What changed

B100137/2024

B100135/2024

European Parliament resolution on the People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

– having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation,

– having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations,

– having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific,

– having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan,

– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,

– having regard to its recommendation of 13 December 2023 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-China relations,

– having regard to the EU-China summit of 71 DecemberApril 2023,2022,

– having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy,

– having regard to the EuropeanStrategic CouncilCompass conclusionsfor onSecurity Chinaand ofDefence, 30approved Juneby 2023,the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the EU’sG7 StrategicForeign CompassMinisters’ forstatement Securityof and3 Defence,August endorsed2022 byon thepreserving Europeanpeace Counciland onstability 24across Marchthe 2022,Taiwan Strait,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),

– having regard to the seventh high-level meeting of the EU-US Dialogue on China and the sixth meeting of the EU-US High-Level Consultations on the Indo-Pacific, which took place on 9 and 10 September 2024,

– having regard to the visitsstatement of the Committee on Foreign AffairsVice-President of 25 tothe 27Commission July/ 2023High andRepresentative of the CommitteeUnion onfor InternationalForeign TradeAffairs ofand 19Security toPolicy 21of December18 2022April to2023 Taiwan,on EU-China relations,

– having regard to the pressjoint statementscommunication byfrom the SpokespersonCommission ofand the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament and the Council of 22 June 2016 entitled ‘Elements for a new EU strategy on China’sChina’ military(JOIN(2016)0030) drillsand aroundthe Taiwan,joint includingcommunication from the mostCommission recentand statementthe High Representative of 14the OctoberUnion 2024,for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council of 12 March 2019 entitled ‘EU-China – A strategic outlook’ (JOIN(2019)0005),

– having regard to the press statement by the US Department of State of 13 October 2024,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971 on the restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations,

– having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statements of 18 April 2023 and of 3 August 2022 on preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,

– having regard to Article 7 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), concluded on 9 May 1992,

– having regard the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to Rule 5 of the Standing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),

– having regard to the press statement of 1 September 2024 by the Spokesperson of the High Representative on the latest dangerous actions by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the South China Sea,

– having regard to Article 4 of the Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol),

– having regard to the motions passed by the AustralianArticle Senate8 onand 21Article August18, 2024paragraph and(h), byof the Dutch HouseConstitution of Representativesthe onWorld 12Health SeptemberOrganization 2024,(WHO),

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; whereas the EU continues to maintain its principled ‘One China’ policy position;

A. whereas many of the most important global issues, such as the fight against climate change, the preservation of human health, the regulation of air navigation and the suppression of transnational crime, require multilateral cooperation involving all countries and stakeholders;

B. whereas UN Resolution 2758, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1971, recognises the PRC as the ‘only lawful representative’ of China; whereas UN Resolution 2758 does not state that the PRC has sovereignty over Taiwan; whereas the PRC has used UN Resolution 2758 to represent Taiwan in the UN system based on the ‘One China’ principle and on the claims that Taiwan is part of the PRC; whereas the PRC seeks to establish a legal basis to undermine Taiwan’s aim to actively participate in the UN system;

B. whereas the statutes of most international organisations tasked with addressing these global issues, including the WHO, the UNFCCC, Interpol and the ICAO, provide opportunities for non-state entities to participate without infringing the rights of member states;

C. whereas on the occasion of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, Taiwan sought to enhance international understanding of UN Resolution 2758; whereas Taiwan claims that this resolution does not mention Taiwan and thus does not concern Taiwan; whereas this resolution neither states that Taiwan is part of China, as claimed by the PRC, nor gives China the right to represent Taiwan at the UN;

C. whereas Taiwan has established a vibrant political system with pluralism and a thriving democracy, has consistently demonstrated a peaceful and cooperative attitude globally, has significantly enhanced global developments and thus could contribute greatly to the work of various international organisations;

D. whereas Taiwan claims that UN Resolution 2758 does not preclude Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the UN system; whereas Taiwan called on the UN Secretariat to adopt a strictly neutral stance and stop erroneously citing UN Resolution 2758; whereas Taiwan further called on the UN Secretariat to grant Taiwanese nationals and journalists the right to access UN premises for visits, meetings and newsgathering activities;

D. whereas UN Resolution 2758 addresses the status of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but does not determine that the PRC enjoys sovereignty over Taiwan, nor does it make any judgement on the future inclusion of Taiwan in the UN or any other international organisation; whereas, however, the PRC continues to misinterpret UN Resolution 2758 to block Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations; whereas these actions highlight the PRC’s ambition to alter the existing multilateral international order and can be seen as an expression of systemic rivalry;

E. whereas the Dutch Parliament passed a motion by a majority on UN Resolution 2758, rejecting Beijing’s distortion of the resolution and calling on the Dutch Government to seek support for this position within the EU; whereas the Australian Senate unanimously passed an urgency motion on UN Resolution 2758, challenging Beijing’s interpretation and supporting Taiwan’s international status;

E. whereas the EU’s commitment to effective multilateralism, with the UN at its core, is central to its external policy, as international cooperation remains indispensable in effectively addressing global crises, threats and challenges; whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; whereas, therefore, the EU has a vital interest in Taiwan’s participation in international organisations, including Interpol, the UNFCCC, the ICAO and the WHO;

F. whereas in recent years, the PRC has sent warships and warplanes to the waters and skies around Taiwan as a demonstration of force and intimidation; whereas a record number of Chinese warplanes flew close to Taiwan during military drills on 14 October 2024, crossing the median line and entering Taiwan’s air defence identification zone; whereas these military exercises involved Chinese drones, 14 detected warships and coastguard vessels simulating a blockade of Taiwan;

F. whereas supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organisations does not undermine the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy, which remains the political foundation of EU-China relations;

G. whereas these activities were condemned by Taiwan as an ‘unreasonable provocation’ and are the latest in a series of war games conducted by the PRC against Taiwan; whereas these military drills were intended as a ‘stern warning’ towards the pro-independence forces in Taiwan and came just days after Taiwan’s new President, Lai Ching-te, gave a speech vowing to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty in the face of challenges from the PRC;

G. whereas the recent military exercises conducted by the PRC in the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan, particularly the drills initiated on 14 October 2024, are of significant concern; whereas these recent exercises, code-named ‘Joint Sword-2024B’, have involved extensive military activities, including 125 aircraft sorties and the mobilisation of 17 naval and coastguard vessels near Taiwan;

H. whereas the Chinese Government responded that, although it is willing to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with Taiwan as part of its plans for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, the PRC will never commit to renouncing the use of force over Taiwan; whereas these events demonstrate once more that China is in the process of keeping Taiwan under pressure and of normalising war actions aimed at shifting the status quo in the Taiwan Strait;

H. whereas the PRC appears to be seeking to perpetuate its overly aggressive actions, trying to erode the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, which may lead to a dangerous escalation, even if unintended, with a severe impact on global stability and peace, including for the EU;

I. whereas the press statements by the High Representative and the US Department of State reaffirm that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are of strategic importance for regional and global security and prosperity; whereas the High Representative’s press statement recalls the need to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, to oppose any unilateral actions that change the status quo by force or coercion and to call on all parties to exercise restraint and avoid any actions that may further escalate cross-Strait tensions;

I. whereas as a global actor and especially as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the PRC has a responsibility to work for peace and stability in the region and particularly in the Taiwan Strait;

J. whereas China’s recent joint military activities around Taiwan further increase cross-Strait tensions and represent a serious threat to the stability and security of the Indo-Pacific region; whereas these drills threaten Taiwan and international waterways and challenge the rules-based international order; whereas the joint communication on an EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific addresses the security challenges in the Taiwan Strait and their impact on stability and peace in the region; whereas these new developments have reinforced the urgent need for active EU engagement to contribute to lowering regional tensions;

J. whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling to Europe from the PRC, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and is thus of vital strategic importance for the EU;

K. whereas former NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, said that what happened in Ukraine could happen in Taiwan next; whereas EU and US deterrence is of strategic importance to dissuade the PRC from undertaking any unilateral actions against Taiwan; whereas the EU should draw lessons from the war in Ukraine and start developing a series of scenarios to adequately respond to a PRC invasion of Taiwan;

K. whereas the EU remains committed to using every available channel to encourage initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building across both sides of the Taiwan Strait;

L. whereas the PRC’s claim of sovereignty and its assertiveness in the East and South China Seas have steadily increased, resulting in heightened tensions with Southeast Asian states; whereas Chinese and Southeast Asian leaders have failed to resolve the disputes diplomatically;

L. whereas the PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law includes the use of non-peaceful means, triggered by ambiguous thresholds, to achieve what the PRC calls ‘unification’ with Taiwan; whereas such military action is a grave threat to the security and stability of the entire region, with potentially dire global consequences;

M. whereas the EU has condemned the dangerous actions by Chinese coastguard vessels against lawful Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea on 31 August 2024; whereas this incident is the latest in a series of actions endangering the safety of life at sea and violating the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in compliance with international law; whereas maritime security and freedom of navigation must be ensured in accordance with international law and, in particular, UNCLOS;

1. Strongly emphasises that UN Resolution 2758 does not mention and therefore does not make any determinations about Taiwan’s future participation in the UN or other international organisations;

N. whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade, notably in high-tech supply chains; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas Taiwan dominates the semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan;

2. Supports Taiwan’s participation in meetings, mechanisms and activities of relevant international organisations, particularly the WHO, the UNFCCC, Interpol and the ICAO, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote Taiwan’s inclusion in these international forums, in accordance with the provisions of their respective statutory rules;

O. whereas Taiwan was the EU’s 13th biggest trading partner in 2023; whereas its total goods trade with the EU reached EUR 77.7 billion in 2023; whereas in 2023, EU exports to and imports from Taiwan amounted to EUR 30.5 billion and EUR 47.8 billion respectively; whereas the Commission established a European Economic and Trade Office in Taipei in 2003;

3. Rejects the institutionalisation and normalisation in the UN of Beijing’s stance on Taiwan; calls on UN bodies to provide transparency on any agreement or pressure exerted by the PRC on the UN to restrict Taiwan’s access to the UN and its facilities, and to deny accreditation to Taiwanese civil society groups and non-governmental organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to push back against such behaviour, while increasing their coordination of and cooperation with excluded Taiwanese groups;

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2. Considers Taiwan a key economic partner and a democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region; commends Taiwan as an outstanding partner in promoting human rights and democratic values in the region; reiterates its calls for the EU to enhance its existing partnership with Taiwan, to promote common values and principles;

5. Underlines that on the democratic island of Taiwan, it is up to the people to decide how they want to live and that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait must not be unilaterally changed by the use or threat of force;

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4. Further condemns the disproportionate reaction of the PRC on 14 October 2024 following Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s speech vowing to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty; is extremely concerned, in particular, by the scale of the military demonstrations of the People’s Liberation Army, involving 14 warships and more than 153 warplanes; expresses grave concern about the PRC’s frequent violations of Taiwan’s air defence identification zone and calls on the PRC to put an immediate end to these intrusions; deplores the PRC’s use of the Taiwanese President’s speech as another pretext for more aggressive military activities in the Taiwan Strait;

7. Reminds the PRC of its responsibilities, as a UN member state, to uphold international law as outlined in the UN Charter, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which emphasises the obligation to resolve disputes peacefully and to maintain freedom of navigation and overflight;

5. Condemns the statement by the Chinese authorities underlining that the PRC will never commit to renouncing the use of force over Taiwan due to the interference of ‘external forces’ and the very small number of Taiwan separatists, and that actions to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity will not cease for a moment;

8. Notes that the PRC’s provocative actions against Taiwan and in the wider region, as well as the PRC’s support for Russia’s illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, have grave consequences for EU-China relations; notes that further escalation would have a detrimental effect on the EU economy, and that contingency planning and mitigation measures must be urgently developed based on likely escalation scenarios; calls, in this context, for stronger cooperation and the sharing of expertise between the EU and Taiwan on issues pertaining to civil-military defence, foreign information manipulation and interference, and emergency relief;

6. Calls on the authorities of the PRC to put an immediate end to the aggressive rhetoric and military threats and actions directed at Taiwan; condemns China’s diplomacy of intimidation and manipulative disinformation campaigns; praises the courage of the Taiwanese people and the proportionate and dignified reactions of the Taiwanese authorities and institutions in the face of intensifying Chinese threats and activities;

9. Firmly rejects the PRC’s economic coercion against Taiwan and other democracies in its region, as well as against EU Member States, and underlines that such practices are not only illegal under World Trade Organization rules, but that they also have a devastating effect on the PRC’s reputation around the world and will lead to a further loss of trust in the PRC as a partner; calls on the missions of the EU and its Member States to expose and call out malign PRC business practices, especially in the Global South;

7. Expresses grave concern about China’s ability to mount a full-scale invasion of Taiwan; calls for the EU, the international community and like-minded partners to actively engage with and step up the pressure on China to prevent an invasion; calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to prepare response plans in the event of a serious escalation or invasion; expresses the view that the recent military actions and provocations by China cast doubt on its long-term intentions of pursuing a peaceful solution;

10. Highlights that the PRC’s various actions in the field of cognitive and legal warfare slowly undermine the status quo, as well as intensifying grey-zone activities that are intended to circumvent detection, existing laws and response thresholds; calls for the EU to establish and enforce its redlines using its toolbox of sanctions, including sectoral sanctions, against hybrid activities and cyberthreats, and to coordinate strong diplomatic and economic deterrence measures with liked-minded partners;

8. Is seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas; recalls the importance of respecting international law, including UNCLOS and, in particular, its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight; calls on all countries that have not done so to swiftly ratify UNCLOS; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their own maritime capacities in the region;

11. Emphasises that the world’s strategic and economic centre of gravity is shifting to the Indo-Pacific, making it imperative for the EU to adopt a clear and credible EU-level approach for this region; calls, therefore, on the Member States to enhance their economic and diplomatic presence across the Indo-Pacific region, including in Taiwan;

9. Reaffirms its grave concerns about China’s increasing military investments and capabilities; expresses grave concerns about the renewed Chinese and Russian commitment to further strengthen their military ties and condemns the Chinese supply of components and equipment to Moscow’s military industry; welcomes the Council decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine; deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China; notes, favourably, the increasing commitment and military presence of the US in the Indo-Pacific; reiterates its calls for a coordinated approach to deepen EU-US cooperation on security matters, including through transatlantic parliamentary dialogue;

12. Applauds the increase in freedom of navigation exercises conducted by several EU countries, including France, the Netherlands and Germany; notes that these activities are in line with international law and calls for more cooperation and coordination with regional partners to increase freedom of navigation operations in the region;

10. Welcomes the decision in 2023 to resume military-to-military dialogue between the US and China; supports US engagement with regional allies and key partners to develop a shared vision for the region;

13. Recognises that gestures of support, such as parliamentary visits, are valuable, and believes that they can contribute to deterrence if paired with substantive cooperation in other fields; underlines, in this context, its intention to send future official parliamentary delegations to Taiwan;

11. Strongly welcomes the close cooperation and alignment of Taiwan with the EU and the US in responding to Russia’s war against Ukraine and issuing sanctions in response to this blatant violation of international law;

14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the United Nations member states, and the government and parliament of Taiwan.

12. Calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify EU-Taiwan relations and pursue a comprehensive and enhanced partnership under the guidance of the EU’s ‘One China’ policy;

13. Calls on the PRC to review its interpretation of UN Resolution 2758 and international law regarding Taiwan’s status and participation in international organisations; invites the Member States and the European External Action Service also to review the EU’s position on Taiwan’s status in international organisations;

14. Recognises the PRC’s abusive interpretation of UN Resolution 2758, with the aim of undermining any peaceful solution between the two parties, and acknowledges its negative effects on Taiwan; is of the opinion that Taiwan could further participate in the work of international organisations and urges the PRC to take a constructive approach in this respect; further calls on the UN Secretariat to grant Taiwanese nationals and journalists the right to access UN premises for visits, meetings and newsgathering activities;

15. Urges the Member States and the EU institutions to support international initiatives calling for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in meetings, mechanisms and activities of international bodies, including the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change;

16. Encourages the EU and its Member States to deepen cooperation with Taiwan on cybersecurity and cyberthreats to counter interference operations, confront disinformation from China, within both Taiwan and the EU, and fight transnational repression;

17. Calls for enhanced parliamentary cooperation between the Taiwanese Parliament and the European Parliament, and with the national parliaments of the Member States;

18. Urges the PRC not to use economic coercion to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; warns that such tactics may trigger substantive costs for Beijing in terms of its political and economic relationship with the EU;

19. Considers Taiwan to be a technologically advanced economy; reiterates its call on the Commission to urgently begin an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan; notes that Taiwan is a full member of the World Trade Organization; recalls the central and essential role of Taiwan in the supply of semiconductors and microchips;

20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the authorities of Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China.