What changed

B100162/2025

P10_TA(2025)0035

European Parliament resolution on theThe need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria

(2025/2569(RSP))

PE769.738

European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2025 on the need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria (2025/2569(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Syria,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) of 18 December 2015,

– having regard to the UN Charter,

– having regard to the establishment of the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic, under UN General Assembly Resolution 77/301 of 29 June 2023,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2254, as adopted on 18 December 2015,

– having regard to its recommendation of 28 February 2024 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in Syria,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 77/301 of 29 June 2023, establishing the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic,

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 December 2024,

– having regard to the report of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic of 11 March 2024 and to theCouncil reportconclusions of 1219 AugustDecember 2024,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 December 2024,

– having regard to the orders of the Paris Judicial Court of 14 November 2023 and 21 January 2025 issuing international arrest warrants for Bashar al-Assad and members of his family, and to universal jurisdiction cases in European courts,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 27 January 2025 and the outcome of the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 24 February 2025,

– having regard to the joint statement by the Governments of France, Syria, Bahrain, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, the Secretary General of the League of Arab States and the Secretary General of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf of 13 February 2025,

– having regard to theCouncil EuropeanDecision Council(CFSP) conclusions2025/406 of 1624 NovemberFebruary 20152025 onamending theDecision EU’s2013/255/CFSP supportconcerning torestrictive transitionalmeasures justice,in view of the situation in Syria,

A. whereas on 8 December 2024 an alliance of rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) overthrew the Assad regime in Syria, marking the end of over five decades of autocratic family rule in Syria, including 14 years of war;

– having regard to the statement issued following Syria’s National Dialogue Conference, held in Damascus on 25 February 2025,

B. whereas on 29 January 2025 Ahmed al-Sharaa was named interim president of Syria and was tasked with forming a temporary legislative council; whereas the interim president has announced plans for a new constitution and for holding elections in four to five years from now; whereas rebel military commander Hassan Abdul Ghani has announced that all institutions related to the old regime, including the 2012 constitution, the People’s Assembly, the Baath Party and all revolutionary factions – military, political and civil – would be dissolved and integrated into new state institutions;

– having regard to the statement of 8 March 2025 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service on the latest developments in Syria,

C. whereas only two out of seven people appointed to the preparatory committee for the National Dialogue Conference were women;

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

D. whereas on 24 and 25 February 2025, the Syrian interim government held the announced National Dialogue Conference;

A. whereas in December 2024 Syria witnessed momentous change, as a rebel coalition spearheaded by the armed group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA), the Southern Operations Room (formerly Southern Front) and several other opposition forces toppled Bashar al-Assad’s murderous regime; whereas the historic collapse of the Assad dynasty marked the end of half of a century of suffering for the Syrian people, with unprecedented tyranny and chaos unfolding after Bashar al-Assad brutally repressed the 2011 uprising and led the country into civil war, as well as the beginning of a new chapter for the Syrian people and the broader Middle East;

E.B. whereas sincethe 2011,fallen halfAssad aregime millionengaged Syriansin havesystematic diedrepression, mass arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and 14other milliongrave havehuman beenrights forciblyviolations, displacedand asis aresponsible resultfor ofdocumented war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the fiercedeliberate repressiontargeting andof demographiccivilians, engineeringsiege bywarfare Assadleading andto hismass allies,starvation, Russiathe use of barrel bombs and Iran;the whereasdeployment betweenof 2011chemical andweapons, Augustin 2024,violation atof leastinternational 157law; 634whereas peoplesince were2011, arrestedat byleast thehalf regimea forcesmillion Syrians have died and other14 partiesmillion tohave thebeen warforced into Syriaflee andtheir arehomes, stillof underwhich arrestroughly and/or7 million have been forciblyinternally disappeared,displaced, withas frequenta occurrencesresult of deathsthe infierce custodyrepression and extrajudicialdemographic executions;engineering whereasby tensthe ofAssad thousandsregime ofand peoplehis wentallies, missingas duringwell as at the Assadhands family’sof ruleterrorist andgroups; theirwhereas the fates and whereabouts of tens of thousands of people remain unknown;

F. whereas over 90 % of Syrians live below the poverty line, with at least 13 million – more than half of the population – unable to access or afford enough quality food; whereas at least 16.5 million Syrians across Syria require some form of humanitarian aid to meet their basic needs;

C. whereas Russia and Iran, under the guise of strategic alliances, were both enablers and active players in the war waged by the bloody Assad regime against its own people and used Syria as a geopolitical battleground for destabilising the region, as a hub for arms and drug trafficking, as well as a testing ground for military capabilities and tactics, systematically targeting civilian infrastructure and humanitarian aid convoys in clear violation of international law; whereas Assad’s power relied on Russia and Iran’s continued support and their supply of manpower and weapons, as well as that of their proxies, including the Wagner Group, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and Afghan mercenaries; whereas his sudden fall is a clear geostrategic defeat for both countries;

G. whereas, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the humanitarian response for Syria is significantly underfunded, having secured less than 10 % of the USD 1.2 billion needed until March 2025;

D. whereas after assuming a leading role in overthrowing the regime, former HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa was designated caretaker President and launched a political transition process, entailing plans for a new constitution and the holding of elections in four to five years from now; whereas the caretaker president was tasked with forming a temporary legislative council, appointed a caretaker government and pledged to establish, by early March 2025, a new non-sectarian, comprehensive, credible and inclusive government reflecting Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity; whereas on 24 and 25 February 2025, the Syrian interim government held the announced National Dialogue Conference; whereas the Syrian constitution of 2012 was nullified and the People’s Assembly and the Baath Party dissolved; whereas many armed groups also formally agreed to dissolve and be integrated into the Syrian army;

H. whereas despite recent adjustments, the EU sanctions policies towards Syria hinder reconstruction efforts and exacerbate the suffering of millions of Syrians struggling to access basic services;

E. whereas the EU rightly refused to normalise its ties with the Assad regime right through to its demise and played a significant role as a major humanitarian donor to Syrian civilians and as host to 1,3 million refugees fleeing the conflicts; whereas since 2011, the EU and its Member States have mobilised more than EUR 33,3 billion in humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance focusing on life-saving aid, resilience programmes and the political implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015); whereas in December 2024 the EU launched a humanitarian air bridge to deliver emergency healthcare and other essential supplies; whereas in the aftermath of the fall of the Assad regime, some Member States announced a suspension of pending asylum applications by Syrians; whereas the EU has suspended sanctions on key economic sectors to facilitate engagement with Syria and its reconstruction;

I. whereas during the rebel offensive, Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) militias, aided by Turkish air strikes, attacked and seized control of parts of the Kurdish-dominated areas in northern Syria; whereas the continuation and intensification of attacks on Kurdish-dominated areas in northern Syria, including through improvised explosive devices, are killing civilians, including children, and causing a new displacement of over 25 000 people from Manbij and eastern Aleppo; whereas, according to Human Rights Watch, the Türkiye-SNA coalition may be responsible for war crimes in north-eastern Syria;

F. whereas the caretaker government authorities control most but not all of Syrian territory, with the overall security situation in Syria remaining fragmented and volatile; whereas violent events, including revenge killings, sectarian violence and criminal activities, are seen to be increasing, particularly in the coastal and rural areas; whereas pro-Assad armed groups and, allegedly, others have conducted coordinated attacks starting on 6 March 2025 in the Latakia, Tartus and Homs governorates, leading to deadly clashes with Syrian security forces; whereas in return, members of the Syrian security forces and the SNA, foreign fighters and jihadists reportedly participated in unjustifiable retaliations and executions targeting Alawite civilians on the basis of their ethno-religious affiliation; deplores also the confirmed killings of at least 10 Christians; whereas, despite the statement delivered by de facto President al-Sharaa, the fighting lasted several days and has so far caused over 1 000 casualties; whereas de facto President al-Shaara has announced the creation of a ‘fact-finding committee’ and of a ‘higher committee’;

J. whereas Türkiye has conducted large-scale military operations on Syrian territory, particularly targeting Kurdish-held areas, and occupies territories in northern Syria, both actions violating international law;

G. whereas north-eastern Syria is still currently administered by the self-proclaimed Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and controlled militarily by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); whereas on 10 March 2025 an agreement towards their integration within all institutions of the Syrian state was jointly signed by de facto President al-Sharaa and Commander in Chief of the SDF Mazloum Abdi; whereas since December 2024, the Turkish-backed SNA militias, some of which have not been included in the transitional government, and Türkiye itself, have intensified attacks and incursions within northern Syrian territory, including attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in the Manbij and Kobani areas, which may amount to war crimes;

K.H. whereas Israel has occupied a part of the Syrian territory in the Golan Heights since 1967; whereas following the overthrow of the Assad regime, Israel revoked the truce of 1974has andfurther seized the UN-patrolled demilitarised zone between Syria andbeyond the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights,Heights and on 17 December 2024 declared thatrepeatedly itcarried wouldout holdstrikes on to the territory indefinitelymilitary andtargets constructin settlements;Syria; whereas Israelthe continuesIsraeli toMinister conductof airDefence raidshas ondeclared Syriathat and‘the hasIDF declaredwill thatremain allat ofthe southernsummit Syriaof shouldMount beHermon aand demilitarisedthe security zone;zone indefinitely’;

L. whereas, as a result of the fall of the Assad regime, the regime’s main foreign supporters, Russia and Iran, have retreated from their military and naval bases and relocated their military assets and militias;I. whereas Russia seeks to retain its military bases in Syria, particularly the Tartus naval base and the Hmeimim military airfield; whereas theBashar interimal-Assad governmentand inhis Damascusfamily cancelledfled athe leasingcountry agreementand withhave thebeen Russiangranted companypolitical Stroytransgazasylum forin theRussia; civilianwhereas sectiondiplomatic ofcontact thehas portbeen ofmade Tartusbetween inRussia Januaryand 2025;the new Syrian authorities;

M. whereas the overall security situation in Syria is volatile and violent events, including revenge killings, sectarian violence and criminal activities, are increasing, particularly in the coastal and rural areas;

J. whereas the Assad regime supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recognised the occupied Luhansk and Donetsk regions in Ukraine, as well as the Abkhazia region in Georgia; whereas Ukraine’s military intelligence service systematically reported that Russia was training mercenaries recruited in Syria to support Russia’s war against Ukraine; whereas the ‘Grain from Ukraine’ initiative was deployed in Syria after the suspension of Russian food exports;

N. whereas EU Member States host over 1.3 million Syrian asylum seekers and refugees; whereas shortly after the ousting of President Assad, some Member States announced a suspension of pending asylum applications by Syrians;

K. whereas Daesh has caused tremendous suffering in Syria, triggered numerous terrorist attacks worldwide and continues to operate within and from Syria, relying on its centre for external operational planning in the Badia region; whereas approximately 10 000 Daesh fighters and 40 000 Daesh family members are currently being detained in the Al-Hol and Roj detention facilities, primarily guarded by the Kurdish-led SDF; whereas Syrian security forces may reportedly take over the management of the detention facilities following the agreement of 10 March 2025 made between de facto President al-Sharaa and SDF Commander in Chief Mazloum Abdi;

O. whereas the revocation of refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention requires fundamental and durable changes in the country of origin, which cannot currently be demonstrated in Syria; whereas the EU Qualification Directive and the new Qualification Regulation state that when deciding on cessation due to a change in circumstances, Member States ‘shall have regard to whether the change of circumstances is of such a significant and non-temporary nature that the refugee’s fear of being persecuted can no longer be regarded as well-founded’;

L. whereas Syria’s Christian population has steeply declined since 2011 due to its targeting by both the Assad regime, as well as by Daesh and other terrorist groups;

1. Welcomes the fall of the Assad regime, putting an end to over 50 years of brutal dictatorship, tyranny and war; recognises the pivotal role that HTS and other armed groups played in the overturn of Assad’s rule;

M. whereas the situation in Syria remains one of the world’s most acute humanitarian crises, with nine out of ten Syrians below the poverty line and almost 17 million people – 70 % of the population – requiring humanitarian assistance because of widespread food insecurity and a lack of basic infrastructure and public services;

2. Echoes the Syrian people’s celebration of the fall of the Assad regime’s long and brutal reign, salutes their long-standing peaceful opposition to the regime and expresses its solidarity with all its victims and their families; acknowledges that victims, survivors and the families of victims of serious violations of international law in Syria continue to require urgent support;

N. whereas, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the humanitarian response for Syria is significantly underfunded, having secured less than 10 % of the USD 1.2 billion needed until March 2025; whereas the executive order issued by US President Donald Trump’s administration, enacting a 90-day suspension of all foreign assistance programmes, including those administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has and will have an impact on the humanitarian programmes and non-governmental organisations that operate on the ground in Syria; whereas the UK and several EU Member States have also announced significant decreases in their global aid budgets;

3. Expresses the EU’s full commitment to supporting a Syrian-led political transition to unite and rebuild the country, in line with the core principles of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, and, to this end, engaging with Syrian civil society to support their demands, also when engaging with the de facto authorities;

O. whereas Syria finds itself in a tremendously dire economic situation, with soaring inflation in the country reaching a record high level of 40,2 % in 2024, electricity shortages and rising commodity prices; whereas the collapse of the Syrian economy was exacerbated by regime corruption, predatory economic policies and reliance on illicit activities, including the production and trafficking of Captagon; whereas a colossal reconstruction effort must be undertaken while navigating the shift to an open market economy, with exports having dramatically decreased compared to pre-war levels;

4. Reaffirms the fundamental role of Syrian civil society, particularly women-led initiatives, for a successful political transition and the future of Syria; calls on the Commission to strengthen Syrian civil society throughout all of its Syria programming and prioritise direct support to these organisations rather than channelling funds through international intermediaries;

P. whereas 5,5 million Syrian refugees live in the five countries neighbouring Syria, namely Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, with the EU providing financial assistance to help shoulder the associated costs; whereas approximately 500 000 internally displaced persons and 300 000 external refugees have returned to their areas of origin since the collapse of the Assad regime, with inadequate services, limited livelihoods and damaged infrastructure hindering their sustainable reintegration;

5. Welcomes interim president Al-Shaara’s acknowledgement of Syria’s religious, political and cultural diversity and his pledge to work towards uniting the country, while taking note that the interim authorities currently do not yet reflect this diversity;

1. Praises the bravery, dignity and resilience of the Syrian people, who finally succeeded in overthrowing the cruel Assad dictatorship; pays tribute to the countless victims of the regime; calls for the EU to seize this historic opportunity to support a Syrian-led political transition in order to unite and rebuild the country, and to assist Syria in implementing its reconstruction and achieving a just and inclusive political transition; remains concerned, however, by the high degree of instability, both in Syria and in the region; underlines that a stable and peaceful Syria is in the interests of the Middle East, the EU’s southern neighbourhood and the EU itself;

6. Supports the Commission and the Member States in continuing to use exchanges with the interim authorities in Damascus to stress that the caretaker government and security forces need to reflect the country’s political, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity and ensure women’s participation and representation;

2. Welcomes the fresh start in EU-Syria relations, manifested by the appointment of an EU Chargé d’affaires in Damascus, diplomatic engagement and high-level meetings undertaken by Member States and EU leaders, as well as the anticipated organisation of the Ninth Brussels Conference set to take place on 17 March 2025; encourages the EU and all its Member States to cooperate with Syria’s interim authorities in a transparent, coordinated and responsible manner, and to convey readiness to provide state-building assistance if and as needed; welcomes dialogue held alongside regional partners in the so-called ‘Aqaba’ format;

7. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to reiterate Parliament’s expectations that the interim government in Damascus uphold good governance, fundamental freedoms and human rights, without discrimination, including the freedom of movement, assembly and expression, refraining from arbitrary arrests or any other form of repression;

3. Strongly believes that stability in Syria will come from a pluralistic political transition that includes credible representatives of all components of Syrian society and of all geographical areas, that is to say all religious and ethnic communities, women, civil society and peaceful opposition forces; welcomes the caretaker president’s acknowledgement of Syria’s diversity while taking note that the composition of the current interim government is lacking in this regard; underlines the importance of the future government reflecting this plurality and for a future constitutional framework guaranteeing equal rights and access to opportunities for all Syrians, in line with democratic principles, the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms, including religious freedom, as upheld by international law, as well as clear and concrete evidence that these rights are respected in national and local decisions;

8. Calls on the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consistently speak out against any violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights in Syria by the interim government or other groups;

4. Acknowledges in this regard, the National Dialogue Conference that took place on 25 February 2025 as a starting point for establishing a culture of dialogue for all Syrians; expresses its concern about the exclusion of Kurdish political representatives, as well as the failure to ensure the participation of all segments of Syrian civil society, particularly women; recalls, further, that this dialogue ought to be upheld in order to prevent deepening societal divisions and discord within key segments of Syrian society and further destabilising an already fragile security situation; calls on the interim government to craft a roadmap setting out its plan for carrying out the political transition process and improve transparency in respect of Syrian citizens;

9. Notes with concern the fragile security situation across Syria, particularly in the coastal area, where revenge killings, kidnappings and sectarian incitement are on the rise; calls on the de facto authorities to rein in violent factions and protect people from violence and ensure their right to live in safety, possibly by involving local communities in providing security;

5. Notes with concern the violent past of factions that toppled the Assad regime and are now participating in government; takes good note of the caretaker President’s declarations of intent, while pledging to monitor the actions of national and local authorities when evaluating further engagement; expresses cautious optimism regarding the behaviour of the caretaker authorities regarding freedom of religion and encourages them to implement further confidence-building measures; calls on the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consistently speak out against any possible violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights in Syria by the interim government or other groups;

10. Calls on the de facto Syrian authorities to release all detainees who are not lawfully detained and ensure that every remaining detainee is rapidly brought before an independent judicial body that can assess the legality and necessity of their detention; calls, further, for them to allow independent monitors such as the International Committee for the Red Cross to access all detention centres to monitor conditions and detainee well-being; calls, further, for them to take urgent steps to provide people released from prison with health care, psychosocial support and rehabilitation, and facilitate swift reunions with their families;

6. Is deeply worried by the fragile security situation across Syria, particularly the coastal area, and firmly condemns the retaliatory targeting of the Alawite community based on its perceived association with the Assad regime; calls on the caretaker authorities to rein in all violent factions, including those set to be incorporated within the Syrian army and security forces, protect all civilian citizens from violence and ensure their right to live in safety; calls for prompt, transparent and impartial investigations into all killings and other violations and for those responsible to be held to account, in line with international legal norms and standards; urges the caretaker government to ensure that all military and security appointments are based strictly on professional qualifications, respect for international human rights and humanitarian law, and a commitment to combating terrorism; expresses concern regarding the presence of foreign extremist fighters, including European citizens, among the forces that overthrew the Assad regime, and cautions against integrating them permanently into the Syrian security apparatus; recognises the challenge for orderly state-building linked to the risk of insurgency by armed groups loyal to the former regime; encourages caretaker authorities to organise paramilitary and civilian disarmament;

11. Endorses the HTS-led rebel offensive’s destruction of the Assad regime’s captagon drug laboratories and the rebels’ efforts to stop drug trafficking, which has negatively affected the whole region for years;

7. Praises the invaluable contribution of civil society, in Syria and abroad, as the legitimate repository and defender of the aspirations of the Syrian people during years of brutal oppression; pays particular tribute to the White Helmets, target of a regime-orchestrated and Russia-backed smear campaign; calls for the EU to increase financial support, especially for Syrian civil society organisations as they adapt to shifting operating conditions, with a focus on promoting civic dialogue, notably between ethnic, cultural and religious communities, to foster pluralism, peaceful coexistence and trust within Syrian society;

12. Notes that all political and religious groups have expressed their wish to be part of the new Syria and have adopted constructive positions in this regard; firmly believes that the unification of all segments of Syria, including the integration of all armed factions within a national army, require a Syrian-led negotiated solution, including between the de facto authorities and the Kurdish-led authorities; calls for the EU and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to support negotiations to reach a peaceful and stable solution and ensure that the well-being and preservation of economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the gender equality of all Syrians, in particular those living in north-eastern Syria, remain at the centre of negotiations;

8. Stresses the importance of recognising the role of sexualised and gender-based violence in justice and accountability processes, as well as of policies to ensure women’s full participation and representation in political life, as well as their economic empowerment; calls, further, to address specifically the suffering inflicted on children;

13. Expresses its strong concern about the continuation of military aggression by the Türkiye-SNA alliance in north-eastern Syria, including deadly attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in the Manbij and Kobani areas, causing a new displacement and putting further strain on a peaceful transition; denounces Türkiye’s unlawful military incursions and occupation of parts of Syria; urges Türkiye to comply with international humanitarian law;

9. Is concerned by the exponential rise of disinformation originating both within Syria and from abroad; warns of the risk of instrumentalisation of communities also by foreign actors; stresses the need for a pluralistic media landscape to flourish and operate free of censorship and under a legally protected freedom of the press; calls for the EU and its Member States to provide funding and capacity-building in this regard;

14. Condemns Israel’s unlawful military air and ground invasion of southern Syria and its seizing of the demilitarised border zone along the occupied Golan Heights, violating the 1974 armistice agreement, undermining Syria’s sovereignty while further destabilising the region; urges Israel to cease its incursions and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law;

10. Strongly believes that the success of the Syrian political transition, notably the safeguarding of civil peace and the building of trust in state institutions, hinges on transitional justice and reconciliation as a path to fighting the impunity of all parties responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses; calls for judicial reform to be made an urgent political priority; encourages the caretaker Syrian Government to establish an independent transitional justice committee to ensure accountability for past human rights violations committed by all factions, emphasising that military unification cannot be achieved without a credible justice mechanism to build trust among armed groups, including representatives from the southern factions, the SDF and former regime officers;

15. Urges all foreign powers to respect Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; calls for an end to external interference in Syria by destabilising actors, including Russia, Iran, Türkiye and their proxies, as well as Israel; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all available diplomatic channels to advocate the stabilisation of Syria, which is in the interest of most countries in the region, and oppose and limit external interference;

11. Calls on caretaker authorities to fully cooperate with competent international instances, including UN mechanisms established specifically for investigating serious crimes in Syria, such as the UN International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and facilitate their on-site operations; encourages Syria to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and align national legislation accordingly, as well as give the ICC retroactive jurisdiction through a declaration; recognises the irreplaceable contribution of Fareed al-Madhhan (‘Caesar’) to documenting regime crimes, as well as the Syrian Network of Human Rights’ work in tracking disappearances; stresses the importance of these processes now being completed; calls for the EU to support the renewal of the mandate of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria and increase funding for all relevant mechanisms, notably in light of US disinvestment;

16. Commends the interim authorities for intercepting Iranian weapon shipments destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon;

12. Commends the steps taken to fight impunity through universal jurisdiction cases in Germany, France and other Member States, of individuals linked to the Assad regime and Daesh; encourages courts to continue such prosecutions and expects newfound evidence and fruitful cooperation with Syrian authorities to lead to leaps in investigations and convictions;

17. Highlights the security threat emanating from prisons, detention centres and refugee camps in north-eastern Syria, where people, including jihadist fighters and their families, notably children, are held arbitrarily without due process in extremely poor humanitarian conditions, also increasing the recruitment potential of Daesh; urgently calls on the Member States to continue repatriating their nationals from these facilities;

13. Stresses the need for Syria’s transitional authorities to urgently take all steps to secure and preserve physical evidence of serious international crimes across the country, including through cooperation and engagement with international experts and current international mechanisms, and to grant all competent organisations access to archival documents; encourages the EU to provide support for timely evidence collection on the ground, including forensic equipment and expertise to identify and analyse mass graves, as well as the collection of survivors’ testimonies;

18. Emphasises the importance of preserving the international coalition against Daesh and for it to cooperate with the Syrian interim government to prevent Daesh and other jihadist groups from reorganising;

14. Highlights that Syria is among the most heavily mine-contaminated countries; is alarmed by the rising number of victims, including children, who have been killed or injured by mines and other explosives, a problem that is further increasing as people start to return; commends efforts by international and local organisations in identifying, marking and clearing explosive ordnance, and calls for the EU to urgently support demining efforts jointly with specialised actors and Syrian authorities;

19. Is alarmed that hundreds of people, including children, have been killed or injured by mines and other explosives since the fall of the Assad regime; commends efforts by international and local organisations in identifying, marking and clearing explosive ordnance, as well as teaching people to stay safe; calls for the EU and the Member States to provide expertise, as well as financial and logistical support, to these initiatives;

15. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of the appalling use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians by the Assad regime; welcomes the announcement by Syria’s interim government to destroy any remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons in Syria and its openness to cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

20. Welcomes the announcement by Syria’s interim government to destroy any remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons in Syria and its openness to cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); calls for the EU and its Member States to aid efforts to identify, secure and destroy stocks of internationally prohibited weapons, such as chemical weapons, anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions;

16. Appreciates the determination demonstrated by caretaker authorities in discontinuing the production and trafficking of drugs, in particular Captagon, which have negatively affected the whole region for years; encourages international cooperation against the trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings;

21. Commends the Syrian interim government for holding the promised National Dialogue Conference as a first step towards a political process and future government; expresses its concern about the exclusion of political representatives of Kurds and other groups, as well as the conference’s failure to ensure the participation of all segments of Syrian civil society, particularly women; encourages the Syrian interim government to organise more inclusive and transparent follow-up National Dialogue Conferences, including on the local level, with binding conclusions on personal freedoms and women’s rights; calls on the interim government to craft a roadmap that sets out its plan and vision for a political process, including for the implementation of initiatives announced by the interim government, and improve its communication with the Syrian public;

17. Highlights the importance of protecting Syria’s cultural heritage and calls for international collaboration to restore historical sites and religious landmarks and to prevent the illicit trade in looted artefacts; urges the EU to support Syria in efforts to restore areas and places of cultural significance to the Syrian public and the world, including the UNESCO site of Palmyra after its revolting partial destruction by Daesh in 2015;

22. Calls on the caretaker government to work on immediate, genuine and profound reforms that ensure the participation of all Syrians, both within Syria and abroad, in designing the transitional phase and the transitional governing body in order to initiate an inclusive constitutional process that is transparent, participatory and formally includes diverse civil society actors, particularly women; highlights Syrian civil society’s demand for a pluralistic and decentralised democratic system, including a law on political parties, that respects the rights of all communities and ethnic, cultural and religious groups in Syria and breaks with the policies of repression and marginalisation;

18. Acknowledges that the Syrian economy is shattered, with considerable investment gaps towards achieving price stability and sustained job creation; calls for all necessary steps to be taken in order to incentivise and facilitate foreign direct investment in accordance with international standards, as well as for reforms addressing housing, land and property rights and policies balancing development across urban and rural areas to reduce regional disparities; encourages economic disentanglement from Russia and Iran after both countries have profited from Syria’s economic collapse to extract resources and control strategic industries;

23. Calls on the Commission to prioritise financial support for Syrian civil society, particularly women’s initiatives, enabling Syrians to embrace their fundamental role in the country’s political transition and future;

19. Welcomes the gradual and conditional suspension of sanctions on a range of economic sectors and the indefinite extension of humanitarian exemptions; underlines that despite recent adjustments, the EU, US and UK sanctions policies towards Syria are an obstacle to reconstruction efforts; calls on the Commission and the Council to reach out to other countries imposing sanctions on Syria, notably the US and the UK; supports a full yet reversible lifting of all sectoral sanctions, with a focus on the financial sector, so as to provide the Syrian economy a much-needed lifeline, while closely monitoring the political transition process; expects over-compliance to remain an issue as long as extensive US and UK sanctions remain in place, notably due to the former’s extraterritorial dimension; calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide European businesses and banks with legal assurances to counteract over-compliance; calls, nevertheless, for individual sanctions against military personnel, officials, business entities and individuals associated with the Assad family to be maintained; expects the yearly update of the EU sanction regime ahead of its expiration on 1 June 2025 to adequately assess the relevance of all renewed sanctions, allowing for much-needed clarity, and asks the European Council to define and clearly communicate clear steps that Syria’s authorities must carry out, to secure further sanctions easing or prevent the activation of a snapback;

24. Calls on the Commission to support independent journalists and provide funding and capacity-building for Syrian journalists and media outlets across the country; recognises the importance of reliable information and the fight against disinformation for Syria’s transition;

20. Welcomes the announcement by the Commission to allocate EUR 235 million in new humanitarian support to Syrians and calls for the EU and its Member States to sustain humanitarian and development aid efforts and to maintain financial support for neighbouring countries hosting Syrian refugees; invites the EU to explore pathways to use frozen assets of the Assad regime for a trust fund for Syrian reconstruction, rehabilitation and compensation of victims; is extremely concerned by the suspension of all USAID funding related to Syria or Syrian refugees and by the foreseen non-participation of the US in the next Brussels conference;

25. Urges Syria’s transitional authorities to immediately take all steps needed to secure and preserve all evidence of serious international crimes across the country in order to give families answers about the fate and whereabouts of their loved ones and provide the crucial bases for accountability and legal processes;

21. Calls for the EU to strategically extend its focus from humanitarian aid to accelerated and early economic recovery and reconstruction in key sectors such as energy, water supply, healthcare and education, in order to reach tangible results while ensuring that programming is accompanied by due diligence and independent monitoring; urges the European Union and its Members States to agree on the joint provision of sustainable funding at the forthcoming Ninth Brussels Conference;

26. Calls on the Syrian interim government to support all international and local documentation and investigation efforts and, to this end, invite and fully cooperate with the International Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria and the Independent Institution on Missing Persons, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the OPCW, as well as civil society initiatives documenting and investigating crimes and violations, granting all of them full access to the country and the relevant facilities;

22. Welcomes the decision taken, for example, by France to allow refugees to return to Syria and participate in its reconstruction without jeopardising their status, including for ‘go-and-see’ visits to Syria; calls on the Member States and third countries to urgently replicate this initiative; calls on the Commission to encourage and provide the Member States with guidance and best practice on the implementation of EU law on this issue, including as regards the difference between ‘travel’ and ‘re-establishment’; insists that all asylum status claims and renewals must be assessed individually and thoroughly; stresses the importance of balanced participation in the political transition process of the Syrian diaspora as a key asset for the country’s transition and reconstruction; recognises the importance of remittances alongside official development assistance and urges the Member States to lift any restrictions placed on sending remittances to Syria; recalls, moreover, that according to the UN Refugee Convention, conditions for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees can only be met following fundamental and durable changes in Syria;

27. Calls for the EU to offer help and expertise in the preservation of evidence and documenting crimes, including financial assistance, technical expertise and capacity-building programmes for Syrians, building on previous experience in the Western Balkans, Colombia and the Central African Republic, in line with the EU’s policy framework on support to transitional justice;

23. Recalls the presence of over 400 000 Palestinian refugees residing in Syria, some of them displaced multiple times, and the role of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in assisting its needs; remembers the siege of the Yarmouk camp by Assadist factions between 2013 and 2015;

28. Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase financial support for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisation (CSOs) engaged in securing and preserving evidence, documentation, the search for missing persons, forensic analysis and capacity building; recognises the negative impact of the freeze of US aid funding on those efforts; urges the EU and its Member States to agree on the joint provision of sustainable funding at the Brussels Conference on Syria on 17 March 2025;

24. Calls on Syria to break free from its notorious long-standing alliances with Tehran and Moscow, which have brought suffering to the Syrian people and destabilisation to the Middle East and beyond; calls, further, on the caretaker Syrian authorities to bring the Russian military presence in Syria to an end; condemns Russia for hosting Bashar al-Assad and his family and shielding them from justice, after having obstructed justice by actively interfering in international investigations and vetoing UN Security Council resolutions aimed at addressing the regime’s war crimes and their own;

29. Calls for the EU to support the renewal of the mandate of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria at the ongoing UN Human Rights Council and increase funding for the IIIM and other current justice initiatives on Syria;

25. Calls on neighbouring countries to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and to immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law;

30. Urges the interim government of Syria to engage in national transitional justice efforts that recognise and address all human rights violations and abuses, regardless of the perpetrator, focus on redress for victims and society, and guarantee the non-recurrence of those human rights violations and abuses; highlights the importance of a victim-based approach and the inclusion of Syrian women’s experiences and perspectives;

26. Firmly believes that the unification of all segments of Syria, including the integration of all armed factions within a national army, require a Syrian-led political solution; calls for the EU and the Member States to use all diplomatic channels to advocate the stabilisation of Syria, which is in the interest of most countries in the region, and support discussions towards a peaceful and stable solution and ensure that the well-being and preservation of fundamental freedoms, economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the gender equality of all Syrians, notably those living in north-eastern Syria, remain at the centre of decisions; welcomes, in this regard, the agreement of 10 March 2025 between de facto President al-Sharaa and SDF Commander in Chief Mazloum Abdi and hopes for its smooth implementation; takes note of the positive result of recent negotiations between Kurdish armed groups in Türkiye and the Turkish Government towards disarmament;

31. Urges the interim government of Syria to closely consult with civil society on transitional justice mechanisms and allow all segments of Syrian society to shape and actively participate in the national transitional justice process; recognises that the expertise and local knowledge of NGOs and Syrian-led CSOs are essential for successful transitional justice efforts; regrets the fact that a conference on transitional justice set for 27 February 2025, organised by Syrian civil society, had to be cancelled at the last minute;

27. Insists that different ethnic and religious groups must be protected in order to create a peaceful Syria; therefore calls for the European Union and the Member States to support the implementation process of the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF, in order to guarantee the Kurdish community full recognition and political participation in Syria;

32. Calls for the EU to make support for transitional justice a priority in its engagement with Syria and offer legal, financial and psychological support to survivors of detention, sexualised and gender-based violence, and torture, while training Syrians to lead these healing processes autonomously;

28. Stresses the importance of the fight led by the international coalition against Daesh, with the invaluable support of Kurdish fighters, and calls for it to cooperate with the Syrian interim government to prevent Daesh and other jihadist groups from reorganising; expresses deep concerns as attacks led or supported by Türkiye in north-eastern Syria not only cause civilian casualties and increase the number of internally displaced persons, but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; urges the caretaker authorities to demonstrate clear commitment to the fight against terrorism and to cooperate with international partners both to fight remaining active cells in Syria and to investigate past crimes, notably against the Yazidi community;

33. Encourages the Commission to function as a bridge-builder between Syrian civil society outside and inside Syria and create forums for exchanges on their perception and demands for transitional justice; calls, further, on the Commission to strengthen the coordination between Syrian-led CSOs, international bodies and relevant Syrian stakeholders, in order to ensure that Syrian-led CSOs are directly integrated into transitional justice processes; recommends the establishment of knowledge exchange programmes bringing Syrian activists, legal experts and civil society leaders into dialogue with their European counterparts;

29. Urgently calls for a lasting solution to be found among all the parties concerned as these camps continue to be breeding grounds for radicalisation and constitute a dormant threat to both Syrian and European security; warns against the serious international security risk a sudden disengagement of the United States in the region would cause in this uncertain context; reiterates its call on the Member States to repatriate all their nationals, especially children, from Al-Hol and Roj and to bring adults to justice in fair trials;

34. Encourages the Syrian transition government to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), give the court retroactive jurisdiction through a declaration and align national Syrian legislation with the ICC treaty and international law;

30. Calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cease all activities aimed at torpedoing the Syrian caretaker government’s political and economic efforts and forcedly altering the status quo; commends the interim authorities for intercepting Iranian weapon shipments destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon and welcomes the complete collapse of Iran’s extensive infrastructure and networks in Syria;

35. Encourages the EU, its Member States and their courts to continue prosecuting people suspected of serious crimes in Syria through universal jurisdiction cases;

31. Welcomes de facto President al-Sharaa’s pledge to seek peaceful relations with all of Syria’s neighbours; calls on the caretaker Syrian authorities to ensure this commitment is turned into concrete action to prevent and refrain from taking any security-threatening measures against neighbouring countries and beyond;

36. Welcomes the European Council’s decision of 24 February 2025 to suspend EU restrictive measures on key economic sectors and to indefinitely extend the exemption of humanitarian aid from sanctions as a positive step towards alleviating the suffering of millions of Syrians and enabling recovery; calls on the European Council to implement this decision swiftly and ensure that as part of its gradual approach, all other sanctions that negatively impact on humanitarian operations, the economic and social rights of Syrians and their access to basic services, or impact on Syrian financial institutions, are lifted, including all restrictions on the sale of petroleum, the repair of electricity networks and financial transactions from and to Syria; calls on the Member States to put Syrians’ well-being at the top of all sanction-related decisions;

32. Condemns those European politicians, including current and former MEPs, who have repeatedly spread pro-Assad narratives and actively engaged in whitewashing the bloody dictatorship; expresses deep concern regarding the recent invitation by Parliament’s Intergroup on Christians in the Middle East of organisations closely linked to EU-sanctioned Assadists;

37. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to remove all sanctions that isolate the Syrian Central Bank and financial sector and provide European businesses and banks with legal assurances to counteract over-compliance;

33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the caretaker Syrian government, and to have it translated and published in Arabic.

38. Takes note of the reversibility of EU sanction relief and asks the European Council to define and clearly communicate clear benchmarks that Syria’s authorities must meet and to secure further sanctions to ease or prevent the activation of a snapback;

39. Agrees with the European Council to maintain restrictive measures against people and entities who are responsible for widespread and systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Syria, in particular the Assad regime and its affiliates, as well as HTS leaders;

40. Calls on the European Council to formulate clear delisting criteria for individuals subject to sanctions, who could assist accountability efforts against the Assad regime’s human rights violations;

41. Encourages the European Council to explore pathways to use frozen assets of the Assad regime for a trust fund for Syrian reconstruction and the rehabilitation and compensation of victims;

42. Calls on the Commission and Council to reach out to other countries imposing sanctions on Syria, in particular the US and the UK, to plead for their alignment with EU sanction relief;

43. Notes that the EU sanctions expire on 1 June 2025; highlights the importance of clarifying the above-mentioned issues before that date and outlining, as soon as possible, a list of individual sanctions that must remain in place for the time being;

44. Express deep concerns over the dire humanitarian and economic conditions faced by Syrians as a consequence of the reign of the Assad regime, war and the obstruction of humanitarian aid; welcomes the interim government’s removal of all barriers to cross-border and cross-line aid access in Syria and calls for the international community and the EU to seize the opportunity to increase humanitarian and development aid; welcomes recent reports by the UN about increased aid delivery to north-western Syria, despite ongoing hostilities;

45. Welcomes the announcement by the Commission to provide EUR 235 million in new humanitarian support to Syrians; encourages the Commission and the Member States to closely work with UN institutions and local humanitarian groups to address the dire humanitarian situation in Syria holistically;

46. Firmly believes that while humanitarian aid is crucial, reconstruction and economic development are key for Syria’s transition and stabilisation; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to support reconstruction efforts in Syria, focusing on sectors that can improve the economic and social rights of Syrians, including transport, electricity, health and education; recommends that the Commission and the Member States focus on bottom-up initiatives supporting local businesses and civil society rather than funnelling money through centralised institutions and, to this end, ensure that funding schemes are adapted to the local context, avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles that could exclude small local actors;

47. Acknowledges that Syrians, especially those most affected by the war, must lead the reconstruction, ensuring that their resilience and knowledge shape the recovery; highlights the importance of mainstreaming gender equality as an objective across reconstruction efforts, including land and property rights for women; expresses the view that all programming needs to be accompanied by due diligence, address housing, land and property rights in Syria and be supervised through independent monitoring;

48. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the relevant countries in the region, to ensure that entities or individuals who are sanctioned by the EU for their responsibility for breaches of international law and violation of human rights are excluded from the reconstruction of Syria and are not awarded any tenders;

49. Welcomes the timely organisation of the 9th Brussels Conference on Syria in March 2025 and urges the Commission to prioritise the inclusion and participation of Syrian CSOs, particularly women’s organisations, in this dialogue to ensure that the EU’s approach supports the Syrian people’s aspirations and protection of their rights;

50. Recognises the importance of the Syrian diaspora in the EU for the economic development and reconstruction of Syria; recognises the importance of remittances alongside official development assistance and urges all Member States to lift any restrictions on sending remittances to Syria;

51. Calls on the Commission to provide Syrian civil society, especially women-led groups, with sustainable, flexible and long-term funding, including small grants and cash assistance, in contexts with financial restrictions; highlights the importance of closely consulting with Syrian civil society in designing and implementing EU funding for Syria and ensuring that schemes are easily accessible to local initiatives;

52. Reaffirms that the fragile and evolving political and security situation of the country does not warrant deeming Syria, or parts of it, a safe country of origin for the return of Syrian nationals living as refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and around the world; reiterates the EU’s position that any return needs to be truly voluntary, safe and dignified, and underpinned by refugees being given all the knowledge they need to make informed decisions about their futures, in full accordance with international law and the principles set out by the UNHCR;

53. Calls on the Member States to reverse any decision that suspends asylum applications by Syrians and guarantee a full, individual and merit-based assessment of each asylum claim in a fair and transparent procedure; urges Member States that suspend decision-making on asylum claims to limit this suspension to a short and clearly defined period of time;

54. Stresses that any change in the protection status of Syrian refugees should be made only after a thorough assessment and securing of evidence that the political and security situation has changed in a fundamental and durable way, as required by the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Qualification Directive, and offers safety and stability, as well as human rights guarantees; emphasises that the withdrawal of international protection from individuals must follow the procedure set out in the Asylum Procedures Directive; encourages the Member States to assess alternative grounds for granting residence permits to Syrians, including naturalisation, family reunification, long-term residence or humanitarian grounds; reiterates that no asylum seeker may be forcibly returned, as this would violate countries’ non-refoulement obligation;

55. Calls on the Member States and non-EU countries, including Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan, to allow, as a matter of urgency, Syrian refugees and asylum seekers residing in their countries to choose to temporarily travel to Syria without losing their protection status; calls on the Commission to encourage and provide the Member States with guidance and best practice on the implementation of EU law on this issue, including as regards the difference between ‘travel’ and ‘re-establishment’;

56. Calls on the Commission to maintain financial support for countries in the region hosting Syrian refugees, in particular Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan;

57. Calls on Syria’s neighbours Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan to adhere to international law and refrain from returning Syrian refugees and asylum seekers until these returns can be voluntary, safe and under dignified conditions;

58. Recalls the plight of the more than 400 000 Palestinian refugees in Syria who depend primarily on the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for their basic needs; commends UNRWA for its essential work in the region and calls on the Commission to continue its full political and financial support for the agency;

59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the interim government of Syria, and to have it translated and published in Arabic.