On opportunities and challenges presented by a comprehensive artificial intelligence strategy for EU trade

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on opportunities and challenges presented by a comprehensive artificial intelligence strategy for EU trade

(2025/2112(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act)1,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)2,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Chips Act)3,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/10204,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union5,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries6,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 November 2025 entitled ‘Data union strategy – unlocking data for AI’ (COM(2025)0835),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 January 2024 entitled ‘Advancing European economic security: an introduction to five new initiatives’ (COM(2024)0024),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 December 2025 entitled ‘Strengthening EU economic security’ (JOIN(2025)0977),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 9 April 2025 on the AI Continent Action Plan (COM(2025)0165),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 October 2025 entitled 'Apply AI Strategy' (COM(2025)0723),

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a Market’ (Letta report),

– having regard to its resolution of 9 July 2025 on product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports7,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2025 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement on Digital Trade between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore8,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0000/2026),

A. whereas artificial intelligence (AI) is a general-purpose technology reshaping EU trade across goods, services and data flows by lowering information and compliance costs, transforming supply-chain management and expanding digitally delivered services; whereas AI presents significant challenges and opportunities to strengthen the EU’s trade competitiveness; whereas EU trade policy is pivotal to ensuring a holistic external AI strategy that combines openness with resilience and supports predictable cross-border operations;

B. whereas the rapid diffusion of AI is contributing to structural changes in the organisation, geography and governance of international services trade, with implications for competitiveness, employment and development; whereas these changes interact with existing gaps in production capacity, infrastructure and skills within the EU and beyond; whereas maintaining an open, resilient and inclusive sustainable trade model requires a coherent and holistic strategy to manage AI-driven change; whereas the EU’s external economic relations, including with partners in the Global South, should support inclusive AI uptake and shared value creation;

C. whereas cross-border data flows are critical for AI development, training and deployment; whereas digital trade rules increasingly shape AI competitiveness; whereas the EU’s human-centric framework, anchored in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the AI Act, provides a credible model for trustworthy AI that, if promoted internationally, can become a competitive advantage in markets valuing transparency and rights-respecting governance;

D. whereas AI use remains uneven across sectors, regions and company sizes, with advantages accruing to actors controlling data, computing power and skills, risking widened productivity and export gaps for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and companies adopting AI at a later stage; whereas AI-enabled trade competitiveness depends on access to data, compute capacity, energy, connectivity, capital and skills, and many of these factors are influenced by trade and investment relations; whereas the EU attracted only six percent of global investment in AI startups in the first half of 2024, creating structural dependencies;

E. whereas the AI supply chain is highly concentrated in a small number of countries and regions, leaving the EU dependent on foreign powers for access to critical computing power and semiconductors; whereas intensifying technological competition between the United States, China, and the EU, marked by divergent AI governance models, tariff escalation and export controls on critical technologies, heightens the risk that access to key AI inputs will be used as geopolitical leverage against the EU;

AI for trade facilitation and regulatory enforcement

1. Recognises that AI can accelerate EU exports, especially for SMEs, by reducing market-entry barriers and compliance costs, enabling firms to reach markets that were previously beyond their reach; calls on the Commission to integrate trustworthy AI advisory services into the Access2Markets portal and the Single Entry Point to navigate tariffs, rules of origin and regulatory requirements;

2. Notes that AI can help cut delays and costs in EU supply chains by improving planning and coordination; calls on the Commission to make paperless trade the norm and promote the sharing of reliable information between operators and authorities; calls for investment in AI-enabled logistics that ease bottlenecks at ports and corridors, and support for greener logistics through smarter routing and maintenance;

3. Notes the potential role of AI in strengthening customs and border controls amid market overcapacity and the limitations of human inspections; calls on the Commission, also through the EU Customs Data Hub, to ensure that AI use enhances enforcement capacity and data sharing among authorities, and upholds compliance with EU law;

AI and structural changes in goods and services trade, labour and development

4. Stresses that Europe’s competitiveness in goods trade will increasingly depend on AI-enabled productivity and quality gains in strategic industrial value chains, including manufacturing, automotive, pharmaceutical and energy technologies; calls on the Commission to reflect these interests systematically in trade negotiations by securing effective market access, robust disciplines on non-tariff barriers, and enforceable provisions that maintain a level playing field by preventing unfair competition and technology-related distortions;

5. Warns that AI is reshaping trade in digitally delivered services by commoditising expertise, eroding Europe’s historic comparative advantage in high-value professional, technical and business services; underlines that responding to intensified global competition in services trade requires the massive mobilisation of investment envisaged in the Draghi and Letta reports; urges the Commission to mobilise trade and investment partnerships to attract capital and talent and to scale up European companies;

6. Recognises AI’s potential to reshape work and labour markets globally; warns of displacement risks from automation, AI-enabled services trade, and widening skills gaps in the EU workforce; calls on the Commission to analyse, within the impact assessments of free trade agreements, which sectors are likely to be affected by AI and to assess the impact of AI use on workers’ rights;

7. Warns that the digital divide risks excluding partners in the Global South from AI-driven growth opportunities, increasing dependency on imported models; calls on the Commission to make use of digital inclusion provisions in trade and sustainable development chapters and digital trade agreements to support AI adoption and productivity gains, and to focus Global Gateway capacity building on open-source AI ecosystems and local capabilities, fostering resilient, mutually beneficial trade and investment relations;

Digital trade governance, regulatory cooperation and multilateral rules

8. Highlights the strategic role of digital partnerships and Trade and Technology Councils with like-minded partners in projecting the EU’s value-driven, human-centric and risk-based approach to AI; calls on the Commission to implement the International Digital Strategy through coordinated positions in the G7, G20, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the United Nations, and structured regulator-to-regulator cooperation to drive global convergence on high standards of AI safety and fundamental rights protection;

9. Underlines that AI-enabled trade requires lawful data flows; reaffirms that safeguards meeting GDPR or equivalent standards are the EU’s primary mechanism for personal data transfers; calls for digital trade agreements to facilitate non-personal flows, protect regulatory autonomy and preserve the technical access needed by regulators to enforce the AI Act and the GDPR;

10. Recalls the EU’s commitment to a rules-based multilateral trading system and underlines the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) relevance as a forum to advance digital trade affecting AI-enabled services; stresses that balanced rules on cross-border data flows and consumer protection under the Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce initiative are vital to unlock AI-enabled trade; calls on the Commission to pursue the integration of those rules into the WTO legal architecture;

11. Warns that diverging AI compliance regimes risk fragmenting markets and raising trade costs; calls on the Commission to use international standards and WTO technical barriers to trade and transparency disciplines as tools to prevent regulatory divergence from becoming a de facto trade barrier, while preserving and leveraging the EU’s AI governance framework to facilitate trusted digital trade;

Economic security and strategic dependencies in the AI value chain

12. Stresses that secure access to advanced semiconductors and affordable computing power is fundamental to the EU’s technological sovereignty and competitiveness; notes that the Chips Act and the AI factories agenda risk falling short due to fragmented delivery and limited scale; calls on the Commission to accelerate their implementation and to leverage trade agreements with trusted partners to diversify supply;

13. Warns that cloud infrastructure concentration in non-EU countries exposes the EU to external jurisdictional vulnerabilities; calls on the Commission, through the Cloud and AI Development Act and the Industrial Accelerator Act, to establish graduated sovereignty frameworks prioritising EU-based providers for critical services through public procurement, while ensuring open strategic autonomy by maintaining non-discriminatory access for like-minded providers meeting EU certification and interoperability requirements;

14. Calls on the Commission to ensure its economic security doctrine coordinates foreign direct investment screening, export controls, the Anti-Coercion Instrument and trade defence as a coherent system preventing the weaponisation of AI dependencies; warns that export restrictions on critical raw materials and growing geopolitical volatility require strengthened coordination and enforcement to protect Europe’s AI ecosystem;

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15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming a general-purpose capability that changes how trade is organised, how firms compete, and how economic power is exercised. It affects goods, services, and data-dependent business models simultaneously, developing in a geopolitical context where technology leadership, access to critical inputs, and rule-setting are increasingly contested. For the EU, AI is therefore not only a question of digital policy but a trade policy question, because the conditions for AI deployment, market access, and cross-border operations will shape Europe’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy.

This report argues for an integrated approach bringing together AI in trade (deployment for competitiveness and enforcement) and trade of AI (open strategic autonomy over critical inputs and rules-based international cooperation), so that Europe can compete globally while safeguarding its social model.

AI IN TRADE: COMPETITIVENESS THROUGH DEPLOYMENT AND PREDICTABILITY

AI adoption is fundamental to EU export competitiveness and trade facilitation. The technology reduces information asymmetries, lowers market-entry costs, and improves compliance predictability, enabling smaller firms to access opportunities previously reserved for large operators with dedicated compliance teams. For small and medium enterprises central to the EU’s industrial base and export potential, AI-powered advisory services for navigating tariffs, rules of origin, and regulatory requirements across multiple markets can substantially reduce the disproportionate costs they face from regulatory complexity and fragmented procedures.

AI deployment by customs authorities can help address critical enforcement challenges at scale. Rising cross-border volumes, faster transaction cycles, and increasingly data-driven commerce create capacity constraints that traditional administrative approaches cannot manage. AI-enabled risk analysis, pattern detection, and supply chain optimisation can strengthen the EU’s ability to ensure fair competition and effective enforcement of agreed rules, sustaining confidence that compliance is rewarded rather than circumvented. This enforcement capacity is inseparable from the EU’s commitment to open and fair markets.

Furthermore, AI is fundamentally altering services trade through increased tradability of tasks and accelerated cross-border delivery, intensifying competition in areas where Europe has historically been strong. This transformation requires the EU to support widespread adoption, investment, and scale-up so that European firms compete globally from a position of strength. Trade agreements and partnerships should promote inclusive AI governance frameworks that enable European service providers to benefit from productivity gains while addressing labour market transitions. The EU’s external engagement must ensure that AI-driven productivity gains translate into broadly shared prosperity and that regulatory cooperation prevents fragmentation from becoming a structural barrier to digital trade and services exports.

TRADE OF AI: OPEN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY THROUGH RESILIENT INPUTS AND RULES-BASED GOVERNANCE

As AI becomes embedded in trade, Europe’s competitiveness will not only depend on deployment, but on access to critical upstream inputs that make AI possible. These inputs, notably advanced semiconductors, frontier compute and cloud infrastructure, are concentrated in very few hands and are increasingly shaped by geopolitical rivalry, export controls and industrial policy. When access to chips, equipment or cloud services can be restricted, conditioned or disrupted, dependency becomes leverage, and leverage becomes a trade risk for European firms and public administrations.

The report therefore argues for open strategic autonomy as a practical trade and economic security strategy. The objective is not autarky, but derisking through diversification with trusted partners, targeted capacity-building in Europe, and coherent use of the EU’s economic security toolbox to deter coercion and manage shocks without undermining legal certainty for operators. This is about keeping Europe open, but less exposed, and ensuring that trade and investment relations support, rather than constrain, Europe’s ability to compete in AI-enabled sectors.

Resilience must be matched by rule-shaping. In a context of accelerating competition and fragmented governance, Europe should project its human-centric, risk-based approach, anchored in the first horizontal AI framework of its kind, through partnerships with like-minded partners, including via Trade and Technology Councils, Digital Partnerships and international standardisation, to facilitate convergence on trustworthy AI.

Finally, the WTO remains essential to prevent digital fragmentation from hardening into new trade barriers, notably through balanced digital trade and data rules that advance ‘data flows with trust’, protect regulatory autonomy, and preserve predictable cross-border conditions that are essential for AI development and deployment. Without credible multilateral guardrails, regulatory fragmentation and data restrictions risk becoming the next generation of trade barriers, particularly for AI-enabled services, undermining predictability for businesses and weakening the rules-based system the EU depends on.

The EU stands at a crossroads. One path leads toward permanent technological dependence, where European firms consume AI developed elsewhere, operate on infrastructure controlled externally, and adjust regulations to accommodate foreign standards. The alternative path, pursued in this report, demands simultaneous action across trade facilitation, sectoral adoption, supply chain resilience, and international rule-making. It requires mobilising investment at unprecedented scale, embedding worker protections and development cooperation in trade policy, diversifying semiconductor and compute supply, and projecting Europe’s governance framework through partnerships that value trustworthy AI.

This comprehensive strategy reflects a fundamental conviction: Europe can achieve AI-enabled competitiveness without sacrificing the social model and fundamental rights protections that define its identity. Trade policy becomes the mechanism through which these objectives converge, facilitating the deployment that drives productivity, securing the inputs that enable autonomy, and shaping the rules that make trustworthy AI the global standard. The question is not whether Europe will participate in the AI-driven transformation of international trade, but whether it will do so on its own terms or on conditions set by others.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the draft report, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

AmChamEU

BEUC

DG CNECT

DG TRADE

Digital Europe

EDRi

European Economic and Social Committee

Information Technology Industry Council

United Nations Industrial Development Organization

World Trade Organisation

2. Representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies

none.

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.