What changed

B100160/2024

Follow up to the European Parliament non-legislative resolution on EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia

European Parliament resolution on EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia

Resolution tabled pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the European Parliament's Rules of procedure

(2024/2885(RSP))

Reference numbers: 2024/2885(RSP) / RC10-0161/2024 / P10_TA(2024)0036

The European Parliament,

Date of adoption of the resolution: 14 November 2024

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union,

Competent Parliamentary Committee: Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET)

– having regard to the European Council conclusions imposing restrictive measures on Russia in response to its aggression against Ukraine,

Brief analysis/ assessment of the resolution and requests made in it:

– having regard to the EU’s sanctions regimes under the common foreign and security policy, and to the guidelines for their implementation,

The resolution recalls the European Parliament’s support for the EU sanctions regime in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and expresses great concerns over Russia’s ability to collect revenue from its energy exports to finance the war. It recognises that the EU has adopted unprecedented sanctions against Russia to diminish its revenues such as a ban on the purchase, import and transfer of Russian seaborne crude oil and certain petroleum products, the Oil Price Cap with G7+ partners and the targeting of specific vessels subject to a port and services ban. The resolution focuses particularly on the issue of sanctions circumvention by Russia especially through its growing reliance on a ‘shadow fleet’ of vessels of mostly old and unfit oil tankers which facilitate the evasion of sanctions and poses serious environmental, maritime safety and security risks.

– having regard to reports on the effectiveness of sanctions regimes and the unintended role of EU entities in sustaining ‘shadow fleet’ activities,

The resolution draws attention to ‘shadow fleet’ vessels, which often sail without industry standard insurance, change their names and flag registrations, manipulate their tracking systems, conduct dangerous ship-to-ship transfers of Russian crude oil and oil products in Union territorial waters, and are suspected of engaging in hybrid operations. It also stresses the risks to economic resources of Member States since an oil spill from ‘shadow fleet’ vessels could result in major clean-up costs for coastal countries and their taxpayers.

– having regard to the 1857 Copenhagen Convention governing navigation through the Danish Straits,

The resolution calls for more actions against the shadow fleet, namely by establishing a list of all shadow fleet vessels and designating these vessels, as well as their owners, operators, managers, accounts banks and insurance companies. It calls for a prohibition for Western vessels to transport Russian oil and for the systematic sanctioning of vessels sailing through EU waters without adequate insurance. To restrict their activity, the European Parliament proposes to ban ship-to-ship transfers of Russian oil in EU waters, to restrict vessel sales to countries facilitating trade with Russia and for the seizing of illegal cargo.

– having regard to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, particularly the provisions thereof on the protection and preservation of the marine environment,

To ensure the stricter enforcement of maritime safety regulations, the resolution calls for the enhanced monitoring and inspection of vessels. It highlights that the EU and its Member States should use the tools already available to them to tackle the risks posed by these vessels to prevent uninsured vessels from sailing though EU waters and docking at EU ports, such as obliging vessels to report all ship-to-ship transfers to flag states, verify insurance coverage and compliance with International Maritime Organisation standards and inspect vessels. The European Parliament also calls upon the European Maritime Safety Agency to enhance the support to Member States in monitoring suspicious ships. The resolution highlights the need for Member States to strengthen their administrative and surveillance capacities for effective enforcement.

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

To diminish Russian revenues, the resolution calls for more EU sanctions on Russian energy goods, such as a complete ban of Russian fossil fuel imports into the EU and a ban on re-exported Russian refined oil products, as well as restrictions on oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) tankers transporting Russian goods. It calls on G7 countries to more effectively enforce the oil price cap imposed on seaborne Russian oil and to substantially decrease it.

A. whereas Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has severe humanitarian, economic and environmental consequences across the region;

The resolution calls for broader international coordination with partner countries also recognising the importance of outreach to flag states. The resolution urges the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Sanctions Envoy to reach out to the governments of countries whose flag registers or management companies are providing services to the shadow fleet. The European Parliament also calls upon the EU to re-assess its bilateral cooperation with countries which continue to help Russia to circumvent EU sanctions.

B. whereas the EU, together with the Price Cap Coalition, has imposed sanctions against Russia targeting key sectors and individuals, including a ban on the import of crude oil and price caps on Russian fossil fuels, with the intention of weakening Russia’s ability to fund its military aggression; whereas the success of these sanctions hinges on their strict and full implementation;

More generally, the resolution calls for the EU and its Member States to reinforce and centralise, at EU level, the oversight of sanctions implementation and sanctions circumvention monitoring and to intensify efforts to curb sanctions evasion and circumvention by Russia, calling for support for the work of the EU Sanctions Envoy to prevent the systematic re-export of sanctioned EU goods to Russia. It reiterates its call on the Council to expand the powers of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to address the crime of violation of EU sanctions.

C. whereas in response to the sanctions, Russia has developed a ‘shadow fleet’ of obscure and mostly decrepit vessels to facilitate trade and evade sanctions, particularly in the oil sector;

Response to the requests and overview of the action taken, or intended to be taken, by the Commission:

D. whereas the 14 sanctions packages that the EU has put in place against Russia since the beginning of the war of aggression against Ukraine have limited Russia’s ability to wage war but have not managed to stop the war;

In very close cooperation with G7 partners, the EU has adopted 16 packages of sanctions to date in response to Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine. These unprecedented, complex and far-reaching individual and sectoral restrictive measures have opened a new chapter for EU sanctions in terms of the level of commitment and resources as well as international coordination and outreach involved.

E. whereas the ‘shadow fleet’ frequently circumvents the sanctions by sailing under flags of convenience from countries with little to no control over the ship’s security standards, without adhering to international safety or environmental standards; whereas this creates a backdoor route for Russian oil and undermines the impact of EU sanctions;

The proper application of sanctions is key. Over the last two years, the Commission has held six high-level meetings with the Member States, as well as four meetings with sanctions coordinators from like-minded third countries, with a focus on addressing circumvention practices. Tackling possible circumvention attempts, including through third country jurisdictions, is among the Commission’s key priorities. The Commission is dedicating significant efforts to this – from legislative changes targeting those who facilitate circumvention and criminalising the violation and circumvention of sanctions to closely monitoring suspicious trade flows and organising dedicated outreach.

F. whereas the ‘shadow fleet’ is often comprised of old, structurally unsound vessels, posing substantial risks to marine ecosystems, with the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas being particularly vulnerable to oil spills, pollution and other maritime incidents; whereas recent reports suggest that this fleet has grown by 70 % over the last year and is estimated to have more than 600 vessels;

With regard to sanctions packages, with the 12th and 14th packages the EU has strengthened due diligence requirements for EU operators, introducing a “no re-export to Russia” clause, and requiring operators to identify and assess risks of re-exports to Russia, and to undertake their best efforts to ensure that sanctions are not undermined by non-EU companies they own or control.

G. whereas the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas are highly sensitive marine environments, with the former being a nearly enclosed sea that is prone to slow water renewal and the latter experiencing significant pressure from pollution, overfishing, oil and gas drilling, biodiversity loss and climate change, making these regions especially susceptible to environmental damage from increased ‘shadow fleet’ activity; whereas the legal possibilities of attributing liability or obtaining compensation in the event of an incident are limited due to the vessels’ unclear ownership and invalid or fake insurance, leaving the cost of attempting to remedy a potential spill for the affected Member States and the EU;

With the implementation of the REPowerEU plan, the EU has significantly reduced its dependency on Russian gas imports. As regards oil, the EU has introduced a ban on the import of Russian oil, with limited exceptions which apply to a small number of Member States which still rely on Russian crude due to their geographical location.

H. whereas the EU’s sanctions on Russian oil and gas exports have had significant impacts on energy prices and inflation within the EU, contributing to rising costs for consumers and industries and reshaping the EU’s energy policy and supply chains; whereas the recent surge in energy prices has been exacerbated by financial market speculation;

The 14th package of sanctions has also introduced restrictions as regards Russian liquified natural gas (LNG). It is now prohibited to ship Russian LNG to EU ports; this prevents Russia from using EU infrastructures to further transport its LNG across the globe. It is also prohibited to export any good, technology and service to LNG projects under construction in Russia, such as Arctic LNG 2. A prohibition to import Russian LNG was also introduced for LNG terminals not connected to the EU gas system. In addition, the EU has already sanctioned two LNG vessels for their contribution to the generation of energy revenues for Russia. Further LNG vessels could be listed, subject to unanimous approval by the Council. Further restrictions on the nuclear sector, in particular on Rosatom, require unanimity in the Council.

I. whereas the EU’s sanctions policy has faced criticism for applying a double standard, especially for the failure to impose sanctions on Israel despite its war of aggression against Palestine, its continued occupation of Palestinian territories, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and its alleged acts of genocide, as acknowledged by the International Court of Justice;

In recent packages, the EU has also leveraged its sanctions powers to contain the shadow fleet. In the 12th package, the EU introduced a notification rule for the sale of a tanker to any third country to make the trade of second-hand tankers more transparent. This allows the Commission to closely monitor tankers sold to third countries and which may be joining the dark fleet. When such tankers are sold to a Russian person or entity, or for use in Russia, the sale must be authorised by a Member State’s competent authorities. The Commission is ready to assess further measures in relation to tanker sales.

J. whereas the sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in 2022 disrupted gas supplies and caused significant environmental harm from methane emissions, impacting the Baltic Sea’s ecosystem and EU energy security;

In its 14th package of June 2024, the EU adopted a measure targeting specific vessels contributing to Russia’s warfare against Ukraine, which are subject to a port access ban and a ban on the provision of services. These vessels can be targeted for various reasons such as the transport of military equipment for Russia, the transport of stolen Ukrainian grain, and support in the development of Russia’s energy sector, for instance through the transport of LNG components or transshipments of LNG. This measure also targets tankers that are part of the shadow fleet which circumvent the EU and Price Cap Coalition’s caps while adopting deceptive shipping practices in complete disregard of international standards. In the first round of designations under the 14th package, the EU targeted 27 vessels, including 17 tankers involved in the transport of Russian oil. In the second round of designations under the 15th package (December 2024), the EU targeted a further 52 vessels including 42 crude oil and petroleum product tankers transporting Russian oil. In the third round of designations under the 16th package (February 2025), 74 vessels were designated, including 72 oil and petroleum product tankers, thereby bringing the total number of designated vessels to 153. To date, this measure has a sizeable impact on the shadow fleet’s activity. These vessels have often changed their names, flag and ownership to obfuscate their identities. Despite such attempts, the vessels become tainted and struggle to lift oil. This also increases the costs on Russia to operate with such a fleet.

K. whereas the purchase by Member States of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) or oil of Russian origin from non-EU countries is not restricted and is currently taking place at levels well above those seen before February 2022; whereas Russia is the EU’s second largest supplier of LNG, behind only the US; whereas the increase in LNG imports from Russia runs counter to the EU’s aim of ending its reliance on Russian fossil fuels; whereas the EU is still sending EUR 2 billion per month to Russia for fossil fuels; whereas, through its continued imports of pipeline gas and LNG, as well as various exceptions to the bans on importing crude oil and oil products, the EU remains one of Russia’s largest clients for fossil fuels;

The list of designated vessels will be updated as regularly as needed to address the ever-shifting composition of the shadow fleet. At the same time, it should be noted that targeting requires thorough preparation to ensure a solid legal basis. The Commission is actively working with Member States, international partners, and the private sector to identify additional vessels. In this endeavour, the Commission also relies on the support of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA).

L. whereas the EU’s growing dependence on US LNG imports has raised concerns regarding both energy security and economic sustainability, as the high costs of LNG are straining Member States’ budgets, contributing to increased energy prices for households and industries; whereas this highlights the need for swift and large-scale investments in structural energy savings and in expanding the deployment of renewable energy; whereas this also shows the need for Member States to support vulnerable and low-income households;

In addition to vessel targeting, the EU has listed entities supporting Russian energy exports which become subject to an asset freeze and a prohibition to provide economic resources. This includes Sovcomflot, Russia's largest shipping company specialising in the transportation of liquefied gas, crude oil, and petroleum products, as well as other leading companies in the energy sector. The EU’s 15th and 16th packages include listings of shipping companies and managers of shipping companies facilitating the transport of Russian oil. Any vessels owned or operated by these individuals or entities also become subject to restrictions, for example on accessing EU services.

M. whereas certain Member States, in response to the energy crisis and high gas prices, have opted to continue or even expand the use of coal and nuclear power to secure stable, domestically sourced energy, which is harming the EU’s green energy transition;

Regarding circumvention practices and enforcement (paragraph 7), the Commission regularly exchanges with business associations on compliance with sanctions and has set up a contact group to discuss with Member States the implementation of sanctions from a customs perspective, including elements and data that are relevant for risk assessment and management purposes. Specifically, the EU closely monitors suspicious trade of dual use and advanced technology items including Common High Priority (CHP) goods to prevent these items falling into the hands of the Russian military-industrial complex. Careful analysis of trade data has allowed the Commission to identify third countries that are at risk of being used as platforms for circumvention. The Commission is conducting bilateral dialogues with all Member States to discuss identified implementation shortcomings.

N. whereas a diplomatic resolution to the war in Ukraine that upholds the territorial integrity of the country would provide a sustainable path to peace and stability in the region and reduce the economic and social burdens borne by EU citizens as a result of the Russian invasion and consequent EU sanctions;

Work on circumvention is coordinated closely with Member States, whose national competent authorities are the main bodies responsible for sanctions implementation and enforcement. To counter sanctions circumvention and ensure the highest level of due diligence, the Commission has also intensified its regular exchange with EU economic operators, regularly providing and updating guidance documents. So far, the Commission has published more than 600 frequently asked questions (FAQs) on its website, sorted by topic. The Commission has also issued specific guidance, such as guidance on due diligence to fight circumvention, on the oil price cap, or on CHP items. On 24 September 2024, the Commission published a joint guidance developed within the G7 Sub-Working Group on Export Control Enforcement to raise awareness on sanctions evasion risks and indicators and to help relevant business operators address and mitigate such risks.

O. whereas applying consistent standards in the sanctions policy, regardless of the geopolitical context, is essential to ensuring the EU’s credibility and commitment to international law and human rights;

The Commission, together with its G7+ partners, is continuously assessing how to further improve the Oil Price Cap. While the Oil Price Cap aims to achieve the dual objectives of reducing Russia’s revenues to finance the war in Ukraine, while keeping Russian crude oil and petroleum products on the global market, the impact of the Cap has diminished over time due to a combination of high oil prices and Russia’s increasing reliance on the shadow fleet of tankers. The Commission is currently working with G7+ partners to find ways to strengthen the enforcement of the price cap.

P. whereas the use of old tankers for oil and LNG transport in the Baltic and Mediterranean regions and the risk of environmentally harmful accidents does not only concern Russian ‘shadow fleets’;

The Commission is also in contact with industry stakeholders which are active in the transport of Russian oil, including traders, shipowners and insurers, to better understand the implementation challenges of the oil price cap. This feedback is carefully analysed by the Commission to bring improvements to the price cap mechanism. For instance, the Commission clarified in its FAQs related to the oil import ban that ship-to-ship transfers of Russian oil are prohibited in the Member States’ territorial waters (FAQ 17).

1. Reaffirms the EU’s condemnation of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and expresses solidarity with the Ukrainian people;

Besides taking action against entities and individuals that are actively undermining the impact of its sanctions, the EU is reaching out to third countries including through cooperation with third countries via the diplomatic outreach of the EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan, as well as capacity-building opportunities.

2. Emphasises the need for Member States to explore all diplomatic avenues to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict with full respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine; calls for the EU to actively engage in diplomatic negotiations alongside other international actors;

Ensuring that EU sanctions are not circumvented lies at the core of the mandate of the Sanctions Envoy, who took up his office in January 2023. He has been visiting countries identified as hubs from where sensitive EU-origin goods are re-exported to Russia, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia, Serbia, Armenia and Georgia. Lately the Sanctions Envoy’s outreach has also focused on Southeast Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam). The Sanctions Envoy is also visiting countries such as India, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates to discuss Russian energy exports and the shadow fleet.

3. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to counter sanctions evasion tactics, such as ‘shadow fleets’; suggests that businesses aiding or benefiting from the activities of the ‘shadow fleet’ be sanctioned, while ensuring that any actions remain proportionate to minimise unintended economic and environmental consequences within the EU;

As regards to outreach to flag states, the Commission and the European External Action Service have reached out to authorities in key jurisdictions. Flag States have the primary responsibility to ensure that their ships are safe to sail and comply with the safety and pollution prevention requirements. EU delegations are engaging at local level to disincentivise the registration of EU targeted vessels and highlight the adverse impacts of high-risk shipping practices and the responsibilities that lie with those countries that provide services to such vessels. Some positive impacts resulting from the Commission’s outreach can already be noted. For instance, Panama has issued a decree for the cancellation of vessels that are targeted by the EU.

4. Urges the Commission to consider implementing targeted measures that:

Regarding the calls for action related to maritime safety and pollution prevention (paragraph 3), the Commission is in continuous discussion with relevant authorities in the Member States for enhancing the maritime surveillance capacity and tools, hosted in the European Maritime and Safety Agency (EMSA), for targeted support in their monitoring and enforcement. This includes the monitoring of ship behaviour as well as tracking and tracing their voyages to detect any suspect practices such as not respecting international instruments rules and guidance concerning ship-to-ship transfers and/or illegally turning off the Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) transponder. For the latter aspect, the Commission has set up an ad hoc technical expert group to investigate how to identify tampering (spoofing) with the position and identification systems (AIS or Long-Range Identification and Tracking, LRIT, signals).

(a) improve the identification and monitoring of vessels associated with sanctions evasion, specifically in the Baltic and Mediterranean regions;

In so far as any such vessel is sailing to any EU Member State’s port, such maritime surveillance support and information helps the Member State carry out an inspection, normally under the port State control regime applicable under EU law.

(b) implement tailored port state controls and due diligence requirements for EU-based companies involved in maritime logistics, insurance, and financing, with a focus on preventing environmentally harmful practices and imposing fines on these companies that are effective, dissuasive and proportionate;

With regard to marine insurance (paragraph 9), the Commission is currently working with Member States, not only to enforce Directive 2009/20/EC on the insurance of shipowners for maritime claims, that already includes the possibility for a Member State to expel a ship not in compliance (and where such an expelled ship subsequently cannot call at any other Member State ports) that are sailing on their ports, but also consider how to require that the same insurance information is reported when a ship sails along the EU Member States’ coasts (in so called ship reporting systems, especially applicable in e.g. dense traffic waters, like straits) but never goes into port. This would allow the identification of ships that are not reporting and can be assumed not to meet the international requirements for marine insurance in this respect. That would allow the Member State as a coastal State to verify the existence of insurance and also the coverage of the insurance and where doubtful, take appropriate action within the frame of International Law (UNCLOS – the Law of the Sea). Furthermore, it could become an indication for candidate ships for possible further investigation with the flag State concerned, as well as future listings under the sanctions regulation (as explained above).

5. Emphasises the environmental risks posed by the ‘shadow fleet’, particularly the increased risk of oil spills, chemical leakage and pollution from unregulated vessels that operate without safety compliance and insurance, risking biodiversity, marine life, and the livelihoods of communities dependent on the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas;

The approach for this action would be to share the information reported, in the same way as is the case today for information required before a port call, via the Union Maritime Information and Exchange System (SafeSeaNet), so that all relevant administrations, cross-Member States and cross-sector, are aware of any suspect and potentially substandard ship carrying dangerous and polluting cargo as early as possible and can monitor more carefully. In this respect, the Commission, together with EMSA and the Member States has started a reflection of the current top-up capacities and capabilities e.g. Stand-by vessels network, to ensure optimal pollution preparedness support, in particular for large scale oil spills.

6. Highlights that incidents of this nature will result in long-term environmental degradation, which could significantly affect the tourism, fishing and marine industries in the Member States bordering these seas;

It is to be noted that the oil tanker transit traffic has increased, but since the EU has introduced an oil embargo on Russian origin oil, such oil cannot be discharged at any EU Member State port. It should also be recalled that there is a general prohibition on all Russian flagged ships, as well as to ships certified by the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (RMRS), to call at EU Member States ports, since shortly after the start of the aggression.

7. Calls on the Commission to coordinate and assist national authorities in charge of monitoring the increased presence of the ‘shadow fleet’ and propose strategies to address environmental risks associated with the ‘shadow fleet’, including crisis preparedness strategies and alleviate economic pressures on EU citizens;

In parallel to the concerted actions within the EU, there are EU coordinated actions with the Member States in international fora: in the International Maritime Organisation (IMO); International Mobile Satellite Organisation (IMSO); and, the International Oil Pollution Funds (IOPC) on a range of actions stemming from the IMO Resolution A.1192(33) to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by the ‘dark’ or ‘shadow’ fleet. These actions focus on the responsibility of States as flag States and the absolute need for any flag State to ensure they have the capacity, ability, and control to enforce all obligations incumbent on the under international law. Actions proposed range from conducting a regulatory scoping exercise of relevant rules and regulations available for Member States, with a view to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by the “dark fleet” or “shadow fleet”, including measures to prevent the misuse of AIS or LRIT ship identification and tracking systems, to underlining obligations on flag States in relation to accepting marine insurance and guidance in how to verify insurers, and to detect unlawful practices associated with the fraudulent registration and fraudulent registries of ships and registers.

8. Urges the Member States to prevent ships that are uninsured, are carrying sanctioned cargo or do not fulfil environmental requirements from entering their territorial waters or using their ports;

The Commission and EU Member States actively work with likeminded partners in these international fora and continue to do so. A central theme in this work is transparency and putting the ‘spotlight’ on dark fleet operators and operations. This aspect is also included in the outreach explained above, as part of the deterrent approach with sanctions and restrictive practices.

9. Calls on the Member States to enforce strict regulatory measures at their ports and in their territorial waters, particularly in the Baltic region; urges the Member States, in the case of tankers potentially carrying Russian oil, to make full use of their right to have vessels guided by an on-board pilot from the relevant national authority to conduct checks on the origins of the cargo, ultimate ship ownership, insurance papers and compliance with safety standards and to ensure that vessels suspected of sanctions evasion and environmental non-compliance are flagged for investigation; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to assist national authorities in carrying out thorough on-site inspections;

10. Calls on the Member States to designate ports capable of handling sanctioned vessels carrying crude oil and LNG and to seize illegal cargo without compensation; calls for revenues from seized cargo to be placed in a fund designated for crisis preparedness and the mitigation of potential environmental impacts from incidents involving the ‘shadow fleet’;

11. Requests that the European Maritime Safety Agency enhance its capacity and resources to monitor and intercept suspicious vessels, while collaborating with environmental agencies and European security agencies to prevent ‘shadow fleet’ activities;

12. Recommends that the European Council establish an EU task force specifically focused on sanction enforcement and environmental impact mitigation, tasked with:

(a) engaging in diplomatic dialogue to coordinate efforts globally and prevent environmental harm from sanctions-evading vessels;

(b) strengthening information-sharing mechanisms with international partners on ‘shadow fleets’ and sanctions evasion;

(c) proposing responses to sanctions evasion that ensure the integrity of sanctions while mitigating adverse economic and environmental impacts on Member States;

13. Calls for increased cooperation with international organisations, such as the International Maritime Organization, to strengthen global environmental standards;

14. Encourages the Member States and the Commission to work with stakeholders, including in the environmental, shipping, energy, insurance, and financial sectors, to identify best practices for detecting and addressing sanctions evasion and mitigating environmental impacts in EU waters;

15. Stresses the need for transparency and accountability and requests that the Member States report to the Commission on enforcement actions, instances of sanctions evasion and the steps they have taken to address both economic and environmental impacts, particularly in the Baltic and Mediterranean regions;

16. Condemns the double standard in EU sanctions policy, whereby sanctions are rigorously imposed on certain countries for acts of aggression or occupation, yet not on others, such as Israel, despite its ethnic cleansing, genocide and international law violations in Palestine;

17. Calls for an immediate review of EU policies towards Israel, including the suspension of the association agreement, an embargo on arms delivery to Israel and sanctions in response to genocidal acts, violations of international law and the humanitarian situation in Gaza, as a necessary measure to stop the massacre and to demonstrate the EU’s commitment to equal standards in its foreign policy;

18. Strongly condemns the sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which has resulted in substantial environmental harm and has disrupted a key component of the EU’s energy supply infrastructure, threatening the EU’s energy security; calls for an international investigation into the Nord Stream sabotage;

19. Deplores the continued imports of Russian LNG and take notes of the increased dependence on US LNG as a measure to fill the energy gap caused by the loss of Russian gas supplies; stresses the high cost and environmental risks of LNG imports, which impact EU households and industries;

20. Stresses the urgent need for investments in renewable energy infrastructure and the acceleration of the EU’s energy transition to reduce dependence on volatile foreign energy markets and destructive fossil fuels;

21. Urges the Commission to enhance support for energy saving, diversification and green technology projects within the EU, including by providing financial assistance to Member States in order to strengthen their renewable energy infrastructure, reduce fossil fuel reliance and move towards a cleaner, independent energy system;

22. Calls on the Commission to develop clearer guidelines and more robust due diligence standards for EU companies and financial institutions to avoid unintended interactions with entities linked to ‘shadow fleets’;

23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the European External Action Service, and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.