What changed

B100140/2024

B100137/2024

European Parliament resolution on the People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previousrecommendation resolutionsof on21 October 2021 to the People’sVice-President Republicof the Commission / High Representative of Chinathe (PRC)Union for Foreign Affairs and Taiwan,Security Policy on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation,

– having regard to the Strategic Compassits forresolution Securityof and15 Defence,September approved2022 byon the Councilsituation onin 21the MarchStrait 2022,of Taiwan,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),

– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations,

– having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy,

– having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific,

– having regard to theits statementresolution of 2316 September 2024 by the Chair of2021 theon G7a Foreignnew Ministers’EU-China Meeting,strategy,

– having regard to the joint declaration by the G7 Defence Ministers of 19 October 2024,

– having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,

– having regard to the motion on UN Resolution 2758 passed by the Dutch House of Representatives on 12 September 2024,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,

– having regard to the EU-China summit of 7 December 2023,

– having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions on China of 30 June 2023,

– having regard to the EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),

– having regard to the visits of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 25 to 27 July 2023 and of the Committee on International Trade of 19 to 21 December 2022 to Taiwan,

– having regard to the press statements by the Spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on China’s military drills around Taiwan, including the most recent statement of 14 October 2024,

– having regard to the press statement by the US Department of State of 13 October 2024,

– having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statements of 18 April 2023 and of 3 August 2022 on preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,

– having regard the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to the press statement of 1 September 2024 by the Spokesperson of the High Representative on the latest dangerous actions by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the South China Sea,

– having regard to the motions passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024 and by the Dutch House of Representatives on 12 September 2024,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas UN Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly on 25 October 1971 and shifted official recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC);

A. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; whereas the EU continues to maintain its principled ‘One China’ policy position;

B. whereas since then, most countries have shifted recognition from Taiwan to the PRC; whereas today, Taiwan, while not being a member of the UN, maintains diplomatic relations with 11 of the 193 UN member states, and with the Holy See;

B. whereas UN Resolution 2758, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1971, recognises the PRC as the ‘only lawful representative’ of China; whereas UN Resolution 2758 does not state that the PRC has sovereignty over Taiwan; whereas the PRC has used UN Resolution 2758 to represent Taiwan in the UN system based on the ‘One China’ principle and on the claims that Taiwan is part of the PRC; whereas the PRC seeks to establish a legal basis to undermine Taiwan’s aim to actively participate in the UN system;

C. whereas following the adoption of UN Resolution 2758, Taiwan lost its right to participate in multilateral forums, such as the World Health Organization;

C. whereas on the occasion of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, Taiwan sought to enhance international understanding of UN Resolution 2758; whereas Taiwan claims that this resolution does not mention Taiwan and thus does not concern Taiwan; whereas this resolution neither states that Taiwan is part of China, as claimed by the PRC, nor gives China the right to represent Taiwan at the UN;

D. whereas through their statement of 23 September 2024, the G7 members, among other things, underlined their support for ‘Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is’;

D. whereas Taiwan claims that UN Resolution 2758 does not preclude Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the UN system; whereas Taiwan called on the UN Secretariat to adopt a strictly neutral stance and stop erroneously citing UN Resolution 2758; whereas Taiwan further called on the UN Secretariat to grant Taiwanese nationals and journalists the right to access UN premises for visits, meetings and newsgathering activities;

E. whereas in recent years, the PRC has deliberately distorted UN Resolution 2758, persistently claiming that the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle allegedly has international endorsement through this resolution, which would entail that Taiwan is part of the PRC;

E. whereas the Dutch Parliament passed a motion by a majority on UN Resolution 2758, rejecting Beijing’s distortion of the resolution and calling on the Dutch Government to seek support for this position within the EU; whereas the Australian Senate unanimously passed an urgency motion on UN Resolution 2758, challenging Beijing’s interpretation and supporting Taiwan’s international status;

F. whereas the EU continues to maintain its own ‘One China’ policy position, which is different from the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle; whereas the EU’s long-standing position has been to support the status quo and a peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait, while encouraging dialogue and constructive engagement;

F. whereas in recent years, the PRC has sent warships and warplanes to the waters and skies around Taiwan as a demonstration of force and intimidation; whereas a record number of Chinese warplanes flew close to Taiwan during military drills on 14 October 2024, crossing the median line and entering Taiwan’s air defence identification zone; whereas these military exercises involved Chinese drones, 14 detected warships and coastguard vessels simulating a blockade of Taiwan;

G. whereas Taiwan has never been part of the PRC; whereas the Republic of China was established in 1912 and the PRC was established in 1949;

G. whereas these activities were condemned by Taiwan as an ‘unreasonable provocation’ and are the latest in a series of war games conducted by the PRC against Taiwan; whereas these military drills were intended as a ‘stern warning’ towards the pro-independence forces in Taiwan and came just days after Taiwan’s new President, Lai Ching-te, gave a speech vowing to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty in the face of challenges from the PRC;

H. whereas over the past decade, the PRC has persistently tried to increase its influence over international institutions, using this to sideline Taiwan and prevent Taiwanese passport holders, including journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and political activists, from accessing international institutions; whereas the PRC exercises transnational repression by misusing extradition treaties to target Taiwanese people abroad and therefore put them at risk of arbitrary persecution and human rights abuses;

H. whereas the Chinese Government responded that, although it is willing to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with Taiwan as part of its plans for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, the PRC will never commit to renouncing the use of force over Taiwan; whereas these events demonstrate once more that China is in the process of keeping Taiwan under pressure and of normalising war actions aimed at shifting the status quo in the Taiwan Strait;

I. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share common values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

I. whereas the press statements by the High Representative and the US Department of State reaffirm that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are of strategic importance for regional and global security and prosperity; whereas the High Representative’s press statement recalls the need to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, to oppose any unilateral actions that change the status quo by force or coercion and to call on all parties to exercise restraint and avoid any actions that may further escalate cross-Strait tensions;

J. whereas Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, with a flourishing civil society; whereas Taiwan held peaceful and well-organised elections on 13 January 2024;

J. whereas China’s recent joint military activities around Taiwan further increase cross-Strait tensions and represent a serious threat to the stability and security of the Indo-Pacific region; whereas these drills threaten Taiwan and international waterways and challenge the rules-based international order; whereas the joint communication on an EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific addresses the security challenges in the Taiwan Strait and their impact on stability and peace in the region; whereas these new developments have reinforced the urgent need for active EU engagement to contribute to lowering regional tensions;

K. whereas the PRC is a one-party state that is entirely controlled and ruled by the Chinese Communist Party; whereas the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is the military of the Chinese Communist Party and not an army of the PRC’s Government;

K. whereas former NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, said that what happened in Ukraine could happen in Taiwan next; whereas EU and US deterrence is of strategic importance to dissuade the PRC from undertaking any unilateral actions against Taiwan; whereas the EU should draw lessons from the war in Ukraine and start developing a series of scenarios to adequately respond to a PRC invasion of Taiwan;

L. whereas on 14 October 2024, the PRC launched a large-scale military drill, named Joint Sword-2024B, that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas during this exercise, a record number of 153 PRC aircraft,18 warships and 17 PRC coastguard ships were detected around Taiwan;

L. whereas the PRC’s claim of sovereignty and its assertiveness in the East and South China Seas have steadily increased, resulting in heightened tensions with Southeast Asian states; whereas Chinese and Southeast Asian leaders have failed to resolve the disputes diplomatically;

M. whereas on 23 May 2024, the PRC launched a military drill called Joint Sword-2024A, coming just days after the inauguration of Lai Ching-te as the new President of Taiwan;

M. whereas the EU has condemned the dangerous actions by Chinese coastguard vessels against lawful Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea on 31 August 2024; whereas this incident is the latest in a series of actions endangering the safety of life at sea and violating the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in compliance with international law; whereas maritime security and freedom of navigation must be ensured in accordance with international law and, in particular, UNCLOS;

N. whereas over the past years, the PRC has held similar military drills around Taiwan; whereas these military drills have increased in intensity and have been moved closer and closer to Taiwan’s mainland; whereas during a previous drill in August 2022, the PRC also fired missiles into the exclusive economic zone of Japan;

N. whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade, notably in high-tech supply chains; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas Taiwan dominates the semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan;

O. whereas on top of military pressure, the PRC has long been pursuing a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference, including hybrid and cyber attacks with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;

O. whereas Taiwan was the EU’s 13th biggest trading partner in 2023; whereas its total goods trade with the EU reached EUR 77.7 billion in 2023; whereas in 2023, EU exports to and imports from Taiwan amounted to EUR 30.5 billion and EUR 47.8 billion respectively; whereas the Commission established a European Economic and Trade Office in Taipei in 2003;

P. whereas the PRC, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan; whereas the PRC is engaging in a historically unprecedented military build-up that is continuously shifting the power balance in the Indo-Pacific; whereas this is negatively affecting cross-Strait stability;

1. Reaffirms the commitment of the EU and the international community to maintaining the rules-based international order and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the Indo-Pacific region; highlights its commitment to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy as the political foundation of EU-China relations;

Q. whereas the PRC is supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through the exportation of dual-use goods to Russia, and the ongoing involvement of PRC-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention;

2. Considers Taiwan a key economic partner and a democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region; commends Taiwan as an outstanding partner in promoting human rights and democratic values in the region; reiterates its calls for the EU to enhance its existing partnership with Taiwan, to promote common values and principles;

R. whereas in a speech on 10 October 2024, Taiwan’s national day, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te stated that the PRC has ‘no right to represent Taiwan’ and reiterated that the two sides are ‘not subordinate’ to each other; whereas the PRC has justified its recent military exercise by claiming that President Lai Ching-te is pursuing a separatist strategy;

3. Condemns the PRC’s continued military actions and any other forms of provocation threatening Taiwan, the status quo between Taiwan and the PRC and more broadly the stability and peace in the region; reaffirms its strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion; calls on all parties to exercise restraint and avoid any actions that may further escalate cross-Strait tensions and to resolve differences through genuine dialogue and peaceful means;

S. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security; whereas the PRC has for many years promoted an alternative narrative, challenging democratic values, open markets and the rules-based international order; whereas the PRC’s growing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in international institutions;

4. Further condemns the disproportionate reaction of the PRC on 14 October 2024 following Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s speech vowing to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty; is extremely concerned, in particular, by the scale of the military demonstrations of the People’s Liberation Army, involving 14 warships and more than 153 warplanes; expresses grave concern about the PRC’s frequent violations of Taiwan’s air defence identification zone and calls on the PRC to put an immediate end to these intrusions; deplores the PRC’s use of the Taiwanese President’s speech as another pretext for more aggressive military activities in the Taiwan Strait;

T. whereas through its 2021 strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the EU and its Member States increased their presence in the region, including a higher military presence and the continued passage of military ships through the Taiwan Strait;

5. Condemns the statement by the Chinese authorities underlining that the PRC will never commit to renouncing the use of force over Taiwan due to the interference of ‘external forces’ and the very small number of Taiwan separatists, and that actions to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity will not cease for a moment;

U. whereas the EU is Taiwan’s fourth largest trading partner after the PRC, the United States and Japan; whereas in 2022, Taiwan was the EU’s 12th biggest trading partner; whereas the EU is the largest source of foreign direct investment in Taiwan; whereas Taiwanese investments in the EU remain below their potential;

6. Calls on the authorities of the PRC to put an immediate end to the aggressive rhetoric and military threats and actions directed at Taiwan; condemns China’s diplomacy of intimidation and manipulative disinformation campaigns; praises the courage of the Taiwanese people and the proportionate and dignified reactions of the Taiwanese authorities and institutions in the face of intensifying Chinese threats and activities;

V. whereas members of the Australian Senate and of the Dutch House of Representatives have recently adopted motions concerning the distortion of UN Resolution 2758 by the PRC, and called for support for Taiwan’s greater participation in multilateral organisations;

7. Expresses grave concern about China’s ability to mount a full-scale invasion of Taiwan; calls for the EU, the international community and like-minded partners to actively engage with and step up the pressure on China to prevent an invasion; calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to prepare response plans in the event of a serious escalation or invasion; expresses the view that the recent military actions and provocations by China cast doubt on its long-term intentions of pursuing a peaceful solution;

1. Reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a like-minded democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region; commends Taiwan and the Taiwanese people for their strong democracy and vibrant civil society, demonstrated once more by the peaceful and well-organised elections of 13 January 2024;

8. Is seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas; recalls the importance of respecting international law, including UNCLOS and, in particular, its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight; calls on all countries that have not done so to swiftly ratify UNCLOS; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their own maritime capacities in the region;

2. Strongly condemns the PRC’s military exercises of 14 October 2024, its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its continued military build-up that is changing the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted;

9. Reaffirms its grave concerns about China’s increasing military investments and capabilities; expresses grave concerns about the renewed Chinese and Russian commitment to further strengthen their military ties and condemns the Chinese supply of components and equipment to Moscow’s military industry; welcomes the Council decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine; deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China; notes, favourably, the increasing commitment and military presence of the US in the Indo-Pacific; reiterates its calls for a coordinated approach to deepen EU-US cooperation on security matters, including through transatlantic parliamentary dialogue;

3. Opposes the PRC’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and its efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change;

10. Welcomes the decision in 2023 to resume military-to-military dialogue between the US and China; supports US engagement with regional allies and key partners to develop a shared vision for the region;

4. Underlines that UN Resolution 2758 takes no position on Taiwan; strongly rejects and refutes the PRC’s attempts to distort history and international rules;

11. Strongly welcomes the close cooperation and alignment of Taiwan with the EU and the US in responding to Russia’s war against Ukraine and issuing sanctions in response to this blatant violation of international law;

5. Strongly underlines that the EU’s ‘One China’ policy corresponds to UN Resolution 2758, while the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle is not endorsed by it;

12. Calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify EU-Taiwan relations and pursue a comprehensive and enhanced partnership under the guidance of the EU’s ‘One China’ policy;

6. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by Chinese President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan; underlines that the PRC’s use of force or threats or other highly coercive measures to achieve unification contradicts international law; recalls that neither Taiwan nor the PRC is subordinate to the other; expresses grave concern over the PRC’s use of hostile disinformation to undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance; reiterates its previous calls for the EU and its Member States to cooperate with international partners in helping to sustain democracy in Taiwan, keeping it free from foreign interference and threats; underlines that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people on the international stage;

13. Calls on the PRC to review its interpretation of UN Resolution 2758 and international law regarding Taiwan’s status and participation in international organisations; invites the Member States and the European External Action Service also to review the EU’s position on Taiwan’s status in international organisations;

7. Condemns the PRC’s systematic grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan, and urges the PRC to halt these activities immediately; calls, in this regard, for cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to be deepened further in order to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference;

14. Recognises the PRC’s abusive interpretation of UN Resolution 2758, with the aim of undermining any peaceful solution between the two parties, and acknowledges its negative effects on Taiwan; is of the opinion that Taiwan could further participate in the work of international organisations and urges the PRC to take a constructive approach in this respect; further calls on the UN Secretariat to grant Taiwanese nationals and journalists the right to access UN premises for visits, meetings and newsgathering activities;

8. Reiterates its call on the Member States to increase the frequency of freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait and to deepen security dialogues with Taiwan to deter Chinese aggression against the democratic island;

15. Urges the Member States and the EU institutions to support international initiatives calling for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in meetings, mechanisms and activities of international bodies, including the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change;

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10. Reiterates its call on the Member States to engage in meaningful and structural technical cooperation with Taiwan in the field of whole-of-society defence;

17. Calls for enhanced parliamentary cooperation between the Taiwanese Parliament and the European Parliament, and with the national parliaments of the Member States;

11. Recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector where Taiwan is the leading producer of semiconductors, and calls for the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan;

18. Urges the PRC not to use economic coercion to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; warns that such tactics may trigger substantive costs for Beijing in terms of its political and economic relationship with the EU;

12. Calls on the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan;

19. Considers Taiwan to be a technologically advanced economy; reiterates its call on the Commission to urgently begin an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan; notes that Taiwan is a full member of the World Trade Organization; recalls the central and essential role of Taiwan in the supply of semiconductors and microchips;

13. Condemns all forms of pressure and threats of reprisals, including economic coercion, regarding the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan, in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights, without foreign interference;

20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the authorities of Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China.

14. Welcomes visits by former and current Taiwanese politicians to Europe, including the recent visit of former President Tsai Ing-wen to the European Parliament on 17 October 2024; welcomes, furthermore, continued exchanges between its Members and Taiwan and encourages further visits by official European Parliament delegations to Taiwan; also encourages further exchanges between the EU and Taiwan at all levels, including political meetings and people-to-people encounters; encourages, in this light, increased economic, scientific and cultural interactions and exchanges, focusing, among other areas, on youth, academia, civil society, sports, culture and education, as well as city-to-city and region-to-region partnerships;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.