What changed

B100071/2025

B100064/2025

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Venezuela, in particular that of 19 September 2024 on the situation in Venezuela,

– having regard to the statement of 10 January 2025 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the European Union on the events of 10 January 2025 in Venezuela,

– having regard to the statement of 15 January 2025 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service on recent decisions by the Venezuelan authorities,

– having regard to the statement of 10 January 2025 by the G7 Foreign Ministers on Venezuela,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to other UN human rights treaties and instruments,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

– having regard to the Venezuelan Constitution,

– having regard to the Carter Center statement of 30 July 2024 on the Venezuela election and its statement of 2 October 2024 legitimising the tally sheets presented by the democratic opposition,

– having regard to the detailed findings of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela of 14 October 2024,

– having regard to the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of 27 December 2024 on human rights violations following the elections in Venezuela,

– having regard to the finalstatement reportof 10 January 2025 by the High Representative of the EUUnion electionfor observationForeign missionAffairs toand VenezuelaSecurity Policy on behalf of the regionalEuropean andUnion municipalon electionsthe events of 2110 NovemberJanuary 2021,2025,

– having regard to the Partialstatement Agreementof on15 theJanuary Promotion2025 ofby Politicalthe RightsSpokesperson andfor ElectoralForeign GuaranteesAffairs forand All,Security mostPolicy commonlyon knownrecent asdecisions by the BarbadosVenezuelan Agreement,authorities,

– having regard to the Partial Agreement on the Promotion of Political Rights and Electoral Guarantees for All, signed by Nicolás Maduro’s regime and the Venezuelan opposition alliance, the Unitary Platform, in October 2023 (the Barbados Agreement),

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the presidential election of July 2024 lacked basic transparency and integrity guarantees and cannot be considered democratic;

A. whereas on 28 July 2024, the Venezuelan people voted peacefully and in high numbers to determine the future of their country, demonstrating outstanding civic and democratic behaviour; whereas after voting closed, the regime-controlled National Electoral Council refused to publish the official record of tally sheets and falsified the results of the election, announcing the false victory of Maduro; whereas the only publicly available electoral records show that the winner of the election was Edmundo González Urrutia, with 67.05 % of votes cast, corroborated by the only credible and impartial international observers, the UN mission and the Carter Center;

B. whereas official data was neither published nor made accessible to international independent bodies; whereas based on the ‘actas’ published by the democratic opposition, Edmundo González Urrutia claims to have received the highest number of votes in the election;

B. whereas in the aftermath of the election, peaceful protests took place across the country to contest the fraudulent display by the Maduro regime; whereas these protests were met with extreme violence and repression, resulting in over 23 deaths and over 2 500 arrests and enforced disappearances, including of approximately 120 children; whereas Venezuelan non-governmental organisations have reported that, as of 1 January 2025, there are more than 1 697 political prisoners in the country;

C. whereas in recent months, tensions have been rising and violence has escalated dramatically in relation to protests and criticism on social media, with large-scale detentions and brutal repression by Nicolás Maduro’s government;

C. whereas the democratic opposition to the regime faced ongoing persecution even before the elections of 28 July 2024, but this harassment has escalated significantly since then, in particular through enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests; whereas María Corina Machado, the leader of the democratic opposition to the regime, has been forced to live clandestinely due to threats against her life, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia was forced to flee the country with his family due to serious threats;

D. whereas Maduro’s government has continually harassed, persecuted and censored activists, journalists and civil society organisations in the midst of a complex humanitarian emergency and a profound human rights crisis that is pushing an unprecedented number of people to flee in search of safety and protection, being the cause of one of the largest displacement crises in the world;

D. whereas on 19 September 2024, Parliament recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela and María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela; whereas other democratic states, namely the United States, Italy, Argentina, Panama, Uruguay, Paraguay, Ecuador, Canada, Peru, Costa Rica, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, among others, have recognised González as the president-elect; whereas he should have been sworn in on 10 January 2025; whereas on 17 December 2024, Parliament awarded the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy;

E. whereas since 2013, Maduro’s government has seen Venezuela’s gross domestic product drop by 80 %, prompting more than 7 million of the country’s 30 million citizens to migrate;

E. whereas, days before the inauguration of President-elect Edmundo González, the regime kidnapped his son-in-law Rafael Tudares and his status is unknown; whereas, in the same way, the regime harassed María Corina Machado’s mother in her own house; whereas many other politicians and staff of the democratic opposition to the regime have also faced persecution, arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearance, including presidential candidate Enrique Márquez;

F. whereas the 2018 elections also lacked basic guarantees of transparency and integrity;

F. whereas on 9 January 2025, the Venezuelan people, led by María Corina Machado, protested in the streets against Nicolás Maduro’s latest attempt to illegitimately seize power; whereas María Corina Machado was abducted by the regime forces while attempting to leave the protest and was later released, in a blatant act of indiscriminate intimidation and harassment that received widespread international condemnation;

G. whereas it is imperative to resolve the current situation and find a negotiated way forward; whereas any solution to this deep and multifaceted conflict must be found within the framework of the rule of law, be in accordance with international standards and fully respect democracy and human rights;

G. whereas on 10 January 2025, dictator Nicolás Maduro illegitimately took power in a fraudulent act; whereas the ceremony was attended by the dictators of Cuba and Nicaragua and not by any democratically elected head of state; whereas the borders of the country were closed and the airspace was heavily guarded, which prevented President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia from travelling to Venezuela;

H. whereas the rights to peaceful protest and freedom of expression are fundamental human rights;

H. whereas since the fraudulent and illegitimate seizure of power, the Maduro regime has ordered the diplomatic presence of some Member States to be considerably reduced, in an arbitrary and unjustified manner, which the regime justifies by ‘the hostile behaviour of the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, France, and Italy, characterised by their support for extremist groups and their interference in internal affairs’;

I. whereas Edmundo González Urrutia and María Corina Machado received the Sakharov Prize in December 2024;

1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the usurpation of the presidency by Nicolás Maduro and highlights that his regime is illegitimate and constitutes an unlawful attempt to remain in power by force;

J. whereas the Council has decided to adopt a new package of targeted sanctions against 15 individuals responsible for undermining democracy, the rule of law or human rights in Venezuela;

2. Recalls that on the basis of the electoral records submitted by the democratic opposition to the regime and as stated by the independent international organisations present at the elections on 28 July 2024, such as the United Nations mission and the Carter Center, the European Parliament recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate winner of the presidential elections, a victory acknowledged by the EU and its Member States;

1. Strongly rejects the legitimacy of the results of the 28 July 2024 election due to the lack of transparency and minimum guarantees during the electoral process and the data aggregation, and strongly rejects Nicolás Maduro’s takeover of the office of President of Venezuela on 10 January 2025;

3. Coincides with the view of the Member States that the Venezuelan regime has missed a key opportunity to respect the will of the people and ensure a transparent democratic transition in the country and that it therefore lacks any democratic legitimacy and should not be recognised;

2. Calls on the Venezuelan electoral authorities to publish all voting records from the presidential elections of 28 July 2024, following their due verification by an independent entity, without further delay; calls on the Venezuelan authorities to respect the election results and the will of the Venezuelan people;

4. Welcomes the statement of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU recognising the victory of Edmundo González Urrutia by a significant majority; considers that he should have taken the presidential oath on 10 January 2025;

3. Stresses the importance of the self-determination of the Venezuelan people and the importance of a genuine expression of their democratic will;

5. Welcomes the recent Council decision of 10 January 2025 to extend the targeted sanctions to 15 additional individuals; calls for these sanctions to be strengthened and expanded to include Nicolás Maduro, his inner circle and their families, including Jorge Rodríguez and Vladimir Padrino López, and all those responsible for violations of human rights, the illegitimate assertion of authority, the usurpation of official functions and all repressive acts in Venezuela;

4. Urges the Venezuelan authorities to ensure full respect for human rights, including the rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression; calls on the Venezuelan authorities to end the political persecution, repression and harassment of the opposition and of civil society;

6. Fully supports the work of the UN’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela that reported the murders, harassment and violations that have been perpetrated against the democratic opposition and the Venezuelan people by the Maduro regime;

5. Demands the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons, including those with dual and foreign citizenship, and demands that their physical and psychological safety be guaranteed, that they be granted access to appropriate healthcare and medicines and to the lawyers of their choice, that they be allowed family visits without undue restrictions, that compensation be paid to them and their families, and that their full civil and political rights be restored; demands the immediate release of non-governmental organisation activist Alberto Trentini, who has been detained since 15 November 2024;

7. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the recent arrests of the democratic opposition to the regime ahead of the presidential inauguration, in particular the abduction and subsequent release of María Corina Machado, by the regime’s security forces, as a deliberate attempt to instil fear; further condemns the persecution perpetrated by the regime against the Venezuelan people, as well as many EU citizens that have been arbitrarily detained and remain unjustly in prison; calls for an end to the systematic pattern of human rights violations; demands the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons; demands that the Maduro regime cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition;

6. Calls on the Venezuelan authorities to respect international law and the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations and on Consular Relations; calls for the physical integrity and right to seek asylum of the five opposition members currently in the Argentinian Embassy to be guaranteed, and for them to be granted safe conduct under the 1954 Caracas Convention on Diplomatic Asylum; calls on the authorities to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross and/or the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to enter the embassy;

8. Calls on the ICC prosecutor to issue an international arrest warrant against Nicolás Maduro and other high-ranking officials of the regime that are suspected of committing crimes against humanity; calls for the EU and its Member States to adhere to this call;

7. Urges the authorities to restore constitutional order and rebuild the separation of powers; calls on the military and security forces to strictly abide by their mandate, so that the military is able to play a constructive role in line with its constitutional duty;

9. Urges the EU, its Member States and all democratic regional and international actors to unconditionally align, as a moral duty, with the democratic forces of Venezuela and to do their utmost to restore democracy in the country in order to show solidarity with and respect for the Venezuelan people and their legitimate will and right to live in freedom and peace in a democratic system;

8. Urges all sides to immediately enter into an inclusive and credible national dialogue aimed at finding a long-term and lasting solution to the Venezuelan crisis;

10. Draws attention to the fact that the illegitimate seizure of power by Maduro has exacerbated an already pre-existing dire humanitarian crisis, which had previously driven over 8 million Venezuelans to seek refuge abroad, and will likely force even more to flee, causing renewed and increasing migratory pressure that will be felt most acutely in the countries that directly neighbour it;

9. Supports all the efforts being made by the international community to find a peaceful, inclusive and democratic solution to the enduring Venezuelan crisis; underlines and welcomes the role that the governments of Brazil, Colombia and Mexico are playing in this regard;

11. Believes that in the disjunction between democracy and dictatorship, there is no room for ambiguity or middle ground, as one is either on the side of the democrats and those that suffer from repression, or on the side of the dictators;

10. Recognises the importance of the regional dimension in finding a solution that supports the Venezuelan people and allows the recovery of their economic and social prospects;

12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States summit participants, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, the Organization of American States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the authorities of the Venezuelan regime.

11. Welcomes the OHCHR’s return to Caracas; urges Venezuela to engage constructively and effectively with the OHCHR, the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, the International Criminal Court and relevant regional mechanisms;

12. Calls for the EU to work with its international partners to ensure that the will of the Venezuelan people, as expressed at the ballot box, is respected and to guarantee respect for democracy and the rule of law;

13. Calls for the EU and its Member States to provide logistical and financial support to human rights defenders and civil society to help address the current humanitarian and socio-economic crisis, including by issuing visas to at-risk human rights defenders;

14. Fully supports the International Criminal Court’s investigations into the Venezuelan government and calls for the EU to continue supporting the investigations into alleged crimes against humanity;

15. Recalls that the situation of Venezuelan refugees and migrants demands long-term solutions; recognises the numerous efforts by neighbouring countries to provide not only food and housing, but also regular legal documentation, schooling and medical support, and invites EU actors to do the same with respect to all Venezuelan refugees and migrants; calls on the EU to expand access to asylum, legal pathways and other forms of international protection for Venezuelans leaving their country, in line with international standards;

16. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to consider, in due time, renewing the targeted sanctions imposed through the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on all those responsible for repression and human rights violations in Venezuela; calls for the implementation of the EU targeted sanctions to be monitored closely to ensure that the EU has not adopted any measures that could harm Venezuela’s people or economy;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Venezuelan authorities.