What changed

B100422/2025

B100423/2025

European Parliament resolution on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and on itsRussia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 21 and 42 thereof,

– having regard to the EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, endorsed by the European Council in March 2022,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, in particular Articles 4 and 5 thereof,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

– having regard to the February 2022 application ofStrategic UkraineCompass for EU membershipSecurity and theDefence, decisionadopted ofby the European Council to grant Ukraine candidate statuson in21 JuneMarch 2022,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö, special adviser to the President of the European Commission, of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Russia has recently unlocked a new stage in its strategy of deliberate and consistent attacks on Europe, seeking to spread confusion and fear among European public opinions, and to undermine and test European infrastructure, political unity, resilience and solidarity with Ukraine on a broad scale; whereas Russia’s strategy includes various forms of assault including the destruction and scoping of undersea pipelines and cables, GPS signal jamming and spoofing, continuous serious cyberattacks, anti-democratic propaganda and various other forms of interference; whereas in recent years, Russia has deliberately violated the airspace of EU Member States on numerous occasions, with a marked uptick in both frequency and brazen intensity in recent weeks;

A. whereas three years ago, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in gross violation of the UN Charter and its own international commitments; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea;

B. whereas on 28 July 2025, a Russian drone carrying explosives entered Lithuanian airspace from Belarus and crashed in its territory at a military polygon; whereas the Lithuanian Defence Minister stated that the drone had likely been directed from Russia towards Ukraine but entered into Lithuanian territory; whereas on 4 October 2025, weather balloons used for smuggling entered Lithuanian airspace from Belarus, seriously interfering with the activities of Vilnius International Airport;

B. whereas since then, Russian forces have continued to carry out and escalate indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure; whereas heavy and intense bombardments, combined with ground fighting, have continued throughout 2025;

C. whereas on 1 September 2025, a plane carrying Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to Bulgaria lost GPS navigation en route due to suspected GPS signal jamming by Russia;

C. whereas Russia has repeatedly violated the airspace of EU Member States and NATO allies for decades; whereas such airspace violations have rapidly increased over the last year and represent a reckless escalation that threatens regional security;

D. whereas on 4 September 2025, two Russian drones entered Polish airspace during an attack on western Ukraine;

D. whereas during the night of 9-10 September 2025, amid a large-scale Russian attack on Ukraine, a swarm of Russian drones violated Polish airspace; whereas several Russian drones were shot down and others avoided interception; whereas in response, Poland invoked NATO consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

E. whereas on 11 September 2025, 19 Russian drones deliberately invaded Polish airspace over several hours; whereas Polish and Dutch fighter jets as well as other NATO aircraft shot down at least four drones; whereas Poland then invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty to call for a meeting with its allies to discuss the situation;

E. whereas on 13 September 2025, a Russian drone violated Romanian airspace, was intercepted by fighter jets and flew inside Romanian airspace for approximately 50 minutes before leaving, heading towards Ukraine; whereas this incident was not isolated, as multiple prior and subsequent violations of Romanian airspace have been documented, including repeated discoveries of Russian drone debris in Tulcea County and the Danube Delta between 2023 and 2025, and confirmed incursions on 17 January 2025 and 29–30 September 2025, when fragments from Russian attack drones targeting Ukrainian Danube ports were found on Romanian territory;

F. whereas since February 2022, Russian drones have entered Romanian airspace 11 times, with several drone fragments falling on Romanian20 territorySeptember on2025, athree furtherRussian 39fighter occasions;jets whereasentered mostup recently,to on10 13kilometres Septemberinto 2025,Estonian aairspace Russianfor Geran12 droneminutes againuntil violatedthey Romanianwere airspaceintercepted and wasescorted interceptedout by two F-16NATO fighter aircraft;jets; whereas similarEstonia incidentsinvoked haveNATO alsoconsultations occurredunder inArticle 4 of the RepublicNorth ofAtlantic Moldova;Treaty in response;

G. whereas on 19 September 2025, three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets entered Estonian airspace for 12 minutes; whereas they were forced out after Italian fighter jets were scrambled; whereas this violation of Estonian airspace represents an extremely serious provocation from Russia; whereas Estonia therefore invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, calling for an urgent discussion with its allies;

G. whereas in recent weeks, drone sightings in Denmark have caused the temporary closure of several airports; whereas drones have also been sighted at Danish military facilities; whereas it remains unclear who is responsible for these incidents; whereas these drones were operated in violation of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft;

H. whereas on 22 September 2025, the airspace above Copenhagen Airport in Denmark was violated by drones; whereas the Danish authorities have stated that the drone attacks in Denmark are linked to the airspace violations in Estonia, Poland and Romania;

H. whereas in recent days, drone sightings in Germany have caused disruption at Munich airport; whereas drones have been spotted across Germany at airports and military installations; whereas in many cases it remains unclear who is responsible for these incidents;

I. whereas on 22 September 2025, the airspace around Oslo Airport in Norway was closed for roughly three hours because of drone sightings;

I. whereas during the night of 25-26 September 2025, drones were sighted near the Swedish Karlskrona naval base, the largest naval base of the Swedish navy; whereas Sweden and its largest island Gotland are of strategic importance for protecting the Baltic states in the event of a conflict with Russia;

J. whereas on 24 September 2025, Aalborg Airport in Denmark was closed temporarily after multiple drones were spotted nearby; whereas that same day, multiple drones were observed near several Danish military installations, including Skrydstrup Air Base and the base of the Jutland Dragoon regiment;

J. whereas Russia continues to pose a direct and long-term military and hybrid threat to the EU and its neighbourhood; whereas EU countries in the Baltic Sea region and along the eastern border face persistent provocations and must maintain a high level of readiness and resilience;

K. whereas since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has launched thousands of drones and missiles at Ukraine; whereas the use of drones by both Russia and Ukraine on a large scale has profoundly transformed the course of the war in Ukraine, in both technological and financial terms, generating significant asymmetries;

K. whereas in response to ongoing airspace violations, NATO announced on 12 September 2025 the launch of ‘Eastern Sentry’, a multi-domain military activity aimed at bolstering NATO’s posture along its eastern flank;

L. whereas Russia produces thousands of drones per month and is further scaling up its production capacities; whereas there are strong indications that the vessels of Russia’s shadow fleet are being used as a launch pad for drone flights over the airspace of European countries; whereas the Boracay crude oil tanker, formerly known as Pushpa and targeted by EU sanctions as a Russian shadow fleet vessel, was stopped, boarded and searched by French military personnel on 28 September 2025 for its failure to fly a flag; whereas the tanker’s commander will stand trial after having exhibited aggressive behaviour during the boarding and subsequent investigation;

L. whereas the Commission President proposed the construction of a ‘drone wall’ in September 2025, as part of a broader Eastern Flank Watch initiative; whereas the Commission has not yet produced a detailed proposal for this ‘drone wall’, leaving questions about cost and practicalities open;

M. whereas the incursions into the airspace of Poland, Romania and Estonia, as well as recent events in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, constitute an escalation by Russia, aimed at destabilising European countries and reducing their support for Ukraine;

M. whereas reinforcing the EU’s eastern border is essential for safeguarding its citizens, economy and infrastructure; whereas deterrence and preparedness must combine civilian, digital and military measures to prevent incursions and protect sovereignty;

N. whereas Russian provocations that pose serious security threats, damage infrastructure, cause economic losses and threaten and intimidate European citizens require a strong and united response from the EU and NATO;

1. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the countries affected by Russian airspace violations and stresses the importance for EU Member States of standing united in the face of Russia’s provocations;

O. whereas in a move that goes against the EU’s common foreign and security policy, and which contradicts the EU’s position on the sovereignty of Ukraine and the support the EU provides to Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s aggression, Hungary sent drones flying over Ukrainian territory; whereas the Hungarian Prime Minister publicly denied that Ukraine is a sovereign country;

2. Highlights that Russia’s clear provocations are an active strategy of hybrid warfare to sow fear and distrust, and are intended to test and destabilise the societies of EU Member States and NATO allies; stresses, therefore, the importance of societal resilience and preparedness as highlighted in the recommendations of the Niinistö report;

P. whereas on 2 October 2025, 15 drones were spotted flying over a military base in Belgium before entering German airspace, with an investigation currently under way; whereas on that same day and then for a second time within a 24-hour period, drone activity surrounding Munich Airport led to its temporary closure;

3. Stresses that while there have been incidents targeting civilian infrastructure in other parts of the EU, these should not divert attention from the security of the EU’s eastern border, which faces growing risks from the use of military drones; emphasises that the EU must act quickly to strengthen and fund protection measures in these regions, combining civil and military tools to ensure effective defence;

1. Strongly condemns Russia’s repeated deliberate violations of the sovereign airspace of EU Member States; stresses that these deliberate incursions do not constitute isolated incidents, but are part of a systematic and escalating hybrid warfare aimed at destabilising the Union, threatening and intimidating its citizens, and testing NATO and EU response mechanisms;

4. Notes the Commission President’s proposal for a ‘drone wall’, as well as Eastern Flank Watch; highlights that this proposal remains very vague, leaving questions about cost and practicalities open; stresses the need for a concrete proposal for drone defence alongside a detailed implementation roadmap with clear financing, governance and technological standards as a complementary element to the Union’s defence readiness, which also includes elements such as cyber defence, air defence and ammunition production as outlined in the white paper entitled ‘White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030’;

2. Underlines that eastern Europe is currently facing the objectively greatest danger of aggression, and therefore the defence of the EU’s eastern border and skies must be a joint effort, carried out with the full support of all EU Member States; expresses its unwavering solidarity with Estonia, Denmark, Poland, Romania, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova and all other Member States and candidate countries exposed to direct threats from Russia; underlines that their security is the security of the whole Union;

5. Highlights with concern that current European drone detection and defence systems are inadequate and supports the creation of a coordinated, multi-layered drone defence network across the eastern flank with a focus on advanced technologies and anti-drone systems for detection, tracking and neutralisation; stresses in this context the need for a holistic approach that also focuses on better equipping police forces and civilian authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones; notes that armed forces are often not the actors best placed to deal with drone sightings swiftly and stresses the importance of civil-military cooperation in this regard;

3. Acknowledges the swift and coordinated response of some of the Member States’ armed forces and NATO partners in safeguarding European skies;

6. Calls for the EU and its Member States to equip authorities with the means to counter drones at critical infrastructure sites such as airports and power plants; notes that such means must be suitable for the civilian context and follow a model of layered defence with multiple systems that can take down drones kinetically and electronically;

4. Calls on the Member States to show political will and resolve, and to signal that any attempt by a non-EU state to violate their sovereignty will immediately face retaliation;

7. Welcomes the support Ukraine has offered to Poland, Romania and other European countries in countering Russian airspace violations; notes that Ukraine has extensive experience with Russian drones that EU Member States and NATO allies can learn from, despite the fact that drone defence in a wartime context fundamentally differs from drone defence in a peacetime context; places particular emphasis, in this regard, on Ukraine’s experience with the digitalisation of its armed forces, and the enhancement of its drone technology and production; calls on the Member States to facilitate the integration of Ukraine’s defence technological and industrial base into the European defence technological and industrial base as a mutually beneficial step;

5. Stresses the importance of military training and joint exercises between the Member States and recalls the importance of the operationalisation of the mutual assistance clause provided for in Article 42(7) TEU in the current context;

8. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next multiannual financial framework and calls for the launch of another off-budget financial facility which would sufficiently pool and Europeanise parts of national defence budgets at EU level and address the entire life cycle of military capabilities, from collaborative research and development and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply, and which is, like the current off-budget European Peace Facility, open to non-EU countries such as Norway and the UK; stresses, therefore, the need to improve decision-making and oversight procedures compared to the current European Peace Facility governance model; calls on EU Member States to use loans under the Security Action for Europe initiative in this regard;

6. Insists on the urgent need to move towards a genuine European Defence Union, building on and going further than existing frameworks such as that provided in the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030; underlines that only through deeper integration, coordination and the pooling of resources can the EU respond effectively to Russia’s escalating threats;

9. Urges the United States and EU Member States to lift restrictions on western-delivered weapons used by Ukraine in order to enable Ukraine to hit military targets inside Russia;

7. Calls for the EU and its Member States, in coordination with NATO, to work on strengthening airspace security and deterrence measures, including enhanced surveillance, joint exercises and the rapid deployment of additional assets, and on developing the full spectrum of measures under NATO Operation ‘Eastern Sentry’; calls for the development of a fully capable European pillar within NATO to enable the EU to defend its sovereignty and tackle the Russian threat while respecting Member States’ constitutional requirements;

10. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure; expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law;

8. Urges the Member States to reinforce their coordinated capacity to protect their airspace integrity, ensuring their systems are interoperable with NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence architecture; stresses that this initiative must also address gaps in early warning systems, command and control, and coordinated procurement to provide robust protection for EU citizens, whether in air, ground, sea or space domains; calls for a resolute effort to decrease EU dependencies on non-EU states in this domain;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, the President and Parliament of Ukraine, and the President and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

9. Calls for the coherent strengthening of the eastern flank along its entire length by improving drone detection and neutralisation capabilities, and by requesting the allocation of adequate financial and material resources for this purpose;

10. Emphasises the urgent need to heavily invest in drones and counter-drone equipment; stresses the need for a robust, end-to-end system encompassing advanced detection, resilient command and control, and interception capabilities; welcomes, in this regard, the proposal by the Commission President to prioritise counter-drone systems among EU flagship projects; encourages relevant initiatives that enable EU Member States to take coordinated, united and proportionate action against all violations of their airspace; highlights the importance of the efficient use of the SAFE financial mechanism for this purpose; calls for the EU and Member States’ leadership to find a solution that will enable Member States to withstand Russian provocations and drone attacks; encourages any initiative that will enable the EU and its Member States to take coordinated, united and proportionate action against all violations of their airspace; emphasises, in this regard, the importance of the recently announced Eastern Flank Watch and Drone Wall initiatives; calls on the Council, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to advance swiftly in their implementation;

11. Expresses its concern about the increased cooperation between Russia and China in drone innovation and production; stresses that this requires particular attention from democratic like-minded partners and the transatlantic community;

12. Highlights the need to develop a regulatory framework to secure safe aviation in combination with expanded infrastructure for drones and to protect against hostile drones;

13. Calls on the Member States to enhance their coordination in collecting, sharing and analysing foreign intelligence, so as to swiftly investigate and attribute hybrid attacks and operations including airspace violations; regrets the fact that, despite the European Council’s pledge in May 2023 to take over the Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre (CIDCC) PESCO project from NATO and transfer its know-how and structures to the EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre (EUCDCC) in order to centralise the creation and coordination of military cyber situational awareness across the EU, the European External Action Service recently announced that no financial resources will be available in 2026 to build up the EUCDCC;

14. Highlights that a strong and united response from the EU and NATO to Russia’s violations of EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure must carry a strong economic component;

15. Notes that Russia has been using its shadow fleet of vessels as a launch pad for the drones which have entered the airspace of EU Member States; calls for an increased crackdown on all vessels that are part of this shadow fleet; reiterates its call for more targeted sanctions on the shadow fleet in the next sanctions packages against Russia, such as identifying and blacklisting all individual shadow fleet vessels, as well as their owners, operators, managers, accounts, banks and insurance companies;

16. Calls, more broadly, for the next EU sanctions packages to include the systematic sanctioning of vessels sailing through EU waters without known insurance; urges the European External Action Service and the EU Sanctions Envoy to reach out to the governments of the countries where the companies managing the shadow tankers are registered; calls for the EU and its Member States to approach these flag states to inform them about the basis of the listings and the consequences of a potential listing, and remind them of flag states’ responsibilities; urges flag states to delist sanctioned vessels from their ship registries;

17. Calls on the Council to significantly tighten and fully enforce existing sanctions against Russia, including in the fields of defence and dual-use technologies; calls for the adoption of a robust 19th sanctions package that targets Russia’s primary sources of revenue; calls on the Commission and the Council to urgently address remaining vulnerabilities related to Russian energy dependency, the shadow fleet and visa misuse, ensuring that sanctions are fully tightened and that their circumvention is eliminated; urges the Commission to coordinate with partners and non-EU countries to prevent re-export and loopholes;

18. Stresses that credible deterrence requires enhanced genuine and effective military mobility over all EU corridors and border protection; calls on the Commission and the Member States to approve the proposed tenfold increase in funding for military mobility in the next multiannual financial framework and to invest in dual-use infrastructure, particularly in frontline regions; welcomes the Commission’s decision to propose an omnibus on military mobility in this regard;

19. Acknowledges the significant knowledge and experience that Ukraine has developed concerning the production of drones and counter-drone technologies; expects the EU and its Member States to learn from this expertise and knowledge; calls for a substantial step up in defence cooperation with Ukraine, in particular regarding both drone technology and countermeasures, including enhancing industrial cooperation between the Member States and Ukraine; calls for the increased provision of air defence, counter-drone systems and intelligence-sharing capacities to Ukraine;

20. Reiterates its call on the EU Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately endorse the Commission proposal to use all frozen Russian assets as a foundation for a substantial grant and loan to Ukraine, with reimbursement contingent on the future payment of war reparations by Russia, as a legally sound and financially significant way to maintain and increase EU support for Ukraine’s military needs, including counter-drone defence;

21. Underlines the importance of the EU’s Black Sea strategy and the significance of the maritime security hub, its strategic placement in the proximity of existing NATO facilities and rapid deployment capabilities in the region;

22. Strongly condemns the presence of Hungarian drones in Ukrainian airspace, the anti-Ukraine statements made by the Prime Minister of Hungary and the systematic opposition from Hungary to the opening of EU accession negotiations with Ukraine; urges the Council to overcome Hungary’s negative attitude, which goes against the interests of the EU;

23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the Russian authorities.