What changed

B100166/2024

B100160/2024

European Parliament resolution on EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2874 of 18 December 2023 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to Council Regulation 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024 amending Regulationthe (EU)European NoCouncil 833/2014conclusions concerningimposing restrictive measures in viewon ofRussia Russia’sin actionsresponse destabilisingto theits situationaggression inagainst Ukraine,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1744 of 24 June 2024 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine,

– having regard to the EU’s sanctions regimes under the common foreign and security policy, and to the guidelines for their implementation,

– having regard to the G7 Leaders’ Statement of 6 December 2023,

– having regard to reports on the effectiveness of sanctions regimes and the unintended role of EU entities in sustaining ‘shadow fleet’ activities,

– having regard to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (‘the Civil Liability Convention’ – CLS) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO),

– having regard to the 1857 Copenhagen Convention governing navigation through the Danish Straits,

– having regard to the conclusions of the 110th session of the IMO Legal Committee of 27-31 March 2023, entitled ‘Addressing ship-to-ship oil transfers and tankers in the “dark fleet“’,

– having regard to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, particularly the provisions thereof on the protection and preservation of the marine environment,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia, in particular that of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Russia launched its illegal and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine in 2014, and 10 years later, the Kremlin’s war aims remain unchanged; whereas this has led to a rapidly deteriorating security environment throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, largely financed by Russia’s energy sector, which, in order to evade sanctions, relies heavily on a large-scale network of tankers, considered a ‘shadow fleet’, which has the sole purpose of providing financing to continue Russia’s war of aggression;

A. whereas Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has severe humanitarian, economic and environmental consequences across the region;

B. whereas sincethe FebruaryEU, 2022together with the EUPrice Cap Coalition, has adoptedimposed 14sanctions packagesagainst ofRussia sanctionstargeting aimedkey atsectors underminingand Russia’sindividuals, abilityincluding toa wageban itson illegalthe warimport of aggression,crude havingoil recently,and togetherprice withcaps theon G7+Russian Pricefossil Capfuels, Coalition,with introducedthe priceintention capsof onweakening seaborneRussia’s crudeability oil,to petroleumfund oilsits andmilitary oilsaggression; obtainedwhereas fromthe bituminoussuccess mineralsof whichthese originatesanctions inhinges oron aretheir exportedstrict fromand Russia;full implementation;

C. whereas since the imposition of the price caps, Russia has heavily invested in building up its shadow fleet, which consists of vessels that are not ostensibly owned, managed or insured by an entity subject to the sanctions imposed by the G7+ Price Gap Coalition and are thus exempted from the price cap;

C. whereas in response to the sanctions, Russia has developed a ‘shadow fleet’ of obscure and mostly decrepit vessels to facilitate trade and evade sanctions, particularly in the oil sector;

D. whereas this tactic has already been used by hostile countries such as Iran, Venezuela and North Korea; whereas, however, the scale and sophistication of Russia’s operations set it apart as Russia’s shadow fleet is estimated to operate around 160-200 tankers monthly to transport oil, with an estimated total fleet of 600 vessels that play a key role in sustaining Russian crude exports;

D. whereas the 14 sanctions packages that the EU has put in place against Russia since the beginning of the war of aggression against Ukraine have limited Russia’s ability to wage war but have not managed to stop the war;

E. whereas some owners and managers of the shadow fleet tankers and gas carriers are also registered in the Member States, most notably Greece and Cyprus;

E. whereas the ‘shadow fleet’ frequently circumvents the sanctions by sailing under flags of convenience from countries with little to no control over the ship’s security standards, without adhering to international safety or environmental standards; whereas this creates a backdoor route for Russian oil and undermines the impact of EU sanctions;

F. whereas despite the fact that the sanctions reduced Russian tax revenue from oil by approximately 30 % in 2023, Russia continues to finance its war effort by evading sanctions through a combination of tactics, such as manipulating documents and certifications that obscure the origin of its oil and the ownership of its vessels, establishing shell companies to launder the proceeds of energy sales, engaging in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in international waters to deny the oil’s true origin and operating in maritime zones known for lax regulatory enforcement;

F. whereas the ‘shadow fleet’ is often comprised of old, structurally unsound vessels, posing substantial risks to marine ecosystems, with the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas being particularly vulnerable to oil spills, pollution and other maritime incidents; whereas recent reports suggest that this fleet has grown by 70 % over the last year and is estimated to have more than 600 vessels;

G. whereas despite sanctions, approximately EUR 80 billion worth of crude oil is being transported in older tankers largely deemed unseaworthy due to poor maintenance, unclear ownership, the evasion of obligatory Automatic Identification System (AIS) navigation and a severe lack of insurance; whereas these tankers operate in and near European waters, risking oil spills and accidents and presenting major ecological and safety risks that, in the event of an oil spill or similar environmental disaster, would require an emergency response from a Member State, for which Russia could evade responsibility and accountability;

G. whereas the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas are highly sensitive marine environments, with the former being a nearly enclosed sea that is prone to slow water renewal and the latter experiencing significant pressure from pollution, overfishing, oil and gas drilling, biodiversity loss and climate change, making these regions especially susceptible to environmental damage from increased ‘shadow fleet’ activity; whereas the legal possibilities of attributing liability or obtaining compensation in the event of an incident are limited due to the vessels’ unclear ownership and invalid or fake insurance, leaving the cost of attempting to remedy a potential spill for the affected Member States and the EU;

H. whereas Russia’s shadow fleet relies heavily on the complicity and collaboration of several countries to bypass sanctions, especially China, India, Türkiye, Panama, Liberia, Gabon and the Marshall Islands;

H. whereas the EU’s sanctions on Russian oil and gas exports have had significant impacts on energy prices and inflation within the EU, contributing to rising costs for consumers and industries and reshaping the EU’s energy policy and supply chains; whereas the recent surge in energy prices has been exacerbated by financial market speculation;

I. whereas EU restrictive measures, being an essential tool of the EU’s common foreign and security policy against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are not directed at EU-flagged vessels; whereas the Russian shadow fleet represents a critical component of Russia’s broader hybrid warfare strategy against the Member States, while aiding its illegal war of aggression and simultaneously undermining European solidarity politically, financially, operationally and logistically;

I. whereas the EU’s sanctions policy has faced criticism for applying a double standard, especially for the failure to impose sanctions on Israel despite its war of aggression against Palestine, its continued occupation of Palestinian territories, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and its alleged acts of genocide, as acknowledged by the International Court of Justice;

1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s use of its shadow fleet; considers the shadow fleet a key financial lifeline for Russia in its illegal and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine and a major tool created to circumvent the sanctions regime; considers STS transfers in the high seas to be high-risk activities that undermine international maritime safety and environmental protection;

J. whereas the sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in 2022 disrupted gas supplies and caused significant environmental harm from methane emissions, impacting the Baltic Sea’s ecosystem and EU energy security;

2. Considers those unregistered and underinsured or uninsured vessels, and their frequent violations of relevant standards and requirements for ship communication and navigation, to be a threat to maritime security and a violation of international maritime law, particularly as they navigate through European seas and waters, especially the Baltic sea, presenting an enormous threat to nature and marine life that could lead to environmental catastrophe;

K. whereas the purchase by Member States of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) or oil of Russian origin from non-EU countries is not restricted and is currently taking place at levels well above those seen before February 2022; whereas Russia is the EU’s second largest supplier of LNG, behind only the US; whereas the increase in LNG imports from Russia runs counter to the EU’s aim of ending its reliance on Russian fossil fuels; whereas the EU is still sending EUR 2 billion per month to Russia for fossil fuels; whereas, through its continued imports of pipeline gas and LNG, as well as various exceptions to the bans on importing crude oil and oil products, the EU remains one of Russia’s largest clients for fossil fuels;

3. Stresses that inaction against or complicity with Russia’s shadow fleet severely undermines the impact of existing sanctions, weakening and demoralising the EU’s political, financial and military support for Ukraine; calls for the EU and the Member States to introduce a full ban on re-exported Russian refined oil products, in order to close all loopholes used by Russia to repackage and sell its oil, in a manner that results in a full cessation of Russian fossil fuel imports to the Member States, and ensures that no new agreements are signed with Russian energy companies, its leadership or subsidiaries;

L. whereas the EU’s growing dependence on US LNG imports has raised concerns regarding both energy security and economic sustainability, as the high costs of LNG are straining Member States’ budgets, contributing to increased energy prices for households and industries; whereas this highlights the need for swift and large-scale investments in structural energy savings and in expanding the deployment of renewable energy; whereas this also shows the need for Member States to support vulnerable and low-income households;

4. Calls for the strict implementation of the IMO assembly resolution to combat illegal maritime operations adopted in December 2023, notably the obligation for vessels to report all STS transfers to flag states and enhanced inspections at ports for suspicious ships known to have switched off their vessel-tracking systems;

M. whereas certain Member States, in response to the energy crisis and high gas prices, have opted to continue or even expand the use of coal and nuclear power to secure stable, domestically sourced energy, which is harming the EU’s green energy transition;

5. Calls for the EU and its Member States to take more effective actions and concrete measures to ensure maritime safety and to avoid environmental hazards or ecological disasters in European waters, and in particular, to continue and expand the vessel designation campaign, which has proven to be extremely successful in removing shadow fleet tankers from operations;

N. whereas a diplomatic resolution to the war in Ukraine that upholds the territorial integrity of the country would provide a sustainable path to peace and stability in the region and reduce the economic and social burdens borne by EU citizens as a result of the Russian invasion and consequent EU sanctions;

6. Calls for countries with international straits to require tankers to demonstrate proof of protection and indemnity insurance and adherence to minimum safety standards, as this would help to mitigate shadow fleet operations and drive up costs for non-compliant vessels; calls on all Member States to require the disclosure of oil spill insurance coverage from all vessels passing through or near their waters, to ensure transparency regarding insurance arrangements;

O. whereas applying consistent standards in the sanctions policy, regardless of the geopolitical context, is essential to ensuring the EU’s credibility and commitment to international law and human rights;

7. Calls for restrictions on vessel sales to be broadened and enforced to limit Russia’s ability to acquire tankers from the ‘white fleet’ – fully legally recognised vessels whose paperwork may remain temporarily valid despite being under new ownership;

P. whereas the use of old tankers for oil and LNG transport in the Baltic and Mediterranean regions and the risk of environmentally harmful accidents does not only concern Russian ‘shadow fleets’;

8. Urges the Member States in which the companies acting as owners or managers of the Russian shadow fleet’s oil and gas carriers are registered to take immediate action, in order to stop them from enabling the circumvention of sanctions;

1. Reaffirms the EU’s condemnation of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and expresses solidarity with the Ukrainian people;

9. Condemns the behaviour of states, legal service providers, other entities and individuals that are helping Russia to evade or mitigate EU sanctions; calls for the Member States and the EU institutions to step up their efforts to limit the evasion and circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia, and to take concrete measures that will ensure maritime safety and avoid environmental hazards or ecological disasters in European waters;

2. Emphasises the need for Member States to explore all diplomatic avenues to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict with full respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine; calls for the EU to actively engage in diplomatic negotiations alongside other international actors;

10. Encourages the Member States to enhance their surveillance capabilities, especially satellite monitoring for STS transfers, in order to expand the real-time monitoring and tracking of Russia’s shadow fleet; encourages the allocation of resources to Member States with major shipping sectors, enabling targeted enforcement and reducing legitimate disconnections of automatic identification systems;

3. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to counter sanctions evasion tactics, such as ‘shadow fleets’; suggests that businesses aiding or benefiting from the activities of the ‘shadow fleet’ be sanctioned, while ensuring that any actions remain proportionate to minimise unintended economic and environmental consequences within the EU;

11. Urges the Member States to collaborate with environmental agencies to hold violators responsible for ecological damage, especially concerning unseaworthy vessels, and to better enforce existing oil spill insurance requirements to address the significant and rising environmental threat stemming from the use of ageing and uninsured shadow fleet tankers;

4. Urges the Commission to consider implementing targeted measures that:

12. Recommends that the Member States impose secondary sanctions on non-EU financial entities that indirectly support the Russian oil trade, in order to further close financial loopholes currently exploited by Russia;

(a) improve the identification and monitoring of vessels associated with sanctions evasion, specifically in the Baltic and Mediterranean regions;

13. Encourages global transparency standards in vessel registration to reduce reliance of vessel owners on shell companies and flags of convenience, in order to improve vessel ownership transparency; urges measures that ensure that shadow fleet vessels, once identified, are communicated to all the Member States to ensure they are denied safe harbour;

(b) implement tailored port state controls and due diligence requirements for EU-based companies involved in maritime logistics, insurance, and financing, with a focus on preventing environmentally harmful practices and imposing fines on these companies that are effective, dissuasive and proportionate;

14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

5. Emphasises the environmental risks posed by the ‘shadow fleet’, particularly the increased risk of oil spills, chemical leakage and pollution from unregulated vessels that operate without safety compliance and insurance, risking biodiversity, marine life, and the livelihoods of communities dependent on the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas;

6. Highlights that incidents of this nature will result in long-term environmental degradation, which could significantly affect the tourism, fishing and marine industries in the Member States bordering these seas;

7. Calls on the Commission to coordinate and assist national authorities in charge of monitoring the increased presence of the ‘shadow fleet’ and propose strategies to address environmental risks associated with the ‘shadow fleet’, including crisis preparedness strategies and alleviate economic pressures on EU citizens;

8. Urges the Member States to prevent ships that are uninsured, are carrying sanctioned cargo or do not fulfil environmental requirements from entering their territorial waters or using their ports;

9. Calls on the Member States to enforce strict regulatory measures at their ports and in their territorial waters, particularly in the Baltic region; urges the Member States, in the case of tankers potentially carrying Russian oil, to make full use of their right to have vessels guided by an on-board pilot from the relevant national authority to conduct checks on the origins of the cargo, ultimate ship ownership, insurance papers and compliance with safety standards and to ensure that vessels suspected of sanctions evasion and environmental non-compliance are flagged for investigation; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to assist national authorities in carrying out thorough on-site inspections;

10. Calls on the Member States to designate ports capable of handling sanctioned vessels carrying crude oil and LNG and to seize illegal cargo without compensation; calls for revenues from seized cargo to be placed in a fund designated for crisis preparedness and the mitigation of potential environmental impacts from incidents involving the ‘shadow fleet’;

11. Requests that the European Maritime Safety Agency enhance its capacity and resources to monitor and intercept suspicious vessels, while collaborating with environmental agencies and European security agencies to prevent ‘shadow fleet’ activities;

12. Recommends that the European Council establish an EU task force specifically focused on sanction enforcement and environmental impact mitigation, tasked with:

(a) engaging in diplomatic dialogue to coordinate efforts globally and prevent environmental harm from sanctions-evading vessels;

(b) strengthening information-sharing mechanisms with international partners on ‘shadow fleets’ and sanctions evasion;

(c) proposing responses to sanctions evasion that ensure the integrity of sanctions while mitigating adverse economic and environmental impacts on Member States;

13. Calls for increased cooperation with international organisations, such as the International Maritime Organization, to strengthen global environmental standards;

14. Encourages the Member States and the Commission to work with stakeholders, including in the environmental, shipping, energy, insurance, and financial sectors, to identify best practices for detecting and addressing sanctions evasion and mitigating environmental impacts in EU waters;

15. Stresses the need for transparency and accountability and requests that the Member States report to the Commission on enforcement actions, instances of sanctions evasion and the steps they have taken to address both economic and environmental impacts, particularly in the Baltic and Mediterranean regions;

16. Condemns the double standard in EU sanctions policy, whereby sanctions are rigorously imposed on certain countries for acts of aggression or occupation, yet not on others, such as Israel, despite its ethnic cleansing, genocide and international law violations in Palestine;

17. Calls for an immediate review of EU policies towards Israel, including the suspension of the association agreement, an embargo on arms delivery to Israel and sanctions in response to genocidal acts, violations of international law and the humanitarian situation in Gaza, as a necessary measure to stop the massacre and to demonstrate the EU’s commitment to equal standards in its foreign policy;

18. Strongly condemns the sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which has resulted in substantial environmental harm and has disrupted a key component of the EU’s energy supply infrastructure, threatening the EU’s energy security; calls for an international investigation into the Nord Stream sabotage;

19. Deplores the continued imports of Russian LNG and take notes of the increased dependence on US LNG as a measure to fill the energy gap caused by the loss of Russian gas supplies; stresses the high cost and environmental risks of LNG imports, which impact EU households and industries;

20. Stresses the urgent need for investments in renewable energy infrastructure and the acceleration of the EU’s energy transition to reduce dependence on volatile foreign energy markets and destructive fossil fuels;

21. Urges the Commission to enhance support for energy saving, diversification and green technology projects within the EU, including by providing financial assistance to Member States in order to strengthen their renewable energy infrastructure, reduce fossil fuel reliance and move towards a cleaner, independent energy system;

22. Calls on the Commission to develop clearer guidelines and more robust due diligence standards for EU companies and financial institutions to avoid unintended interactions with entities linked to ‘shadow fleets’;

23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the European External Action Service, and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.