Sittings · Document

Draft report (COM(2023)0241 – C90172/2023 – 2023/0137(CNS)) 2023-10-25

Amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure

Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

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Amendment 1

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

–

Proposal for a rejection

The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.

Or. en

Amendment 2

João Pimenta Lopes, Mick Wallace, Clare Daly

Proposal for a regulation

–

Proposal for a rejection

The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal; Urges the European Commission to present a new proposal in which it repeals the Stability and Growth Pact and the related instruments of economic governance and replace it with a Pact for Social Progress and Employment which: (i) Respects the sovereignty of each state, ensuring the conditions for its economic and social development, for overcoming structural deficits, for improving productive capacity; (ii) Promotes the realisation of the principles of economic, social and territorial cohesion; (iii) Fights unemployment and aims for full employment, promotes the defence and strengthening of workers' rights and other social rights, the defence and promotion of collective bargaining as well as the eradication of precariousness; (iv) Promotes the defence and strengthening of public services and the social functions of states, namely access to the right to health, education, housing and social security.

Or. en

Amendment 3

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), entails compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.

Or. en

Amendment 4

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2) The economic governance framework of the Union, which comprises an elaborate system of policy coordination and surveillance of Member States’ economic policies, has guided Member States in achieving their economic and fiscal policy objectives. Since the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, the framework has helped achieve macroeconomic convergence, safeguard sound public finances and address macroeconomic imbalances. Together with a common monetary policy and a common currency in the euro area, the framework has created conditions for economic stability, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and higher employment for citizens of the Union.

(2) The economic governance framework of the Union, which comprises an elaborate system of policy coordination and surveillance of Member States’ economic policies, has failed Member States in achieving their economic and fiscal policy objectives. Since the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, the framework has failed in promoting macroeconomic convergence, as well complying with the goals for public debt and government deficit. Together with a common monetary policy a common currency in the euro area, the framework has failed in creating the conditions for economic stability, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and higher employment for citizens of the Union

Or. en

Amendment 5

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which initially consisted of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/9719 , Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 199720 and the Resolution of the European Council of 17 June 1997 on the SGP21 , is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.

(3) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which initially consisted of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/9719 , Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 199720 and the Resolution of the European Council of 17 June 1997 on the SGP21 , is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability. Such framework failed in promoting full employment, sustainable and inclusive growth, and overall macroeconomic convergence between Member States.

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19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1).

20 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6).

21 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 June 1997 (OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1).

Or. en

Amendment 6

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 3 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3a) The set goals of 3% and 60% of GDP for government deficit and public debt, respectively, lack a sound economic justification. Moreover, evidence shows the compliance by Member States with such rules is unrealistic, especially clear regarding the public debt threshold.

Or. en

Amendment 7

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 3 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3b) The Commission recognizes the large amount of public and private investment to accomplish the EU’s climate goals and the even higher when referring to the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement. However, evidence shows that EU net public investment as a proportion of GDP has not fully recovered since its sharp fall after the financial crisis, especially serious in Southern Europe, due to fiscal consolidation pressure under the former EU economic governance rules. Moreover, recent independent studies show that the current Commission’s proposal fails to guarantee sufficient fiscal capacity to Member States to promote the investment needed to promote climate transition and conversion.

Or. en

Amendment 8

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 3 c (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3c) EU's past experience showed the limits of fiscal consolidation in promoting sustainable public finances and promoting full-employment. Recently, the IMF published evidence that, on average, fiscal consolidation does not reduce debt-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, the so-called Troika programmes failed to accomplish its own economic goals and accentuated the economic downturn.

Or. en

Amendment 9

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(4) In stage three of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Member States are, according to Article 126(1) TFEU, under the obligation to avoid excessive government deficits.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 10

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The strong policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic proved effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis, but resulted in a significant increase in public- and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to help address the medium- and long-term challenges facing the Union, including achieving a fair digital and green transition, including the Climate Law22 , ensuring energy security, open strategic autonomy, addressing demographic change, strengthening social and economic resilience, and implementing the strategic compass for security and defence, all of which requires reforms and sustained high levels of investment in the years to come.

(5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The strong policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic proved effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis in the short term, but resulted in a significant increase in public- and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to help address the medium- and long-term challenges facing the Union, including achieving a fair digital and green transition, ensuring energy security, open strategic autonomy, addressing demographic change, strengthening social and economic resilience, and implementing the strategic compass for security and defence, all of which requires reforms and sustained high levels of investment in the years to come.

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22 The European Climate Law sets a Union-wide climate neutrality objective by 2050 and requires Union institutions and Member States to progress in enhancing adaptive capacity, requiring significant public investment to reduce the negative socio-economic impacts of climate change on the EU and its Member States, including negative impacts on growth and fiscal sustainability.

Or. en

Amendment 11

Lídia Pereira

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic mitigated the economic and social damage of the crisis, but resulted in a significant increase in public and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to help address the medium and long-term challenges facing the Union, including achieving a fair digital and green transition, including the Climate Law22 , ensuring energy security, open strategic autonomy, addressing demographic change and intergenerational fairness, strengthening social and economic resilience, promoting higher levels of productivity and implementing the strategic compass for security and defence, all of which requires reforms and sustained high levels of investment in the years to come.

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Or. en

Amendment 12

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the macroeconomic divergences and disparities in production capacities, growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The strong policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic proved effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis, but resulted in a significant increase in public- and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to help address the medium- and long-term challenges facing the Union, including achieving a fair digital and green transition, including the Climate Law, ensuring energy security, open strategic autonomy, addressing demographic change, strengthening social and economic resilience, and implementing the strategic compass for security and defence, all of which requires reforms and sustained high levels of investment in the years to come.

__________________

Or. en

Amendment 13

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The strong policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic proved effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis, but resulted in a significant increase in public- and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained, resilience-enhancing and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to help address the medium- and long-term challenges facing the Union, including achieving a fair digital and green transition, including the Climate Law22 , ensuring energy security, open strategic autonomy, addressing demographic change, strengthening social and economic resilience, and implementing the strategic compass for security and defence, all of which requires reforms and sustained high levels of investment in the years to come.

__________________

Or. en

Amendment 14

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put debt sustainability and sustainable growth at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account their public debt challenges and allowing country-specific fiscal trajectories.

(6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put full employment and the achievement of the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account country-specific challenges. Moreover, it should allow for true ownership and democratic scrutiny of such choices.

Or. en

Amendment 15

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Csaba Molnár, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put debt sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account their public debt challenges and allowing country-specific fiscal trajectories.

Or. en

Amendment 16

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put debt sustainability, sustainable growth and resilience at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account their public debt challenges and allowing country-specific fiscal trajectories.

Or. en

Amendment 17

Paul Tang, Pedro Silva Pereira, Aurore Lalucq, Margarida Marques, Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 6 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6a) Government budgets can be brought in line either by spending reductions or revenue increases. As such this regulation should be neutral in the way governments seek to reduce their levels of debt and deficit, and should not prioritise cuts in public expenditures over increases in tax revenue;

Or. en

Amendment 18

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(7) At the same time, to ensure a transparent and common Union framework based on the reference values referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the TFEU and the Treaty on the European Union (TUE), stronger enforcement underpinning multilateral surveillance should be the necessary counterpart of a risk-based surveillance framework that allows for country-specific fiscal trajectories.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 19

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(7) At the same time, to ensure a transparent and common Union framework based on the reference values referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the TFEU and the Treaty on the European Union (TUE), stronger and real enforcement underpinning multilateral surveillance should be the necessary counterpart of a risk-based surveillance framework that allows for country-specific fiscal trajectories.

Or. en

Amendment 20

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(8) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscal surveillance for each Member State. That single indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding interest expenditure as well as cyclical unemployment expenditure and expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by revenue from Union funds. This indicator allows for macro-economic stabilisation as it is not affected by the operation of automatic stabilisers, including revenue and expenditure fluctuations outside the direct control of the government.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 21

René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(8) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscal surveillance for each Member State. That single indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding expenditure on programmes of the Union fully matched by Union funds revenue, national expenditure on co-financing of programmes funded by the Union cap with a limit of 0.5% of GDP, cyclical elements of unemployment benefit expenditure, and costs related to the borrowing of funds for the loans related to the national plans in accordance with the Recovery and Resilience Facility in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241. This indicator allows for macro-economic stabilisation as it is not affected by the operation of automatic stabilisers, including revenue and expenditure fluctuations outside the direct control of the government.

Or. en

Amendment 22

Margarida Marques, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(8) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscal surveillance for each Member State. That single indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding expenditure on programmes of the Union fully matched by Union funds revenue, national expenditure on co-financing of programmes funded by the Union cap with a limit of 0.25% of GDP, cyclical elements of unemployment benefit expenditure, and costs related to the borrowing of funds for the loans related to the national plans in accordance with the Recovery and Resilience Facility in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241. This indicator allows for macro-economic stabilisation as it is not affected by the operation of automatic stabilisers, including revenue and expenditure fluctuations outside the direct control of the government.

Or. en

Amendment 23

Billy Kelleher, Martin Hlaváček, Eva Maria Poptcheva

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(8) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscal surveillance for each Member State. That single indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding interest expenditure as well as cyclical unemployment expenditure and expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by revenue from Union funds, including the costs related to the borrowing of funds for the loans related to Union programmes. This indicator allows for macro-economic stabilisation as it is not affected by the operation of automatic stabilisers, including revenue and expenditure fluctuations outside the direct control of the government.

Or. en

Amendment 24

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 25

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 9

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(9) The excessive deficit procedure (EDP) for breaches of the deficit reference value of 3 % of gross domestic product (GDP) (‘deficit-based EDP’), referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 is a well-established element of the Union’s fiscal surveillance framework that has been effective in influencing fiscal policy in the Member States.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 26

Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 9

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 27

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10) To strengthen the EDP for breaches of the debt criterion of 60 % of GDP (‘debt-based EDP’), referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 the focus should be on departures from the fiscal path set by the Council under Regulation (EU) […] of the European Parliament and of the Council23 .

deleted

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23 Regulation (EU) […] of the European Parliament and of the Council of […] [on the effective coordination of economic policies and multilateral budgetary surveillance] (OJ L …, …, p….).

Or. en

Amendment 28

Lídia Pereira

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10) To strengthen the EDP for breaches of the debt criterion of 60 % of GDP (‘debt-based EDP’), referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 the focus should be on significant deviations from the fiscal path set by the Council under Regulation (EU) […] of the European Parliament and of the Council23 .

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23 Regulation (EU) […] of the European Parliament and of the Council of […] [on the effective coordination of economic policies and multilateral budgetary surveillance] (OJ L …, …, p….).

Or. en

Amendment 29

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11) On the basis of Article 126(2) TFEU, the deficit criterion is also fulfilled where the excess over the reference value of 3 % of GDP is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value. Therefore, a temporary breach that remains close to the reference value should not lead to the opening of a deficit-based EDP if it results from exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, which includes a severe economic downturn in the Member State concerned.

(11) When social or ecological circumstances with a significant impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned occur, or an economic downturn in the Member State concerned, the excess of a primary deficit should be considered exceptional.

Or. en

Amendment 30

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11) On the basis of Article 126(2) TFEU, the deficit criterion is also fulfilled where the excess over the reference value of 3 % of GDP is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value. Therefore, a temporary breach that remains close to the reference value should not lead to the opening of a deficit-based EDP if it results from exceptional circumstances or cyclical conditions that adversely impact the public finances of the Member State concerned, which includes a severe economic downturn in the Member State concerned.

Or. en

Amendment 31

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 12

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 32

Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 12

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(12) Moreover, in case of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, and following the application of Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], or in case of relevant investments in public services, public infrastructures, social protection, climate action and environmental protection, the Commission and the Council should decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

Or. en

Amendment 33

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 13

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(13) In accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], Member States can deviate from the reference trajectory they set that Regulation in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, or in the event of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. As a consequence, such a deviation should not lead to the opening of a debt-based EDP.

Or. en

Amendment 34

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 13

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 35

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 13

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(13) In accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council, following a recommendation from the Commission, can allow Member States to deviate from the net expenditure path set by the Council under that Regulation in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, or in the event of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term or where Member States implement, within a defined timeframe, justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], and adhering to the reforms and investments outlined in national plans, including those of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds, and future EU investment instruments designed to serve similar purposes. As a consequence, such a deviation should not lead to the opening of a debt-based EDP.

Or. en

Amendment 36

Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, Gilles Boyer, Georgios Kyrtsos, Valérie Hayer, Pascal Canfin

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account, as a key relevant factor, the degree of debt challenge in the Member State concerned. A substantial public debt challenge established according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor should be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an EDP as a rule. Since, in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission is to take into account all other relevant factors, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned, that should include in particular the developments in the medium-term economic position and the developments in the medium-term budgetary position, and the implementation of structural reforms and investment. In order to increase national ownership, the independent fiscal institutions referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive [on the national budgetary frameworks]24 , should provide an opinion on the relevant factors.

deleted

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24 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ L …, …, p….).

Or. en

Amendment 37

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account all relevant factors on equal footing. Besides the sustainability of public debt, the Commission should take into account all the developments in the medium-term economic position and the developments in the medium-term budgetary position, the progress on the national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction and the implementation of investment. In order to increase national ownership, national parliaments, representatives of workers' associations and the independent fiscal institutions referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive [on the national budgetary frameworks], should provide an opinion on the relevant factors.

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24 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ L …, …, p….).

Or. en

Amendment 38

Enikő Győri

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account all other relevant factors, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned, that should include in particular the developments in the medium-term economic position and the developments in the medium-term budgetary position, and the implementation of structural reforms and investment. In order to increase national ownership, the independent fiscal institutions referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive [on the national budgetary frameworks]24 , should provide an opinion on the relevant factors.

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24 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ L …, …, p….).

Or. en

Amendment 39

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account, as a key relevant factor, the degree of debt challenge in the Member State concerned. A substantial public debt challenge established according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor may be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an EDP as a rule. Since, in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission is to take into account all other relevant factors, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned, that should include in particular the efforts in addressing climate related fiscal risks and green investment needs, in line with the EU Green Deal and the Union’s climate targets to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 and achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest, developments in the medium-term economic position and the developments in the medium-term budgetary position, and the implementation of structural reforms and investment. In order to increase national ownership, the independent fiscal institutions referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive [on the national budgetary frameworks]24 , should provide an opinion on the relevant factors.

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24 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ L …, …, p….).

Or. en

Amendment 40

Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account that a significant part of Member States' debt is illegitimate and originates from policies promoted by the EU economic governance such as tax cuts and exemptions that result in lower fiscal revenues; that Member States' debt would be lower if it was not for the obligation imposed on them to borrow money from private banks instead of directly from the ECB, resulting in higher costs of debt servicing. A substantial public debt challenge established according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor should be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an EDP as a rule. Since, in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission is to take into account all other relevant factors, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned, that should include in particular the developments in the medium-term economic position and the developments in the medium-term budgetary position, and the implementation of structural reforms and investment. In order to increase national ownership, the independent fiscal institutions referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive [on the national budgetary frameworks]24 , should provide an opinion on the relevant factors.

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24 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ L …, …, p….).

Or. en

Amendment 41

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(15) To keep track of actual and planned annual deviations from the net expenditure path as set out in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission should set up a control account for each Member State summing those deviations over time. The information in the control account should be the basis of enforcement actions, in particular of a report pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU following a deviation from the net expenditure path. At the same time, the degree of ambition of the net expenditure path in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan referred to in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] should be considered when deciding on the opening of a debt-based EDP. In particular, if the Member State’s net expenditure path set by the Council is more ambitious than the medium-term technical trajectory put forward by the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and the deviation from the path is not significant when measured against this trajectory, the opening of an excessive deficit procedure should be avoided.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 42

Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, Gilles Boyer, Georgios Kyrtsos, Valérie Hayer, Pascal Canfin, Olivier Chastel

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 43

Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 16

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(16) The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should bring or keep the general government deficit durably below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 by the deadline established by the Council. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should also ensure sufficient progress during the period covered by the recommendation regarding putting the projected debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or remaining at a prudent level. When setting the corrective net expenditure path under the EDP, the Council should also ensure that there is no back-loading of the required fiscal adjustment effort. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP would in principle be the one originally set by the Council, while taking into account the need to correct the deviation from that path. In case the original path is no longer feasible, due to objective circumstances, the Council should be able to set a different path under the EDP.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 44

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 16

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(16) When a Member State, in dialogue with the Commission and the Council, defines primary deficit as excessive, it should present a detailed economic explanation, including a list of growth-enhancing investments and a budgetary plan laying down the expenditure and revenue options, to overcome it.

Or. en

Amendment 45

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 16

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(16) The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should bring or keep the general government deficit durably below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 or put the general government deficit on a plausibly downward path towards the 3% of GDP reference value. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should also ensure sufficient progress during the period covered by the recommendation regarding putting the projected debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or a sustainable level. When setting the corrective net expenditure path under the EDP, the Council should also ensure that there is no back-loading of the required fiscal adjustment effort. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP would in principle be the one originally set by the Council, while taking into account the need to correct the deviation from that path. In case the original path is no longer feasible, due to objective circumstances, the Council should be able to set a different path under the EDP.

Or. en

Amendment 46

Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, Gilles Boyer, Georgios Kyrtsos, Valérie Hayer, Pascal Canfin, Olivier Chastel

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 16

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(16) The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should bring or keep the general government deficit durably below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 by the deadline established by the Council. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should also ensure sufficient progress during the period covered by the recommendation regarding putting the projected debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or remaining at a prudent level. When setting the corrective net expenditure path under the EDP, the Council should also ensure that there is no back-loading of the required primary structural fiscal adjustment. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP would in principle be the one originally set by the Council, while taking into account the need to correct the deviation from that path. In case the original path is no longer feasible, due to objective circumstances, the Council should be able to set a different path under the EDP.

Or. en

Amendment 47

Lídia Pereira

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 16

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(16) The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should bring or keep the general government deficit durably below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 by the deadline established by the Council. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should also ensure sufficient progress during the period covered by the recommendation regarding putting the projected debt ratio on a plausibly and sustainable downward path or remaining at a prudent level. When setting the corrective net expenditure path under the EDP, the Council should also ensure that there is no back-loading of the required fiscal adjustment effort. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP would in principle be the one originally set by the Council, while taking into account the need to correct the deviation from that path. In case the original path is no longer feasible, due to objective circumstances, the Council should be able to set a different path under the EDP.

Or. en

Amendment 48

Billy Kelleher, Eva Maria Poptcheva

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 16 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(16a) For those years where deficit is expected to remain above the reference value, the net expenditure path should be consistent with an effective yearly reduction of 0.5% of the Member State GDP on average. The Commission will set an annual minimum adjustment figure for each Member State, and those figures will fall within a range of 0.2% to 0.8% of GDP as a benchmark. When deciding the exact figure for each Member State each year, the Commission will take into account the economic growth of the Union as a whole and of that Member State, together with the past adjustments and future projected adjustments of the Member State during the correction period. That way, deficit reduction will oscillate below or above a 0.5% target in order to avoid procyclicality, while compliance with the wider deficit reduction objective is preserved as there is an obligation to have an effective deficit reduction of 0.5% of GDP per year on average. During periods of high economic growth, the annual minimum adjustment should be set by the Commission above 0.5%, and the opposite should happen in times of economic contraction. When conducting the calculations and assessments to set the annual minimum adjustment figure, the Commission will also take into account deficit reduction in the previous years of the period and the remaining deficit reduction needed to ensure a reduction of 0.5% of GDP on average by the end of the correction period. Therefore, when providing the minimum adjustment figure for a given year, the Commission will also present the estimates for the annual minimum adjustment figure during the remaining years of the correction period. The Commission should incorporate into its assessment a worst-case scenario where an economic downturn persists until the end of the period and assess its likelihood, in order to avoid any potential backloading

Or. en

Amendment 49

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(17) For Member States under an EDP, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, should continue to be able to extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit where it establishes the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], or in the case of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of an individual Member State and provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. Such extension should require that the overall size of the shock exceeds a normal range, for example costs of natural disasters should be anticipated within bandwidths.

(17) Member States under an EDP should continue to be able to extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit where it establishes the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], or in the case of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of an individual Member State and provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. Such extension should require that the overall size of the shock exceeds a normal range, for example costs of natural disasters should be anticipated within bandwidths.

Or. en

Amendment 50

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(18) Specific provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 related to the contributions to second pillar pension systems should be deleted since the net expenditure path set by the Council should already take into account the revenue loss related to such contributions.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 51

Bogdan Rzońca

on behalf of the ECR Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(19) Independent fiscal institutions have proven their capacity to foster fiscal discipline and strengthen the credibility of Member States’ public finances. In order to enhance national ownership, the role of independent fiscal institutions, traditionally mandated to monitor compliance with the national framework, should be expanded to the economic governance framework of the Union.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 52

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(19) Independent fiscal institutions should have a pluralistic and multidisciplinary board, where minority views have representation as well as representatives of workers' associations, in order to truly enhance national ownership. Moreover, when requested by the Member State concerned, such independent institutions should be responsible to produce the forecasts and the impact assessments needed to the budgetary practices.

Or. en

Amendment 53

Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, Gilles Boyer, Georgios Kyrtsos, Valérie Hayer, Pascal Canfin, Olivier Chastel

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(19) Independent fiscal institutions have proven their capacity to foster fiscal discipline and strengthen the credibility of Member States’ public finances. In order to enhance national ownership, the role of independent fiscal institutions, traditionally mandated to monitor compliance with the national framework, should be adapted to the economic governance framework of the Union.

Or. en

Amendment 54

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(20) Clear conditions should be laid down for abrogation of excessive deficit procedures. Abrogation should require the deficit to remain credibly below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 and, for a debt-based EDP, that the Member State demonstrates compliance with the net expenditure path under the EDP.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 55

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(20) Abrogation of excessive deficit procedures should in particular take place when the deficit remains credibly below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 and, for a debt-based EDP, when the Member State demonstrates compliance with the net expenditure path under the EDP.

Or. en

Amendment 56

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(21) The fines provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU should not provide for a minimum amount but they should accumulate until effective action is taken, in order to constitute a real incentive for compliance with the notices given to Member States under an EDP in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 57

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 21 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(21a) A strong track record of commitments and implementation rate of reforms and investments approved under the Recovery and Resilience Plan of the Member State, as well on its Partnership Agreement for the Cohesion Funds, should be taken into account for the Commission to halt its proposal to the Council to suspend all or part of the commitments or payments of these two instruments as stated in Article 10(1) and Article 19(7) of the Recovery and Resilience Facility Regulation , respectively.

Or. en

Amendment 58

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23) This Regulation is part of a package together with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and Directive (EU) […] amending 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. Together, they establish a reformed Union economic governance framework that incorporates into Union law the substance of Title III ‘Fiscal Compact’ of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union25 , in accordance with Article 16 thereof. By building on the experience with the implementation of the TSCG by the Member States, the package retains the Fiscal Compact’s medium-term orientation as a tool to achieve budgetary discipline and growth promotion. The package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by means of a stronger role for independent fiscal institutions, which draws on the Fiscal Compact’s common principles proposed by the Commission26 in accordance with Article 3(2) of the TSCG. The analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures for the overall assessment of compliance required by the Fiscal Compact is set out in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. As in the Fiscal Compact, temporary deviations from the medium-term plan are allowed only in exceptional circumstances in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Similarly, in case of significant deviations from the medium-term plan, measures should be implemented to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. The package strengthens fiscal surveillance and enforcement procedures to deliver on the commitment of promoting sound and sustainable public finances and sustainable growth. The economic governance framework reform, thus, retains the fundamental objectives of budgetary discipline and debt sustainability set out in the TSCG.

deleted

__________________

25 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012.

26 Communication COM(2012) 342 final of 20 June 2012 from the Commission ‘Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms’.

Or. en

Amendment 59

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23) This Regulation is part of a package together with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and Directive (EU) […] amending 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. The package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by Member States being the ones deciding on their fiscal choices and requiring its parliamentary approval.

__________________

25 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012.

26 Communication COM(2012) 342 final of 20 June 2012 from the Commission ‘Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms’.

Or. en

Amendment 60

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

__________________

25 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012.

26 Communication COM(2012) 342 final of 20 June 2012 from the Commission ‘Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms’.

Or. en

Amendment 61

Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. This Regulation lays down the provisions for speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. The objective of the excessive deficit procedure is to deter excessive government deficits and, if they occur, to further prompt their correction, where compliance with the budgetary discipline is examined on the basis of the government deficit and government debt criteria.

1. This Regulation lays down the provisions for the replacement of the excessive deficit procedure by a social imbalance procedure and an excessive greenhouse gases emissions procedure. Additionally, it creates the possibility for Member States to implement unilateral anti-dumping measures in order to remedy insufficient improvements from a Member State towards its social or ecological targets following the opening a social imbalance procedure or an excessive greenhouse gas emissions procedure.

The objective of the social imbalance procedure is to deter excessive deviation from commitments and targets laid down in Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm] aimed at the fulfilment of economic and social rights, that risks jeopardizing individual well-being and social cohesion at national level and have spillover effects on other Member States. The objective of the excessive greenhouse gas emissions procedures is to deter excessive deviation from the fulfilment of national commitments and targets such as defined in the National Energy and Climate Plans that risk jeopardizing the achievement of EU climate goals.

The objective of the anti-dumping measures is to give the possibility to Member States to compensate for the disadvantages that may occur from the fact that one Member State does not meet its country-specific social and ecological targets.

Or. en

Amendment 62

Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. Failure of a Member State to reach its minimum targets regarding the fulfilment of economic and social rights may trigger a Social Imbalance Procedure, by which the Member State is required to carry out additional investments and reforms in line with these objectives, and which allows other Member States to take protective measures against social dumping in case insufficient progress is made by the Member State under procedure.

Failure of a Member state to reach its minimum targets regarding its National Energy Climate Plans may trigger an excessive greenhouse gas emissions procedure, by which the Member state will be required to carry out additional investments and reforms in line with these objectives, and which allows other Member States to enforce protective measures against ecological dumping in case insufficient progress is made by the Member State under procedure.

The Social Imbalance Procedure and the excessive greenhouse gas emissions procedure shall be triggered only after a vote of the European Parliament.

Or. en

Amendment 63

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(aa) 'reference trajectory' means the trajectory for the primary balance each Member State shall present, as set in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;

Or. en

Amendment 64

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures and other budgetary variables outside the control of the government, as defined in Annex II, point (a) of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 65

Paul Tang, Pedro Silva Pereira, Aurore Lalucq, Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of tax revenue, interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures and other budgetary variables outside the control of the government, as defined in Annex II, point (a) of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;

Or. en

Amendment 66

René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures, expenditure on programmes of the Union fully matched by Union funds revenue, national expenditure on co-financing of programmes funded by the Union cap with a limit of 0.5% of GDP, cyclical elements of unemployment benefit expenditure, and costs related to the borrowing of funds for the loans related to the national plans in accordance with the Recovery and Resilience Facility in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241;

Or. en

Amendment 67

Margarida Marques, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures, expenditure on programmes of the Union fully matched by Union funds revenue, national expenditure on co-financing of programmes funded by the Union cap with a limit of 0.25% of GDP, cyclical elements of unemployment benefit expenditure, and costs related to the borrowing of funds for the loans related to the national plans in accordance with the Recovery and Resilience Facility in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241;

Or. en

Amendment 68

Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures, other budgetary variables outside the control of the government, as defined in Annex II, point (a) of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*. Costs related to the borrowing of funds for the loans related to the national plans in accordance with the Recovery and Resilience Facility shall be included in the calculation of the net expenditure;

Or. en

Amendment 69

Billy Kelleher, Olivier Chastel, Martin Hlaváček, Eva Maria Poptcheva

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures, costs related to the borrowing of funds for the loans related to the national plans in accordance with the Recovery and Resilience Facility in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241 , cyclical elements of unemployment benefit expenditure and other budgetary variables outside the control of the government, as defined in Annex II, point (a) of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;

Or. en

Amendment 70

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) ‘net expenditure’ means all government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures, cyclical unemployment expenditure and expenditure on programmes of the Union fully matched by Union funds revenue;

Or. en

Amendment 71

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 72

Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures, cyclical unemployment expenditure and expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by revenue from Union funds;

Or. en

Justification

The complete definition should be in the operative part, not the annex

Amendment 73

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;

Or. en

Amendment 74

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures and other budgetary variables outside the control of the government, as defined in Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;

Or. en

Amendment 75

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) ‘technical trajectory’ means the net expenditure trajectory put forward by the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm];

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 76

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) ‘technical trajectory’ means the net expenditure trajectory put forward by the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm];

(c) 'reference trajectory’ means the net expenditure trajectory put forward by each Member State and negotiated after with the Commission to provide guidance to Member States with public debt above the 60% of gross domestic product (GDP) reference value or government deficit above the 3% of GDP reference value when drawing up their national medium-term fiscal-structural plans;

Or. en

Amendment 77

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) ‘net expenditure path’ means the multi-annual trajectory for net expenditure of a Member State as set by the Council in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm];

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 78

Bogdan Rzońca

on behalf of the ECR Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) ‘net expenditure path’ means the multi-annual trajectory for net expenditure of a Member State as set by the Council in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm];

(d) ‘nationally financed net expenditure path’ means the multi-annual trajectory for net expenditure real growth of a Member State as set by the Council in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm];

Or. en

Justification

Request to insert “nationally financed” before words “net expenditure path” for the sake of consistency with other articles. Otherwise “net expenditure path” will be misleading because it would suggest we take all expenditure into account, also those fully financed by EU revenue. It is also necessary to clarify that it is about the expenditure growth - not its level

Amendment 79

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(da) 'corrective net expenditure path' means the multi-annual trajectory for net expenditure as requested by the Council under Articles 3 and 5 of this Regulation following a decision on the existence of excessive deficit and defined in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] ;

Or. en

Amendment 80

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point e

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(e) ‘control account’ means a record of a Member State’s cumulated deviations of the actual net expenditure from the net expenditure path.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 81

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 82

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 83

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), where the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, or where Member States implement, within a defined timeframe, justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], and adhering to the reforms and investments outlined in national plans, including those of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds, and future EU investment instruments designed to serve similar purposes in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

Or. en

Amendment 84

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission indicate that the deficit will fall below the reference value following the end of the severe economic downturn or the exceptional circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph.

In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Member State indicate that the deficit will orient towards below the reference value following the end of the economic downturn or the circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph.

Or. en

Amendment 85

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission and the Member State indicates that the deficit is on a downward path towards the reference value following the end of the severe economic downturn or the exceptional circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph.

Or. en

Amendment 86

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 87

Eva Maria Poptcheva, Caroline Nagtegaal

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission, after gathering the opinion of the relevant national independent fiscal institution, indicate that the deficit will fall below the reference value following the end of the severe economic downturn or the exceptional circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph.

Or. en

Amendment 88

Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 89

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. The Member State shall present a detailed economic explanation, including a list of growth-enhancing investments and a budgetary plan laying down the expenditure and revenue options, to overcome such excessive primary deficit.

Or. en

Amendment 90

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 91

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the Member State concerned respects its net expenditure path and the control account does not exceed the threshold set in Article 21 of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

Or. en

Amendment 92

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 93

José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 94

Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the Member State concerned respects its net expenditure path. A Member State is considered not to respect its net expenditure path if a significant deviation in accordance with [OJ: please insert respective Article from preventive arm] exists.

Or. en

Amendment 95

Caroline Nagtegaal, Nicola Beer, Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the Member State concerned respects its net expenditure path. A Member State is considered not to respect its net expenditure path if a significant deviation in accordance with Article XX of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] exists.

Or. en

Amendment 96

Eva Maria Poptcheva, Caroline Nagtegaal

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 1a a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1aa. The European Fiscal Board shall elaborate an annual report assessing Member States having a government deficit above the 3% of GDP reference value or public debt above the 60% of GDP reference value. In this report, the European Fiscal Board shall evaluate, in particular, whether the excessive deficit can be considered exceptional and temporary according to paragraph 1, whether a severe economic downturn referred to in paragraph 2 might exist, as well as, all the factors included in paragraph 3. The European Fiscal Board shall also include, in its annual report, an opinion on whether an excessive deficit procedure should be opened for a particular Member State. The report shall be submitted to the Commission and shall be made public.

Or. en

Amendment 97

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, may consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a severe economic downturn as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the Council establishes the existence of exceptional circumstances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, shall consider an excess over the reference value resulting from an economic downturn as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the Member State concerned establishes the existence of exceptional circumstances in accordance with paragraph 1.

Or. en

Amendment 98

Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, shall consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a severe economic downturn, relevant investments in public services, public infrastructures, social protection, climate action and environmental protection, as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the Council establishes the existence of exceptional circumstances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

Or. en

Amendment 99

Esther de Lange

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, may consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a severe economic downturn as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the Council establishes the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or the existence of exceptional circumstances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

Or. en

Amendment 100

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, may consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a severe economic downturn as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the Council establishes the existence of exceptional circumstances or cyclical conditions in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

Or. en

Amendment 101

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Valentino Grant, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. it

Amendment 102

Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, Gilles Boyer, Georgios Kyrtsos, Valérie Hayer, Pascal Canfin, Olivier Chastel

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Justification

The notion of ‘key relevant factor' is contrary to the objective of simplifying the governance framework, by introducing a new hierarchy between relevant factors that did not exist in the current governance framework. Furthermore, the opening of the EDP ‘as a rule’ in case of substantial debt challenges introduces an automaticity that disregards the existence of other relevant factors. In addition, this proposal can lead to unequal treatment between Member States, by putting a specific stigma on high debt countries.

Amendment 103

Enikő Győri

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 104

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account, on an equal footing, all relevant factors as indicated in that Article 126(3) TFEU, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of the sustainability of the primary deficit and public debt criteria of the Member State concerned.

Or. en

Amendment 105

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a relevant factor the degree of debt challenges, national public investment gaps and needs to achieve the common priorities of the Union as stated in the Article 12 of Regulation (EU) on the preventive arm], in the Member State concerned.

Or. en

Amendment 106

Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of medium term debt challenges in the Member State concerned. Where the Member State faces substantial medium term public debt challenges according to the Debt Sustainability Analysis conducted under Article 8 of Regulation [OJ: please insert reference to preventive arm], the opening of an excessive deficit procedure shall follow as a rule. Before preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission takes into account the European Fiscal Board’s report on the assessment of an excessive deficit in the particular Member State.

Or. en

Amendment 107

Caroline Nagtegaal, Nicola Beer, Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of medium term debt challenges in the Member State concerned. Where the Member State faces substantial medium term public debt challenges according to the Debt Sustainability Analysis conducted under Article XX of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the opening of an excessive deficit procedure shall follow as a rule. Before preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission takes into account the European Fiscal Board’s report on the assessment of an excessive deficit in the particular Member State.

Or. en

Amendment 108

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered the key factor leading to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure. When preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU the Commission shall take into account the European Fiscal Board’s report on the assessment of an excessive deficit in the particular Member State.

Or. en

Amendment 109

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned.

Or. en

Amendment 110

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 111

Bogdan Rzońca

on behalf of the ECR Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the commonly agreed methodology, it shall be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure as a rule.

Or. en

Amendment 112

Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered one of the key factors leading to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure as a rule.

Or. en

Amendment 113

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as the key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure as a rule.

Or. en

Amendment 114

Martin Hlaváček

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure as a rule.

Or. en

Amendment 115

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

In addition, when preparing the report, the Commission shall take into account the economic and social conditions of the Member State, in particular the progress on national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction. The report will also need to analyse how an excessive deficit procedure would affect investments needed to achieve a fair twin transition.

Or. en

Amendment 116

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission shall equally take into account as a key relevant factor progress by the Member State in addressing climate related fiscal risks and green investments needs, in line with the EU Green Deal and the Union’s climate targets.

Or. en

Amendment 117

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Additionally, when preparing the report the Commission shall take into account the economic and social circumstances of the Member State in relation to progress on the national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction and measures implementing Directive 2022/2041. Moreover, the report needs to also take into account progresses toward the common priorities as referred to in Annex VI of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] with the specific aim to analyse how an excessive deficit procedure would affect investments needed to enable an energy transition.

Or. en

Amendment 118

Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission shall also take into account all other relevant factors as indicated in Article 126(3) TFEU, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned. The key relevant factor of substantial medium term public debt challenges shall take precedence over other relevant factors. Developments in the medium-term economic position should only be considered as relevant factor if the output gap is lower than -1,5% of potential output. Developments in the medium-term budgetary positions and the evolution of the government debt position and its financing should only be considered as relevant factor if the member state concerned does not face substantial medium term public debt challenges.

Or. en

Amendment 119

Caroline Nagtegaal, Nicola Beer, Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 120

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Valentino Grant, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission shall also take into account relevant factors as indicated in Article 126(3) TFEU, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned.

Or. it

Amendment 121

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission shall take into account as a key relevant factor to prevent the opening of a EDP the delivery and commitment by the Member State on the implementation of the investments and reforms to address the common priorities of the Union as stated in the Article 12 of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], but also the reforms and investments committed in the national plans of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds and future EU investments instruments that serve the same purpose.

Or. en

Amendment 122

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Moreover, with the aim to identify risks and difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation, the European Commission shall invite social partners to offer their views on the socio-economic situation in the Member state.

Or. en

Amendment 123

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) the developments in the medium-term economic position, in particular inflation developments and cyclical developments compared to the assumptions underlying the net expenditure path;

(a) the developments in the medium-term economic position, in particular inflation developments and cyclical developments;

Or. en

Amendment 124

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) the developments in the medium-term budgetary positions;

Or. en

Amendment 125

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) the developments in the medium-term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, in annual and cumulative terms as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], in particular if the balance of control account exceeds 0.3% of GDP in accordance with Article 21 of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Where relevant, the deviation compared to the technical trajectory shall also be taken into account when considering the size of the deviation. To safeguard the counter cyclical properties of the expenditure path, higher than anticipated economic growth, lower than expected interest expenditure, any expenditure and revenue windfalls or favourable stock-flow adjustments in the government debt ratio, relative to the forecasts underlying the net expenditure path, shall not be taken into account as relevant factors when assessing the existence of an excessive deficit based on deviations from the net expenditure path in accordance with paragraph 1a;

Or. en

Amendment 126

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) the developments in the medium-term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, in annual and cumulative terms as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], in particular if the balance of control account exceeds 2% of GPD in accordance with Article 21 of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Where relevant, the deviation compared to the technical trajectory shall also be taken into account when considering the size of the deviation; To safeguard the counter cyclical properties of the expenditure path, higher than anticipated economic growth, lower than expected interest expenditure, any expenditure and revenue windfalls or favourable stock-flow adjustments in the government debt ratio, relative to the forecasts underlying the net expenditure path, shall not be taken into account as relevant factors when assessing the existence of an excessive deficit based on deviations from the net expenditure path in accordance with paragraph 1a;

Or. en

Amendment 127

Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) the developments in the medium-term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, in annual and cumulative terms as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Where relevant, the deviation compared to the technical trajectory shall also be taken into account when considering the size of the deviation. To safeguard the counter cyclical properties of the expenditure path, higher than anticipated economic growth, lower than expected interest expenditure, any expenditure and revenue windfalls or favourable stock-flow adjustments in the government debt ratio, relative to the forecasts underlying the net expenditure path, shall not be taken into account as relevant factors when assessing the existence of an excessive deficit based on deviations from the net expenditure path in accordance with paragraph 1a;

Or. en

Amendment 128

Bogdan Rzońca

on behalf of the ECR Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) the developments in the medium-term budgetary positions, including, in particular, whether the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, is at least 0,5 % of GDP in a single year or at least 0,25 % of GDP on average per year in 2 consecutive years, as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. When the net expenditure path is more demanding than the technical trajectory, the deviation compared to the technical trajectory shall also be taken into account when considering the size of the deviation;

Or. en

Amendment 129

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 130

Billy Kelleher, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, Valérie Hayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 131

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) the evolution of the government debt position and its financing, and the related risk factors, in particular the maturity structure, the currency denomination of the debt and contingent liabilities;

(c) the evolution of the government debt position with a focus on its financing, notably interest rate expenditure as a share of GDP, the related risk factors, in particular the maturity structure, the currency denomination of the debt and contingent liabilities, as well as the share of creditors domestic to the euro area;

Or. en

Amendment 132

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) the evolution of the government debt stock, but also its position and its financing, including possible ECB temporary support put in place, and the related risk factors, including in particular the debt structure, maturity structure, and the currency denomination of the debt and contingent liabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 133

Lídia Pereira

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) the evolution of the government debt position and its financing, and the forecast for debt levels, considering related risk factors, in particular the maturity structure, the currency denomination of the debt and contingent liabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 134

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ca) the progress in addressing national public investment gaps in alignment with the priorities of the Union as stated in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], recognising that these investments play a pivotal role in supporting the fulfilment of Union objectives and ensuring sustainable and inclusive growth and fiscal stability;

Or. en

Amendment 135

Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union including those supported by NextGenerationEU, and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks.

deleted

Or. en

Justification

The implementation of investments should already be taken into account in the net expenditure path.

Amendment 136

Caroline Nagtegaal, Nicola Beer, Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Justification

The implementation of investments should already be taken into account in the net expenditure path.

Amendment 137

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) the implementation investments including, in particular policies to implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union including those supported by NextGenerationEU, and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks.

Or. en

Amendment 138

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances, and policies to implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union, the EU Green Deal, including those supported by NextGenerationEU, measures to be taken in case of insufficient progress towards achieving applicable targets in line with Member States reporting on the performance of their budgetary frameworks under Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks.

Or. en

Amendment 139

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union and the European Pillar of Social Rights, including those supported by NextGenerationEU, Cohesion Funds and EU investments instruments that serve the same purpose, and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks.

Or. en

Amendment 140

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to implement growth and employment, and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks. Non-implementation of reforms and investments will also be taken into account.

Or. en

Amendment 141

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to implement the growth and employment strategy and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks. Non-implementation of reforms and investments will also be taken into account.

Or. en

Amendment 142

Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union including those supported by NextGenerationEU, the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks, long-term national strategic investments and public-private partnership investments. Non-implementation of reforms and investments will also be taken into account.

Or. en

Amendment 143

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(da) the quality of investment expenditure in line with the common key policy priorities of the Union in line with Annex VI of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

Or. en

Amendment 144

Esther de Lange, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(da) Where applicable, temporary above average government investment in defence compared to the average over the four-year period before the plan.

Or. en

Amendment 145

José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(da) Where applicable, temporary above average government investment in defence compared to the average over the four-year period before the plan.

Or. en

Amendment 146

Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, Gilles Boyer, Georgios Kyrtsos, Valérie Hayer, Pascal Canfin, Eva Maria Poptcheva

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(da) the investments made in defence to ensure open strategic autonomy and in the green transition to achieve the climate goals;

Or. en

Justification

Given the massive investments that would be needed to achieve our EU climate goals and ensure our open strategic autonomy in terms of defence during these times of crisis.

Amendment 147

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion of its national independent fiscal institution on relevant factors.

The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity, achieving the EU common priorities of the Union, the size of the public investment committed to address the priorities referred in Article 12ba) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 and any other relevant factors outside of the control of the Member State.

Or. en

Amendment 148

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission shall give due and express consideration to all the factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess the sustainability of primary deficit and public debt and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union.

Or. en

Amendment 149

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 150

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion on relevant factors, but also the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation, of the:

(i) national parliament of the state concerned;

(ii) representatives of workers' associations;

(iii) national independent fiscal institution.

Or. en

Amendment 151

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion of its national independent fiscal institution and the EFB.

Or. en

Amendment 152

Bogdan Rzońca

on behalf of the ECR Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union, such as defence expenditure increased due to direct threat at the EU’s borders. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion of its national independent fiscal institution on relevant factors.

Or. en

Amendment 153

Martin Hlaváček

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission shall, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, take into account the independent assessment of the Commission latest macroeconomic and budgetary forecast, compliance with the deficit and debt criterion together with relevant factors affecting the budgetary development in the Member State. Such assessment shall be carried out by the European Fiscal Board. The Commission shall explain in its report any differences from the European Fiscal Board's assessment.

Or. en

Amendment 154

Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3a. After the Commission´s report referred in paragraph 3, Member State shall have the power, in the observations submitted under Art. 126(6) TFEU, may propose a rectification plan to comply with its net expenditure path.

Or. en

Amendment 155

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors.

Or. en

Amendment 156

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors,

Or. en

Amendment 157

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors, specifically, the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors. The assessment will clearly specify which factors are deemed aggravating or mitigating and where relevant clearly specify the differences in the weight attributed to each relevant factor.

However, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit when assessing compliance on the basis of the debt criterion only if the double condition of the overarching principle — that, before these relevant factors are taken into account, the general government debt remains close to the reference value of 60% of GDP and the deviation from the expenditure path set out by the Council is limited - is fully met.

Or. en

Amendment 158

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 159

Martin Hlaváček

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors, specifically, the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors. Both the Council and the Commission shall explain in their overall assessment any differences from the European Fiscal Board's assessment.

Or. en

Amendment 160

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

When assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit provided for in Article 126(4), (5) and (6) TFEU only if the double condition of the overarching principle — that, before these relevant factors are taken into account, the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary — is fully met.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 161

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 162

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 163

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

However, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit when assessing compliance on the basis of the debt criterion.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 164

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

However, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit when assessing compliance on the basis of the debt criterion.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 165

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

However, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit when assessing compliance on the basis of the debt criterion.

Those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit when assessing compliance on the basis of the debt criterion.

Or. en

Amendment 166

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, may decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

5. Where Member States decides to deviate from their reference trajectory in accordance with paragraph 1 pursuant to Article 24 and Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, shall decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

Or. en

Amendment 167

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, may decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], or in case of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, shall decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

Or. en

Amendment 168

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, may decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, shall decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

Or. en

Amendment 169

Bogdan Rzońca

on behalf of the ECR Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, may decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, shall decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

Or. en

Amendment 170

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, may decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, shall decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

Or. en

Amendment 171

Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, may decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

Or. en

Amendment 172

Caroline Nagtegaal, Nicola Beer, Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, may decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

Or. en

Amendment 173

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in establishing a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that deadline. However, those relevant factors shall not be taken into account for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) TFEU on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under Article 126(6) to (9) and (11) TFEU.’;

Or. en

Amendment 174

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 175

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in the deadline agreed with the Member State for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that deadline. Those relevant factors shall also be taken into account for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) TFEU on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under Article 126(6) to (9) and (11) TFEU.’;

Or. en

Amendment 176

Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 2 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 and 3a of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in establishing a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that deadline. However, those relevant factors shall not be taken into account for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) TFEU on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under Article 126(6) to (9) and (11) TFEU.’;

Or. en

Amendment 177

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 2a

Present text

Amendment

(1a) Article 2a is replaced by the following:

Article 2a

1. In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions of the Union, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President of the Eurogroup, to appear before the committee to discuss Council decisions under Article 126(6) TFEU, Council recommendations under Article 126(7) TFEU, notices under Article 126(9) TFEU, or Council decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU.

The Council is, as a rule, expected to follow the recommendations and proposals of the Commission or explain its position publicly.

1a. Where the Council considers to take action under Article 126(6) TFEU, Council recommendations under Article 126(7) TFEU, notices under Article 126(9) TFEU, or Council considers taking decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU, it shall not do so without first obtaining a vote of consent by the competent committee of the European Parliament.

The Council and European Parliament are, as a rule, expected to follow the recommendations and proposals of the Commission or explain their position in a public hearing.

The competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned by such decisions, recommendations or notices to participate in an exchange of views.

2. The Council and the Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament of the application of this Regulation.

Or. en

Amendment 178

Bogdan Rzońca

on behalf of the ECR Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Within two weeks of the adoption by the Commission of a report issued in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Economic and Financial Committee shall formulate an opinion in accordance with Article 126(4) TFEU. The opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee shall be made public.

Or. en

Amendment 179

José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Within two weeks of the adoption by the Commission of a report issued in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the European Fiscal Board shall formulate an opinion as advice to the Commission, the Economic and Financial Committee and the Council. The opinion of the European Fiscal Board shall be made public.

Within four weeks of the adoption by the Commission of a report issued in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Economic and Financial Committee shall formulate an opinion in accordance with Article 126(4) TFEU. The opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee shall be made public.

Or. en

Amendment 180

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 181

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. The Council shall decide on the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(6) TFEU, as a rule within four months of the reporting dates established in Article 3(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. When it decides that an excessive deficit exists, the Council shall at the same time make recommendations to the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU. The Council shall make its decisions and recommendations public.

3. The Member State, the Commission and the Council shall decide on the existence of an excessive primary deficit. When it decides that an excessive deficit exists, the Commission and the Council may at the same time make recommendations to the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU. The recommendations shall be made public.

Or. en

Amendment 182

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendation, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the recommendation. For the years when the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP as a benchmark.

The Member State shall agree with the Commission and the Council on a maximum deadline for effective action to be taken and for the correction of the excessive deficit.

Or. en

Amendment 183

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Paul Tang, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Csaba Molnár, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of twelve months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. The Council recommendation may also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit ensuring a sustainable and balanced correction that does not endanger sustainable and inclusive growth, social convergence or the implementation of significant investments and social policies. In its recommendation, the Council may also request that the Member State implements a new net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit is declining towards a reference value

Or. en

Amendment 184

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit brought below the reference value or is put on a plausibly downward path towards the reference value at the end of the adjustment period.

Or. en

Amendment 185

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 186

Billy Kelleher, Olivier Chastel, Eva Maria Poptcheva

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Each year, an annual minimum adjustment figure for each Member State shall be set by the Commission, after consulting the European Fiscal Board, within a range of 0.2% to 0.8% of GDP as a benchmark.

The annual minimum adjustment figure shall be determined on the basis of the following criteria:

(i) Expected GDP growth in the relevant year in both the Union as a whole and the specific Member State.

(ii) Past adjustments and future forecasted adjustments by the specific Member State within the adjustment period.

When providing the annual minimum adjustment figure, the Commission shall also release a projection of annual minimum adjustment figures for each of the remaining years of the adjustment period based on its own economic growth forecasts. The total minimum adjustment foreseen in that projection shall be equivalent to a 0.5 percent annual adjustment on average.

The quantitative elements and the calculations needed for determining the annual minimum adjustment figures for each Member State shall be developed by the Commission in a delegated act in accordance with Article 17a(new) of this Regulation.

Or. en

Amendment 187

Martin Hlaváček

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 188

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendation, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value and ensures that the value of the control account is brought to zero within the deadline set in the recommendation. For the years when the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP in the structural primary balance as a benchmark.

Or. en

Amendment 189

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 3 – subparagraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendation, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value and ensures that the value of the control account is brought to zero within the deadline set in the recommendation. For the years when the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP in the structural primary balance as a benchmark.

Or. en

Amendment 190

José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendation, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value and ensures that the value of the control account is brought to zero within the deadline set in the recommendation. For the years when the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP in the structural primary balance as a benchmark.

Or. en

Amendment 191

Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, Gilles Boyer, Georgios Kyrtsos, Valérie Hayer, Pascal Canfin, Olivier Chastel

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 192

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. The corrective net expenditure path shall ensure that the average annual fiscal adjustment effort in the first three years is at least as high as the average annual fiscal effort of the total adjustment period.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 193

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Paul Tang, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Csaba Molnár, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly and sustainable downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and prevent the occurrence or incentives to pro-cyclical policies.

Or. en

Amendment 194

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 195

Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, Gilles Boyer, Georgios Kyrtsos, Valérie Hayer, Pascal Canfin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4– subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in Article 6 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

Or. en

Justification

Deletion of the Annex is in line with changes made in preventive arm. Additionally, the proposed introduction of the benchmark goes beyond what is necessary to ensure such a consistency, and represents a significant addition to the criteria that were in the original Commission’s proposal and constrains the flexibility that could be needed in order for the corrective path to be realistic.

Amendment 196

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or a sustainable level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. The corrective net expenditure path shall ensure that the adjustment effort is not postponed towards the final years of the adjustment period.

Or. en

Amendment 197

Martin Hlaváček

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level consistent with the criteria established in Article 6 and Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. The corrective net expenditure path shall ensure that the average annual fiscal adjustment effort in the first three years is at least as high as the average annual fiscal effort of the total adjustment period.

Or. en

Amendment 198

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 199

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. The Member State concerned shall report to the Council and the Commission on action taken in response. The report shall include:

(i) the targets for government expenditure and revenue and for the discretionary measures on both the expenditure and the revenue side as well as information on the measures taken and the nature of those envisaged to achieve the targets.

(ii) an analysis on the impact that such measures may have in relation to progress on the national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction and measures implementing Directive 2022/2041

(iii) an analysis on the progresses toward the common priorities of which in Annex VI of the Regulation [preventive arm] with the specific aim to analyse how an excessive deficit procedure would affect investments needed to enable an energy transition.

The report shall also include the opinion of the national parliament and the independent fiscal institution of the Member State concerned on the adequacy of the measures taken.

The Member State shall make the report public.

Or. en

Amendment 200

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. Within the deadline provided for in paragraph 4 of this Article, the Member State concerned shall report to the Council and the Commission on action taken in response to the Council’s recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The report shall include the targets for government expenditure and revenue and for the discretionary measures on both the expenditure and the revenue side consistent with the Council’s recommendation, as well as information on the measures taken and the nature of those envisaged to achieve the targets. The report shall also include the opinion of the independent fiscal institution of the Member State concerned on the adequacy of the measures taken and envisaged with respect to the targets. Moreover, when preparing the report, the Member State shall take into account the economic and social conditions of the Member State, in particular the progress on national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction. The report will also need to analyse how an excessive deficit procedure would affect investments needed to achieve a fair twin transition. The Member State shall make the report public.

Or. en

Amendment 201

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path recommended by the Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised recommendation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 202

José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU and where Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path recommended by the Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.

Or. en

Amendment 203

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 204

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 205

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path recommended by the Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, , or where Member States implement, within a defined timeframe, justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, and adhering to the reforms and investments outlined in national plans, including those of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds, and future EU investment instruments designed to serve similar purposes, occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised recommendation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule

Or. en

Amendment 206

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances or cyclical conditions that adversely impact the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path recommended by the Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council shall decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by at least one year. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council shall, on a recommendation from the Commission, adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised recommendation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by at least one year;

Or. en

Amendment 207

Lídia Pereira

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path recommended by the Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised recommendation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit.;

Or. en

Amendment 208

Martin Hlaváček

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) Np 1467/97

Article 3 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU and where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path recommended by the Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised recommendation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;

Or. en

Amendment 209

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3) Article 4 is replaced by the following:

(3) Article 4 is deleted

Or. en

Amendment 210

Bogdan Rzońca

on behalf of the ECR Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 4 – subparagraph 1 (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Any decision by the Council under Article 126(8) TFEU to make public its recommendations where it is established that no effective action has been taken, shall be taken immediately after the expiry of the deadline set in accordance with Article 3(4) of this Regulation.

Or. en

Amendment 211

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 4 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Council, when considering whether effective action has been taken in response to its recommendations made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU, shall base its decision on the report submitted by the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 3(5) of this Regulation and its implementation, as well as on any other publicly announced and sufficiently detailed decisions by the government of the Member State concerned.

The Council, when considering whether effective action has been taken in response to its recommendations made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU, shall base its decision on the report submitted by the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 3(5) of this Regulation and its implementation, as well as, having heard most representative social partners of the Member State concerned, on any other publicly announced and sufficiently detailed decisions by the government of the Member State concerned.

Or. en

Amendment 212

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(4) Article 5 is amended as follows:

(4) Article 5 is deleted

Or. en

Amendment 213

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 214

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Paul Tang, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Csaba Molnár, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 215

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Valentino Grant, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. it

Amendment 216

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 217

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value and ensures that the value of the control account is brought to zero within the deadline set in the notice. For the years where the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP in the structural primary balance as a benchmark. Any potential exclusions from the net expenditure definition regarding to expenditure on co-financing of programmes financed by the Union or costs related to the borrowing of funds for the loans related to the Recovery and Resilience Facility shall not apply to the calculations regarding the 0.5% annual adjustment above.

Or. en

Amendment 218

José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 219

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 220

Martin Hlaváček

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the notice. For the years where the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP as a benchmark, in terms of the net expenditure path defined in Article 2 of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

Or. en

Amendment 221

Billy Kelleher, Olivier Chastel, Eva Maria Poptcheva

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 222

Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, Gilles Boyer, Georgios Kyrtsos, Valérie Hayer, Pascal Canfin, Olivier Chastel

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 223

Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, Gilles Boyer, Georgios Kyrtsos, Valérie Hayer, Pascal Canfin, Olivier Chastel

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 224

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 225

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. The Council shall also indicate measures conducive to the achievement of the corrective net expenditure path.

Or. en

Amendment 226

Martin Hlaváček

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 227

José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised notice may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;

2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU and where Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], or unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.

Or. en

Amendment 228

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU and where Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], or unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.

Or. en

Amendment 229

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 230

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, or where Member States implement, within a defined timeframe, justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, and adhering to the reforms and investments outlined in national plans, including those of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds, and future EU investment instruments designed to serve similar purposes, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised notice may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.’;

Or. en

Amendment 231

Bogdan Rzońca

on behalf of the ECR Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or in case the Council has established, in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the existence of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised notice may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;

Or. en

Amendment 232

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, taking into due account the relevant factors referred in Article 2(3), on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised notice may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;

Or. en

Amendment 233

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances or cyclical conditions adversely impact the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by at least one year. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised notice may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;

Or. en

Amendment 234

Lídia Pereira

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised notice may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit.;

Or. en

Amendment 235

Martin Hlaváček

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b

Regulation No 1467/97

Article 5 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU and where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised notice may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;

Or. en

Amendment 236

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5) in Article 6, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

deleted

‘

1. The Council, when considering whether effective action has been taken in response to its notice made in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU, shall base its decision on the report submitted by the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 5(1a) of this Regulation and its implementation, as well as on any other publicly announced and sufficiently detailed decisions by the government of the Member State concerned. The outcome of the surveillance mission carried out by the Commission in accordance with Article 10a of this Regulation shall be taken into account.;

’

Or. en

Amendment 237

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 6 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The Council, when considering whether effective action has been taken in response to its notice made in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU, shall base its decision on the report submitted by the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 5(1a) of this Regulation and its implementation, as well as, having heard the most representative social partners, on any other publicly announced and sufficiently detailed decisions by the government of the Member State concerned. The outcome of the surveillance mission carried out by the Commission in accordance with Article 10a of this Regulation shall be taken into account.;

Or. en

Amendment 238

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 8

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6) Article 8 is replaced by the following:

deleted

‘

Article 8

1. Any Council decision under Article 126(11) TFEU to intensify sanctions shall be taken no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009.

2. Any Council decision under Article 126(12) TFEU to abrogate some or all of its decisions shall be taken as soon as possible and in any event no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009.

3. A Council decision shall only be taken pursuant to Article 126(12) TFEU where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission indicate that the deficit has been brought durably below the reference value and, where the excessive deficit procedure was opened on the basis of the debt criterion, the Member State concerned respected the corrective net expenditure path set by the Council in accordance with Article 3(4) or Article 5(1) of this Regulation over the previous 2 years and is projected to continue to do so in the current year on the basis of the Commission forecast.;

’

Or. en

Amendment 239

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 8 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. A Council decision shall only be taken pursuant to Article 126(12) TFEU where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission indicate that the deficit has been brought on plausible downward trends or below the reference value and, where the excessive deficit procedure was opened on the basis of the debt criterion, the Member State concerned respected the corrective net expenditure path set by the Council in accordance with Article 3(4) or Article 5(1) of this Regulation over the previous 2 years and is projected to continue to do so in the current year on the basis of the Commission forecast.;

Or. en

Amendment 240

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 8 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. A Council decision shall be taken pursuant to Article 126(12) TFEU in particular where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission indicate that the deficit has been brought durably below the reference value and, where the excessive deficit procedure was opened on the basis of the debt criterion, the Member State concerned respected the corrective net expenditure path set by the Council in accordance with Article 3(4) or Article 5(1) of this Regulation over the previous 2 years and is projected to continue to do so in the current year on the basis of the Commission forecast.;

Or. en

Amendment 241

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 8 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. A Council decision shall only be taken pursuant to Article 126(12) TFEU where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission and the Member State indicate that the deficit has been brought close to the reference value and, where the excessive deficit procedure was opened on the basis of the debt criterion, the Member State concerned followed the corrective net expenditure path set by the Council in accordance with Article 3(4) or Article 5(1) of this Regulation over the previous 2 years and is projected to continue to do so in the current year on the basis of the Commission forecast.;

Or. en

Amendment 242

Bogdan Rzońca

on behalf of the ECR Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 8 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 243

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) where the Member State concerned acts in compliance with recommendations made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU;

(a) where the Member State concerned acts employs active economic and fiscal measures to address its fiscal situation, taking under consideration the public recommendations made by the Commission and the Council;

Or. en

Amendment 244

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) where the participating Member State concerned acts in compliance with notices given in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU.;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 245

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point ba (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ba) where the participating Member State returns to its original net expenditure path as assessed in accordance with Article 8 of Regulation EU [on the preventive arm];

Or. en

Amendment 246

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 10 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The Council and the Commission shall regularly monitor the implementation of action taken:

deleted

— by the Member State concerned in response to recommendations made under Article 126(7) TFEU;

— by the participating Member State concerned in response to notices given under Article 126(9) TFEU.

Or. en

Amendment 247

Eva Maria Poptcheva, Caroline Nagtegaal

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 10 – paragraph 1a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. In case an excessive deficit procedure has been opened, the European Fiscal Board shall elaborate an annual report assessing the implementation of action taken, as well as, the potential existence of a severe economic downturn in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or exceptional circumstances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. In this report, the European Fiscal Board shall give an opinion on whether sanctions under Article 12 should be imposed or if any other decision should be taken. The report shall be submitted to the Commission and shall be made public.

Or. en

Amendment 248

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 10 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where action by a participating Member State is not being implemented or, in the Council's view, is proving to be inadequate, the Council shall immediately take a decision under Article 126(9) TFEU or Article 126(11) TFEU respectively.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 249

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 10 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. Where actual data pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 indicate that an excessive deficit has not been corrected by a participating Member State within the time limits specified either in recommendations issued under Article 126(7) TFEU or notices issued under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Council shall immediately take a decision under Article 126(9) TFEU or Article 126(11) TFEU respectively.;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 250

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 10a – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with authorities of the Member States in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation. To that end, the Commission shall, in particular, carry out missions for the purpose of the assessment of the actual economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation and allow an exchange with other relevant stakeholders, including the national independent fiscal institutions.;

1. The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with authorities of the Member States in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation, for the purpose of the assessment of the actual economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation and allow an exchange with national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders, including the national independent fiscal institutions.

During such dialogue, the Commission shall invite representatives of workers' associations to offer their views on the socio-economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation.

Or. en

Amendment 251

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 10a – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with authorities of the Member States in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation. To that end, the Commission shall, in particular, carry out missions for the purpose of the assessment of the actual economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation and allow an exchange with national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders, including the national independent fiscal institutions and the most representative social partners;

Or. en

Amendment 252

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 10a – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 253

Esther de Lange

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 10a – paragraph 1a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. The European Parliament shall be informed in accordance with Article 26a and Article 29 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

Or. en

Amendment 254

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 10a – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Following the adoption by the Council of a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Commission shall carry out a dedicated surveillance mission to the Member State concerned to discuss the measures that the Member State intends to take in response to the measures judged necessary following the notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State. Enhanced surveillance may be undertaken for Member States which are the subject of recommendations and notices issued following a decision pursuant to Article 126(8) TFEU and decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU for the purposes of on-site monitoring. The Member States concerned shall provide all necessary information for the preparation and the conduct of the surveillance mission.;

2. Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State.

Or. en

Amendment 255

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 10a – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Following the adoption by the Council of a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Commission shall carry out a mission to the Member State concerned to discuss the measures that the Member State intends to take in response to the measures judged necessary following the notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State. The Member States concerned shall provide all necessary information for the preparation and the conduct of the mission.;

Or. en

Amendment 256

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 10a – paragraph 3

Present text

Amendment

(ba) paragraph 3 is deleted.

3. The Commission may invite representatives of the European Central Bank, if appropriate, to participate in surveillance missions in a Member State whose currency is the euro or which is participating in the Agreement of 16 March 2006 between the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the Member States outside the euro area laying down the operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in stage three of Economic and Monetary Union6 (ERM II).

__________________

6. OJ C 73, 25.3.2006, p. 21.

Or. en

Amendment 257

Esther de Lange

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 10a – paragraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ba) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

4. The Commission shall report to the Council on the outcome of the mission referred to in paragraph 2 and may decide to make its findings public. The European Parliament shall be informed in accordance with Article 26a and Article 29 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

Or. en

Amendment 258

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

SECTION 4

Present text

Amendment

[…]

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 259

Philippe Lamberts, Rasmus Andresen, Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 11

Present text

Amendment

(9a) Article 11 is replaced by the following:

Article 11

"Article 11

Whenever the Council decides under Article 126(11) TFEU to impose sanctions on a participating Member State, a fine shall, as a rule, be required. The Council may decide to supplement such a fine by the other measures provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU.Article 12

1. Whenever the Council decides under Article 126(11) TFEU to impose sanctions on a participating Member State, a fine may be taken where necessary and proportionate. The Council may decide to supplement such a fine by the other measures provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU.

2. The Council may not take decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU without first obtaining a vote of consent by the competent committee of the European Parliament.

3. Fines or other measures provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU shall not be taken or otherwise shall be suspended as long as the Commission establishes the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or exceptional circumstances or cyclical conditions adversely impacting the public finances of the Member State concerned, in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

Or. en

Amendment 260

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 11

Present text

Amendment

(9a) Article 11 is replaced by the following:

Article 11

"Article 11

"Whenever the Council decides under Article 126(11) TFEU to impose sanctions on a participating Member State, a fine shall, as a rule, be required. The Council may decide to supplement such a fine by the other measures provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU.

A strong track record of commitments and implementation rate of reforms and investments approved under the Recovery and Resilience Plan of the Member State, as well on its Partnership Agreement for the Cohesion Funds, should be taken into account for the Commission to halt its proposal to the Council to suspend all or part of the commitments or payments of these two instruments as stated in Article 10(1) of the RRF regulation and Article 19(7), respectively.

Or. en

Amendment 261

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 12 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The amount of the fine shall amount to up to 0,05% of GDP for a 6-month period and be paid every 6 months until the Council assesses that the Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the notice issued under Article 126(9) TFEU.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 262

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 12 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The amount of the fine shall amount to up to 0,05% of GDP as a general rule for a 6-month period and be paid every 6 months until the Council assesses that the Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the notice issued under Article 126(9) TFEU. The amount of each individual 6-month fine could exceed the general rule in case the lack of effective action causes financial stability risks for the Member State or to the other Member States through spill-over effects. Individual 6-month fines cannot exceed 0.2% of GDP.

Or. en

Amendment 263

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 12 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The amount of the fine shall as a general rule amount to up to 0,05% of GDP for a 6-month period and be paid every 6 months until the Council assesses that the Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the notice issued under Article 126(9) TFEU. the amount of each individual 6-month fine could exceed the general rule in case the lack of effective action causes financial stability risks for the Member State or the Member States through spill-over effects. Individual 6-month fines cannot exceed 0.2% of GDP.

Or. en

Amendment 264

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Csaba Molnár, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 12 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The amount of the fine shall amount to up to 0,01% of GDP for a 6-month period and be paid every 6 months until the Council assesses that the Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the notice issued under Article 126(9) TFEU.

Or. en

Amendment 265

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 12 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. In each 6-month period following that in which a fine is imposed, until the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is abrogated, the Council shall assess whether the participating Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the Council notice in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU. In this semi-annual assessment the Council shall decide, in accordance with Article 126(11) TFEU, to intensify the sanctions, unless the participating Member State concerned has complied with the Council’s notice.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 266

Esther de Lange, Markus Ferber, Frances Fitzgerald, Jessica Polfjärd

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 12 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. The cumulated amount of the fines referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed 0,5 % of GDP.;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 267

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 12 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. The cumulated amount of the fines referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed 0,5 % of GDP.;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 268

Johan Van Overtveldt

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EC) 1467/97

Article 12 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. The cumulated amount of the fines referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed 0,5 % of GDP.;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 269

Margarida Marques, Irene Tinagli, Pedro Silva Pereira, Costas Mavrides, Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Csaba Molnár, Joachim Schuster, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 12 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. The cumulated amount of the fines referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed 0,5 % of GDP.;

3. The cumulated amount of the fines referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed 0,2 % of GDP.;

Or. en

Amendment 270

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan, Manon Aubry

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 14

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. In accordance with Article 126(12) TFEU, the Council shall abrogate the sanctions referred to in Article 126(11), first and second indent, TFEU depending on the significance of the progress made by the participating Member State concerned in correcting the excessive deficit.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 271

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 15

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

In accordance with Article 126(12) TFEU, the Council shall abrogate all outstanding sanctions if the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is abrogated. Fines imposed in accordance with Article 12 of this Regulation will not be reimbursed to the participating Member State concerned.;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 272

Esther de Lange

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 17

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(12) Articles 16 and 17 are deleted.

(12) Article 17 is deleted.

Or. en

Amendment 273

Esther de Lange

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 16

Present text

Amendment

(11a) Article 16 is replaced by the following:

'Article 16

The fines referred to in Article 12 shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and shall be assigned to the European Financial Stability Facility. When the participating Member States create another stability mechanism to provide financial assistance in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, the amount of those fines shall be assigned to that mechanism.

The fines referred to in Article 12 shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and shall be assigned to the European Stability Mechanism. When the participating Member States create another stability mechanism to provide financial assistance in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, the amount of those fines shall be assigned to that mechanism.'

Or. en

Amendment 274

Martin Hlaváček

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 17a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) the effectiveness of this Regulation;

(a) the effectiveness of this Regulation, in particular in reducing excessive deficits;

Or. en

Amendment 275

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 17b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU to Member States subject to a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or to a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU on [date of entry into force of amending Regulation], and that have taken effective action.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 276

José Gusmão, Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 17b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

It shall adopt the revised recommendation or notice together with the adoption of the recommendation pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] setting the net expenditure path.;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 277

Billy Kelleher, Olivier Chastel, Eva Maria Poptcheva

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97

Article 17 c (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14a) The following Article 17c is inserted:

'Article 17c

Exercise of the delegation

The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.

The power to adopt the delegated acts referred to in Article 3 shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of one year from [Please insert the date of entry into force of this Council Regulation.]

Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making.

As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council.

A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 3 shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of one month of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by one month at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.’;

Or. en