What changed

B100136/2024

B100139/2024

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

(2024/2980(RSP))

(2024/2890(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Armenia and Azerbaijan, in particular those of 20 May 2021 on prisoners of war in the aftermath of the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, of 10 March 2022 on the destruction of cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh, of 19 January 2023 on the humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh, of 14 September 2023 on the case of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, imprisoned in Azerbaijan, of 13 March 2024 on closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and of 25 April 2024 on Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev,

having regard to its previous resolutions on Azerbaijan and on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh,

– having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 22 April 1996 between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part,

having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

– having regard to the jointStatement statementof Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the OfficeElection ofObservation Mission to the PrimeEarly MinisterPresidential ofelections held on 7 February 2024 and to the RepublicStatement of ArmeniaPreliminary Findings and Conclusions of the PresidentialInternational AdministrationElection Observation Mission of the RepublicEarly ofParliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan ofheld 7on December1 2023,September 2024,

– having regard to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group’s 2009 Basic Principles,

having regard to the report of 29 March 2023 by the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Azerbaijan and to the memorandum of 21 October 2021 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights on the humanitarian and human rights consequences following the 2020 outbreak of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

having regard to the orders of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 22 February 2023, of 6 July 2023 and of 17 November 2023 on the request for the indication of provisional measures for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v Azerbaijan),

A. whereas from 11 to 22 November 2024 Azerbaijan will host the 29th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29); whereas respect for fundamental human rights and civil society participation are enshrined in the host country agreement through which the Azerbaijani Government committed to uphold these rights;

having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

B. whereas for more than a decade and with increasing determination Azerbaijani authorities have been reducing space for civil society, arbitrarily closing down non-governmental organisations and arresting or forcing into exile civil society representatives;

having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

C. whereas since the announcement that Azerbaijan would host COP29, control of critical voices has increased, resulting in the arrest, arbitrary detention and prosecution of civil society activists, journalists and media workers, including foreign journalists;

A. whereas the choice of Azerbaijan’s capital Baku as the venue for the 29th United Nations Climate Change conference (COP29), scheduled to take place from 11 to 22 November 2024, has sparked controversy, notably owing to Azerbaijan’s worsening human rights record, as well as recent and blatant violations of international law, including aggressive behaviour towards its neighbour Armenia; whereas in the lead-up to this major international conference, the Azerbaijani authorities have intensified their repression of civil society organisations, activists, opposition politicians and the remaining independent media through detentions and judicial harassment;

D. whereas an estimated 300 people are currently being detained on politically motivated charges, including human rights defenders, journalists, academics, peaceful protesters, lawyers and political and other activists; whereas they are being held in conditions that do not meet international human rights standards and they are often denied access to their family members, lawyers and adequate medical care;

B. whereas civil society organisations list over 300 political prisoners in Azerbaijan, including Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, Tofig Yagublu, Ilhamiz Guliyev, Aziz Orujov, Bahruz Samadov and Akif Gurbanov; whereas there are credible reports of violations of prisoners’ human rights, including detention in inhumane conditions, torture and refusal of adequate medical care;

E. whereas the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) decided in January 2024 not to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation, noting its ‘very serious concerns as to …[Azerbaijan’s] respect for human rights’; whereas the PACE noted that its Monitoring Committee’s rapporteurs were not allowed to meet with people who had been detained on allegedly politically motivated charges, and that the Azerbaijani delegation refused to allow the rapporteur for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to visit the country;

C. whereas in recent years, the Azerbaijani authorities have imposed increasingly stringent restrictions on civil society organisations; whereas activists, journalists, political opponents and others have been imprisoned on fabricated and politically motivated charges;

F. whereas Azerbaijan has implemented a systematic policy of bribing officials and elected representatives in Europe in order to downplay Azerbaijan’s human rights record and to silence critics, as part of a widely used strategy described as ‘caviar diplomacy’; whereas some cases have been investigated and some of those involved have been prosecuted and convicted by national courts in several EU Member States;

D. whereas Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist, opposition figure and one of the finalists for the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; whereas his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life; whereas the health of Gubad Ibadoghlu’s wife, Irada Bayramova, continues to deteriorate as a result of the physical violence she suffered during her detention by the Azerbaijani authorities;

G. whereas Azerbaijan has been actively involved in destabilisation campaigns against the national politics of Member States, as recently observed and well-documented in New Caledonia, where it has conducted disinformation operations and provided support for rioters;

E. whereas the Azerbaijani regime appears to extend its repressive actions beyond its borders; whereas, since 2020, Mahammad Mirzali, an Azerbaijani dissident blogger, has been the target of several assassination attempts in France; whereas, on 29 September 2024, Vidadi Isgandarli, a critic of the Azerbaijani regime living as a political refugee in France, was attacked in his home and succumbed to his injuries two days later; whereas the Azerbaijani authorities have also engaged in politically motivated prosecutions of EU citizens, as seen in the case of Théo Clerc, prompting at least one Member State to formally warn its citizens against travelling to Azerbaijan owing to the risk of arbitrary detention;

H. whereas on 3 July 2024, the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) publicly denounced Azerbaijan’s ‘refusal to improve the situation in the light of the Committee’s recommendations’ and the ‘persistent lack of cooperation of the Azerbaijani authorities with the CPT’,

F. whereas according to the Election Observation Mission led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the early presidential election held on 7 February 2024 took place in a restrictive environment and was marked by the stifling of critical voices and the absence of political alternatives; whereas Azerbaijan held early parliamentary elections on 1 September 2024 in what the OSCE/ODIHR-led International Election Observation Mission described as a restrictive political and legal environment that did not enable genuine pluralism and resulted in a contest devoid of competition; whereas in the period leading up to the parliamentary elections, several government critics were detained;

I. whereas Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, a renowned political economist, anti-corruption activist and chairperson of the Azerbaijan Democracy and Prosperity Movement, who is due to start his visiting scholarship at Technische Universität in Dresden, was arbitrarily detained on 23 July 2023, kept in prison on dubious charges with limited contact with his family and lawyer and reportedly subjected to inhumane treatment; whereas since Parliament’s resolutions of 14 September 2023 and 25 April 2024, his health has further deteriorated due to the inadequate treatment of his serious medical condition, poor detention conditions and inhumane treatment; whereas on 22 April 2024 Dr Ibadoghlu was moved to house arrest, where he is being kept under constant police surveillance without being allowed to communicate with doctors, while his health condition still gives rise to serious concerns for his life; whereas on 17 October 2024 Dr Ibadoghlu was shortlisted for the 2024 Sakharov Prize;

G. whereas according to Reporters Without Borders, virtually the entire media sector in Azerbaijan is under official control, with no independent television or radio broadcasts from within the country, and all critical print newspapers shut down; whereas the authorities continue to suppress the last remaining independent media and repress journalists who reject self-censorship;

J. whereas on 4 December 2023 human rights activist Ilhamiz Guliyev was arrested on politically motivated charges a few months after he gave an anonymous interview to AbzasMedia about the alleged police practice of planting drugs on political activists;

H. whereas media legislation in Azerbaijan has become increasingly repressive, with the February 2022 media law effectively legalising censorship; whereas several other laws affecting the media also violate the country’s international obligations with regard to freedom of expression and press freedom; whereas public criticism of the authorities is subject to severe penalties;

K. whereas charges have been brought against numerous independent journalists who remain in prison or in pre-trial detention, while independent media outlets such as AbzasMedia, Kanal 13, Toplum TV and others have been shut down after key members of their staff were arrested on politically motivated charges;

I. whereas in September 2023, after months of the illegal blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan launched a pre-planned, unjustified military attack on the territory, forcing over 100 000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia, which amounts to ethnic cleansing; whereas as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this attack represents a gross violation of human rights and international law, a clear breach of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and a failure to uphold commitments made during EU-mediated negotiations;

L. whereas Dr Ibadoghlu’s research found that Azerbaijan was highly unlikely to be able to increase its natural gas production sufficiently in order to fulfil its promise to provide gas to the EU as set out in the strategic partnership for energy; whereas Azerbaijan’s increased Russian gas imports are a cause for concern as to whether Azerbaijan can replace Russia as a gas supplier, as Baku, unable to meet European demand, may relabel Russian gas as Azerbaijani for European consumption;

J. whereas the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh lost their property and belongings while fleeing the Azerbaijani military push in 2023 and have been unable to recover them since; whereas actions amounting to ethnic cleansing have continued since then; whereas the EU has provided humanitarian aid to people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas credible reports confirm the organised destruction of Armenian cultural and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas Azerbaijani leaders and officials repeatedly use hate speech against Armenians;

M. whereas on 19 September 2023 Azerbaijan launched an unjustified attack against Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in several hundred casualties, the death of civilians, and the majority of the population fleeing from their homes; whereas this forced displacement of the population and offensive against the civilian population represent a de facto ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh and gross violations of international law and human rights, which may amount to crimes against humanity;

K. whereas both Azerbaijan and Armenia are bound by international humanitarian law and the Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war from all forms of torture and cruel treatment; whereas reports indicate that 23 Armenian prisoners are currently being held in Azerbaijani prisons, including eight former leaders of the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, some of whom have received long prison sentences;

N. whereas in December 2023 a joint statement of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan brought about the release of 32 Armenian prisoners of war, expressed the commitment of both countries to continue their discussions regarding the implementation of more confidence-building measures, and called on the international community to support their efforts that would contribute to building mutual trust between the two countries and positively impact the entire South Caucasus region;

L. whereas in February 2023, the EU deployed the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to observe developments at the international border with Azerbaijan; whereas Azerbaijan has refused to cooperate with EUMA and the mission has been the target of disinformation by Azerbaijani authorities and government-controlled media; whereas Azerbaijan occupies territories internationally recognised as Armenian;

1. Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to address the deteriorating human rights situation in the country ahead of COP29 and to show its commitment to fundamental rights and to fundamental principles of democracy, justice, the rule of law and human dignity;

M. whereas Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in negotiations on a peace treaty, the normalisation of their relations and border delimitation, both before and after the 2023 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas, despite mediation efforts by the EU and others, no peace agreement has been signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia; whereas, although both governments have stated that they are close to an agreement, recent remarks by the Azerbaijani President indicate that Baku is not eager to conclude the negotiations;

2. Denounces the reported violations of the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, the reprisals against human rights defenders and journalists, the widespread violations of the right to a fair trial, and the abuse of the criminal justice system for political purposes;

N. whereas the EU fully supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and actively supports efforts towards a sustainable peace agreement between the two countries, achieved by peaceful means and respecting the rights of the population concerned;

3. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all human rights defenders, activists, journalists and government critics imprisoned in retaliation for their human rights work and dissenting views; demands that freedom of the press and expression be guaranteed and that media organisations not be restricted; calls, therefore, on the Azerbaijani Government to release journalists working for AbzasMedia, including Ulvi Hasanli and Sevinj Vagifqizi, and Alasgar Mammadli who works for Toplum TV;

O. whereas since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Azerbaijan has deepened its relations with Russia, including political and economic ties, as well as increased cooperation between their intelligence services; whereas Russia has openly backed Azerbaijan in its aggressive behaviour towards Armenia; whereas there are worrying reports of Russian gas being rebranded as Azerbaijani for sale in the EU;

4. Deplores the crackdown on civil society, as documented by Amnesty International, around major international events hosted by Azerbaijan, including Eurovision 2012 and the 2015 European Games;

P. whereas Azerbaijani leaders have engaged in anti-EU and anti-Western rhetoric; whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its disinformation campaigns targeting the EU and its Member States, with a specific focus on France; whereas Azerbaijan has actively interfered in European politics under the guise of ‘anti-colonialism’, notably in overseas countries and territories such as New Caledonia;

5. Takes note of the statements of the electoral observation mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, according to which Azerbaijan’s presidential and early parliamentary elections of February and September 2024 did not offer voters genuine political alternatives and took place within a legal framework that overly restricted fundamental freedoms and the media;

1. Strongly condemns the domestic and extraterritorial repression by the Azerbaijani regime against activists, journalists, opposition leaders and others, including EU nationals, which has noticeably intensified ahead of COP29; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all persons arbitrarily detained or imprisoned on account of their political views, to drop all politically motivated charges, and to cease all forms of repression, both within and beyond Azerbaijan;

6.2. Reiterates its grave concern over the detention of anti-corruption activist and academic Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, who was held in pre-trial detentioncall for almost one year despite his deterioratingthe health,Azerbaijani movedauthorities to house arrest onlift 22the Apriltravel 2024ban and continues to be deprived ofdrop liberty,all andcharges whoagainst isDr notGubad allowedIbadoghlu; tocalls leaveon Azerbaijan to receive the medicalensure carethat he requires; calls on thereceives Vice-Presidentan ofindependent themedical Commissionexamination /by Higha Representativedoctor of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Securityhis Policyown (VP/HR)choosing and on the Member States to actively call for the release of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to drop all charges against him, release him immediately from house arrest and allow him to leave the country on humanitarian grounds to receive urgently needed medical treatment abroad;

7. Expresses its concern over the case of Anar Mammadli, a prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, who was arrested on 29 April 2024 and placed in pre-trial detention, and who faces charges of conspiracy in apparent retaliation for his criticism of the government and his activism; calls for his release from prison;

3. Expresses deep concern about the choice of Baku as the host city for COP29, given Azerbaijan’s flagrant violations of fundamental rights, democracy and international law; considers that Azerbaijan’s ongoing human rights abuses are incompatible with its hosting of COP29; urges the EU to use COP29 as an opportunity for the international community to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to condemn and meaningfully address the country’s human rights record in their interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities;

8. Deplores the arbitrary detention of human rights defender Ilhamiz Guliyev and opposition leader Tofig Yagublu and calls for their immediate and unconditional release;

4. Demands that the organisers of COP29 ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enshrined and guaranteed in the Host Country Agreement; calls for the EU and its Member States to do their utmost to ensure that United Nations Climate Change Conferences are not hosted in countries with poor human rights records;

9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to impose targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for human rights violations and systematic repression against civil society in Azerbaijan, as well as on Azerbaijani officials responsible for the ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh;

5. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect fundamental freedoms, and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent non-governmental organisations and media to the margins of the law; reminds the Azerbaijani Government of its international obligations to safeguard the dignity and rights of detainees, ensuring that they receive adequate medical care, are detained in humane conditions and are protected from any mistreatment;

10. Reiterates its call for independent investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh that could amount to war crimes; calls, further, on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh and to offer solid promises regarding the protection of their rights and protection from intimidation and discrimination, guaranteed and monitored by an international presence;

6. Reiterates its call for EU sanctions to be imposed under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations;

11. Highlights the importance of providing continuous support to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who were displaced in September 2023 and beforehand through direct humanitarian aid and budget support for the Armenian Government; calls for the EU, in this regard, to provide a new package of assistance to Armenia to help the Armenian Government address the humanitarian needs of refugees;

7. Insists that any future partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan be made conditional on the release of all political prisoners, the implementation of legal reforms, and the overall improvement of the human rights situation in the country;

12. Calls on the Azerbaijani Government to immediately and unconditionally release all remaining Armenian prisoners of war, hostages and captives, and to ensure transparency regarding the situation of detainees from Nagorno-Karabakh;

8. Calls on the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to request meetings with political prisoners in Azerbaijan;

13. Strongly condemns the destruction of Armenian cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; calls on Azerbaijan to refrain from destroying this heritage in the region and calls for the protection of this heritage in line with UNESCO standards, including through the authorisation of a UNESCO mission to the area;

9. Reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory; calls on Azerbaijan to unequivocally commit to respecting Armenia’s territorial integrity;

14. Calls for thorough investigations into serious risks of Russian gas laundering through Azerbaijan and into the Azerbaijani authorities’ facilitation of Russia’s circumvention of EU sanctions, which would severely contradict EU foreign policy objectives; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the circumvention of sanctions by non-EU states; calls on the Council to design a new horizontal sanctions regime to counter this circumvention, which will require a more general and holistically applicable instrument to target circumvention in all regimes implemented by the EU;

10. Expresses its support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; reiterates its concern regarding the repeated smear campaigns originating from Azerbaijan against EUMA; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration;

15. Insists that any partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan – including on energy – must have strong conditions attached on the respect of international law, fundamental rights and international obligations, in particular on Azerbaijan making substantial progress towards a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement with Armenia; calls on the Commission, consequently, to urgently assess and review the 2022 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy and to act accordingly;

11. Urges Azerbaijan and Armenia to promptly sign a peace treaty – before COP29 – in order to resolve their long-lasting disputes; warns Azerbaijan that any military action against Armenia would be unacceptable and would have serious consequences for the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU;

16. Calls on the VP/HR to suspend the negotiations for a renewed partnership agreement until Azerbaijan has demonstrated its genuine readiness to faithfully engage in the negotiation of a peace agreement with Armenia and to respect the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians;

12. Calls for the full implementation of all orders issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), including the 17 November 2023 order indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of people who fled Nagorno-Karabakh; recalls that the decision to host COP29 in Baku was made after Azerbaijan failed to comply with the abovementioned ICJ order as well as those of 7 December 2021 and of 22 February 2023; reiterates its call on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to provide robust guarantees for the protection of their rights and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric that could incite discrimination against Armenians; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all 23 Armenian prisoners of war detained following Azerbaijan’s retaking of the Nagorno-Karabakh region;

17. Confirms its full and strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan; condemns any military aggression, use of force or hybrid threats against Armenia, as well as foreign interference and attempts to destabilise the political situation in Armenia; welcomes the assistance measures under the European Peace Facility in support of the Armenian armed forces and calls for the cooperation between Armenia and the EU to be further reinforced in security and defence; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges the Member States to consider similar initiatives;

13. Reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to continue to offer assistance to Armenia to deal with the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh;

18. Urges Azerbaijan and Armenia to advance towards full normalisation of their relations on all pending issues and to promptly conclude a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement; calls on Azerbaijan to demonstrate genuine efforts to this end and invites the VP/HR to continue to support efforts towards a comprehensive peace treaty;

14. Expresses deep concern regarding the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh following the massive exodus of its Armenian population; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destruction, neglect or alteration of the origins of cultural, religious, or historical heritage in the region;

19. Welcomes the joint Armenia-Azerbaijan statement of 7 December 2023 on confidence-building measures; firmly believes that such measures can benefit the overall peace process and pave the way for increased trust between the two sides; welcomes the progress made in the framework of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process, which has led to an agreement on several sections of the border; encourages both sides to take further steps on the remaining sections;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

20. Calls on EU and Member State officials and elected representatives taking part in COP29 in Baku not to turn a blind eye to human rights violations in the country and to use the momentum of the conference to increase diplomatic pressure on the Azerbaijani regime to respect fundamental rights and freedoms, release all political prisoners and return Armenian hostages;

21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe.