What changed

B100142/2024

B100133/2024

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

The European Parliament,

– having regard to theits Europeanprevious Conventionresolutions on HumanAzerbaijan Rightsand Armenia, and in particular its resolution of 1950,25 ratifiedApril by2024 Azerbaijanon inAzerbaijan, 2002,notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev,

– having regard to the UNInternational Charter,Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

– having regard to Genevathe ConventionsInternational ofCovenant 1949,on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

– having regard to the InternationalUN CovenantConvention onagainst CivilTorture and PoliticalOther RightsCruel, ofInhuman 1966,or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

– having regard to the joint EU-US-Armenia high-level meeting of 5 April 2024 in support of Armenia’s resilience,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Armenia and Azerbaijan,

– having regard to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,

– having regard to the ComprehensivePartnership and Enhanced PartnershipCooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy CommunityCommunities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia,Azerbaijan, of the other part (CEPA), which fully entered into force on 1 March 2021,part,

– having regard to Decision 99/614/EC, ECSC, Euratom of the Council and of the Commission of 31 May 1999 on the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part (EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement), which has been in force since 1999,

– having regard to the statement of 29 May 2024 by the Spokesperson of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the human rights situation in Azerbaijan,

– having regard to the launch of the EU Mission in Armenia on 20 February 2023,

– having regard to Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) resolution 2527 (2024) of 24 January 2024 entitled ‘Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Azerbaijan’,

– having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, to which Armenia and Azerbaijan are parties,

– having regard to the statement of 24 August 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on recent post-election developments,

– having regard to the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the early parliamentary elections of 1 September 2024 in Azerbaijan,

– having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service (EEAS) spokesperson of 3 September 2024 on Azerbaijan’s early parliamentary elections,

– having regard to the statement by the EEAS spokesperson of 29 May 2024 on the human rights situation in Azerbaijan,

– having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic partnership in the field of energy signed between the EU and Azerbaijan on 18 July 2022,

– having regard to the 2023 Eastern Partnership Index,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Azerbaijan has serious shortcomings in the area of fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression and assembly and media freedom, and engages in repression of political activists, journalists and civil society, all of which distances Azerbaijan from democratic norms and international human rights standards; whereas corruption and a lack of judicial independence further undermine the country’s governance, while government authorities continue to suppress dissent and persecute critics; whereas despite international agreements and calls for reform, including from the European Parliament, Azerbaijan has made limited to no progress on improving its human rights record;

A. whereas Azerbaijan’s track record on human rights has reached a historic low point owing to the fact that, since late 2022, the government has intensified its systematic repression of critics and dissident voices, with a new and ongoing wave of arrests of human rights defenders, political and civic activists, journalists and independent researchers on the basis of politically motivated baseless charges;

B. whereas journalists, human rights defenders and activists have been imprisoned in the country, with approximately 30 prominent figures behind bars on politically motivated charges, and a surge in arbitrary arrests and detentions has been reported, their number having tripled as Azerbaijan silences opposition ahead of the upcoming 2024 UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) in Baku, and there are allegations of torture and beatings; whereas notable civil society organisations have called for the EU and international leaders to pressure Azerbaijan to improve its human rights record during COP29, urging the release of political prisoners and an end to arbitrary prosecutions;

B. whereas the detained journalists and activists listed in its urgency resolution of 25 April 2024 remain in custody;

C. whereas according to the US Department of State’s Azerbaijan 2023 Human Rights Report, there were credible allegations that the Azerbaijani Government ‘used violence or threats of violence against individuals in other countries as politically motivated reprisal’; whereas according to this report, the Azerbaijani Government ‘limited freedom of expression and media independence’, and ‘there were reports that dissidents and journalists who lived outside the country suffered digital harassment and intimidation of family members who remained in Azerbaijan’;

C. whereas these developments are taking place in the lead-up to the 29th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29) in Baku, as part of a concerted effort by the Azerbaijani authorities to effectively silence the few remaining dissenting voices and stifle Azerbaijani civil society; whereas Azerbaijan was granted the status of COP29 host city by the UN Regional Group of Eastern European States, which includes 11 EU Member States;

D. whereas early parliamentary elections were held in Azerbaijan on 1 September 2024, and, according to the OSCE’s International Election Observation Mission, took place ‘in a restrictive political and legal environment that does not enable genuine pluralism and resulted in a contest devoid of competition’;

D. whereas people are being detained for actions such as participating in public protests, giving media interviews, criticising the government on social media, exposing police brutality and alleging government corruption, which is in violation of the Azerbaijani Government’s obligations under international human rights law; whereas in addition to politically motivated persecution, the Azerbaijani authorities also use tools of intimidation and harassment to incite fear and effectively censor independent voices;

E. whereas September 2024 was the fourth anniversary of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and marked one year since Azerbaijan forcibly regained control over Nagorno-Karabakh, which is part of its internationally recognised territory; whereas all the state institutions of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic were dissolved as of 1 January 2024; whereas these events, preceded by Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor, resulted in the mass exodus of almost the entire population of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas, as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been entirely ethnically cleansed of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries;

E. whereas there are credible reports of severe acts of ill treatment and even of torture inflicted upon detained persons by police officers in Azerbaijan; whereas Azerbaijan refuses to cooperate with the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;

F. whereas over more than three decades, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has resulted in tens of thousands of casualties, immense destruction, including of cultural, religious and historical heritage, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people on both sides; whereas there are six interstate cases before the European Court of Human Rights between Armenia and Azerbaijan in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, with both countries standing accused of having violated human rights conventions; whereas Azerbaijan has repeatedly been accused of ethnic cleansing, particularly in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, where it is said to have displaced over 100 000 ethnic Armenians;

F. whereas Anar Mammadli, who leads the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center and is a founding member of the Climate Justice Initiative, which seeks to advocate for civic freedoms and environmental justice in conjunction with COP29, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities on 29 April 2024 on bogus smuggling charges; whereas Mr Mammadli’s health has deteriorated significantly while in custody;

G. whereas three decades of diplomacy and peacebuilding efforts by the OSCE, the EU and other international actors have failed to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and, therefore, to deter Azerbaijan from its use of military force;

G. whereas researcher and activist Bahruz Samadov was arrested on 21 August 2024 and charged with ‘high treason’ for his articles criticising Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh policy;

H. whereas according to the US Department of State’s Azerbaijan 2023 Human Rights Report, the Azerbaijani Government ‘did not take credible steps to punish the majority of officials who were reported to have committed human rights abuses’; whereas the report also states that there was ‘no reported progress on government investigations of alleged abuses committed by Azerbaijani armed forces or individuals during the 2020 and 2022 hostilities’;

H. whereas women human rights defenders continue to face threats, coercion, violations of their right to privacy and smear campaigns that are gender-specific and target them as women;

I. whereas it is necessary to ensure connectivity between Europe and Asia while avoiding crossing Russian territory; whereas the South Caucasus is in a strategic position for promoting Europe-Asia connectivity, which is particularly important for the EU’s energy capacities and for trade with Central Asia;

I. whereas Azerbaijani laws regulating the registration, operation and funding of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are highly restrictive, and Azerbaijani authorities arbitrarily implement these laws; whereas this results in the effective criminalisation of unregistered NGO activity;

J. whereas Armenia has already managed to weaken its ties with Russia in relation to security, as it has frozen its participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, although it remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union;

J. whereas civil society activists have been fleeing the country in growing numbers since November 2023; whereas the ongoing crackdown on freedom of expression in Azerbaijan is also reflected in reports of transnational repression and reprisals against family members of detainees;

K. whereas the eighth meeting of the border commissions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, held on 19 April 2024, concluded with a preliminary agreement on the delimitation of four border sections;

K. whereas the media sector is under the official control of the authorities, and any remaining independent media outlets, primarily AbzasMedia and Toplum TV, have been targeted through judicial harassment and the detention of its journalists;

L. whereas the peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to be at a standstill and it is unlikely that an agreement will be concluded and signed before COP29; whereas the peace deal should contribute to the long-term stability of bilateral relations and of the wider region as a whole; whereas this goal can only be achieved if the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan can guarantee peaceful coexistence and respect for minority rights;

L. whereas many international and domestic human rights activists and organisations have called on the international community to recognise and respond to the urgency and gravity of the human rights situation in Azerbaijan;

M. whereas Azerbaijan is a major oil and natural gas producer, particularly through the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil field and the Shah Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea, and the country primarily uses the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to export hydrocarbons to Europe, bypassing Russia and offering the EU an alternative energy source, which is valuable in this geopolitical climate; whereas Azerbaijan’s economy is heavily reliant on oil and gas revenues, which make up more than 90 % of the country’s export revenues and account for a noteworthy portion of the government’s budget;

M. whereas PACE officially suspended the Azerbaijan delegation on 24 January 2024 owing to Azerbaijan’s failure to conduct free and fair elections and ensure the separation of powers, the weakness of its legislature vis-à-vis the executive, and the lack of independence of the judiciary and respect for human rights;

N. whereas gas contracts between Gazprom and SOCAR for the delivery of one billion cubic metres of gas from Russia to Azerbaijan between November 2022 and March 2023 have raised significant concerns about the re-export of Russian gas to the European market, particularly in light of the memorandum of understanding signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen; whereas the EU aims to reduce European dependence on Russian gas, but this agreement could be seen as undermining that goal, as Russian gas would still be flowing into Azerbaijan, thus potentially freeing up Azerbaijani gas for increased re-export to the EU; whereas there are significant challenges facing European efforts to replace Russian gas shipped via Ukraine with Azerbaijani gas by the end of 2024, and although Ukraine, the EU and Azerbaijan support the injection of Azerbaijani gas into Russian pipelines, Azerbaijan might lack sufficient gas supplies to make up the shortfall; whereas, in this regard, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline could provide an alternative route to ensure adequate supply, but new infrastructure is required to enhance gas transmission capacity in the interconnections with the EU, particularly through Bulgaria and Romania on one side and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline on the other, in order to ensure a more efficient and secure flow of gas into the European market;

N. whereas a number of European Court of Human Rights decisions have found that Azerbaijan has violated human rights; whereas more than 320 court judgments against Azerbaijan have not yet been executed or have been only partially implemented, which is the highest number among all state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights;

1. Expresses its concern about the human rights situation in Azerbaijan; urges Azerbaijan to fulfil its obligations under its own constitution and under international agreements to protect fundamental freedoms and respect the human dignity of its citizens, and to cease the use of criminal prosecution as a tool to suppress government critics and members of civil society;

O. whereas the EU has intensified its energy trade relations with Azerbaijan over the past two years with a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy and more recently an MoU on wind energy cooperation; whereas Commissioner Kadri Simson earlier this year praised the dynamism of the EU’s energy cooperation with Azerbaijan;

2. Calls on Azerbaijan to drop all charges against Gubad Ibadoghlu, Ilhamiz Guliyev and all other people imprisoned for exercising their fundamental rights, to release them and to ensure free and unhindered space for independent journalism and freedom of expression; calls on Azerbaijan to allow Dr Ibadoghlu to travel abroad, unhindered and to the country of his choice, to reunite with his family and to receive the medical care he urgently needs;

P. whereas Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) stipulates that the Union’s action must be guided by democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law;

3. Calls on the Commission, UN mechanisms and other international actors to step up their efforts to promote human rights and democratic governance in Azerbaijan ahead of COP29;

Q. whereas, separately, peace talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia are ongoing, with both sides stating that negotiations are edging towards a peace agreement; whereas several significant deadlocks seemingly remain, owing to issues including Azerbaijani demands in relation to Armenia’s constitution and a corridor to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave via southern Armenia, disregarding Armenia’s sovereignty; whereas earlier this year a deal was signed on a joint border commission to demarcate and delimit their shared border;

4. Underlines that COP29 could be an opportunity for Azerbaijan to reaffirm its genuine commitment to its obligations under international law, instead of using it to gloss over its human rights record while continuing repressive practices;

1. Reiterates its profound concern regarding the human rights situation in Azerbaijan, in particular the government’s severe restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly and association that have worsened over the past two years;

5. Calls on the Commission to work closely with the UN to urgently establish a comprehensive plan for investigating and clarifying the fate of the Armenian military personnel, including women, and the eight unarmed Armenian prisoners of war who were killed or reported missing in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and to conduct impartial inquiries on the ground, facilitate information exchanges, secure unhindered access to detention facilities for international observers through the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, such observers having previously been denied access, and launch a centralised database for tracing and resolving missing persons cases, while also providing the necessary support and resources to the families affected;

2. Is deeply concerned about the systematic repression of freedom of expression by the Azerbaijani authorities, targeting civil society, civic and political activists, journalists and human rights defenders, including acts of harassment, intimidation, arbitrary detention and severe ill treatment and torture by police officers, and politically motivated legal persecution; expresses deep concern about the environment of fear that this has created inside the country, leaving civil society effectively silenced;

6. Demands that Azerbaijan release the 23 Armenian hostages who are still being held in Baku, including the former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh;

3. Urges the Government of Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release Anar Mammadli, Bahruz Samadov, Igbal Abilov, Farid Mehralizade, Emin Ibrahimov and Famil Khalilov, as well as political prisoners named in previous urgency resolutions, including Ilhamiz Guliyev, Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov and Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, and human rights defenders and journalists Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli and Farid Ismayilov; calls, further, for the vacation of any convictions against those released and the removal of restrictions on their freedom of movement;

7. Reiterates its condemnation of the Azerbaijani military incursions into the internationally recognised territory of Armenia in recent years; expresses its sympathy with the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who had to flee their ancestral lands, and calls on the authorities in Baku to guarantee the safe return of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and to uphold their rights to cultivate their culture and traditions; welcomes all efforts by the Government of Armenia to provide shelter and aid to the displaced Armenians;

4. Reminds Azerbaijan that the provision of healthcare for prisoners is the responsibility of the state; calls for adequate healthcare and medical treatment to be provided to all those detained in Azerbaijan on politically motivated charges;

8. Expresses deep concern for the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destroying, neglecting or altering the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments; insists that Azerbaijan allow a UNESCO mission to Nagorno-Karabakh and grant it the necessary access to heritage;

5. Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to drop all charges against renowned scholar, anti-corruption activist and shortlisted finalist of the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, release him from house arrest, and allow him to travel abroad for urgent medical care without delay and attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony in Strasbourg in December;

9. Strongly condemns Russia’s increasing hybrid attempts to destabilise the political situation inside Armenia and in the region; is concerned that the EU Mission in Armenia is regularly targeted by Russian disinformation attempts and campaigns;

6. Is deeply concerned about Azerbaijan’s violations of the freedom of association through undue restrictions and misuse of NGO legislation, resulting in the persecution of civil society and curtailing of its work; calls on the Azerbaijani Government to repeal the restrictive NGO and media legislation and ensure that civil society can operate without undue hindrance or fear of reprisals and persecution;

10. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to peace, stability and prosperity in the Caucasus region; underlines its unequivocal support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan; expresses support for the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the goal of achieving lasting peace; encourages both countries to continue to make progress on finalising an agreement and signing a peace deal as soon as possible;

7. Encourages the Commission to review its approach to supporting human rights in Azerbaijan and recommends a reassessment of its funding mechanisms for Azerbaijani independent civil society and media, aligning them more closely with the strategies used to support these sectors in Belarus;

11. Believes that genuine dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia is the only sustainable way forward and calls for the EU and its Member States to support such efforts, which must include the mutual recognition of territorial integrity, guarantees for the rights and security of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population and the release of the remaining prisoners, including the former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, and an end to the sham trials against them;

8. Condemns the continued repression of the right to freedom of assembly, for instance in the case of anti-pollution protests in the village of Soyudlu in 2023, which were quashed by security forces using violence and arrests;

12. Stresses that EU involvement in the region should be practical and result-oriented, unlike the role played by Russia, which for decades has fuelled the conflict and used it for its own political gain; welcomes the fact that Armenia has frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization; underlines that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave of Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia;

9. Calls on the Azerbaijani Government to swiftly comply with long-standing recommendations of the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on the subject of the widespread recourse to physical ill treatment (including, on occasion, torture) by the police in Azerbaijan;

13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the UN and the Council of Europe.

10. Calls on the Azerbaijani Government to implement all decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, reminds it of its obligations to respect human dignity and fundamental freedoms and calls on it to repeal repressive legislation on the registration and funding of NGOs, to bring it in line with Venice Commission recommendations;

11. Deeply regrets statements by various Commission representatives, including President Ursula von der Leyen, calling Azerbaijan a ‘reliable partner’ in the field of energy; insists that, in the interest of its geopolitical security, integrity and pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals, the EU end its reliance on fossil-fuel-rich authoritarian countries once and for all;

12. Reiterates its denunciation of Azerbaijan’s systematic bribery of European politicians, including in the context of PACE;

13. Considers that the ongoing human rights violations in Azerbaijan are incompatible with the country’s role as COP29 host; urges the EU and the Member States to use COP29 as an occasion for the international community to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to condemn and address in a meaningful way Azerbaijan’s human rights violations in interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities in Baku during COP29; calls on delegates attending COP29 on behalf of the EU and the Member States, in particular President Ursula von der Leyen, to make public and private calls for the immediate and unconditional release of arbitrarily detained journalists, activists and human rights defenders and to request meetings with political prisoners while in the country;

14. Stresses the fact that Azerbaijan will host COP29 on behalf of the UN Regional Group of Eastern European States, which includes EU Member States, and that they cannot allow the Azerbaijani Government to use the occasion to whitewash its image and human rights track record; demands that the organisers and the Member States make clear to the Azerbaijani authorities how important a thriving and independent civil society is to the conference’s success, and ensure that human rights, fundamental freedoms and the effective participation of civil society are guaranteed during the event;

15. Calls for the EU and the Member States to prioritise, in line with Article 21 TEU, addressing Azerbaijan’s appalling human rights situation in their relations with the country and introducing stronger human rights conditions in the EU’s relations with Azerbaijan; calls for the EU’s economic and political ties with and support for Azerbaijan, including any cooperation on energy, to be made conditional on the release of all political prisoners, reform of laws and regulations governing NGOs and their funding, and the improvement of the overall human rights situation in the country; insists, in this regard, that the EU and the Member States suspend all energy trade relations with Azerbaijan, including the MoU on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy, and make any reinstatement conditional on meeting the above requirements;

16. Calls on the Commission to investigate options for imposing targeted sanctions under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on those individuals responsible for the grave and consistent human rights violations in Azerbaijan;

17. Welcomes, separately, the ongoing negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on all pending issues with the aim of concluding a peace treaty, and calls on both parties to remain fully committed to a lasting and peaceful settlement of the long-standing dispute, through dialogue and negotiations; believes that an agreement between these two countries needs to be negotiated in good faith and be based on the recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-use of force; recalls that, meanwhile, all rights of the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan must be safeguarded and calls for all prisoners of war to be released in line with the 1949 Third Geneva Convention;

18. Urges the Commission and the Council to ensure the EU’s ability to credibly and effectively continue supporting the negotiations directed at a lasting peace for the benefit of all people in the region;

19. Calls on Türkiye to take more diplomatic responsibility in the region by actively contributing to the promotion of peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and by playing a constructive role in facilitating a lasting and peaceful resolution of the conflict;

20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President and Parliament of Azerbaijan and the President, Prime Minister and Parliament of Armenia.