with major delays; calls for continuous investment in defence innovation and technology to support the EDTIB and close the investment and research gaps that exist in defence technology; highlights the strategic importance of defence-related production and the need to ensure that production output can be rapidly scaled up in times of crisis;

21. Notes that UAV capabilities require significant acceleration of military mobility capabilities as well as fast cross-border movement of equipment and personnel, particularly focusing on border checks, customs procedures and clearance processes; notes, in this regard, the need for a military Schengen area;

22. Underlines the need for targets for both UAV and counter-UAV development, to ensure comprehensive UAV capabilities; calls on the Commission to propose further and far-reaching exemptions from EU environmental legislation for UAV manufacturing facilities;

23. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to fully engage in amending relevant EU and national regulatory frameworks to facilitate future UAV and counter-UAV capabilities, especially in view of the engagement of armed forces;

24. Stresses that increased EDF funding rates should apply to projects relating to those capabilities, as is already the case for PESCO projects; underlines that the EU needs to develop, in full alignment with NATO requirements and plans, a set of coherent full spectrum air and missile defence capabilities, ranging from countering small UAVs to defeating hypersonic threats;

25. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure swift implementation of the European internal security strategy (ProtectEU) and the preparedness strategy to ensure comprehensive readiness and protection against threats posed by Russia’s breaches of European airspace and other threats; stresses the need for sufficient EU funding in this respect under the current and next MFFs;

26. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to jointly develop secure, reliable and resilient systems of communication and information sharing to be used by law enforcement, security agencies and civilian institutions for matters of security, in particular in times of crises;

27. Calls on the Member States to activate Article 42(7) TEU where such gross aggressive actions amount to an armed attack or contribute to preparing an imminent attack; calls for military support for the Member States concerned to be funded from the European Peace Facility; is convinced that any Member State that opposes recourse to the European Peace Facility in such cases contravenes its duty of loyalty and solidarity under Article 24(3) TEU and its obligation of mutual aid and assistance enshrined in Article 42(7) TEU; considers, therefore, that an opposing vote may not be considered in the Council; recalls that constructive abstention should be possible for those Member States whose constitutional prerogatives require it;

28. Calls for the capacity of Frontex to be boosted, in the light of the continuous pressure exerted by Russia and Belarus on the EU’s external borders through instrumentalised migration, in order to provide swift and flexible support to Member States by addressing any technological and operational gaps when they arise, whether in the air, on land or in water;

29. Welcomes the announcement by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that Ukraine will begin foreign production and exporting of proprietary defence technologies to preferred European and NATO partners; calls for the EU and its Member States to make use of this offer and learn from Ukraine’s UAV ecosystem; calls for the EDIP legislation to be finalised swiftly and for it to be used, alongside the SAFE instrument, to commit financial resources to learning and mutual support in UAV warfare;

30. Notes that adequate UAV and counter-UAV capabilities must involve a multilevel partnership between the EU and Ukraine; recognises the potential contribution of Ukraine’s military and industrial know-how accumulated during Russia’s invasion;

31. Calls on the Commission, together with the EDA, to coordinate the purchase of defence UAV licenses from Ukraine, to enable willing Member States to produce the UAVs; calls on those Member States, in the light of the rapid innovative cycles in drone development, to ensure that the drones they produce are constantly supplied to Ukraine as soon as updated versions are available;

32. Reiterates that the recent aggressive actions by Russia must not, and will not, deter the EU and its Member States from their enduring commitment to supporting Ukraine in the exercise of its inherent right to self-defence; emphasises that assisting Ukraine in strengthening its air defence capabilities is crucial, as engagement in Ukrainian skies reduces the risk of drones reaching EU territory;

33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO and the President and Parliament of Ukraine.