What changed

B100083/2024

B100079/2024

European Parliament resolution on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative and the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement of 17 April 2024 on the adoption of the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law,

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative of 18 September 2024 on the Georgian law on ‘family values and protection of minors’,

– having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service Spokesperson of 4 April 2024 on the draft law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0697),(COM(2023)0690),

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative with the European Commission of 28 May 2024 on the final adoption of the law on transparency of foreign influence in Georgia,

– having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service (EEAS) Spokesperson of 12 June 2024 on the continued acts of intimidation, threats and assaults on civil society in Georgia,

– having regard to the statement by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of 15 May 2024 entitled ‘Georgia: UN experts condemn adoption of Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence’,

– having regard to the Venice Commission urgent opinion of 21 May 2024 on the Law of Georgia on Transparency of Foreign Influence,

– having regard to the Venice Commission opinion of 22 June 2024 on amendments to the Election Code which abolish gender quotas,

– having regard to the Venice Commission follow-up opinion of 22 June 2024 to the joint opinion on the draft amendments to the Election Code and to the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Georgia,

– having regard to the Venice Commission opinion of 25 June 2024 on the draft Constitutional Law on Protecting Family Values and Minors,

– having regard to Resolution 2561 (2024) of 27 June 2024 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe entitled ‘Challenges to democracy in Georgia’,

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

– having regard to the joint statement by the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus and the European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Georgia of 18 April 2024 on the reintroduction of the draft law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ in Georgia,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the past months have seen significant attacks on democracy in Georgia, which have been characterised by the hasty adoption of anti-democratic legislation criticised by the UN, the Venice Commission and the EU, concurrent with attacks on civil society and independent media, prolonged mass protests and deep political and societal tensions and polarisation;

A. whereas the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly is a fundamental rights enshrined in the Georgian Constitution;

B. whereas on 14 May 2024 the Georgian Parliament adopted the law on transparency of foreign influence at third and final reading; whereas this law targets civil society organisations and independent media by requiring non-governmental organisations and media that receive over 20 % of their funds from abroad to register as an ‘organisation pursuing the interests of a foreign power’ and label themselves as such; whereas these organisations will be subjected to additional scrutiny, reporting requirements and possibly sanctions, including administrative penalties up to GEL 25 000;

B. whereas Georgia, as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as a member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, has committed itself to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights;

C. whereas the law was adopted in a procedure which, according to the Venice Commission, left no space for genuine discussion and meaningful consultation, in open disregard for the concerns of large parts of the Georgian population; whereas the restrictions set by that law to the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association and the right to privacy are incompatible with the strict test set out in Articles 8(2), 10(2) and 11(2) of the ECHR and Articles 17(2), 19(2) and 22(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as they do not meet the requirements of legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality in a democratic society, and they are also incompatible with the principle of non-discrimination set out in Article 14 of the ECHR;

C. whereas Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution provides that ‘the constitutional bodies shall take all measures within the scope of their competence to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’;

D. whereas the Georgian Government has so far refrained from strictly implementing the law, but the law is expected to significantly affect the activities of civil society organisations and independent media outlets that very often rely on foreign funding to exist and operate; whereas the threat of this law has already instigated a muzzling of Georgia’s vibrant civil society, which is at the core of Georgia’s democracy and contributed greatly to the context of the decision on Georgia’s status as an EU candidate country;

D. whereas the EU expects Georgia, a candidate country for EU accession, to abide fully by the Association Agreement and other international commitments it has made and, in particular, to fulfil the conditions and take the steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 8 November 2023; whereas the European Council decided to grant candidate status to Georgia solely on the understanding that these steps would be taken, including combating disinformation and interference against the EU and its values, engaging opposition parties and civil society in governance, and ensuring freedom of assembly and expression, as well as meaningfully consulting civil society and involving it in legislative and policymaking processes and ensuring that it can operate freely;

E. whereas this legislation comes at a time of increasing and ongoing attacks against civil society in Georgia in a seeming effort to narrow civic space by starving independent groups of funds; whereas the adoption of this law, modelled on the foreign agent legislation in Russia, is not taking place in a geopolitical vacuum, but represents a trend in the broader region;

E. whereas on 20 February 2024 the Parliament of Georgia passed amendments to the electoral code, changing the procedure for the election of chairman and so-called professional members of the Central Election Commission and abolishing the post of deputy chairman, which is filled by an opposition representative;

F. whereas on 174 SeptemberApril 2024,2024 the Georgian Parliament passedadopted aamendments lawto onthe ‘familycountry’s valueselectoral code and theabolished protectionmandatory ofparliamentary minors’,quotas for women, which aimsrequired tothat banat reliableleast andone appropriatein informationfour aboutcandidates sexualon orientationa andparty list be of a different gender identity;than the majority;

G. whereas the Georgian Parliament, in recent months, adopted several amendments to the legal framework for elections in Georgia that change the manner in which the chairperson and the non-partisan members of the Central Election Commission are elected, along with last-minute amendments to the Electoral Code;

G. whereas on 28 May 2024, the Georgian Parliament adopted the so-called transparency of foreign influence law, which requires organisations receiving over 20 % of their funding from abroad to register within two months as ‘organisations pursuing the interests of a foreign power’ and label themselves as such; whereas these organisations are subjected to additional scrutiny, reporting requirements and possibly sanctions, including administrative penalties of up to GEL 25 000; whereas this law seriously restricts media and civil society organisations’ ability to operate freely; whereas adopting this law has led to the suspension of EU financial assistance for Georgia;

H. whereas Georgia’s politics has been historically marked by systemic corruption and oligarchic influence, which continue to impact the independence and democratic organisation of political movements;

H. whereas on 6 June 2024 the US imposed visa restrictions on dozens of Georgian officials over the adoption of the ‘foreign agents law’;

I. whereas in August 2024, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze confirmed that his Georgian Dream party plans, if victorious in the upcoming parliamentary elections, to ban all political forces that oppose it, referring to the opposition as a ‘criminal political force’;

I. whereas on 11 July 2024 the US Congress Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted Georgia sanctions legislation known as the Megobari Act, which imposes sanctions against Georgian officials responsible for undermining the country’s democratic system;

J. whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EEAS and the EU Member States have released statements urging the Georgian Government to refrain from adopting legislation that could compromise Georgia’s progress on its path to EU membership;

J. whereas on 17 September 2024 the Georgian Parliament passed a law on ‘family values and the protection of minors’, which strips the LGBTI community of its rights and bans Pride events and public displays of the rainbow flag;

K. whereas a plethora of international organisations and high-level officials have called on the Georgian Government to withdraw these harmful laws, including the Venice Commission, the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, the UN Resident Coordinator in Georgia, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the European Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House and the US Agency for International Development;

K. whereas a parliamentary election will take place in Georgia on 26 October 2024; whereas there is growing anti-Western and hostile rhetoric from the Georgian Dream party against Georgia’s democratic partners, as well as promotion of Russian disinformation and manipulation; whereas the Georgian Dream party is pursuing a narrative of the West as a ‘global war party’ trying to push Georgia back into a war with Russia;

1. Expresses its deep concern about the democratic backsliding in Georgia that has occurred to an ever greater extent throughout this year and especially ahead of the parliamentary elections on 26 October 2024; points to a broader package of laws proposed and adopted by the ruling Georgian Dream party in recent months that violate the right to freedom of expression, censor the media, science and the arts, and are incompatible with international human rights standards in a way that will have a significant impact on the lives and well-being of the residents of Georgia;

L. whereas on 28 August 2024, the leader of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, at the inauguration of his party’s electoral campaign, spoke of his desire to ban democratic opposition parties; whereas he was seconded by the Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, who stated that if their party achieved a majority in the Georgian Parliament, it would ban certain opposition parties;

2. Deplores, specifically, the adoption by the Georgian Parliament of the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ after it had voted down the earlier veto by Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili; expresses its concern that the law passed its readings in the Georgian Parliament in the absence of opposition members of parliament;

1. Strongly condemns the adoption of the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and the law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, as well as the changes to the electoral code; considers that the foregoing are incompatible with EU values and democratic principles, run against Georgia’s ambitions for EU membership, damage Georgia’s international reputation and endanger the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; strongly underlines that unless the abovementioned legislation is rescinded, progress cannot be made in Georgia’s relations with the EU; regrets that Georgia, once a champion of democratic progress with Euro-Atlantic aspirations, has been in a democratic backsliding free fall for a considerable period;

3. Emphasises that this law will render the work of civil society organisations and independent media in Georgia effectively impossible as a result of costly and time-consuming administrative burdens, possible legal prosecutions, and the reputational damage inflicted by the ‘foreign agent’ label; stresses that, although they receive international funding, these organisations do not pursue the ‘interests of a foreign power’ but rather strive every day to uphold the human rights and democratic hopes of Georgia’s citizens and to provide them with unbiased reporting on the developments in their country;

2. Expects Georgian Dream to respect the will and free choice of the Georgian people in the upcoming parliamentary election and to relinquish power peacefully if defeated; demands that Georgian Dream and its leaders immediately stop the violence, intimidation, hate speech, persecution and repression that it is committing against the opposition, civil society and independent media;

4. Shares the concerns raised by the Venice Commission about the adoption of amendments to the legal framework for elections in Georgia and the Electoral Code, agreeing that these changes to the Electoral Code will have a major impact on the stakeholders’ perceptions of and trust in the impartiality and fairness of the election administration;

3. Strongly believes that the EU should consider temporarily suspending its visa-free regime with Georgia if the conduct of the election is not in line with accepted international standards and if Georgia’s fulfilment of the visa liberalisation benchmarks is questioned, in particular the fundamental rights benchmark;

5. Calls on the Georgian authorities to take full account of the concerns and act on the recommendations contained in the Venice Commission opinions on the adopted and proposed laws;

4. Strongly believes that the upcoming election will be decisive in determining Georgia’s future democratic development and geopolitical choice, as well its ability to make progress with its EU member state candidacy; considers that the result of the Georgian election should allow the country to return to its pro-Western democratic agenda, implement the necessary reforms and launch accession negotiations with the EU;

6. Condemns comments by the ruling Georgian Dream party concerning its intention to ban all opposition parties and the polarising rhetoric that refers to the opposition as a ‘criminal political force’; notes that such intimidation seriously undermines the political process and the freedom of expression, and contributes to an environment of fear; calls on all political actors to refrain from using rhetoric that further fuels the extreme polarisation, to cease the spread of false information during their campaigns for the upcoming elections and instead to commit to upholding the truth;

5. Reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous country, free from corruption, that fully respects fundamental freedoms, protects human rights and guarantees an open society and independent media; underlines that the decision to grant Georgia EU candidate country status was motivated by the wish to acknowledge the achievements and democratic efforts of Georgia’s civil society, as well as the overwhelming support for EU accession among its citizens; appreciates the efforts made by Georgia’s President Salome Zourabishvili to return Georgia to the democratic and pro-European path of development;

7. Condemns the broader campaign of attacks by the government targeting civil society organisations and reputable international donors who pursue the support of democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in Georgia; expresses its concern about the increasing number of reports of intimidation, threats and physical assaults on civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists and journalists in Georgia; reiterates its call to cease all attacks on civil society and independent media, and ensure a genuine enabling environment for all civil society and media in the country;

6. Deplores the personal role played by Georgia’s sole oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who returned to active politics on 30 December 2023 when he became ‘honorary chairman’ of the Georgian Dream party, in the current political crisis and in yet another attempt to undermine the country’s Western-oriented course in favour of pivoting towards Russia; reiterates its call on the Council and the EU’s democratic partners to consider imposing personal sanctions on Ivanishvili for his role in bringing about the deterioration of the political process in Georgia and in working against the interests of its people;

8. Recalls its support for the granting of EU candidate country status to Georgia in 2023, this having been assigned in recognition of the tireless efforts of Georgia’s civil society and the overwhelming aspirations of EU membership held by the vast majority of Georgian people, and on the understanding that nine recommendations would be implemented; emphasises that the recent adoption of several pieces of legislation directly contradicts the EU’s nine recommendations on which Georgia’s EU candidate country status was made contingent; highlights further that there has been little to no progress on any of the nine recommendations;

7. Calls for the EU and its Member States to hold to account and impose personal sanctions on all those responsible for undermining democracy in Georgia, who are complicit in the violence committed against political opponents and peaceful protesters and who spread anti-Western disinformation; welcomes the personal sanctions imposed by the US on Georgian Dream officials;

9. Stresses that the targeting of civil society organisations and independent media in general and the legislation on foreign influence in particular are indisputably inconsistent and irreconcilable with the norms and values of the EU and with any EU membership aspirations; recalls that the Commission is scheduled to present its 2024 enlargement package later this month, which will include an assessment of Georgia’s implementation of the steps on which the country’s candidate status was made conditional;

8. Highlights the worrying fact that many recent legislative decisions of Georgian Dream betray the aspirations of the large majority of the Georgian people to live in a democratic society, continue democratic and rule of law reforms, pursue close cooperation with Euro-Atlantic partners and commit to a path towards EU membership;

10. Notes that addressing outstanding problems regarding public administration, interinstitutional relations, good governance and corruption, and implementing the necessary reforms of the justice system during the EU accession process, are also part and parcel of ensuring that Georgia’s society and democratic institutions will be able to avert foreign interference and democratic backsliding in the long term;

9. Emphasises that the rights to freedom of expression and assembly and to peaceful protest are fundamental freedoms and must be respected under all circumstances, particularly in a country aspiring to join the EU;

11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to investigate the consequences of the democratic backsliding that these laws represent for their donor role in Georgia and to communicate this possible impact to the Government and Parliament of Georgia;

10. Recalls that the European Council of 14 and 15 December 2023 granted Georgia candidate country status on the understanding that the relevant steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 would be taken; stresses that recently adopted legislation clearly goes against this ambition and has effectively put on hold Georgia’s integration into the EU;

12. Considers, in accordance with Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 215(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, given that the rule of law is a principle of the EU’s common foreign and security policy, and the law on foreign influence violates the Council of Europe’s rule of law standards as interpreted by the Venice Commission, that the Council may adopt a decision regarding targeted sanctions;

11. Urges the Georgian Government to return to its European path, uphold its commitment to respect, strengthen and promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and genuinely engage in the full implementation of the steps required to fulfil the conditions for candidate country status and EU membership, in a spirit of engagement and cooperation with Georgia’s civil society and political opposition;

13. Calls on the authorities to ensure free, fair and credible parliamentary elections and to strive without delay towards depolarisation and societal reconciliation for the benefit of all Georgians; stresses that human rights and Georgia’s democracy must be respected and urges the Georgian authorities to take all necessary measures to ensure that all respected civil society organisations involved in election observation can observe these elections without hindrance or interference in their work;

12. Reiterates the tangible opportunities that Georgia would take advantage of once the accession negotiations begin, such as pre-accession assistance that would improve the standard of living of Georgian citizens, as well as support the institutions, infrastructure and social services;

14. Reiterates its continued support for the democratic ambitions of the Georgian people and their wish for a future in the EU; stresses that independent polls consistently show that over 80 % of Georgians wish to join the EU, which is one of the highest proportions in the candidate countries; recalls that in previous years Georgia had been a front runner in adopting reforms in line with its society’s long-standing aspiration to join the EU; recognises that it is still possible to consolidate Georgia’s democratic future as an EU candidate country with a young, engaged generation of leaders, as was exemplified by the spontaneous protests against the foreign agent law that took place during 2024;

13. Expresses deep concern about the increased influence of Russia in Georgia, the increased number of Russian citizens residing in Georgia, increased trade ties with Russia, and Georgia’s willingness to pursue reconciliation with Russia despite Russia’s war in Ukraine and its occupation of a fifth of Georgian sovereign territory; calls on the Government of Georgia to impose sanctions against Russia in response to its war of aggression against Ukraine;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the President, Prime Minister and Parliament of Georgia.

14. Reiterates its call on the Georgian authorities to release former President Mikheil Saakashvili from prison;

15. Calls on the Georgian Bureau of Investigation to conduct a thorough investigation of police brutality during the spring protests against the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ in Georgia;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.