What changed

B100081/2024

B100072/2024

European Parliament resolution on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration

(2024/2821(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Republic of Moldova,

– having regard to the EuropeanAssociation CouncilAgreement conclusionsbetween ofthe 23European Union and 24the JuneEuropean 2022,Atomic whichEnergy grantedCommunity EUand candidatetheir countryMember statusStates, toof the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area,

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part,

– having regard to the Republic of Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, and the European Council’s consequent granting of candidate status on 23 June 2022 based on a positive assessment by the Commission and in line with the views expressed by Parliament,

– having regard to Recommendation No 1/2022 of the EU-Republic of Moldova Association Council of 22 August 2022 on the EU-Republic of Moldova Association Agenda,

– having regard to the EU Support Package of June 2023 for the Republic of Moldova,

– having regard to the joint statement by the US, Canada and the UK of 13 June 2024 exposing Russia’s subversive activity and electoral interference targeting Moldova,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 20 October 2024, the Republic of Moldova willis holdscheduled ato presidentialhold election,presidential alongelection withand a constitutional referendum on whetherEU theintegration, countryamid shouldongoing amendRussian itsinterference constitutionand attempts to includedestabilise Moldovanthe citizens’political wishsituation forand EUelectoral membership;process in the country;

B. whereas free, fair and independent elections are the cornerstone of any democratic society; whereas Russia makes consistent attempts to influence, subvert and undermine the democratic elections of other countries in order to secure its desired results;

B. whereas the Russian Federation has been using economic blackmail, provocation, disinformation, illegal funding of political parties, cyberattacks and other hybrid means to undermine the stability, sovereignty, constitutional order and democratic institutions of the Republic of Moldova; whereas Russia’s subversive activities in Moldova seek to undermine popular support for the European path chosen by the Moldovan people and foster destabilisation;

C. whereas Russia continues its efforts to destabilise Moldova in an attempt to push it off its democratic European course;

C. whereas one of the tools used by the Russian state is the state-funded RT network, which has moved beyond media activities, becoming actively involved in cyber operations, covert influence, military procurement, and information warfare across various regions; whereas in June 2024, the United States, together with the United Kingdom and Canada, exposed Russia’s efforts to engage in subversive activities and electoral interference targeting the Republic of Moldova;

D. whereas the joint statement by the US, Canada and the UK of 13 June 2024 raised concerns that Moscow uses criminal groups to finance political activities and undermine Moldova’s democratic institutions; whereas the three countries explicitly warned partners that Russian actors are carrying out a plot to influence the outcome of Moldova’s October 2024 presidential election and intend to incite protests in Moldova should a pro-Russia candidate not win;

D. whereas in September 2024, the United States imposed sanctions on three entities and two individuals for their involvement in Russia’s destabilising actions abroad, including in the Republic of Moldova; whereas these covert efforts have included RT personnel providing direct support to fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, the key perpetrator of the 2014 USD 1 billion bank fraud scandal; whereas, according to the US State Department, RT and its employees, including editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, have directly coordinated with the Kremlin to support Russian Government efforts to influence the Moldovan presidential election of October 2024, with the apparent aim of inciting unrest in the Republic of Moldova;

E. whereas Moldova’s national security services have accused Russia of funding the campaign for a ‘no’ vote in the upcoming referendum, with some EUR 100 million worth of support provided to pro-Russian political groups and to the spread of disinformation on social media, with the aim of sowing doubt about the legitimacy of the electoral process to create chaos;

E. whereas despite the dramatic effects of the war in Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova has managed to significantly consolidate its democracy, continue its reform trajectory and develop its relations with the EU, with the convening of the first intergovernmental conference on Moldova’s accession to the European Union in June 2024 representing a recent significant milestone in the country’s European integration;

F. whereas in 2023, the Ukrainian intelligence services reported that they had intercepted a plan by Russia to stage a coup and oust Moldovan President Maia Sandu;

F. whereas the EU opened accession negotiations with the Republic of Moldova during the first accession conference at ministerial level, held in Luxembourg on 25 June 2024, following the European Council’s decision of 14-15 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Moldova, and the Council’s approval of the negotiating framework for these negotiations on 21 June 2024;

G. whereas the EU continues to provide comprehensive support to Moldova’s resilience, including through the European Peace Facility and the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova; whereas this support has proven particularly valuable in countering hybrid and cyber threats;

1. Strongly condemns the Russian interference and hybrid operations aimed at subverting the electoral processes, security, sovereignty and democratic foundations of the Republic of Moldova ahead of the upcoming presidential election and the constitutional referendum on EU integration;

H. whereas the EU Support Package for the Republic of Moldova of June 2023 aimed, among its priorities, to counter foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation, and enhance strategic communication by providing technical support to the Moldovan Government and building capacity for independent media, civil society and youth to address disinformation and to communicate actively on the benefits of EU integration;

2. Reiterates its call on the Russian authorities to respect the Republic of Moldova’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to cease its provocations and attempts to destabilise the country and undermine its constitutional order and democratic institutions; reiterates its calls on Russia to withdraw its military forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova and to support a peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, in line with the principles of international law and with the 1999 Istanbul Summit Declaration of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe;

I. whereas the European Council decided in December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Moldova;

3. Calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that all necessary assistance is provided to the Republic of Moldova to strengthen its institutional mechanisms and its ability to respond to hybrid threats; calls for increased EU support to the Republic of Moldova in countering disinformation, hybrid threats and cyberattacks; underlines that this should entail boosting Moldova’s capacity to combat disinformation, strengthen its cybersecurity infrastructure and enhance resilience against external malign influences;

J. whereas the Council approved the Negotiating Framework for EU membership negotiations with Moldova on 21 June 2024, in accordance with the revised enlargement methodology;

4. Calls on the Council to adopt additional targeted sanctions listings against individuals and entities responsible for supporting or carrying out actions which undermine or threaten the Republic of Moldova’s sovereignty and independence, as well as the country’s democracy, stability or security, and the rule of law; calls for the EU and national authorities to make sure those sanctions are duly implemented; reiterates its call on the respective hosting states and territories to extradite Ilan Shor, Vladimir Plahotniuc and other individuals sought for trial in the Republic of Moldova;

K. whereas the EU held its first intergovernmental conference with Moldova on 25 June 2024;

5. Highlights the important role played by the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova) which works with the Moldovan institutions to enhance the resilience of the security sector of the Republic of Moldova in the areas of crisis management and hybrid threats, including cybersecurity and countering foreign information manipulation and interference; asks the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to ensure that EUPM Moldova performs to the best of its ability, taking stock of progress and adapting its operations if necessary to make it as efficient as possible while proposing to further extend its mandate and scope and increase the mission’s resources; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their support to Moldova’s Center for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation;

1. Stands in solidarity with Moldova, reiterates its unwavering support for the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, and condemns, in this regard, hybrid aggression by Russia that aims to destabilise Moldova and push it off its democratic course, be it by carrying out cyberattacks, running disinformation campaigns, sponsoring pro-Russian political entities, inciting and exploiting fear of war, weaponising energy supply, supporting organised crime or violating Moldova’s airspace;

6. Applauds the Republic of Moldova’s steadfast support for Ukraine since the start of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression; commends the Republic of Moldova for welcoming 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees throughout the war, of which an estimated 125 000 remain in the country;

2. Demands that Russia abandon its efforts to undermine Moldova’s democracy, and that it respect Moldova’s sovereignty and the outcomes of free, fair and independent elections and referendums;

7. Reaffirms its commitment to the Republic of Moldova’s future membership of the EU and recognises that Moldova’s rightful place is within the EU; recognises that the desire of the people of the Republic of Moldova to join the EU stems from a shared commitment to democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights; stresses that the Republic of Moldova’s European integration represents not only a path towards greater economic prosperity but also a safeguard for political stability and security in the face of external threats;

3. Calls for the EU and the Member States to promote the accountability of those involved in foreign interference activities concerning Moldova’s election and referendum, and to place sanctions on those individuals and entities attempting to destabilise Moldova’s democratic institutions;

8. Calls for the acceleration of the screening process and the timely organisation of the subsequent intergovernmental conferences, where negotiations on cluster 1 on Fundamentals should be initiated; calls for the EU to adequately support accession related reforms by developing robust and adaptable financial instruments tailored to the Republic of Moldova’s specific needs with a view to effectively addressing its economic and structural challenges, ensuring the country remains resilient and capable of implementing the necessary reforms throughout its EU accession process; urges the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by allowing participation in new initiatives and EU programmes which will deliver tangible socio-economic benefits in specific areas even before the country formally joins the EU;

4.9. UrgesCalls for the CommissionEU and theits Member States to continue to assist Moldovaprioritise inand improvingallocate itsadditional resilienceresources to Russian hybrid attacks,efforts includingto insupport the areasrule of defence, cybersecuritylaw and strategic communication; calls on the Commission toanti-corruption reportreforms onin the resultsRepublic of the EU Support Package for Moldova ofin Juneorder 2023,to particularlyaddress thevulnerabilities, statedincluding aimsthose ofrelated counteringto foreigncorruption informationin manipulationthe andsecurity interference,sector, andjustice buildingsystem, capacitypublic foradministration independentand media, civil society andwhich youthcould toenable addressRussian disinformationinterference and to communicate actively on the benefits of EU integration;disinformation;

5. Stresses that addressing outstanding corruption problems and implementing the necessary reforms of the justice system during the EU accession process are also part and parcel of ensuring that Moldova’s society and democratic institutions will be able to avert foreign interference in the long term; recognises, in that regard, the need for a professional, resilient and capable civil service; recommends that significant sections of the EU’s Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance and other (future) accession-support funding mechanisms be dedicated to capacity building, professional training and public administration reform, in particular for those government bodies coordinating the implementation of accession reforms from the cluster on fundamentals, in particular chapters 23 and 24;

10. Reiterates its support for stronger cooperation on security and defence policy between the EU and the Republic of Moldova; commends the Republic of Moldova for becoming the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU and calls for this partnership to be put into practical action;

6. Welcomes multilateral efforts to support Moldova’s democratisation, including the UN Development Programme project ‘Strengthening democratic resilience in Moldova’, which pools together funding from different UN member states; encourages the EU and its Member States to increase international collaboration in this regard by cooperating with non-EU partners, along with Moldova, to improve the oversight of political financing, parties and election campaigns, to strengthen and make electoral institutions more resilient to cyber and disinformation challenges, and to boost civic engagement;

11. Calls on the Member States to increase the European Peace Facility’s funding for the Republic of Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

7. Warns that protracted conflicts are always at risk of flaring up, as has been observed in the South Caucasus; calls on the relevant actors to prevent the destabilisation of the situation in Transnistria and, more broadly, to minimise the tensions that underlie Moldova’s immediate problems; calls on Russia to completely and unconditionally withdraw its military forces and armaments from the Transnistrian region, in line with the decisions laid down in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Istanbul Summit Declaration of 19 November 1999, and in accordance with the Republic of Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

12. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to support the Republic of Moldova in enhancing its energy security by supporting the construction of new electricity interconnections with neighbouring countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to financially support energy efficiency and renewable energy projects as a clean and sustainable way to reduce Moldova’s energy demand and diversify its supply;

8. Calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure continued support to Moldova and its people in addressing the challenges facing the country as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including large numbers of refugees, inflation, threats to its energy supply, violations of its airspace, and a multitude of hybrid actions such as disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

13. Urges the Commission and the European External Action Service to improve strategic communication about the EU in the Republic of Moldova; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue supporting media literacy and media independence, as well as the strengthening of Moldova’s critical digital infrastructure, including through the replacement of Russian-origin information and communications technology systems; calls for the EU and its Member States to expand and intensify their direct engagement with Moldovan citizens by including them in various EU and bilateral programmes and projects, such as citizen consultations, and to foster people-to-people connections;

9.14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of MoldovaMoldova, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and toCo-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the Russian authorities.