What changed

B100141/2024

B100136/2024

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

(2024/2890(RSP))

(2024/2980(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous reports and resolutions on Azerbaijan and Armenia,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Armenia and Azerbaijan, in particular those of 20 May 2021 on prisoners of war in the aftermath of the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, of 10 March 2022 on the destruction of cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh, of 19 January 2023 on the humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh, of 14 September 2023 on the case of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, imprisoned in Azerbaijan, of 13 March 2024 on closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and of 25 April 2024 on Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, ratified by Azerbaijan in 2002,

– having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 22 April 1996 between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part,

– having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

– having regard to the joint statement of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan of 7 December 2023,

– having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part, signed on 22 April 1996,

– having regard to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group’s 2009 Basic Principles,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas 300 people remain in detention in Azerbaijan on politically motivated charges; whereas prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, Anar Mammadli, has been in pre-trial detention since 30 April 2024 on bogus charges of conspiracy to bring illegal foreign currency into the country and his health has deteriorated significantly while in custody; whereas economist and political activist Gubad Ibadoghlu was moved to house arrest on 22 April 2024 after 274 days in detention;

A. whereas from 11 to 22 November 2024 Azerbaijan will host the 29th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29); whereas respect for fundamental human rights and civil society participation are enshrined in the host country agreement through which the Azerbaijani Government committed to uphold these rights;

B. whereas Azerbaijan has also intensified its repression against the remaining independent media, such as Abzas Media and Toplum TV, through detentions and judicial harassment;

B. whereas for more than a decade and with increasing determination Azerbaijani authorities have been reducing space for civil society, arbitrarily closing down non-governmental organisations and arresting or forcing into exile civil society representatives;

C. whereas the Azerbaijani laws regulating the registration, operation and funding of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are highly restrictive and arbitrarily implemented, thus effectively criminalising unregistered NGO activity;

C. whereas since the announcement that Azerbaijan would host COP29, control of critical voices has increased, resulting in the arrest, arbitrary detention and prosecution of civil society activists, journalists and media workers, including foreign journalists;

D. whereas Freedom House’s 2024 index ranks Azerbaijan among the least free countries in the world, below Russia and Belarus;

D. whereas an estimated 300 people are currently being detained on politically motivated charges, including human rights defenders, journalists, academics, peaceful protesters, lawyers and political and other activists; whereas they are being held in conditions that do not meet international human rights standards and they are often denied access to their family members, lawyers and adequate medical care;

E. whereas on 19 September 2023, after a nine-month illegal blockade of the Lachin corridor and disregarding both the commitments it made in the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020 and an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling, Azerbaijan launched an offensive on the remaining parts of Nagorno-Karabakh not already under its control;

E. whereas the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) decided in January 2024 not to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation, noting its ‘very serious concerns as to …[Azerbaijan’s] respect for human rights’; whereas the PACE noted that its Monitoring Committee’s rapporteurs were not allowed to meet with people who had been detained on allegedly politically motivated charges, and that the Azerbaijani delegation refused to allow the rapporteur for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to visit the country;

F. whereas more than 100 000 Armenians had to flee the territory, including 30 000 children, resulting in Nagorno-Karabakh being almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this amounts to ethnic cleansing;

F. whereas Azerbaijan has implemented a systematic policy of bribing officials and elected representatives in Europe in order to downplay Azerbaijan’s human rights record and to silence critics, as part of a widely used strategy described as ‘caviar diplomacy’; whereas some cases have been investigated and some of those involved have been prosecuted and convicted by national courts in several EU Member States;

G. whereas the Russian peacekeeping force did not act in accordance with its mandate, as laid down in the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020, taking no action against Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor, the establishment of the Azerbaijani checkpoint at the entrance to the corridor or the offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023;

G. whereas Azerbaijan has been actively involved in destabilisation campaigns against the national politics of Member States, as recently observed and well-documented in New Caledonia, where it has conducted disinformation operations and provided support for rioters;

H. whereas the Azerbaijani leadership continues to make irredentist statements with reference to the sovereign territory of Armenia; whereas the Azerbaijani army continues to occupy no less than 170 km2 of the sovereign territory of Armenia;

H. whereas on 3 July 2024, the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) publicly denounced Azerbaijan’s ‘refusal to improve the situation in the light of the Committee’s recommendations’ and the ‘persistent lack of cooperation of the Azerbaijani authorities with the CPT’,

1. Stresses its profound concern regarding the human rights situation in Azerbaijan;

I. whereas Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, a renowned political economist, anti-corruption activist and chairperson of the Azerbaijan Democracy and Prosperity Movement, who is due to start his visiting scholarship at Technische Universität in Dresden, was arbitrarily detained on 23 July 2023, kept in prison on dubious charges with limited contact with his family and lawyer and reportedly subjected to inhumane treatment; whereas since Parliament’s resolutions of 14 September 2023 and 25 April 2024, his health has further deteriorated due to the inadequate treatment of his serious medical condition, poor detention conditions and inhumane treatment; whereas on 22 April 2024 Dr Ibadoghlu was moved to house arrest, where he is being kept under constant police surveillance without being allowed to communicate with doctors, while his health condition still gives rise to serious concerns for his life; whereas on 17 October 2024 Dr Ibadoghlu was shortlisted for the 2024 Sakharov Prize;

2. Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all human rights defenders, journalists, environmental, political and other activists prosecuted under fabricated and or politically motivated charges; recalls in this context the names of Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, as well as human rights defenders and journalists including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali and Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli and Farid Ismayilov; underlines that since April 2024, Azerbaijan has carried out further arrests of civil society activists on bogus charges, including Farid Mehralizade, Igbal Abilov, Bahruz Samadov, Emin Ibrahimov and Famil Khalilov;

J. whereas on 4 December 2023 human rights activist Ilhamiz Guliyev was arrested on politically motivated charges a few months after he gave an anonymous interview to AbzasMedia about the alleged police practice of planting drugs on political activists;

3. Recalls the need to lift the travel ban in force against Gubad Ibadoghlu and drop all charges against him, and calls on Azerbaijan urgently to ensure an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing, and allow him to receive treatment abroad;

K. whereas charges have been brought against numerous independent journalists who remain in prison or in pre-trial detention, while independent media outlets such as AbzasMedia, Kanal 13, Toplum TV and others have been shut down after key members of their staff were arrested on politically motivated charges;

4. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect human dignity and fundamental freedoms in accordance with their international commitments and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent NGOs and media to the margins of the law;

L. whereas Dr Ibadoghlu’s research found that Azerbaijan was highly unlikely to be able to increase its natural gas production sufficiently in order to fulfil its promise to provide gas to the EU as set out in the strategic partnership for energy; whereas Azerbaijan’s increased Russian gas imports are a cause for concern as to whether Azerbaijan can replace Russia as a gas supplier, as Baku, unable to meet European demand, may relabel Russian gas as Azerbaijani for European consumption;

5. Calls for the EU to impose sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia;

M. whereas on 19 September 2023 Azerbaijan launched an unjustified attack against Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in several hundred casualties, the death of civilians, and the majority of the population fleeing from their homes; whereas this forced displacement of the population and offensive against the civilian population represent a de facto ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh and gross violations of international law and human rights, which may amount to crimes against humanity;

6. Recalls that the 1996 EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is the legal basis for bilateral relations, is based on respect for democracy and the principles of international law and human rights and that these have been systematically violated in Azerbaijan;

N. whereas in December 2023 a joint statement of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan brought about the release of 32 Armenian prisoners of war, expressed the commitment of both countries to continue their discussions regarding the implementation of more confidence-building measures, and called on the international community to support their efforts that would contribute to building mutual trust between the two countries and positively impact the entire South Caucasus region;

7. Reiterates the EU’s unequivocal support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Armenia; strongly supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders based on the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration;

1. Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to address the deteriorating human rights situation in the country ahead of COP29 and to show its commitment to fundamental rights and to fundamental principles of democracy, justice, the rule of law and human dignity;

8. Recalls its previous condemnation of the pre-planned and unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan of 19-20 September 2023 against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to the expulsion of the entirety of the ethnic Armenian community which had been living there for centuries, amounting to ethnic cleansing; recalls that this attack resulted in the complete dissolution of the structures of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and the establishment of full Azerbaijani control over the region; demands the release of all remaining Armenian political prisoners and prisoners of war;

2. Denounces the reported violations of the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, the reprisals against human rights defenders and journalists, the widespread violations of the right to a fair trial, and the abuse of the criminal justice system for political purposes;

9. Reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of the sovereign territory of Armenia; rejects and expresses its grave concern regarding the irredentist and inflammatory statements made by the Azerbaijani President and other Azerbaijani officials threatening the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Armenia; warns Azerbaijan against any potential military adventurism against Armenia proper; highlights that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave of Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia;

3. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all human rights defenders, activists, journalists and government critics imprisoned in retaliation for their human rights work and dissenting views; demands that freedom of the press and expression be guaranteed and that media organisations not be restricted; calls, therefore, on the Azerbaijani Government to release journalists working for AbzasMedia, including Ulvi Hasanli and Sevinj Vagifqizi, and Alasgar Mammadli who works for Toplum TV;

10. Calls on Azerbaijan to genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with the Karabakh Armenians to ensure respect for their rights and guarantee their security, including their right to return to and live in their homes in dignity and safety, overseen by an international presence, to access their land and property rights, to maintain their distinct identity and to fully enjoy their civic, cultural, social and religious rights;

4. Deplores the crackdown on civil society, as documented by Amnesty International, around major international events hosted by Azerbaijan, including Eurovision 2012 and the 2015 European Games;

11. Calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee within the European institutions to identify or develop international mechanisms to guarantee the collective, safe, dignified and sustainable return of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh to their ancestral land; calls for the creation of a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the reports and resolutions adopted by Parliament on Nagorno-Karabakh;

5. Takes note of the statements of the electoral observation mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, according to which Azerbaijan’s presidential and early parliamentary elections of February and September 2024 did not offer voters genuine political alternatives and took place within a legal framework that overly restricted fundamental freedoms and the media;

12. Urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destroying, neglecting or altering the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region, bearing in mind the destruction of cultural, religious and historical heritage that has occurred since the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and calls on it to instead strive to preserve, protect and promote this rich diversity; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments;

6. Reiterates its grave concern over the detention of anti-corruption activist and academic Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, who was held in pre-trial detention for almost one year despite his deteriorating health, moved to house arrest on 22 April 2024 and continues to be deprived of liberty, and who is not allowed to leave Azerbaijan to receive the medical care he requires; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and on the Member States to actively call for the release of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to drop all charges against him, release him immediately from house arrest and allow him to leave the country on humanitarian grounds to receive urgently needed medical treatment abroad;

13. Recognises the urgent need to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Armenia in the field of security and defence; welcomes the fact that Armenia has frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization; notes the added value of regular EU-Armenian Political and Security Dialogues, as an umbrella platform for all security related matters; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges other Member States to consider similar initiatives;

7. Expresses its concern over the case of Anar Mammadli, a prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, who was arrested on 29 April 2024 and placed in pre-trial detention, and who faces charges of conspiracy in apparent retaliation for his criticism of the government and his activism; calls for his release from prison;

14. Expresses its support for the decision of Armenia to discontinue the presence of Russian Federal Security Service border guards at the international airport in Yerevan, and its understanding for the suspension of relations with Belarus;

8. Deplores the arbitrary detention of human rights defender Ilhamiz Guliyev and opposition leader Tofig Yagublu and calls for their immediate and unconditional release;

15. Calls for the EU to end its dependency on gas exports from Azerbaijan; is seriously concerned about Azerbaijan’s import of Russian gas and the substantial Russian share in the production and transportation of Azerbaijani gas for the EU, which contradicts the EU’s objective of undermining Russia’s capacity to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine by cutting its revenues from oil and gas exports to the EU; urges the Commission to investigate suspicions that Azerbaijan actually exports Russian gas to the EU;

9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to impose targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for human rights violations and systematic repression against civil society in Azerbaijan, as well as on Azerbaijani officials responsible for the ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh;

16. Calls for the suspension of all imports of oil and gas from Azerbaijan to the EU; recalls its demand, in the light of Azerbaijan’s 2023 invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh, for the suspension of the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy between the European Union and Azerbaijan;

10. Reiterates its call for independent investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh that could amount to war crimes; calls, further, on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh and to offer solid promises regarding the protection of their rights and protection from intimidation and discrimination, guaranteed and monitored by an international presence;

17. Supports all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement; believes that if a peace agreement is to be lasting, it requires genuine engagement from the parties, not the escalation of rhetoric and demands; welcomes the recent achievement in the Commission on Delimitation and Border Security of a preliminary agreement on the delimitation of several sectors of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border;

11. Highlights the importance of providing continuous support to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who were displaced in September 2023 and beforehand through direct humanitarian aid and budget support for the Armenian Government; calls for the EU, in this regard, to provide a new package of assistance to Armenia to help the Armenian Government address the humanitarian needs of refugees;

18. Welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; takes good note of Armenia’s European aspirations, as expressed by the Armenian foreign minister, among others; recalls its previous position that, pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any European state may apply to become a member of the European Union provided that it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respects fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights, and upholds the rule of law; considers that, should Armenia be interested in applying for candidate status and continuing on its current path of sustained reforms consolidating its democracy, this could set the stage for a transformative phase in EU-Armenia relations; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU, not only in the area of economic partnership but also in political dialogue, people-to-people contacts, sectoral integration and security cooperation; believes that the experience stemming from the Association Agreements / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova should serve as a good basis for closer EU-Armenia cooperation, in particular in relation to a gradual sectoral integration with the single market;

12. Calls on the Azerbaijani Government to immediately and unconditionally release all remaining Armenian prisoners of war, hostages and captives, and to ensure transparency regarding the situation of detainees from Nagorno-Karabakh;

19. Welcomes the decision of 22 July 2024 to launch the visa liberalisation dialogue with Armenia, which is the first step towards achieving a visa free regime for short stays in the EU; welcomes further the decision to adopt the first assistance measure under the European Peace Facility (EPF) in support of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, worth EUR 10 million; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan;

13. Strongly condemns the destruction of Armenian cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; calls on Azerbaijan to refrain from destroying this heritage in the region and calls for the protection of this heritage in line with UNESCO standards, including through the authorisation of a UNESCO mission to the area;

20. Condemns the Baku Initiative Group’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise EU Member States; condemns in particular its support for irredentist groups and disinformation operations targeting France, especially in the French departments and territories of New Caledonia, Martinique and Corsica; recalls that these methods were used against Germany in 2013; denounces the smear campaigns targeting Denmark; strongly opposes the allegations made by Ilham Aliyev himself at the Baku Initiative Group meeting in Baku in November 2023;

14. Calls for thorough investigations into serious risks of Russian gas laundering through Azerbaijan and into the Azerbaijani authorities’ facilitation of Russia’s circumvention of EU sanctions, which would severely contradict EU foreign policy objectives; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the circumvention of sanctions by non-EU states; calls on the Council to design a new horizontal sanctions regime to counter this circumvention, which will require a more general and holistically applicable instrument to target circumvention in all regimes implemented by the EU;

21. Condemns the arbitrary arrests of EU citizens based on spurious accusations of espionage and their disproportionate sentencing;

15. Insists that any partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan – including on energy – must have strong conditions attached on the respect of international law, fundamental rights and international obligations, in particular on Azerbaijan making substantial progress towards a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement with Armenia; calls on the Commission, consequently, to urgently assess and review the 2022 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy and to act accordingly;

22. Regrets the smear campaign aimed at damaging France’s reputation by calling into question its capacity to host the 2024 Olympic Games, launched by actors suspected of being close to the Azerbaijani regime;

16. Calls on the VP/HR to suspend the negotiations for a renewed partnership agreement until Azerbaijan has demonstrated its genuine readiness to faithfully engage in the negotiation of a peace agreement with Armenia and to respect the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians;

23. Strongly condemns the intimidation, death threats and assassination attempts against opponents of the Azerbaijani Government, including in EU countries, and against Azerbaijani citizens who have been granted political asylum by Member States, such as Mahammad Mirzali in France; calls on the Member States to cooperate, if necessary, in the investigation into the murder, in September 2024, of Vidadi Isgandarli, an Azerbaijani political opponent residing in France; stresses that for the Member States, preventing any act of retaliation on their territory is a matter of democracy, human rights, security and sovereignty; insists that Europol should closely monitor this matter;

17. Confirms its full and strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan; condemns any military aggression, use of force or hybrid threats against Armenia, as well as foreign interference and attempts to destabilise the political situation in Armenia; welcomes the assistance measures under the European Peace Facility in support of the Armenian armed forces and calls for the cooperation between Armenia and the EU to be further reinforced in security and defence; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges the Member States to consider similar initiatives;

24. Strongly condemns the public insults and direct threats made by Azerbaijani diplomatic or government representatives, or members of the Azerbaijani Parliament, targeting elected officials of EU Member States; demands, in this regard, that access for all Azerbaijani officials to EU institutional buildings be denied until further notice;

18. Urges Azerbaijan and Armenia to advance towards full normalisation of their relations on all pending issues and to promptly conclude a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement; calls on Azerbaijan to demonstrate genuine efforts to this end and invites the VP/HR to continue to support efforts towards a comprehensive peace treaty;

25. Welcomes the fact that the Republic of Armenia formally deposited the instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2023 and that the statute entered into force for Armenia on 1 February 2024;

19. Welcomes the joint Armenia-Azerbaijan statement of 7 December 2023 on confidence-building measures; firmly believes that such measures can benefit the overall peace process and pave the way for increased trust between the two sides; welcomes the progress made in the framework of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process, which has led to an agreement on several sections of the border; encourages both sides to take further steps on the remaining sections;

26. Deplores steps taken by Azerbaijan towards the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, which are against international law and the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984); calls on Azerbaijan to respect the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and to not invite the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus to any meetings of the Organization of Turkic States;

20. Calls on EU and Member State officials and elected representatives taking part in COP29 in Baku not to turn a blind eye to human rights violations in the country and to use the momentum of the conference to increase diplomatic pressure on the Azerbaijani regime to respect fundamental rights and freedoms, release all political prisoners and return Armenian hostages;

27.21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the MemberPresident, StatesGovernment and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of Azerbaijan.the Republic of Armenia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe.