Sittings · Document

Draft report (COM(2023)0226 – C90139/2023 – 2023/0111(COD)) 2023-11-06

Amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action

Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

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Amendment 56

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1a) The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is, along with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the still missing European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) one of the pillars of the banking union. The ongoing review of the Union crisis management and deposit insurance framework is intended to pave the way towards the long-due completion of the banking union, including the establishment of a European deposit insurance scheme. A first step in that direction is the establishment of an EU credit line provided by a dedicated fund, managed by the Single Resolution Board (SRB), to depleted, or close to being depleted, national DGSs. This new fund should be financed through progressive transfer of banks’ contributions collected by participating DGSs.

Or. en

Amendment 57

Lídia Pereira

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1a) The Banking Union is a fundamental pillar of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and its development has been essential to guaranteeing the stability and resilience of the banking sector, including by way of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism. Unfortunately, the Banking Union is not yet complete, owing to the slow adoption of a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS).

Or. pt

Amendment 58

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect to some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. Taxpayer money is used rather than resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution or entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation in turn generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest, including for smaller and medium-sized institutions primarily funded through deposits and without sufficient other bail-inable liabilities.

Or. en

Justification

Justification: There is no reason to expand the resolution regime in the way the Commission has proposed. The largely harmonised European deposit guarantee schemes have proven their ability to function, as the payout events from Greensill Bank and the cross-border case of Sberbank have shown. For the majority of institutions, it is already possible to ensure an orderly exit from the market without endangering financial market stability through national insolvency/liquidation proceedings.If, in individual cases, a resolution authority does not make use of its already extensive powers, deficiencies in application in practice do not justify a change of the existing legal framework. Instead, more attention should be paid to the application of the existing legal framework.

Amendment 59

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 60

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect to some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. Taxpayer money is used rather than resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution or entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation in turn generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest, including for smaller and medium-sized institutions.

Or. en

Amendment 61

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 62

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2a) The current legislative review seeks to reinforce the conditions for an orderly bank resolution that provides more protection for depositors. It firmly upholds the insurance to covered deposits, while ameliorating the policy toolbox for resolution, thus allowing for smoother alternatives that provide additional safeguards to depositors and financial stability.

Or. en

Amendment 63

Roberts Zīle

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2a) The current legislative review seeks to reinforce the conditions for an orderly bank resolution that provides more protection for depositors. It firmly upholds the insurance to covered deposits, while reinforcing the policy toolbox for resolution, thus allowing for smoother alternatives that provide additional safeguards to depositors and financial stability.

Or. en

Amendment 64

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(4) The intensity, and level of detail, of the resolution planning work needed with respect to subsidiaries that have not been identified as resolution entities varies depending on the size and risk profile of the institutions and entities concerned, the presence of critical functions, and the group resolution strategy. The Single Resolution Board (the ‘Board’) should therefore be able to consider those factors when identifying the measures to be taken in respect of such subsidiaries and follow a simplified approach where appropriate.

Or. en

Amendment 65

Roberts Zīle

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 66

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 9

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(9) The rules for determining the MREL are mostly focused on setting the appropriate level of the MREL with the assumption of the bail-in tool as the preferred resolution strategy. However, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 allows the Board to use other resolution tools, namely those relying on the transfer of the business of the institution under resolution to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution. It should therefore be specified that, in case the resolution plan envisages the use of the sale of business tool or of the bridge institution tool and the resolution entity’s exit from the market, the Board should determine the level of the MREL for the resolution entity concerned on the basis of the specificities of those resolution tools and of the different loss-absorbing and recapitalisation needs those tools entail.

(9) The rules for determining the MREL are mostly focused on setting the appropriate level of the MREL with the assumption of the bail-in tool as the preferred resolution strategy. However, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 allows the Board to use other resolution tools, namely those relying on the transfer of the business of the institution under resolution to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, as a standalone tool or in combination with other tools including bail-in. It should therefore be further specified that, in case the resolution plan envisages the use of a combination of tools, or the sale of business tool or of the bridge institution tool and the resolution entity’s exit from the market, the Board should always determine the level of the MREL for the resolution entity concerned on the basis of the specificities of those resolution tools and of the different loss-absorbing and recapitalisation needs those tools entail, taking into consideration the reduction in size and complexity that result from the implementation of recovery options in the runup to resolution and from the resolution actions.

Or. en

Justification

The principle of adjusting the MREL target to the specificities of the preferred resolution strategy needs to be implemented horizontally for all tools and combination of tools.

Amendment 67

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enables the resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for an appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent as in the case of an open-bank bail-in strategy, because the Board will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action. Nevertheless, the losses in such cases are expected to exceed the resolution entity’s own funds requirements. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities continues to include a recapitalisation amount that is adjusted in a way which is proportionate to the resolution strategy.

(10) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enables the post-resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for an appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent as in the case of an open-bank bail-in strategy, because the Board will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action, although the acquirer might ask for the transaction to be capital neutral. Nevertheless, the losses in such cases are expected to exceed the resolution entity’s own funds requirements. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities continues to include a recapitalisation amount that is adjusted in a way which is proportionate to the resolution strategy, and subject to an appropriate floor.

Or. en

Justification

The adjustment of the Retarget for transfer tool with market exit needs to be sufficiently prudent and robust.

Amendment 68

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enables the resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for an appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent as in the case of an open-bank bail-in strategy, because the Board will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities continues to include a recapitalisation amount that is adjusted in a way which is proportionate to the resolution strategy.

Or. en

Amendment 69

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 70

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of open bank bail-in. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the Board should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments, and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool. Since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from the deposit guarantee scheme and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the Board should not consider the potential contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme (in resolution when calibrating the level of the MREL.

Or. en

Amendment 71

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 72

Roberts Zīle

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 73

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of open bank bail-in. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and, optionally, its exit from the market, the Board should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments, and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool. Since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from the deposit guarantee scheme and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the Board must not consider the potential contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme in resolution when calibrating the level of the MREL. That approach also reduces the likelihood of moral hazard behaviours.

Or. en

Amendment 74

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in or alongside bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of the sole open bank bail-in strategy. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for such resolution entities the Board should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments, and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool or any other tool. In case of the transfer tool with market exit, since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from the deposit guarantee scheme and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the Board should not consider the potential contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme (in resolution when calibrating the level of the MREL.

Or. en

Justification

The principle of adjusting the MREL target to the specificities of the preferred resolution strategy needs to be implemented horizontally for all tools and combination of tools.

Amendment 75

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 12

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(12) It is necessary to ensure equal incentives to build sufficient amounts of MREL for institutions and entities that would be subject to transfer strategies both in and outside resolution. The setting of the level of the MREL for institutions and entities that may be subject to measures in the context of national insolvency proceedings pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council32 should therefore follow the same rules as those applicable to the setting of the MREL for resolution entities whose preferred resolution strategy provides for the sale of business or transfer to a bridge institution leading to its exit from the market.

deleted

__________________

32 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149).

Or. en

Amendment 76

Roberts Zīle

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 14 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14a) Where the Board requires information that is necessary for the purposes of updating resolution plans, preparing for the possible resolution of an entity or of carrying out a valuation, the ECB or the relevant national competent authorities should provide the Board with that information to the extent that it is available to them. Where the relevant information is not already available to the ECB or the relevant national competent authorities, the Board and the ECB or the relevant national competent authorities should cooperate and coordinate to collect the information considered necessary by the Board. In the context of such cooperation, the authorities should collect the necessary information having due regard to the principle of proportionality.

Or. en

Amendment 77

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(17) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified.

(17) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to manage the failure of any institution or entity that has a positive public interest assessment, namely, when the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to any failing institution or entity should be specified.

Or. en

Amendment 78

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 79

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(17) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified.

Or. en

Amendment 80

Roberts Zīle

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 17 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(17a) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to manage the failure of any institution or entity that has a positive public interest assessment, namely, when the tools available under national law are not adequate. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to any failing institution or entity should be specified.

Or. en

Amendment 81

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the deposit guarantee scheme.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 82

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 83

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 84

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme funds are used more efficiently. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the protection of depositors may be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the deposit guarantee scheme.

Or. en

Amendment 85

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect, among other factors, the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme funds are used more efficiently following a holistic evaluation. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, it should be considered that protection of depositors could be better achieved, depending on cases, in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the deposit guarantee scheme.

Or. en

Amendment 86

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme (‘DGS’) funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting covered depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the DGS.

Or. en

Justification

There is no need to acknowledge all kinds of deposits in the public interest assessment. For example, large companies or, in the future, government bodies, do not require any protection that would be granted to them with the general depositor preference. On the contrary, the single-tier treatment is likely to create moral hazard on the depositor side. For these reasons a special treatment of all deposits is not justified and should therefore be based on covered deposits.

Amendment 87

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(19) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, the Board should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the deposit guarantee scheme, preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States.

deleted

Or. en

Justification

From a State Aid perspective all extraordinary public financial support is State Aid, weather it comes from the budget of a MS or not. There is no need to separate the different cases of extraordinary public financial support.

Amendment 88

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(19) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, the Board should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the deposit guarantee scheme, preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States. However, this should not lead to expectation that burden sharing requirements will be reduced as burden sharing by shareholders and creditors should remain primary source of funding.

Or. en

Amendment 89

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(19) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect the prioritisation of using industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) instead of funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money, except for extraordinary circumstances of a systemic nature or pertaining to very large economic turmoil. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, the Board should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the deposit guarantee scheme, preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States.

Or. en

Amendment 90

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 91

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(19) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, the Board should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the deposit guarantee scheme, preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States. Nevertheless, burden sharing by shareholders and creditors must remain the primary source of funding.

Or. en

Amendment 92

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(20) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative only where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively and not only to the same extent as resolution.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 93

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 94

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(20) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the public interest assessment should consider whether the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives to the same extent as resolution.

Or. en

Amendment 95

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 96

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 97

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(20) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives to the same extent as in case of resolution.

Or. en

Amendment 98

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(21) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU, it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of deposit guarantee schemes in the Union, interventions of such schemes in the context of preventive measures complying with the requirements laid down in Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity does not meet any of the conditions for being deemed as failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The ECB currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for the following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be laid down in Regulation (EU) No 806/2014. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distress faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should therefore be specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures.

(21) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU and without prejudice to the question whether a preventive measure constitutes extraordinary public financial support in the first place, it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a preventive precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of deposit guarantee schemes in the Union, interventions of such schemes in the context of preventive measures complying with the requirements laid down in Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity does not meet any of the conditions for being deemed as failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The ECB currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for the following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be laid down in Regulation (EU) No 806/2014. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distress faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should therefore be specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures.

Or. en

Justification

It should be made clear that none of the newly introduced rules on state aid, in particular Art. 18a of the draft SRMR, is intended to classify precautionary measures per se as state aid. It should therefore be made clear that this question remains unaffected.

Amendment 99

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(21) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU, it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of deposit guarantee schemes in the Union, interventions of such schemes in the context of preventive measures complying with the requirements laid down in Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity has been not declared failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The ECB currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for the following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be revised in Regulation (EU) No 806/2014. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distress faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should therefore be specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures.

Or. en

Amendment 100

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(21) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU, it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of deposit guarantee schemes in the Union, interventions of such schemes in the context of preventive measures complying with the requirements laid down in Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity has been not declared failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The ECB currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for the following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be revised in Regulation (EU) No 806/2014. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distress faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should therefore be specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures.

Or. en

Amendment 101

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 22

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(22) To preserve market discipline, protect public funds and avoid distortions of competition, precautionary measures should remain the exception and only be applied to address serious disturbances in the market or to preserve financial stability. Moreover, precautionary measures should not be used to address incurred or likely losses. The most reliable instrument to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses is an asset quality review by the ECB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council34 or national competent authorities. The ECB and national competent authorities should use such a review to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses if such review can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe. Where that is not possible, the ECB and national competent authorities should identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses in the most reliable way possible under the prevailing circumstances, based on on-site inspections where appropriate.

(22) To preserve market discipline, protect public funds and avoid distortions of competition, precautionary measures should remain the exception and only be applied to address serious disturbances in the market or to preserve financial stability and only use funds available in industry funded safety nets. Moreover, precautionary measures should not be used to address incurred or likely losses. The most reliable instrument to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses is an asset quality review by the ECB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council or national competent authorities. The ECB and national competent authorities should use such a review to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses if such review can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe. Where that is not possible, the ECB and national competent authorities should identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses in the most reliable way possible under the prevailing circumstances, based on on-site inspections where appropriate.

__________________

34 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).

Or. en

Amendment 102

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23) Precautionary recapitalisation is aimed at supporting viable institutions and entities identified as likely to encounter temporary difficulties in the near future and to prevent their situation from deteriorating further. To avoid that public subsidies are granted to businesses that are already unprofitable when the support is granted, precautionary measures granted in the form of acquisition of own funds instruments or other capital instruments or through impaired asset measures should not exceed the amount necessary to cover capital shortfalls as identified in the adverse scenario of a stress test or equivalent exercise. To ensure that public financing is ultimately discontinued, those precautionary measures should also be limited in time and contain a clear timeline for their termination (exit strategy). Perpetual instruments, including Common Equity Tier 1 capital, should only be used in exceptional circumstances and be subject to certain quantitative limits because by their nature they are not well suited for compliance with the condition of temporariness.

Or. en

Amendment 103

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23) Precautionary recapitalisation is aimed at supporting viable institutions and entities identified as likely to encounter temporary difficulties in the near future and to prevent their situation from deteriorating further. To avoid that industry safety net funds are granted to businesses that are already unprofitable when the support is granted, precautionary measures granted in the form of acquisition of own funds instruments or other capital instruments or through impaired asset measures should not exceed the amount necessary to cover capital shortfalls as identified in the adverse scenario of a stress test or equivalent exercise. To ensure that public financing is ultimately discontinued, those precautionary measures should also be limited in time and contain a clear timeline for their termination (exit strategy). Perpetual instruments, including Common Equity Tier 1 capital, should only be used in exceptional circumstances and be subject to certain quantitative limits because by their nature they are not well suited for compliance with the condition of temporariness.

Or. en

Amendment 104

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 24

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(24) Precautionary measures should be limited to the amount that the institution or entity would need to maintain its solvency in case of an adverse scenario event as determined in a stress test or equivalent exercise. In the case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures, the receiving institution or entity should be able to use that amount to cover losses on the transferred assets or in combination with an acquisition of capital instruments, provided that the overall amount of the shortfall identified is not exceeded. It is also necessary to ensure that such precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures comply with existing State aid rules and best practices, that they restore the institution or entity's long-term viability, that State aid is limited to the minimum necessary and that distortions of competition are avoided. For those reasons, the authorities concerned should, in case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures, take into account the specific guidance, including the AMC Blueprint35 and the Communication on Tackling Non-Performing Loans36 . Those precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures should also always be subject to the overriding condition of temporariness. Public guarantees granted for a specified period in relation to the impaired assets of the institution or entity concerned are expected to ensure better compliance with the temporariness condition than transfers of such assets to a publicly supported entity. To ensure the market exit of institutions and entities that prove not to be viable, despite the support received, it is necessary to lay down that non-compliance by the institution or entity concerned with the terms of the support measures specified at the time such measures were granted is to result in the institution or entity concerned being considered failing or likely to fail.

__________________

35 COM(2018) 133 final.

36 COM(2020) 822 final.

Or. en

Amendment 105

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 31

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(31) In certain circumstances, after the Single Resolution Fund has provided a contribution up to the maximum of 5 % of the institution or entity’s total liabilities including own funds, the Board may use additional sources of funding to further support their resolution action. It should be specified more clearly in which circumstances the Single Resolution Fund may provide further support where all liabilities with a priority ranking lower than deposits that are not mandatorily or discretionarily excluded from bail-in have been written down or converted in full.

deleted

Or. en

Justification

There is no need to review the current framework on this point.

Amendment 106

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 31

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 107

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 35

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(35) In order to ensure institutional continuity and the build-up of institutional expertise, the Chair, the Vice-Chair and the other full-time members of the Board should be allowed to serve for two consecutive terms in their respective positions. It should therefore be possible to renew their term of office for a five-year term, based on an evaluation by the Commission of the discharge of their duties during the first term.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 108

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 35

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 109

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 37

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(37) After the initial build-up period of the Single Resolution Fund referred to in Article 69(1) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, its available financial means may face slight decreases below its target level, in particular resulting from an increase in covered deposits. The amount of the ex-ante contributions likely to be called in those circumstances is thus likely to be small. It may therefore be possible that, in some years, the amount of those ex ante contributions is no longer commensurate to the cost of the collection of those contributions. The Board should therefore be able to defer the collection of the ex ante contributions for one or more years until the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the cost of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the Board to use the Single Resolution Fund.

(37) After the initial build-up period of the Single Resolution Fund referred to in Article 69(1) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, the collection of ex-ante contributions ends once the target level of 1% of covered deposits has been reached.

Or. en

Amendment 110

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 37

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(37) After the initial build-up period of the Single Resolution Fund referred to in Article 69(1) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, the regular collection of contributions ends when the target level of 1 % of the amount of covered deposits of all credit institutions authorised in all of the Member States has been reached for the first time.

Or. en

Justification

Amendment 111

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 38

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(38) Irrevocable payment commitments are one of the components of the available financial means of the Single Resolution Fund. It is therefore necessary to specify the circumstances in which those payment commitments may be called, and the applicable procedure when terminating the commitments in case an institution or entity ceases to be subject to the obligation to pay contributions to the Single Resolution Fund. In addition, to provide more transparency and certainty with respect to the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of ex ante contributions to be raised, the Board should determine such share on an annual basis, subject to the applicable limits.

(38) Irrevocable payment commitments are one of the components of the available financial means of the Single Resolution Fund. It is therefore necessary to specify the circumstances in which those payment commitments may be called, and the applicable procedure when terminating the commitments in case an institution or entity ceases to be subject to the obligation to pay contributions to the Single Resolution Fund. In addition, to provide more transparency and certainty with respect to the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of ex ante contributions to be raised, the Board should grant such share in the full amount as specified in Article 70(3) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014.

Or. en

Justification

The European Commission's proposal to increase the IPC share (Article 70(3)) is, in principle, a good idea, however the decision on granting it and the amount of the IPC share remains subject to the discretion of the Board. In order to improve planning capabilities, the institutions should always have the option of using IPCs to an amount of 50%.

Amendment 112

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 40

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(40) The Single Resolution Fund can be used to support the application of the sale of business tool or of the bridge institution tool, whereby a set of assets, rights, and liabilities of the institution under resolution are transferred to a recipient. In that case, the Board may have a claim against the residual institution or entity in its subsequent winding up under normal insolvency proceedings. That may occur where the Single Resolution Fund is used in connection to losses that creditors would otherwise have borne, including under the form of guarantees to assets and liabilities, or coverage of the difference between the transferred assets and liabilities. To ensure that the shareholders and creditors left behind in the residual institution or entity effectively absorb the losses of the institution under resolution and improve the possibility of repayments in insolvency to the Board, those claims of the Board against the residual institution or entity, and claims that arise from reasonable expenses properly incurred by the Board, should benefit from the same priority ranking in insolvency as the ranking of the claims of the national resolution financing arrangements in each participating Member State, which should be higher than the priority ranking of deposits and of deposit guarantee schemes. Since compensations paid to shareholders and creditors from the Single Resolution Fund due to breaches of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle aim to compensate for the results of resolution action, those compensations should not give rise to claims of the Board.

deleted

Or. en

Justification

The proposed extension of co-financing through deposit guarantee funds (which is addressed by way of referral to the draft BRRD) is to be rejected. Particularly in conjunction with the proposed extension of depositor protection to unprotected deposits - which is contrary to the mandate - this can have serious effects on financing requirements and lead to a financial depletion of Deposit Guarantee Schemes. Therefore, all corresponding rules leading to financial depletion of DGS should be deleted.

Amendment 113

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 40 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(40a) Given the creditor hierarchy review, market conditions might not be as favourable to deposit guarantee schemes that seek such alternative funding arrangements. Therefore, to prevent temporary financing by the Member States, and to ensure that it remains a last resort, the Board should be able to provide either a credit line or a guarantee based on the Single Resolution Fund to a deposit guarantee scheme in order to facilitate its access to markets at favourable financing conditions. The Single Resolution Fund's support should be provided when the deposit guarantee scheme is required to intervene in resolution, yet available financial means are insufficient to satisfy the needs of such action.

Or. en

Amendment 114

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 40 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 115

Roberts Zīle

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 40 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(40a) Despite an agreement having been reached on the introduction by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) of a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund, its implementation has not yet been achieved. The additional function of the Single Resolution Fund to provide guarantees to deposit guarantee schemes thus warrants additional safeguards to the former, such as the ratification of the ESM backstop to the Single Resolution Fund.

Or. en

Amendment 116

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 41

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(41) Since some of the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 concerning the role that deposit guarantee schemes may play in resolution are similar to those of Directive 2014/59/EU, the amendments made to those provisions in Directive 2014/59/EU by [OP please insert the number of the directive amending Directive 2014/59/EU] should be mirrored in Regulation (EU) No 806/2014.

deleted

Or. en

Justification

Amendment 117

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 41 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(41a) As deposit guarantee schemes are vested with additional tasks and responsibilities and considering that one direct implication of this review of the EU crisis management and deposit insurance framework, is to make DGS funds more available for resolution, their risks of being totally or partially depleted is increased. It is therefore now time to move toward a more Europeanised model, whereby a deposit insurance fund is established, financed by transfer from national DGS and managed by the Board in order to provide loans to depleted or almost depleted national DGS. The contributions to this fund should be computed according to a risk-based methodology. National DGS should inform early the Board if it anticipates that it will need to recourse to the EU credit line offered by the DIF.

Or. en

Amendment 118

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 41 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(41b) Two years after the entry into force of this amending Regulation, the Commission should prepare a report to the European Parliament and the Council to assess whether and under which modalities the Deposit Insurance Fund shall also cover losses incurred by national DGS.

Or. en

Amendment 119

Lídia Pereira

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 42 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(42a) The Fund should guarantee high levels of transparency to duly safeguard the public interest, particularly when public resources are deployed for the application of resolution tools, and should therefore endeavour to publish regular reports on the resolution processes for which those resources were deployed, mentioning the total amount, the amounts repaid and the timeframe for future repayments.

Or. pt

Amendment 120

Pedro Marques, Jonás Fernández, Aurore Lalucq, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point - a(new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 24

Present text

Amendment

(- a) point (24) is replaced by the following:

‘(24) cross-border group’ means a group that has entities as referred to in Article 2 established in more than one participating Member State;

"(24) ‘cross-border group’ means a group whose parent undertaking and at least one of its subsidiaries are entities as referred to in Article 2 established in more than one participating Member State;

Or. en

(Regulation (EU) No 806/2014)

Amendment 121

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point c a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – points 55a– 55c (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ca) the following points are added:

(55a) ‘promotional bank’ means any undertaking or entity established by a Member State’s central, regional or local government, which grants promotional loans or grants promotional guarantees, whose primary goal is not to make profit or maximise market share but to promote that government’s public policy objectives, provided that, subject to State aid rules, that government has an obligation to protect the economic basis of the undertaking or entity and maintain its viability throughout its lifetime, or that at least 90 % of its original capital or funding or the promotional loan it grants is directly or indirectly guaranteed by the Member State’s central, regional or local government;

(55b) ‘promotional loan’ means a loan granted by a promotional bank or through an intermediate bank on a non-competitive, non for profit basis, in order to promote the public policy objectives of central or regional governments in a Member State;

(55c) ‘intermediary institution’ means a credit institution which intermediates promotional loans provided that it does not give them as credit to a final customer

Or. en

(See the wording of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 Article 3, points (27) - (29); instead of the definition in Article 3, point (27), of the Delegated Regulation, the definition of "promotional entity" defined in Article 4(1), point (19), of CRR (Regulation (EU) No 57572013) is used.)

Amendment 122

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point c a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 55 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ca) the following point is added:

‘(55a) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely, in one or more Member States, to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national or regional level on a significant scale, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross-border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;’.

Or. en

Amendment 123

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point c a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 55 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ca) the following point is added:

Or. en

Amendment 124

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Board may instruct the national resolution authorities to exercise the powers referred to in Article 10(8) of Directive 2014/59/EU. The national resolution authorities shall implement the instructions of the Board in accordance with Article 29 of this Regulation.;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 125

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 8 – paragraph 6 –subparagraph 3

Present text

Amendment

(aa) in paragraph 6, the third subparagraph is replaced by the following:

When drawing up and updating the resolution plan, the Board shall identify any material impediments to resolvability and, where necessary and proportionate, outline relevant actions for how those impediments could be addressed, in accordance with Article 10.

When drawing up and updating the resolution plan, the Board shall identify any material impediments to resolvability and, where appropriate, outline relevant actions for how those impediments could be addressed, in accordance with Article 10.

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)

Amendment 126

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 8 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 5 –point c a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(aa) in paragraph 6, fifth subparagraph, the following point is inserted:

‘(ca) any use of deposit guarantee schemes’;

Or. en

Justification

Internal resources should remain the first line of defense. Consequently, any external funding, including the use of DGS in resolution, should be used only in case of unplanned gaps in resources, subject to applicable conditions. As a consequence, resolution planning and MREL calibration should not assume any use of DGS funds in resolution.

Amendment 127

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a b(new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 8 – paragraph 7

Present text

Amendment

(ab) paragraph 7 is replaced by the following:

7. The resolution plan shall include an analysis of how and when an institution may apply, in the conditions addressed by the plan, for the use of central bank facilities and shall identify those assets which would be expected to qualify as collateral while providing a prudent estimation of its average yearly value in aggregate for central bank liquidity purposes taking due account of relevant haircuts.

Or. en

Amendment 128

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a c (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 8 – paragraph 9

Present text

Amendment

(ac) paragraph 9 is replaced by the following

9. The resolution plan for each entity shall include, quantified where appropriate and possible:

(a)a summary of the key elements of the plan;

(a) a summary of the key elements of the plan;

(aa) where applicable, a detailed description of the reasons for determining that an institution is to be qualified as a liquidation entity;

(b)a summary of the material changes to the institution that have occurred after the latest resolution information was filed;

(c)a demonstration of how critical functions and core business lines could be legally and economically separated, to the extent necessary, from other functions so as to ensure continuity upon the failure of the institution;

(d)an estimation of the timeframe for executing each material aspect of the plan;

(e)a detailed description of the assessment of resolvability carried out in accordance with Article 10;

(f)a description of any measures required pursuant to Article 10(7) to address or remove impediments to resolvability identified as a result of the assessment carried out in accordance with Article 10;

(g)a description of the processes for determining the value and marketability of the critical functions, core business lines and assets of the institution;

(h)a detailed description of the arrangements for ensuring that the information required pursuant to Article 11 of Directive 2014/59/EU is up to date and at the disposal of the resolution authorities at all times;

(i)an explanation as to how the resolution options could be financed without the assumption of any of the following:

(i)any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with Article 67;

(i) any extraordinary public financial support to the resolution entity or entities acquiring parts of its business besides the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 67 ;

(ii)any central bank emergency liquidity assistance; or

(iii)any central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms;

(j)a detailed description of the different resolution strategies that could be applied according to the different possible scenarios and the applicable timescales;

(j) a detailed description of the different resolution strategies that could be applied according to the different possible scenarios and the applicable timescales;

(k)a description of critical interdependencies;

(k) a description of critical interdependencies;

(l) a description of options for preserving access to payments and clearing services and other infrastructures and an assessment of the portability of client positions;

(m) an analysis of the impact of the plan on the employees of the institution, including an assessment of any associated costs, and a description of envisaged procedures to consult staff during the resolution process, taking into account national systems for dialogue with social partners, where applicable;

(n)a plan for communicating with the media and the public;

(n) a plan for communicating with the media and the public;

(o)the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities required pursuant to Article 12 and a deadline to reach that level, where applicable;

(o) the requirements referred to in Article 12f and 12g and a deadline to reach that level, in accordance with Article 12k;

(p)where applicable, the minimum requirement for own funds and contractual bail-in instruments pursuant to Article 12, and a deadline to reach that level, where applicable;

(p) where the Board applies Article 12c(4), (5), or (7), a timeline for compliance by the resolution entity in accordance with Article 12k;

(pa) a detailed and comprehensive list of MREL eligible instruments including whether their holders qualify as retail or professional investors pursuant to Directive 2014/65/EU;

(pb) a detailed and quantified list of covered deposits, retail deposits, corporate deposits for payment and settlement purposes and other corporate deposits as defined respectively in Article 2(1) points (95), (97), (98) and (98a) of Directive 2014/59/EU ;

(q)a description of essential operations and systems for maintaining the continuous functioning of the institution's operational processes;

(r)where applicable, any opinion expressed by the institution in relation to the resolution plan.

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)

Amendment 129

Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 8 – paragraph 9 – point fa (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(aa) in paragraph 9, the following point is inserted:

(fa) a detailed description of the reasons for determining that an institution is to be qualified as a liquidation entity, including explaining how the resolution authority came to the conclusion that the institution lacks critical functions;

Or. en

Amendment 130

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 8 – paragraph 10

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) in paragraph 10, the following subparagraph is added:

(b) paragraph 10 is replaced by the following:

The identification of the measures to be taken in respect of the subsidiaries referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), that are not resolution entities may be subject to a simplified approach by the Board if such approach would not negatively affect the resolvability of the group, taking into account the size of the subsidiary, its risk profile, the absence of critical functions and the group resolution strategy.

10. Group resolution plans shall include a plan for the resolution of the group, headed by the Union parent undertaking established in a participating Member State, as a whole, either through resolution at the level of the Union parent undertaking or through break up and resolution of the subsidiaries. The group resolution plan shall identify measures for the resolution of:

(a) the Union parent undertaking;

(b)the subsidiaries that are part of the group and that are established in the Union;

(d) subject to Article 33, the subsidiaries that are part of the group and that are established outside the Union.

The group resolution plan shall also determine whether entities within a resolution group other than the resolution entity, qualify as liquidation entities. Without prejudice to other factors that may be deemed relevant by the Board, entities that provide critical functions or critical services or are material subsidiaries pursuant Article 4(1), point 135, of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 shall not qualify as liquidation entities.

Or. en

Amendment 131

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 8 – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The identification of the measures to be taken in respect of the subsidiaries referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), that are not resolution entities may be subject to a simplified approach by the Board, after consulting with the relevant national resolution authority, and if such approach would not negatively affect the resolvability of the group, taking into account the size of the subsidiary, its risk profile, the absence of critical functions and the group resolution strategy.;

Or. en

Amendment 132

Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b a(new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 8 – paragraph 11 – point - a a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ba) in paragraph 11, the following point is inserted:

(-aa) a detailed description of the reasons for determining that a group entity is to be qualified as a liquidation entity, including explaining how the resolution authority came to the conclusion that the institution lacks critical functions, and how the ratio of its total risk exposure amount and operating income in the group’s total risk exposure amount and operating income, as well as the leverage ratio of the group entity in the context of the group have been taken into account;

Or. en

Amendment 133

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b a(new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 8 – paragraph 11

Present text

Amendment

(ba) paragraph 11 is replaced by the following

11. The group resolution plan shall:

(a)set out the resolution actions to be taken in relation to group entities, both through resolution actions in respect of the entities referred to in Article 2(b) and subsidiary institutions and through coordinated resolution actions in respect of subsidiary institutions, in the scenarios provided for in paragraph 6;

(aa) where a group referred to in paragraph 1 comprises more than one resolution group, set out the resolution actions that are to be taken for the resolution entities of each resolution group and the implications of those actions on both of the following:

(i)other group entities that belong to the same resolution group;

(ii)other resolution groups;

(ab) a detailed description of the reasons for determining that a group entity referred to in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 1 is to be qualified as a liquidation entity,

(b)examine the extent to which the resolution tools and powers could be applied and exercised in a coordinated way to group entities established in the Union, including measures to facilitate the purchase by a third party of the group as a whole, or separate business lines or activities that are delivered by a number of group entities, or particular group entities, and identify any potential impediments to a coordinated resolution;

(c)include a detailed description of the assessment of resolvability carried out in accordance with Article 10;

(d)where a group includes entities incorporated in third countries, identify appropriate arrangements for cooperation and coordination with the relevant authorities of those third countries and the implications for resolution within the Union;

(e)identify measures, including the legal and economic separation of particular functions or business lines, that are necessary to facilitate group resolution where the conditions for resolution are met;

(f)identify how the group resolution actions could be financed and, where the Fund and the financing arrangements from non-participating Member States established in accordance with Article 100 of Directive 2014/59/EU would be required, set out principles for sharing responsibility for that financing between sources of funding in different participating and non-participating Member States. The plan shall not assume any of the following:

(i)any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with Article 67 of this Regulation and the financing arrangements from non-participating Member States established in accordance with Article 100 of Directive 2014/59/EU;

(ii)any central bank emergency liquidity assistance; or

(iii)any central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms. Those principles shall be set out on the basis of equitable and balanced criteria and shall take into account in particular Article 107(5) of Directive 2014/59/EU and the impact on financial stability in all Member States concerned. The group resolution plan shall not have a disproportionate impact on any Member State.

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)

Amendment 134

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 8 – paragraph 14

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

14. The Board shall not adopt resolution plans for the entitites and groups referred to in paragraph 1 where Article 22(5) applies or where the entity or group is being wound up in accordance with the applicable national law pursuant to Article 32b of Directive 2014/59/EU.

14. The Board shall disclose on its website the resolution plans of institutions under its remit on an annual basis. Commercially sensitive information or information that is protected by statutory confidentiality provisions, shall be redacted from such disclosures.

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)

Amendment 135

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point - a a(new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 10 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Present text

Amendment

(-aa) in paragraph 4, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

A group shall be deemed to be resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the Board either to wind up group entities under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve them by applying resolution tools to, and exercising resolution powers with respect to, resolution entities of that group while avoiding, to the maximum extent possible, any significant adverse consequences for the financial systems of the Member States in which group entities are located or of other Member States or the Union, including broader financial instability or system wide events, with a view to ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out by those group entities, where they can be easily separated in a timely manner, or by other means.

"A group shall be deemed to be resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the Board either to wind up group entities under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve them by applying resolution tools to, and exercising resolution powers with respect to, resolution entities of that group while avoiding, to the maximum extent possible, any significant adverse consequences for the financial systems of the Member States in which group entities are located or of other Member States or the Union, including broader financial instability or system wide events, with a view to ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out by those group entities, where they can be easily separated in a timely manner, or by other means. In order to perform the assessment under this subparagraph, the Board shall address requirements to a central body and credit institutions permanently affiliated to that central body.

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0806-20220812)

Amendment 136

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 10 – paragraph 10

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(i)in the second subparagraph, the word ‘institution’ is replaced by the words ‘entity concerned;

"10. The Board, after consulting the competent authorities, shall assess whether the measures referred to in paragraph 9 effectively address or remove the substantive impediments in question. If the measures proposed by the entity or parent undertaking concerned do not effectively reduce or remove the impediments to resolvability, the Board shall take a decision, after consulting the competent authorities and, where appropriate, the designated macro-prudential authority, indicating that the measures proposed do not effectively reduce or remove the impediments to resolvability, and instructing the national resolution authorities to require the institution, the parent undertaking, or any subsidiary of the group concerned, to take any of the measures listed in paragraph 11.

(ii) in the third subparagraph, the word ‘institution’ is replaced by the word ‘entity’;

The Board shall take into account the threat to financial stability of those impediments to resolvability and the effect of the measures on the business of the institution, its stability and its ability to contribute to the economy, on the internal market for financial services and on the financial stability in other Member States and the Union as a whole.

(iii) the following subparagraph is added:

‘If the measures proposed by the entity concerned effectively reduce or remove the impediments to resolvability, the Board shall take a decision, after having consulted the ECB or the relevant national competent authority and, where appropriate, the designated macro-prudential authority. That decision shall indicate that the measures proposed effectively reduce or remove the impediments to resolvability and shall instruct the national resolution authorities to require the institution, the parent undertaking, or any subsidiary of the group concerned, to implement the measures proposed.’;

The entity concerned shall have the right to demonstrate how the measures it proposed would be able to remove the impediments to resolvability and how the alternative measures proposed by the Board are unnecessarily burdensome in removing them.

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0806-20220812)

Amendment 137

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 10a – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Where an entity is in a situation where it meets the combined buffer requirement when considered in addition to each of the requirements referred to in Article 141a(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Directive 2013/36/EU, but fails to meet the combined buffer requirement when considered in addition to the requirements referred to in Articles 12d and 12e of this Regulation when calculated in accordance with Article 12a(2), point (a), of this Regulation, the Board shall have the power, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, to instruct the national resolution authority to prohibit an entity from distributing more than the Maximum Distributable Amount related to the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ("M-MDA"), calculated in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article, through any of the following actions:;

1. Where an entity is in a situation where it meets the combined buffer requirement when considered in addition to each of the requirements referred to in Article 141a(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Directive 2013/36/EU, but it fails to meet the combined buffer requirement when considered in addition to the requirements referred to in Articles 12d and 12e of this Regulation, when calculated in accordance with Article 12a(2), point (a), of this Regulation, or where an entity is in a situation where it breaches its requirements referred to in Articles 12d and 12e of this Regulation when calculated in accordance with Article 12a(2), point (b), the Board shall, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, prohibit an entity from distributing more than the Maximum Distributable Amount related to the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (‘M-MDA’), calculated in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article, through any of the following actions:

Or. en

Amendment 138

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12 – paragraph 4 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6a) in Article 12, the following paragraph is inserted:

4a. The calculation of the minimum requirement referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article and Article 45(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU shall, in case of institutions operating promotional loans, exclude the liabilities of the intermediary institution towards the originating or another promotional bank or another intermediary institution and the liabilities of the original promotional bank towards its funding parties in so far as the amount of these liabilities is matched by the promotional loans of that institution.

Or. en

(see wording of Article 5 paragraph 1 point f of Regulation (EU) 2015/63)

Amendment 139

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12a – paragraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(8a) in Article 12a, the following paragraph is inserted:

1a. Within a resolution group, subsidiaries that are institutions or entities referred to in Article 2(1) but are not resolution entities, whose total assets do not exceed EUR 5 billion and that do not reach a 2% threshold of the resolution group’s total risk exposure amount, or leverage exposure, shall not be subject to the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Or. en

Justification

A materiality threshold for consideration of iMREL decisions for subsidiaries within resolution groups should be introduced in the level 1 text, that will serve as a floor to the MREL policy of the resolution authorities. The current MREL policy threshold should be used to calibrate this floor in the level 1 text.

Amendment 140

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 b (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12b

Present text

Amendment

(8b) Article 12b is replaced by the following:

Article 12b

Exemption from the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities

1. Notwithstanding Article 12a, the Board shall exempt from the requirement laid down in Article 12a(1) mortgage credit institutions financed by covered bonds which are not allowed to receive deposits under national law, provided that all of the following conditions are met:(a) those institutions will be wound up in national insolvency proceeding or in other types of proceedings laid down for those institutions and implemented in accordance with Article 38, 40 or 42 of Directive 2014/59/EU; and(b) the proceedings referred to in point (a) ensure that creditors of those institutions, including holders of covered bonds, where relevant, bear losses in a way that meets the resolution objectives.2. Institutions exempted from the requirement laid down in Article 12(1) shall not be part of the consolidation referred to in Article 12f(1).

Notwithstanding Article 12a, the Board shall exempt credit institutions financed by covered bonds which are not allowed to receive deposits under national law, from the requirement laid down in Article 12a(1).

2. Institutions exempted from the requirement laid down in Article 12(1) shall not be part of the consolidation referred to in Article 12f(1).

Or. en

(REGULATION (EU) No 806/2014)

Justification

Article 45a(2) of BRRD currently provides that credit institutions financed by covered bonds which are not allowed to receive deposits under national law are are exempted from MREL providing that (i) they would be wound up under NIPs or transfer measures in case of failure and (ii) NIP (or equivalent) for these institutions ensure that resolution objectives are met. In this case, these institutions shall not be part of the consolidation referred to in Article 45e(1).These provisions should be improved in order to better take into account that such institutions are structurally designed to mainly issue covered bonds, and not MREL eligible liabilities. The specific guarantees of holders of covered bonds ensure they would not bear losses in NIPs or in resolution (see Directive (EU) 2019/2162).Therefore, credit institutions financed by covered bonds which are not allowed to receive deposits under national law do not need an additional loss-absorption capacity based on MREL and should be per se exempted of MREL. In addition, the exclusion of the consolidation perimeter has resulted in unforeseen consequences. In some cases, this exclusion leads to an unwarranted increase of the TREA used in the calculation of group’s external MREL (and thus an increase in external MREL). Credit institutions financed by covered bonds which are not allowed to receive deposits under national law are simply pass-through vehicles and their deconsolidation should not result in a increase of risks.

Amendment 141

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10) in Article 12d, paragraph 3, eight subparagraph, and paragraph 6, eight subparagraph, the words ‘critical economic functions’ are replaced by the words ‘critical functions’;

(10) Article12d is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 3, the fifth and sixth subparagraphs are replaced by the following:

‘When setting the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the previous subparagraphs, the Board shall:

(a) use the most recently reported values for the relevant total risk exposure amount or total exposure measure, adjusted for any changes resulting from resolution actions set out in the resolution plan, including the reduced size and risk profile of the resolution group resulting from resolution, in particular when the preferred resolution strategy includes the use of resolution tools referred to in Article 22(2), points (a), (b) or (c), as well as for any changes resulting from the recovery options included in the recovery plan that are expected to be implemented by the time of resolution or shortly thereafter; and

(b) after consulting the competent authorities, including the ECB, adjust the amount corresponding to the current requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU downwards to determine the requirement that is to apply to the resolution entity after the implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, taking into account changes referred to in point (a) of this subparagraph;

(c) after consulting the competent authority, including the ECB, for resolution entities subject to the requirement of Article 131 of Directive 2013/36/EU, adjust the combined buffer requirement applicable to the resolution group, taking into account the changes referred to in point (a) of this subparagraph.

The Board shall be able to increase the requirement provided in point (a)(ii) of the first subparagraph by an appropriate amount necessary to ensure that, following resolution, the entity is able to sustain sufficient market confidence for an appropriate period, which shall not exceed one year, except where its preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market.

The Board shall communicate to the resolution entity the rationale behind the adjustments mentioned in points (a), (b) and (c) of the fifth subparagraph.

(b) in paragraph 3, eighth subparagraph, and paragraph 6, eighth subparagraph, the words ‘critical economic functions’ are replaced by the words ‘critical functions’;

Or. en

Amendment 142

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11) the following Article 12da is inserted:

deleted

[…]

Or. en

Justification

The first paragraph aims to set MREL requirements when a transfer strategy is preferred for resolution. This applies to some institutions, which struggle to issue MREL liabilities and should remain exempt. Simply easing requirements won't suffice. The second paragraph concerns cases in which insolvency proceedings are chosen as the preferred strategy. In such cases, no further-reaching MREL requirements should continue to be issued on a regular basis. Therefore, a corresponding application of paragraph 1 is regularly irrelevant.

Amendment 143

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. When applying Article 12d to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the Board shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 12d(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

1. When applying Article 12d to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the Board shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 12d(3) in a proportionate way that ensures that the resolution group can be resolved in all possible scenarios without the need for external funding on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Or. en

Justification

A strong MREL regime is necessary to ensure credibility of the resolution system.

Amendment 144

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. When applying Article 12d to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages the exclusive use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the Board shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 12d(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Or. en

Amendment 145

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;

(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile;

Or. en

Justification

A strong MREL regime is necessary to ensure credibility of the resolution system.

Amendment 146

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;

(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile;

Or. en

Justification

Covers all ams to article 12da : Currently, the depth of the market criteria only applies to the setting of MREL subordinated requirements in accordance with Article 12d(8). As the entities that are subject to Article 12da may not always be subject to MREL subordintated requirements, the inclusion of this criteria in Article 12da is at odds with the current MREL framework. MREL overall requirements should remain based on intrinsic features of banks, regardless of the type of tools envisaged in the preferred resolution strategy. MREL requirements should not be met with non-covered non-preferred deposits, or other bail-inableliabilities when there is a significant likelihood that such deposits and liabilities would be discretionary excluded under Article 27(5) in a resolution scenario. This specific risk could be reduced in resolution planning by taking into account MREL-eligible liabilities pursuant to Article 27(5), when setting the level of MREL. This would not replace but act as a complement to any deduction from the MREL capacity of these liabilities pursuant to Article 12d(8)BRRD.A distinction should be made between the sale of business tool and the bridge institution tool.

Amendment 147

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;

(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the ability to access the capital markets for eligible liabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 148

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;

(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the ability to access the capital markets for eligible liabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 149

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point b – point ii

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ii) the liabilities excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 27(3);

(ii) the liabilities excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 27(3) or bail-inable liabilities where Article 27(5) is likely to apply with regard to these liabilities;

Or. en

Justification

Covers all ams to article 12da : The recapitalisation amount should in principle be higher when the preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the bridge institution tool as opposed to the sale of business tool, as this institution would need to be capitalised. In particular, if all assets and liabilities of the institution under resolution are transferred to a bride bank under the bridge institution tool, there capitalisation amount should theoretically be the same than in the case of an open bank bail-in under Article 12d(3).It is important that funding needs in resolution be evaluated in a coherent manner across Member States, for MREL requirements can in some cases weigh on banks’ profitability. Diverging practices would therefore hinder the level playing field. Likewise, it is important to ensure that the proportionalization of MREL requirements when transfer tools are used does not lead to under/overestimate funding needs and MREL.

Amendment 150

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(iiia) expected own funds requirements for any bridge institution that may be needed to implement the market exit strategy, to ensure its compliance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU, as applicable;

Or. en

Justification

Covers all ams to article 12da : The use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU would imply that measures taken in liquidation would be similar to the ones in resolution in case of transfer strategies, with the same economic outcome – namely, “market exit”. These liquidation entities should therefore be subject to the same requirements as resolution entities subject to Article 12da(1). Should that not be the case, liquidation with alternative measures from the DGS would most probably remain away to arbitrate resolution while increasing the cost for other banks.

Amendment 151

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(iiia) any risks to successful implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, in particular a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;

Or. en

Justification

A strong MREL regime is necessary to ensure credibility of the resolution system.

Amendment 152

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a – point iii b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(iiib) expected demand by the recipient for the transaction to be capital neutral with regards to the requirements applicable to the acquiring entity.

Or. en

Justification

Covers all ams to article 12da : To ensure that the revised framework remains based on internal loss-aborption not merely in theory but also in practice, the amendment introduces minimum levels of external MREL for resolution entities with the new resolution strategy. Above a size threshold, such resolution entities would also be required to comply with their external MREL target by using a minimum share of instruments that do not include Common Equity Tier 1 instruments : Tier 2 instruments and other MREL-eligible instruments with a higher ranking in insolvency. This would avoid situations where an institution complies with its MREL target almost entirely with Common Equity Tier 1. Although CET1 is an essential safeguard to ensure loss-absorption capabilities in a going-concern, such resources are, due to their very nature, lacking when solvency issues lead an institution into resolution.

Amendment 153

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point c – point i

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(i) any material impediments to resolvability, identified by the resolution authority, that are directly related to the application of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool;

(i) any impediments to resolvability, identified by the resolution authority, that are related to the application of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool

Or. en

Justification

A strong MREL regime is necessary to ensure credibility of the resolution system.

Amendment 154

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point c – point ii a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(iia) a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;

Or. en

Justification

A strong MREL regime is necessary to ensure credibility of the resolution system.

Amendment 155

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ea) whether any contribution by a deposit guarantee scheme is expected to be made pursuant to Article 79.’

Or. en

Amendment 156

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ea) whether any contribution by a deposit guarantee scheme is expected to be made pursuant to Article 79.

Or. en

Amendment 157

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ea) the potential recapitalisation amount required under an alternative resolution strategy.

Or. en

Amendment 158

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. For resolution entities subject to the proportionalisation rules of paragraph 1 of this Article, the level of the requirement referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 12d shall be at least equal to:

(a) 16 % when calculated in accordance with point (a) of Article 12a(2); and

(b) 5,5 % when calculated in accordance with point (b) of Article 12a(2).

Resolution entities that are part of a resolution group the total assets of which exceed EUR 5 billion and resolution entities with consolidated total assets in excess of EUR 5 billion shall meet a level of the requirement referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph that is equal to 4,5 % when calculated in accordance with point (a) of Article 12a(2) and to 1,5 % when calculated in accordance with point (b) of Article 12a(2), using Tier 2 instruments and eligible liabilities.’

In order to ensure effective and consistent application of this Article, the Board shall give guidance and address instructions to the national resolution authorities for the application of the RTSs referred to in Article 45ca(1b) of Directive 2014/59/EU.

Or. en

Amendment 159

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to institutions that are designated as "small and non-complex institutions" in line with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

Or. en

Justification

In the interest of proportionality, the new MREL requirements should not apply for small and non-complex institutions.

Amendment 160

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the Board shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 12d(2a), second subparagraph, of this Regulation.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 161

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 162

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 163

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, by way of derogation from Article 12d(2a) the resolution authority shall set a recapitalization amount as provided in Article 12d(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraph 1.

Or. en

Amendment 164

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12da – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. The application of paragraph 1 shall not result in an amount that is higher than the amount resulting from the application of Article 12d(3).;

3. The application of paragraph 1 shall not result in an amount that is lower than 90% of the amount resulting from the application of Article 12d(3).;

Or. en

Amendment 165

Pedro Marques, Aurore Lalucq, René Repasi, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point a a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12k – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(aa) in paragraph 1, the following subparagraph is added:

After 1 January 2024 or the transitional period ending after 1 January 2024 set by the Board pursuant to the third subparagraph, the Board, where duly justified and appropriate on the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraph 7, and taking into consideration the elements referred to in the third subparagraph, may determine an appropriate transitional period within which to comply with the requirements in Articles 12f or 12g or the requirements that result from the application of Article 12c(4), (5) or (7).

Or. en

Amendment 166

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point a a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 12k – paragraph 1a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(aa) the following paragraph is inserted:

‘1a. Regarding entities that were not part of a resolution group prior to the [date of application of this amending Regulation], the Board shall determine appropriate transitional periods for institutions or entities referred to in Article 2(1) to comply with the requirements of Articles 12f or 12g, or with requirements that result from the application of Article 12c(4), (5) or (7), as appropriate. These transitional periods shall not extend beyond 1 January 2030.’

Or. en

Justification

The setting of a transitional period to comply with new MREL requirements for institutions that will newly fall within the scope of resolution is reasonable, but should not be too long. A [5] year transition seems reasonable, leading to end 2029 if the CMDI review enters into force in 2025.

Amendment 167

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The ECB may apply early intervention measures where an entity as referred to in Article 7(2)(a) meets any of the following conditions:

1. The ECB considers without undue delay, and if necessary adopts swiftly, early intervention measures where an entity as referred to in Article 7(2)(a) meets any of the following conditions:

Or. en

Justification

This proposal aims at ensuring that the EIM framework is embedded in a governance process that is swift and efficient, tilted towards the adoption of the decisions that will best preserve capital and MREL resources, in order not to hinder a possible resolution at a later stage.

Amendment 168

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 – paragraph 1 –point a –point ii

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ii) the ECB deems that remedial actions other than early intervention measures are insufficient to address the problems due inter alia to a rapid and significant deterioration of the financial condition of the entity;

(ii) the ECB deems that remedial actions other than early intervention measures are insufficient to address the problems;

Or. en

Amendment 169

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point a – point ii

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ii) the ECB deems that remedial actions other than early intervention measures are not sufficient to address the problems due inter alia to a rapid and significant deterioration of the financial condition of the entity;

Or. en

Amendment 170

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) the entity infringes or is likely to infringe in the 12 months following the assessment of the ECB the requirements laid down in Title II of Directive 2014/65/EU, in Articles 3 to 7, 14 to 17, or 24, 25 and 26 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, or in Articles 12f or 12g of this Regulation.

Or. en

Amendment 171

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Where appropriate to characterize the infringement referred to in point (b), the ECB shall ensure that the Board and the relevant national resolution authorities inform the competent authorities without delay.

Or. en

Justification

Amendment 172

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The ECB may determine that the condition referred to in the first subparagraph, point (a)(ii), is met without having previously taken other remedial actions, including the exercise of the powers referred to in Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU or in Article 16(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.

The ECB may determine, where there is a rapid deterioration of conditions, adverse circumstances or new information about an entity is obtained, that the condition referred to in the first subparagraph, point (a)(ii), is met without having previously taken other remedial actions, including the exercise of the powers referred to in Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU or in Article 16(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.

Or. en

Amendment 173

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 – paragraph 2 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) the requirement for the management body of the entity to draw up a plan, in accordance with the recovery plan where applicable, for negotiation on restructuring of debt with some or all of its creditors;

(c) the requirement for the management body of the entity to draw up an action plan, in accordance with the recovery plan where applicable, for negotiation on restructuring of debt with some or all of its creditors;

Or. en

Amendment 174

Roberts Zīle

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point f a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(fa) the requirement for the management body of the entity to draw up a plan that the entity can implement in case the relevant corporate body decides to initiate the voluntary winding down of the entity.

Or. en

Amendment 175

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

After having received the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board shall assess, in close cooperation with the ECB or the relevant national competent authority, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe for the purposes of the assessment of the condition referred to in Article 18(1), point (b), taking into account the speed of the deterioration of the conditions of the entity, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and any other relevant considerations. The Board shall communicate that assessment to the ECB or to the relevant national competent authority as early as possible. The notification referred to in the first subparagraph does not impact the ability of institutional protection schemes to implement any measures. Any decisions relating to measures by an institutional protection scheme are within the sole discretion of the institutional protection scheme.

Or. en

Amendment 176

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. The ECB shall choose the appropriate early intervention measures based on what is proportionate to the objectives pursued, having regard to the seriousness of the infringement or likely infringement and the speed of the deterioration in the financial situation of the entity, among other relevant information.

3. The ECB shall choose the appropriate and timely early intervention measures based on what is proportionate to the objectives pursued, having regard to the seriousness of the infringement or likely infringement and the speed of the deterioration in the financial situation of the entity, among other relevant information.

Or. en

Amendment 177

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 – paragraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. For each of the measures referred to in paragraph 2, the ECB shall set a deadline that is appropriate for completion of that measure and that enables the ECB to evaluate its effectiveness.

4. For each of the measures referred to in paragraph 2, the ECB shall set a deadline that is appropriate for completion of that measure and that enables the ECB to evaluate its effectiveness. The evaluation of the measure should be carried out immediately after the deadline is reached and shared with the Board and relevant national resolution authorities. Should the evaluation conclude that the measures have not been fully implemented or are not effective, the ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall make an assessment of the condition referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) of Article 18 of this Regulation, after having consulted the Board and the relevant national resolution authority.

Or. en

Justification

Amendment 178

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Where a group includes entities established in participating Member States and subsidiaries established, or significant branches located, in non-participating Member States, the ECB shall communicate any decisions or measures referred to in Articles 13 to 13c relevant to the group to the competent authorities or the resolution authorities of the non-participating Member States, as appropriate.;

Or. en

Amendment 179

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The ECB shall make public the appointment of any temporary administrator, except where the temporary administrator does not have the power to represent the entity.

The ECB shall make public the appointment of any temporary administrator, except where the temporary administrator does not have the power to represent or make decisions on behalf of the entity.

Or. en

Amendment 180

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13b – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. The ECB shall specify the powers of the temporary administrator at the time of his or her appointment, based on what is proportionate in the circumstances. Such powers may include some or all of the powers of the management body of the entity, under the statutes of the entity and under national law, including the power to exercise some or all of the administrative functions of the management body of the entity. The powers of the temporary administrator in relation to the entity shall comply with the applicable company law.

Or. en

Amendment 181

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13b – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

6. At the request of the ECB, the temporary administrator shall draw up reports on the financial position of the entity and on the acts performed in the course of his or her appointment, at intervals set by the ECB, and in any case at the end of his or her mandate.

Or. en

Amendment 182

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13b – paragraph 7

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

7. The temporary administrator shall be appointed for maximum 1 year. That period may be exceptionally renewed if the conditions for appointing the temporary administrator continue to be met. The ECB shall determine those conditions and shall justify any renewal of the appointment of the temporary administrator to the shareholders.

7. The temporary administrator shall be appointed for maximum 1 year. That period may be exceptionally renewed once, if the conditions for appointing the temporary administrator continue to be met. The ECB shall determine those conditions and shall justify any renewal of the appointment of the temporary administrator to the shareholders.

Or. en

Amendment 183

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall not constrain the ability of institutional protection schemes to implement measures. Decisions relating to any measures by an institutional protection scheme shall remain under the sole discretion of the institutional protection scheme.

Or. en

Amendment 184

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13 c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

After having received the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board shall assess, in close cooperation with the ECB or the relevant national competent authority, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe for the purposes of the assessment of the condition referred to in Article 18(1), point (b), taking into account the speed of the deterioration of the conditions of the entity, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and any other relevant considerations. The Board shall communicate that assessment to the ECB or to the relevant national competent authority as early as possible. The application of any measures by institutional protection schemes shall not be affected by the notification referred to in the first subparagraph.

Or. en

Amendment 185

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

After having received the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board shall assess, in close cooperation with the ECB or the relevant national competent authority, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe for the purposes of the assessment of the condition referred to in Article 18(1), point (b), taking into account the speed of the deterioration of the conditions of the entity, the potential impact on the financial system and protection of depositors and client funds, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and any other relevant considerations. The Board shall communicate that assessment to the ECB or to the relevant national competent authority as early as possible.

Or. en

Amendment 186

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13c – paragraph 4 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. The Board shall have the power to market to potential purchasers, or make arrangements for such marketing, the entity referred to in Article 7(2), or the entity referred to in Article 7(4), point (b), and Article 7(5) where the conditions for the application of those provisions are met or require the entity to do so, for the following purposes:

4. After having received the notification referred to in paragraph 2, the Board shall have the power to market to potential purchasers, or make arrangements for such marketing, the entity referred to in Article 7(2), or the entity referred to in Article 7(4), point (b), and Article 7(5) where the conditions for the application of those provisions are met or require the entity to do so, for the following purposes:

Or. en

Amendment 187

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13c – paragraph 4 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Justification

Marketing is already regulated as part of the corporate sale measure, cf. Art. 13 (3) SRMR in connection with Art. 39 (1) BRRD, and does not need to be supplemented/repeated way earlier than this, i.e., before an institution has reached the FOLF-status. Marketing, which entails the risk of reputational damage to the institution and the disclosure of business secrets, should be considered exclusively as a component (and not as preparation) of a resolution measure and should therefore only be carried out when the conditions for resolution are met.

Amendment 188

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13c – paragraph 4 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) to prepare for the resolution of that entity, subject to the conditions specified in Article 39(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU and the requirements of professional secrecy laid down in Article 88 of this Regulation;

(a) to prepare for the highly likely resolution of that entity, subject to the conditions specified in Article 39(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU and the requirements of professional secrecy laid down in Article 88 of this Regulation;

Or. en

Justification

Amendment 189

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13c – paragraph 4 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) to inform the assessment by the Board of the condition referred to in Article 18(1), point (b), of this Regulation.

deleted

Or. en

Justification

Amendment 190

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13c – paragraph 7

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

7. The Board shall inform the Commission, the ECB, the relevant national competent authorities and the relevant national resolution authorities of any action taken pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 without delay.

7. The Board shall inform the Commission, the ECB, the relevant national competent authorities and the relevant national resolution authorities and the relevant national ministries of any action taken pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 without delay.

Or. en

Amendment 191

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 13c – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The ECB, the national competent authorities, the Board and the relevant national resolution authorities shall closely cooperate:

The ECB, the national competent authorities, the Board and the relevant national resolution authorities and the relevant national ministries shall closely cooperate:

Or. en

Amendment 192

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State;

Or. en

Amendment 193

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State;

Or. en

Justification

From a State Aid perspective all extraordinary public financial support is State Aid, whether it comes from the budget of a MS or not. There is no need to separate the different cases of extraordinary public financial support.

Amendment 194

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State;

Or. en

Amendment 195

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State;

Or. en

Amendment 196

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) to protect depositors while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

(d) to protect covered deposits, and to the extent possible also that uncovered part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

Or. en

Justification

As regards resolution objectives, larger corporates should not be better treated than other clients. In addition, it is important to maintain the objective to minimise losses for deposit guarantee schemes, which is key to ensure the limitation of external support to the strict minimum and the economic efficiency of the resolution process.

Amendment 197

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) to protect depositors while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

(d) to protect depositors while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes by allowing cost-effective involvement of the DGS and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

Or. en

Amendment 198

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) to protect depositors while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

(d) to protect depositors and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;

Or. en

Amendment 199

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) to protect depositors while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

(d) to protect depositors covered by Directive 2014/49/EU, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

Or. en

Amendment 200

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) to protect depositors while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

(d) to protect depositors covered by Directive 2014/49/EU and investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

Or. en

Justification

To avoid moral hazard, only covered depositors should be protected.

Amendment 201

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) to protect depositors while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

(d) to protect depositors covered by Directive 2014/49/EU and investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC ;

Or. en

Amendment 202

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) to protect depositors while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

(d) to protect depositors covered by Directive 2014/49/EU and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;

Or. en

Justification

The draft amendment of Art. 14 (2) point (d) deletes the reference to the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive 2014/49/EU with the consequence that in future the protection of all deposits should be the objective of resolution. However, this is not necessary, as deposits not protected by the deposit guarantee scheme are also regularly given sufficient protection in insolvency proceedings. According to the explanatory memorandum in the legislative proposal, the insertion of "while minimizing losses" should have the consequence that resolution is always a priority if insolvency would cause higher costs. Although it is welcome that the losses of deposit guarantee schemes are supposed to remain in control, the ultimate intention behind the insertion is rejected.

Amendment 203

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 14 – paragraph 2a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(17a) in Article 14, the following paragraph 2a is inserted:

"2a. Subject to different provisions of this Regulation, the resolution objectives are of equal significance, and resolution authorities shall balance them as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case. For the purposes of Article 18(5), the objectives of preserving financial stability and protecting depositors pursuant to points (b) and (d) of paragraph 2, respectively, shall be deemed to be more significant than other resolution objectives.’;

Or. en

Amendment 204

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) having regard to the timing, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure, including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or the write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 21(1), taken in respect of the entity would prevent the failure of the entity within a reasonable timeframe;

(b) having regard to the timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure, including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or the write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 21(1), taken in respect of the entity would prevent the failure of the entity within a reasonable timeframe;

Or. en

Justification

The timeframe to implement alternative private measures should not be artificially limited.

Amendment 205

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 206

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) having regard to the timing, and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure, including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or the write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 21(1), taken in respect of the entity would prevent the failure of the entity within a reasonable timeframe;

Or. en

Amendment 207

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority has assessed that the condition referred to in the first subparagraph, point (a), is met in relation to an entity as referred to in the first subparagraph, they shall communicate that assessment to the Commission and to the Board without delay.

Where the ECB assesses that the condition referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph is met in relation to an entity or group referred to in the first subparagraph, it shall communicate that assessment without delay to the Commission and to the Board taking into account, however, that preventive measures carried out by an IPS falling under Article 1(2), point (c), of Directive 2014/49/EU shall not lead to the determination that the credit institution is failing or likely to fail according to this Article or Article 32 (1) of Directive 2014/59/EU if the provisions of Article 11f of Directive 2014/49/EU are met.

Or. en

Amendment 208

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 1a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. The Board may adopt a resolution scheme in accordance with paragraph 1 in relation to a central body and all credit institutions permanently affiliated to it that are part of the same resolution group where the central body and all credit institutions permanently affiliated to it, or the resolution group to which they belong, comply as a whole with the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, first subparagraph.

1a. When a resolution action is deemed necessary in the public interest, the Board shall adopt a resolution scheme in accordance with paragraph 1 in relation to a central body and all permanent affiliates to it, that are part of the same resolution group where the central body and all permanent affiliates to it, or the resolution group to which they belong, comply as a whole with the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, first subparagraph. The assessment of the conditions referred to in paragraph 1, first subparagraph, shall be made exclusively for the central body and its permanent affiliates as a whole.

Or. en

Justification

The solidarity mechanism among a central body and its affiliates ensures that losses of one or more affiliates will be shared among all affiliates, leading them all to be FOLTF. Thus, it is important to clarify that FOLTF assessment in relation to a central body and its affiliates should not be done on an entity-by-entity basis, but on the whole affiliation perimeter given the solidarity mechanism. This is important to ensure that the resolution authorities can effectively use the power described in this article. It must also be ensured that resolution authorities can take resolution action in relation to a central body and all kind of affiliated entities and institutions that are part of resolution group (and not only in relation to credit institutions affiliated to a central body).

Amendment 209

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Without prejudice to cases where the ECB has decided to exercise directly supervisory tasks relating to credit institutions pursuant to Article 6(5), point (b) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, in the event of receipt of a communication pursuant to paragraph 1 in relation to an entity or group as referred to in Article 7(3), the Board shall communicate its assessment as referred to paragraph 1, fourth subparagraph, to the ECB or the relevant national competent authority without delay.

2. Prior to determining an institution failing or likely to fail, the relevant authority referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 18(1) shall examine whether there exist measures, including alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures, which can avoid the failing or likely to fail declaration.

Or. en

Amendment 210

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 211

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 14 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectively.

For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 14(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in that Article 31, and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent.

Or. en

Amendment 212

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Justification

Resolution measures should only be applied where insolvency proceedings are less effective.

Amendment 213

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 14(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, the resolution objectives referred to in that Article, and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent.

Or. en

Amendment 214

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 215

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Justification

National insolvency or classification as an insolvency institution are only permissible if this ensures financial stability better than resolution. According to this, the vast majority or probably all credit institutions might be reclassified as resolution entities (non-liquidation entities) in the future. Consequently, this reclassification would result in considerable administrative and financial burdens for previous insolvency institutions (reporting obligations to resolution plans as well as compliance with MREL quotas with MREL capital).

Amendment 216

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, pursuant to Articles 8(2), 9(2) and 12d(2), the Board, in order to assess the appropriateness of the resolution for the institution, considers the following elements: (a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model; (b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities; (c) the extent to which the institution relies on Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet its capital requirements.

Or. en

Amendment 217

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Resolution action shall be presumed not to be in the public interest for the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), where the institution qualifies as small and non-complex institution as defined in Article 4(1), point 145, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In case the Board assesses that one or more of those resolution objectives would be at risk, the presumption shall not apply.

Or. en

Justification

In order to increase predictability in the framework, there should be a presumption of negative PIA for small and non complex institutions, and of positive PIA for large institutions. So long as there is leeway left to national resolution authorities to perform the public interest assessment, there could remain diverging practices across jurisdictions, that could eventually affect the level playing field and the predictability of the framework.

Amendment 218

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

For entities designated as significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 there shall be a presumption that the winding up under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet the resolution objectives to the same extent.

Or. en

Justification

Resolution measures should only be applied where insolvency proceedings are less effective.

Amendment 219

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Resolution action shall be presumed to be in the public interest for the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), of this Article where the institution qualifies as large institution as defined in Article 4(1), point (146) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In case the Board assesses that no resolution objective would be at risk, the presumption shall not apply.

Or. en

Justification

Amendment 220

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Justification

Excluding the additional expenses related to designing the resolution process while focusing solely on exceptional public financial assistance can lead to a skewed perspective on insolvency liquidation. As a result, cost considerations should not factor into the PIA.

Amendment 221

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 222

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model;

(b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 223

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model;

(b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 224

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, shall consider and compare all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the entity, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.; If liquidation aid is expected to be granted in winding up the institution according to the national law, the resolution action shall be assessed to be in the public interest.

Or. en

Amendment 225

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, shall evaluate and compare all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the entity, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.’;

Or. en

Amendment 226

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board, based on the information available to it at the time, shall consider and compare all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the entity, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;

Or. en

Amendment 227

Pedro Marques, Aurore Lalucq, Jonás Fernández, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

For the purposes of the second subparagraph, participating Member States, deposit guarantee schemes and, where necessary, the designated authority within the meaning of Article 2(1), point (18), of Directive 2014/49/EU shall keep the Board informed of any preparatory measures for the granting of the measures referred to in Article 18a(1), points (c) and (d), of this Regulation, including any pre-notification contacts with the Commission.

Or. en

Amendment 228

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Moreover, in the resolution plan, the Board shall include its reasoning as regards the procedure best achieving resolution objectives for each of the resolution objectives laid down in Article 14.

Or. en

Justification

Amendment 229

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point e a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 11 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ea) the following paragraph is added:

11a. In order to ensure effective and consistent application of this Article, the Board shall give guidance and address instructions to national resolution authorities for the application of the RTSs referred to in Article 32(5) of Directive 2014/59/EU.

Or. en

Justification

Amendment 230

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – title

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Extraordinary public financial support

Extraordinary financial support

Or. en

Amendment 231

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Extraordinary public financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an entity as referred to in Article 2 only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:

1. Extraordinary public financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an entity as referred to in Article 2 on an exceptional basis only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework and such support is implemented in the legislation of the Member State:

Or. en

Justification

It should be made clear that it would not be mandatory for MSs to have all extraordinary public financial support options available. This should clearly be a MS option if they want to have some or all of points (a) to (d) available. We do not want a presumption of the State being there always ready to rescue distressed banks. Instead, it is preferable that there is a credible resolution and insolvency framework to deal with such banks.

Amendment 232

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Extraordinary financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an entity as referred to in Article 2 only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:

Or. en

Amendment 233

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:

deleted

(i) a State guarantee to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks in accordance with the central banks’ conditions;

(ii) a State guarantee of newly issued liabilities;

(iii) an acquisition of own funds instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or of other capital instruments, or a use of impaired assets measures at prices, duration, and terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 18(4), points (a), (b) or (c), or Article 21(1) are present at the time the public support is granted.

Or. en

Amendment 234

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:

(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State of an exceptional or systemic nature or to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:

Or. en

Amendment 235

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:

(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:

Or. en

Amendment 236

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none or of the circumstances referred to in Article 18(4) are present;

deleted

Or. en

Justification

None of the private measures under the DGSD should be subject to state aid law. The DGS funds are privately collected, they are not taxpayers' money. In addition, a state aid audit causes a long delay, which prevent the rapid implementation of preventive or alternative measures or deposit compensation. Article 11b(6) DGSD draft makes the implementation of preventive measures virtually impossible in view of the timeline. Accordingly, Article 11b(6) DGSD draft should be deleted. Furthermore, similar regulations in the SRMR must be adapted: Article 18a(1) point (b) SRMR draft should be clarified so that preventive measures are not classified as state aid and do not trigger state aid proceedings.

Amendment 237

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of a cost - effective intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none or of the circumstances referred to in Article 18(4) are present;

Or. en

Amendment 238

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of an institution pursuant to Article 32b of Directive 2014/59/EU and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;

(c) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of a cost - effective intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of an institution pursuant to Article 32b of Directive 2014/59/EU and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;

Or. en

Amendment 239

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU granted in the context of the winding up of the institution or entity pursuant to Article 32b of Directive 2014/59/EU, other than the support granted by a deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 240

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:

The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) and (b), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:

Or. en

Justification

Preventive forms of support should be treated on an equal footing to preserve the level playing field ,whether they come from public funds or from a private DGS. In precautionary recapitalisation, it must be ensured that the most appropriate valuation is used.

Amendment 241

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:

The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (b), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:

Or. en

Amendment 242

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) the measures are of a precautionary and temporary nature and are based on a pre-defined exit strategy approved by the ECB or the relevant national competent authority, including a clearly specified termination date, sale date or repayment schedule for any of the measures provided;

(b) the measures are of a precautionary and temporary nature and are based on a pre-defined exit strategy approved by the ECB or the relevant national competent authority;

Or. en

Amendment 243

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) the measures are not used to offset losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future.

(d) the measures are not used to offset losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur over the next 12 months.

Or. en

Amendment 244

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) the measures are not used to offset losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future.

(d) the measures are not used to offset losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur in the next 12 months.

Or. en

Amendment 245

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority have concluded that no breach has occurred, or is likely to occur in the 12 following months, of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under national or Union law.

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority have concluded that under current economic conditions, no breach has occurred, or is foreseeable to occur in the 12 following months, of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under national or Union law.

Or. en

Amendment 246

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority have concluded that no breach has occurred of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under national or Union law.

Or. en

Amendment 247

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The ECB or the relevant national competent authority may deem an entity to be solvent where they determine that a breach of the requirements referred to in the second subparagraph is temporary in nature, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, and provided that the entity can demonstrate a reasonable plan for the remedy of the breach within an appropriate timeframe, as determined by the ECB or the relevant national competent authority.

Or. en

Amendment 248

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on the institution’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as confirmed by an independent external auditor, and, where available, on asset quality reviews conducted by the ECB, EBA or national authorities or, where appropriate, on on-site inspections conducted by the ECB or the relevant national competent authority.

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on asset quality reviews conducted by the ECB, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on-site inspections conducted by the competent authority. Where such exercises cannot be undertaken in due time, the competent authority can base its evaluation on the institution’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as confirmed by an independent external auditor. The competent authority shall make its best efforts to ensure that the quantification is based on the market value of the institution or entity’s assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items.

Or. en

Justification

Preventive forms of support should be treated on an equal footing to preserve the level playing field, whether they come from public funds or from a private DGS. In precautionary recapitalisation, it must be ensured that the most appropriate valuation is used.

Amendment 249

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on asset quality reviews conducted by the ECB, the EBA or national authorities or, where appropriate, on on-site inspections conducted by the ECB or the relevant national competent authority. Where such exercises cannot be undertaken in due time, the competent authority can base its evaluation on the institution’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as confirmed by an independent external auditor.

Or. en

Amendment 250

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a)(iii), shall be limited to measures that have been assessed by the ECB or the national competent authority as necessary to maintain the solvency of the entity by addressing its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario of national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests or equivalent exercises conducted by the ECB, EBA or national authorities, where applicable, confirmed by the ECB or the relevant competent authority.

Support measures may involve an acquisition of own funds instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or of other capital instruments, or a use of impaired assets measures at prices, duration, and terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 18(4), points (a), (b) or (c), or Article 21(1) are present at the time the public support is granted.

Such support shall be limited to measures that have been assessed by the ECB or the national competent authority as necessary to maintain the solvency of the entity by addressing its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario of national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests or equivalent exercises conducted by the ECB, EBA or national authorities, where applicable, confirmed by the ECB or the relevant competent authority. Support shall not be used to address a capital shortfall established in the baseline scenario of national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests or equivalent exercises conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities.

Or. en

Amendment 251

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

By way of derogation from paragraph 1, point (a)(iii), acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be exceptionally permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise. The amount of acquired Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall not exceed 2% of the total risk exposure amount of the institution or entity concerned calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

Acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise.

Or. en

Amendment 252

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

By way of derogation from the fourth subparagraph, acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be exceptionally permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise. The amount of acquired Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall not exceed 2% of the total risk exposure amount of the institution or entity concerned calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

Or. en

Amendment 253

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 18(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures and shall communicate that assessment to the Commission and to the Board, in accordance with Article 18(1), third subparagraph.;

In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) and (b), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 18(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures and shall communicate that assessment to the Commission and to the Board, in accordance with Article 18(1), third subparagraph.;

Or. en

Justification

Preventive forms of support should be treated on an equal footing to preserve the level playing field, whether they come from public funds or from a private DGS. In precautionary recapitalisation, it must be ensured that the most appropriate valuation is used.

Amendment 254

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

In case any of the support measures is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 18(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures and shall communicate that assessment to the Commission and to the Board, in accordance with Article 18(1), third subparagraph.;

Or. en

Amendment 255

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall request the institution or entity to submit a remediation plan describing the steps to be taken in order to ensure or restore compliance with supervisory requirements, its long-term viability and to repay the amount provided, as well as the associated timeframe.;

Or. en

Amendment 256

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority does not recognise the remediation plan as credible or feasible, or where the institution or entity fails to comply with the remediation plan, an assessment of whether the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail shall be conducted in accordance with Article 18.

Or. en

Amendment 257

Roberts Zīle

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 258

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18a – paragraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2a. The ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall inform the Board of its assessment whether the conditions referred to in paragraph 2, points (a), (b) and (d), with respect to the entities and groups referred to in Article 7(2), and to the entities and groups referred to in Article 7(4), point (b), and Article 7(5) are met.

Or. en

Amendment 259

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 18 – paragraph 2 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2b. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, point (d), the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) can be used to offset losses that the institution or entity is likely to incur in the near future where an exception to the burden-sharing requirement is made under Union State aid framework.

Or. en

Amendment 260

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Where resolution action involves the granting of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU or of Fund aid in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, the resolution scheme referred to in Article 18(6) of this Regulation shall not enter into force until such time when the Commission adopts a positive or conditional decision, or a decision not to raise objections, concerning the compatibility of the use of such aid with the internal market, while taking into consideration the need for timely execution of the resolution scheme by the Board. The Commission shall take the decision concerning the compatibility of the use of State aid or of Fund aid with the internal market at the latest when it endorses or objects to the resolution scheme pursuant to Article 18(7), second subparagraph, or when the period of 24 hours referred to in Article 18(7), fifth subparagraph, expires, whichever is earlier. In the absence of such decision within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the resolution scheme shall be deemed authorised by the Commission and shall enter into force in accordance with Article 18(7), fifth subparagraph.

Or. en

Amendment 261

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 19 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 7

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission may issue a negative decision, addressed to the Board, where it decides that the proposed use of the Fund would be incompatible with the internal market and cannot be implemented in the form proposed by the Board. On receipt of such a decision the Board shall reconsider its resolution scheme and prepare a revised resolution scheme.;

The Commission shall issue a negative decision, addressed to the Board, where it decides that the proposed use of the Fund would be incompatible with the internal market and cannot be implemented in the form proposed by the Board. On receipt of such a decision the Board shall reconsider its resolution scheme and prepare a revised resolution scheme.;

Or. en

Amendment 262

Luděk Niedermayer

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 20 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Before determining whether the conditions for resolution, or the conditions for write down or conversion of capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 21(1) are met, the Board shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of an entity as referred to in Article 2 is carried out by a person that is independent from any public authority, including the Board and the national resolution authority, and from the entity concerned.;

1. Before determining whether the conditions for resolution, or the conditions for write down or conversion of capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 21(1) are met, the Board shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of an entity as referred to in Article 2 is carried out by a person with appropriate expertise that is independent from any public authority, including the Board and the national resolution authority, and from the entity concerned.’

Or. en

Amendment 263

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 20 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Before taking resolution action or exercising the power to write down or convert relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities in accordance with Article 21(1), the Board shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of an entity as referred to in Article 2 is carried out by a person that is independent from any public authority, including the Board and the national resolution authority, and from the entity concerned.

Or. en

Justification

According to the current version of Art. 20 (1), the resolution authority shall only obtain a valuation of the assets and liabilities by a third party if a write-down of capital instruments or a resolution takes place. Now, the valuation is to be obtained before it is determined that the conditions for resolution or write-down exist. It is therefore possible for the authority to obtain a valuation even though the corresponding measures are not subsequently taken because the conditions are not met. It is not clear why the timing of the assessment is brought forward. The burdens that regularly accompany such an assessment therefore do not appear to be justified at this stage yet.

Amendment 264

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 20 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Justification

A valuation is only necessary once resolution action is imminent.

Amendment 265

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point c a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 20 – paragraph 18 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ca) the following paragraph is added:

18a. The independent valuer shall have no duty or responsibility to shareholders or creditors of the institution under resolution and shall have no liability to such shareholders or creditors for acts and omissions when carrying out the valuation, unless the act or omission implies gross negligence or wilful misconduct in accordance with national law which directly affects rights of such shareholders or creditors.

Or. en

Amendment 266

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 21 – paragraph 3 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) having regard to timing, the need to implement effectively the write down and conversion powers or the resolution strategy for the resolution group and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any action, including alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures, other than the write-down or conversion of relevant capital instruments, and eligible liabilities as referred to in paragraph 7a, would prevent the failure of that entity or group within a reasonable timeframe.;

(b) having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any action, including alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures, other than the write-down or conversion of relevant capital instruments, and eligible liabilities as referred to in paragraph 7a, would prevent the failure of that entity or group within a reasonable timeframe.;

Or. en

Amendment 267

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 21 – paragraph 3 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Justification

According to current law, an institution can be considered no longer viable if (among other prerequisites) the failure cannot be averted within a reasonable timeframe by other measures, including alternative measures by the private sector or supervisory authorities, than a write-down carried out individually or together with a resolution measure. It is not clear why the feasibility of the wind-down strategy should play a role in this assessment in the future. When assessing whether a write-down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities is necessary at all, the wind-down strategy should not be a criterion, as it becomes irrelevant in the event of a successful avoidance of default.

Amendment 268

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 22 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23a) in Article 22(4), the following subparagraph is added:

"The resolution plan shall consider the combination of resolution tools which is the best suited to achieve resolution objectives.

Or. en

Justification

The aim is to incentivize resolution authorities to consider the use of several resolution tools together as part of the preferred resolution strategy, for transfer tools can usefully complement bail-in in order to better achieve resolution objectives while minimizing the destruction of value.

Amendment 269

Lídia Pereira

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 23 – paragraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23a) Article 23 is amended as follows:

(a) the following third paragraph is added:

The resolution scheme shall outline the resolution actions that should be taken by the Board in relation to the Union parent undertaking or particular group entities established in the Member States with regard to management decisions on awarding management bonuses, distributing dividends or purchasing own shares.

Or. pt

Amendment 270

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 27 – paragraph 7 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 20(1) to (15), has been made by shareholders, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write-down, or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU and Article 21(10) of this Regulation, and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 79 of this Regulation and Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU where relevant;

Or. en

Justification

Any weakening of the 8%-TLOF-threshold would thus undermine the core idea that burden sharing is the primary source of financing.

Amendment 271

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 27 – paragraph 7 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 272

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 27 – paragraph 7 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 273

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 27 – paragraph 7 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Or. en

Justification

Depending on the form of the bridge that will be agreed, this article needs to acknowledge that the bridge will be subject to certain conditions.

Amendment 274

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 27 – paragraphs 9 and 10

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) paragraphs 9 and 10 are replaced by the following:

deleted

‘

9. The Fund may make a contribution from resources which have been raised through ex-ante contributions as referred to in Article 70 and which have not yet been used, provided that all of the following conditions are met:

(a) the Fund has made a contribution pursuant to paragraph 6 and the 5 % limit referred to in paragraph 7, point (b), has been reached;

(b) all liabilities ranking lower than deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5, have been written down or converted in full.

10. In extraordinary circumstances, as an alternative or in addition to the contribution of the Fund referred to in paragraph 9, where the conditions laid down in paragraph 9 are met, the Board may seek further funding from alternative financing sources.;

’

Or. en

Justification

This is further increasing potential costs for SRF outside of exceptional circumstances. This is not needed to make the bridge work. This is not in line with depositor hierarchy in case single tier is not maintained.

Amendment 275

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) all liabilities ranking lower than deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5, have been written down or converted in full.

(b) all liabilities ranking lower than covered and retail deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5, have been written down or converted in full.

Or. en

Amendment 276

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) all liabilities ranking lower than deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5, have been written down or converted in full.

(b) all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities other than eligible deposits have been written down or converted in full.

Or. en

Amendment 277

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) all liabilities ranking lower than deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5, have been written down or converted in full.

(b) all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities other than eligible deposits, have been written down or converted in full.

Or. en

Amendment 278

Eero Heinäluoma

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) all liabilities ranking lower than deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5, have been written down or converted in full.

(b) all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities other than eligible deposits, have been written down or converted in full.

Or. en

Amendment 279

Lídia Pereira

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 29 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(24a) the following Article 29a is inserted:

(a) Article 29a (Transparency)

The Fund shall publish regular reports on the repayment of public resources provided under a resolution instrument with clear, accessible information on the total amount provided, the amounts repaid and the timeframe for future repayments.

Or. pt

Amendment 280

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 26 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 31 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

Present text

Amendment

(26a) in Article 31(1), the third subparagraph is replaced by the following:

For the purposes of evaluating resolution plans, the Board may request national resolution authorities to submit to the Board all information necessary, as obtained by them in accordance with Article 11 and Article 13(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, without prejudice to Chapter 5 of this Titl

‘Cooperation regarding information sharing shall be conducted in accordance with Article 11 and Article 13(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, without prejudice to Chapter 5 of this Title. In that framework and for the purposes of evaluating resolution plans, the Board:

(a) may request national resolution authorities to submit to the Board all information necessary, as obtained by them;

(b) shall, upon request by a national resolution authority of a participating Member State, provide that authority with any information that is necessary for the performance of that authority’s tasks under this Regulation.’

Or. en

Justification

Insufficient cooperation within the SRM (SRB and NRAs) is a concern expressed by most of the NRAs during the Strategic Review Consultation launched by the SRB in 2023. In particular, improvements are needed regarding the following issues :- Information sharing between the SRB and NRAs,- Association of NRAs in the relevant technical groups and subgroups when the SRB drafts and reviews its general policies. Appropriate industry consultation prior to the adoption and revision of SRB’s general policies.

Amendment 281

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 30 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 45 – title and paragraph 3 a (new)

Present text

Amendment

(30a) Article 45 is amended as following:

(a)the title is replaced by the following:

Accountability

“Transparency and accountability”;

(b) the following paragraph is inserted:

“3a. The Board shall publish all guidelines, general instructions, policies or guidance notes establishing resolution policies or methodologies to be applied within the Single Resolution Mechanism.”

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)

Amendment 282

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 50 – paragraph 1 – points qa and qb (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(31a) in Article 50(1), the following points are added:

‘(qa) adopt rules to ensure that national resolution authorities are consulted and are able to contribute to any policy or guidance adopted by the executive session that they will contribute to implementing.

(qb) adopt rules for organising industry consultations where appropriate prior to any substantive decision by the plenary or the executive session of a broad or general nature.’

Or. en

Justification

The association of NRAs in the relevant technical groups and subgroups when the SRB drafts and reviews its general policies, is essential to ensure consistent and effective implementation across the Banking Union. Industry consultations prior to any substantive decision would enhance cooperation and understanding of the sector. Policies and guidance should be tailored to banks’ models to facilitate implementation. In addition, industry consultations address the need expressed by the banking sector for more detailed information in order to be able to tailor capabilities further.

Amendment 283

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 56 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

A person who has served two terms of office as the Chair, the Vice-Chair or a member referred to in Article 43(1), point (b), shall not be eligible for appointment to any of the other two positions.;

A person who has served as the Chair, the Vice-Chair or a member referred to in Article 43(1), point (b), shall not be eligible for appointment to any of the other two positions.;

Or. en

Amendment 284

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34 – point c

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 56 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – sentence 1a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

‘

The Commission may arrange the names on the shortlist in the order reflecting the Commission’s assessment of the suitability of each candidate in light of the criteria referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article.;

’

Or. en

Amendment 285

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34 – point c a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 56 – paragraph 6

Present text

Amendment

(ca) in Article 56, paragraph 6 is replaced by the following:

6. After hearing the Board, in its plenary session, the Commission shall provide to the European Parliament a shortlist of candidates for the positions of Chair, Vice-Chair and members referred to in Article 43(1)(b) and inform the Council of the shortlist. By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, for the appointment of the first members of the Board following the entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall provide the shortlist of candidates without hearing the Board.The Commission shall submit a proposal for the appointment of the Chair, the Vice-Chair and the members referred to in Article 43(1)(b) to the European Parliament for approval. Following the approval of that proposal, the Council shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair, the Vice-Chair and the members referred to in Article 43(1)(b). The Council shall act by qualified majority.

"6. After hearing the Board, in its plenary session, the Commission shall provide to the European Parliament a gender-balanced shortlist of candidates for the positions of Chair, Vice-Chair and members referred to in Article 43(1)(b) and inform the Council of the shortlist. The European Parliament may conduct hearings of the candidates on that shortlist. In accordance with the outcome in the European Parliament, the Commission shall submit a proposal for the appointment of the Chair, the Vice-Chair and the members referred to in Article 43(1)(b) to the European Parliament for approval. Following the approval of that proposal, the Council shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair, the Vice-Chair and the members referred to in Article 43(1)(b). The Council shall act by qualified majority.

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)

Amendment 286

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34 – point d

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 56 – paragraph 6 a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

6a. In the 9 months preceding the end of the first term of office of the Chair, of the Vice-Chair and of the members referred to in Article 43(1), point (b), the Commission shall evaluate the results achieved in the first term of office and shall decide whether to put forward a proposal for renewal of the term based on the results of that evaluation.

deleted

The Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt an implementing decision to renew the term of office of the Chair, of the Vice-Chair and of the members referred to in Article 43(1), point (b). The Council shall act by qualified majority.;

Or. en

Amendment 287

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34 – point e a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 56 – paragraph 8

Present text

Amendment

(ea) in Article 56, paragraph 8 is deleted.

8. A Chair whose term of office has been extended shall not participate in another selection procedure for the same post at the end of the overall period.

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)

Amendment 288

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 35 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 69 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(35a) in Article 69(1), the following subparagraph is added:

‘When the available financial means have significantly exceeded the target level for a second consecutive year, the Commission shall assess the situation and report on the appropriateness of introducing a possibility to restitute part of available financial means.’

Or. en

Justification

This reform might change the likelihood of small and midsize banks to access the DGS / SRF. This likelihood should be reflected in the contribution rules in order to set the right incentives on a “polluter-pays” model. Until this is reviewed, there should be a pause in contributions, subject to a prudent floor.

Amendment 289

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 36

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 69 – paragraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. If, after the initial period referred to in paragraph 1, the available financial means fall below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions calculated in accordance with Article 70 shall be raised until the target level is reached. The Board may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 70 for 1 or more years to ensure that the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the Board to use the Fund pursuant to Section 3. After the target level has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two-thirds of the target level, those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within 6 years.;

4. If, after the initial period referred to in paragraph 1, the available financial means fall below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions calculated in accordance with Article 70 shall be raised until a level is reached that corresponds to the target level that was reached at the end of the initial period. The Board may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 70 and the reporting obligations therefor for 1 or more years to ensure that the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process on the part of the resolution authorities and the institutions, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the Board to use the Fund pursuant to Section 3. After the target level has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two-thirds of the target level, those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within 6 years.

Or. en

Justification

The purpose of this amendment is to clarify that the regular collection of contributions ends when the financial means of the Single Resolution Fund reaches the target level (1 % of the amount of covered deposits of all credit institutions authorised in all of the participating Member States) for the first time at the end of the initial period of time. The target level is not “dynamic”. However, if the available financial means fall below the achieved target level, regular contributions shall be raised until a target level is reached that is equal to the target level that was reached at the end of the initial period of time. With regard to the Single Resolution Fund in particular, it should be noted: The level to be achieved by the end of 2023, around 78 billion euros, is already around 40% higher than the originally envisaged target level, which was previously considered sufficient. This increase has on no account been the result of an increase in the willingness of banks to take more risks – as noted by, among others, the SRB. It is solely due to an increase in covered deposits. By keeping this mandatory contribution in place, the fund would be considerably more overcapitalised than it already is today. The explicit clarification should be included in the legal text that the cost of the collection process include all costs at authorities and institutions. if only the costs of the collection process at the authorities were taken into account, a suspension of the levy would be unlikely. Furthermore, a suspension of the collection process should not only include the contributions themselves, but also the submission of the annual report for the calculation of the contributions. Otherwise the institutions would be burdened with unnecessary administrative effort.

Amendment 290

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 36

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 69 – paragraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. After the target level has been reached for the first time, the collection of the regular contributions calculated in accordance with Article 70 shall be subject to the following modulations:

(a) until the available financial means, net of any disbursement, diminish below 85% of the target level, the Board shall defer the collection of the regular contributions;

(b) where the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, the Board shall defer the collection of the regular contributions.

Furthermore, the resumption of the regular contributions after the deferral mentioned in the first subparagraph shall be set at a level allowing for the target level to be reached within 3 years.’;

Or. en

Justification

Amendment 291

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 36

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 69 – paragraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. If, after the initial period referred to in paragraph 1, the available financial means fall below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions calculated in accordance with Article 70 shall be raised until the target level is reached. The Board may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 70 for 1 year to ensure that the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the Board to use the Fund pursuant to Section 3. After the target level has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two-thirds of the target level, those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within 6 years.;

Or. en

Amendment 292

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 37 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 70 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 69 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low-risk assets unencumbered by any third-party rights, at the free disposal of and earmarked for the exclusive use by the Board for the purposes specified in Article 76(1). The share of those irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 50 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the Board shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;

3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 69 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low-risk assets unencumbered by any third-party rights, at the free disposal of and earmarked for the exclusive use by the Board for the purposes specified in Article 76(1). The share of those irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 30 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the Board shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;

Or. en

Amendment 293

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 37 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 70 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the Board for the purposes specified in Article 76(1). The share of those irrevocable payment commitments shall be 50 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. The Board shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.

Or. en

Justification

The European Commission's proposal to increase the IPC share is, in principle, a good idea, however the decision on granting it and the amount of the IPC share remains subject to the discretion of the Board. In order to improve planning capabilities, the institutions should always have the option of using IPCs to an amount of 50%.

Amendment 294

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 37 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 70 – paragraph 3a – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Where an institution or entity stops being within the scope of Article 2 and is no longer subject to the obligation to pay contributions in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, the Board shall call the irrevocable payment commitments made pursuant to paragraph 3 and still due. If the contribution linked to the irrevocable payment commitment is duly paid at first call, the Board shall cancel the commitment and return the collateral. If the contribution is not duly paid at first call, the Board shall seize the collateral and cancel the commitment.;

Where an institution or entity stops being within the scope of this regulation the irrevocable payment commitments shall be cancelled and the collateral backing these commitments shall be returned at the latest two years after the entity has exited the scope of this Regulation;

Or. en

Justification

By giving time to the SRF to levy new contributions to fill the gap, the return of the collateral would not to induce a reduction in the available financial means of the SRF. Such a clarification will also preserve the specificity of the IPC whereby it may be treated not as an expense in the P&L of the banks.

Amendment 295

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 37 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 70 – paragraph 3a – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Where an institution or entity stops being within the scope of Article 2 and is no longer subject to the obligation to pay contributions in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, the Board shall return the irrevocable payment commitments made pursuant to paragraph 3 as soon as the subsequent regular contribution round pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article has replenished the Fund up to the target level.

Or. en

Justification

The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that adjusting the framework for IPCs (e.g. regarding return of IPC) does not change their current accounting treatment.

Amendment 296

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40 – point -a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 76 – paragraph 1 – point ga (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(-a) in paragraph 1, the following point is added:

'(ga) where the deposit guarantee scheme makes a contribution pursuant to Article 79(1) and where applicable conditions are met, to contribute the amount needed to close the remaining funding gap after the DGS contribution towards the 8% TLOF; in this case, the contribution made by the Fund is to be repaid in full by the DGS within 6 years at the most;

Or. en

Justification

OPTION 1 : Bridge in liquidity support to the DGS: (Low level of ambition in CMDI package to harmonize crisis management) : Depending on the bridge design, there needs to be a clear reference to this new use case of the resolution financing arrangement in this article. There also needs to be a review of the rules governing contributions to make sure the polluter pays principle is still effective after the entry into force of the CMDI reform.

Amendment 297

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40 – point -a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 76 – paragraph 1 – point g a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(-a) in paragraph 1, the following point is added:

Or. en

Justification

OPTION 2 : Bridge in loss sharing between DGS and RF/SRF : (High level of ambition in CMDI package to harmonize crisis management) : Depending on the bridge design, there needs to be a clear reference to this new use case of the resolution financing arrangement in this article. There also needs to be a review of the rules governing contributions to make sure the polluter pays principle is still effective after the entry into force of the CMDI reform.

Amendment 298

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 76 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. Where the resolution tools referred to in Article 22(2), point (a) or (b), are used to transfer only part of the assets, rights or liabilities of the institution under resolution, the Board shall have a claim against the residual entity for any expense and loss incurred by the Fund as a result of any contributions made to resolution pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article in connection to losses which creditors would have otherwise borne.

deleted

Or. en

Justification

The claims of the Board established here and their preferential position in insolvency proceedings will probably regularly lead to losses of the deposit guarantee schemes and to their financial depletion. This in turn will lead to a loss of confidence on the part of depositors.

Amendment 299

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 76 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

6. The claims of the Board referred to paragraph 5 of this Article and in Article 22(6) shall, in each participating Member State, have the same priority ranking as the claims of the national resolution financing arrangements in the national law of that Member State governing normal insolvency proceedings pursuant to Article 108(9) of Directive 2014/59/EU.;

deleted

Or. en

Justification

Amendment 300

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 76 – paragraph 6a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

6a. By 31 December 2026, the Commission shall report, to the European Parliament and to the Council, on the appropriateness of the rules governing the contributions to the Fund. The report shall take stock of the reforms to the crisis management framework, and assess whether these changes call for a review of the rules governing the contributions to the resolution financing arrangement in order to preserve the effectiveness of the incentives of a polluter-pay principle. Where appropriate, the Commission shall table a legislative proposal.’;

Or. en

Justification

OPTIONS 1 & 2

Amendment 301

Engin Eroglu

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(41) Article 79 is amended as follows:

deleted

[…]

Or. en

Justification

The proposed change of the current use of deposit guarantee schemes in the context of resolution is to be rejected. Otherwise, the financial contributions of deposit guarantee schemes for resolutions will be increased significantly in terms of frequency and amount of co-financing required. The use of deposit guarantee scheme funds for resolution measures is to be made standard, despite the fact that this is inappropriate and unnecessary. In addition, extending the scope of protection to include uncovered and unprotected deposits in resolution gives wholesale investors a free pass. This contradicts the mandate of the deposit protection scheme, which is to protect depositors in the event that a bank becomes insolvent by reimbursing up to 100,000 EUR of money deposited with the bank in question.

Amendment 302

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Participating Member States shall ensure that when the Board takes resolution action with respect to a credit institution, provided that such action ensures that depositors continue to have access to their deposits, to prevent depositors from bearing losses, the deposit guarantee scheme to which that credit institution is affiliated shall contribute for the purposes and under the conditions laid down in Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU.

Deleted

Or. en

Amendment 303

Markus Ferber, Herbert Dorfmann

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Justification

The "bridge the gap" approach undermines the key principle that losses should be borne primarily by shareholders and then creditors of a failing bank. "Bridge the gap" is not necessary as MREL requirements ensure sufficient resolution funding.

Amendment 304

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Participating Member States shall ensure that when the Board takes resolution action with respect to a credit institution, provided that such action ensures that natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises continue to have access to their deposits, to prevent them from bearing losses, the deposit guarantee scheme to which that credit institution is affiliated shall contribute for the purposes and under the conditions laid down in Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU.

Or. en

Justification

As regards resolution objectives, larger corporates should not be better treated than other clients. Also, the SRB should be in charge of approving the LCT (as part of the resolution scheme) as soon as the Fund might be used including via the “bridge” function.

Amendment 305

Joachim Schuster

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. The Board shall determine the amount of the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme in accordance with paragraph 1 after having consulted the deposit guarantee scheme, and where necessary the designated authority within the meaning of Article 2(1), point (18), of Directive 2014/49/EU, on the estimated cost of repaying depositors pursuant to Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in compliance with the conditions referred to in Article 20 of this Regulation.

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 306

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. The Board shall determine the amount of the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme in accordance with paragraph 1 after having determined the estimated cost of repaying depositors pursuant to Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in compliance with the conditions referred to in Article 20 of this Regulation in consultation with consulted the deposit guarantee scheme, and where necessary the designated authority within the meaning of Article 2(1), point (18), of Directive 2014/49/EU

Or. en

Justification

Amendment 307

Pedro Marques, Aurore Lalucq, René Repasi, Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(41a) the following article is inserted:

'Article 79a

Safeguarding the financial capacity of deposit guarantee schemes

1. Where the intervention of a deposit guarantee scheme is necessary in the context of a resolution but its available financial means are insufficient to achieve the purposes of its intervention, the deposit guarantee scheme may request support from the Board.

2. The request shall include all relevant information, including:

(a) the shortfall of the deposit guarantee scheme for the purposes of the specific intervention in the resolution;

(b) the conditions offered to the deposit guarantee scheme in other alternative funding arrangements;

3. Upon receiving the request referred to in paragraph 1, the Board may decide to establish temporary liquidity support to the requesting deposit guarantee scheme, through the provision of a guarantee by the Single Resolution Fund.

4. The Board in its executive session, after consulting with the Board in its plenary session, shall provide the guarantee to the deposit guarantee scheme and the terms applicable to its provision.

5. The guarantee shall be used by the deposit guarantee scheme as collateral for alternative funding arrangements as referred to in Article 10(9) of Directive 2014/49/EU, thus ensuring access to markets in more favourable conditions.

6. The EBA shall develop a common template for the purposes of paragraph 2, and a methodology to establish how the Board defines the terms applicable to the provision of guarantees, pursuant to paragraph 4.'

Or. en

Amendment 308

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(41a) the following article is inserted:

Article 79a

Reporting on liquidity resolution

By 31 December 2024 the Commission shall report, to the European Parliament and to the Council, on the issue of “liquidity in resolution”.

There might be situations where a resolved bank with insufficient remaining collateral temporarily struggles to access again the markets and/or to stabilise the outflow of deposits, and as a result keeps facing a liquidity shortfall although it has been properly recapitalised during the resolution weekend.

In such a case, depending on the size of the concerned bank, the Fund, even in combination with the ESM backstop, might not have sufficient means to provide the adequate amount of temporary refinancing, since such safety nets have been calibrated in accordance with a recapitalisation need and not a refinancing need.

The report shall therefore examine whether such situations correspond to a missing instrument in the resolution toolbox, and what the most efficient way to address this issue might be, taking into consideration what other jurisdictions do.

The report shall present concrete policy options. In particular, the report shall explore an option that would combine liquidity provision by the ECB to ensure sufficient firepower, with a guarantee provided by the EU budget in order to meet the collateral criteria of the ECB, backed by a counter-guarantee provided by the Fund to ensure that any loss be ultimately borne by the banking sector.

Or. en

Justification

Recent crisis episodes have shown the possible scale of the refinancing needs of a resolved bank. It seems not economically efficient to prefund such potential funding needs within the industry funded safety nets. At the same, it is the banking sector that should pay for any loss that might be incurred on such temporary refinancing provision, just as for any other intervention of the funds. The Commission should explore options that could meet these various constraints.

Amendment 309

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(41a) the following article is inserted:

Article 79a

Safeguarding the financial capacity of deposit guarantee schemes

2. The request shall include all relevant information, including:

(i) the shortfall of the deposit guarantee scheme for the purposes of the specific intervention in the resolution;

(ii) the conditions offered to the deposit guarantee scheme in other alternative funding arrangements;

(iii) the expected length of the requested support.

4. The Board in its executive session, after consulting with the Board in its plenary session, shall provide the support to the deposit guarantee scheme and the terms applicable to its provision.

Or. en

Amendment 310

Gilles Boyer, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(41b) the following article is inserted:

Article 79b

Reporting on internal loss transfer mechanism

By 31 December 2024, in the context of the resumption of Banking Union discussions, the Commission shall report, to the European Parliament and to the Council, on the effectiveness and scope of the internal loss transfer mechanism within resolution groups resulting from the reform of the crisis management framework.

In particular, the report shall take stock of the expansion of the scope of resolution to smaller entities, the level of compliance with internal MREL targets, the implementation of the new deduction rules, and the changes in conditions to access the industry funded safety nets, in particular the single resolution fund.

The Commission shall then assess whether this situation delivers sufficiently credible and efficient solidarity mechanisms within resolution groups, among entities earmarked for resolution, for granting more systematically material liquidity waivers to such entities, or whether further safeguards should be introduced.

Or. en

Justification

Any waiver must come hand in hand with adequate safeguards. Liquidity waivers exist but are not being widely used. This situation has not been affected by the entry into force of the crisis management framework, although this framework has created solidarity within resolution groups via functioning loss sharing / recapitalisation mechanisms among entities earmarked for resolution. This is being further reinforced by the present review. The Commission should, as part of the broader Banking Union discussion, assess to what extent this framework delivers appropriate solidarity that could warrant granting more systematically material liquidity waivers to entities earmarked for resolution within resolution groups or whether there needs to be additional safeguards.

Amendment 311

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Chapter 2 a – title (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(41a) the following Chapter 2a is inserted:

Chapter 2a

CONSTITUTION OF THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND

Or. en

Amendment 312

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Section 1 – title (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Section 1

Establishment and use of the deposit insurance fund

Or. en

Amendment 313

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 79a

General Provisions

1. The Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) is hereby established.

It shall be gradually filled by transfer of contributions by credit institutions raised by participating DGSs.

2. The available financial means of the Deposit Insurance Fund shall reach an initial target level of 20% of the total minimum target levels that participating DGSs shall reach under the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU. The Board shall determine the amount of financial means that each participating DGS shall annually transfer to the DIF, in order for the fund to reach its initial target level by [entry into force of this amending Regulation + 2y], in accordance with the methodology laid down in Article 79b.

3. The Board shall use the Deposit Insurance Fund in order to provide funding to participating DGS for covering liquidity shortfalls in accordance with Article 12 of Directive 2014/49/EU. The Board may also grant access to the EU credit line to a participating DGS that, following an intervention made in accordance with Article 11 (1), (2), (3) or (5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, has disbursed over the past year an amount equal or above 75% of its target level.

4. The owner of the Deposit Insurance Fund shall be the Board. The Board's activities under this Regulation may under no circumstances engage the budgetary liability of the Member States.

5. The Fund shall not cover losses of participating DGS before the Commission has provided its report referred to in Article 94(4). Under no circumstances shall the Union budget or the national budgets be held liable for expenses or losses of the Fund.

Or. en

Amendment 314

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 79b

Contributions to the fund

1. The amount that participating DGS shall transfer to the DIF in accordance with Article 79a shall be calculated on the basis of a risk-based methodology reflecting the risk of the institutions established in the Member State of the participating DGS relating to the Banking Union.

2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 93 in order to specify the risk-based method when calculating the contributions in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. The calculation shall be based on the amount of covered deposits and the degree of risk incurred by each credit institution relative to all credit institutions within the scope of the Board.The delegated act shall include, inter alia, a calculation formula and specific indicators. The methodology shall at least take into account the following criteria:

(a) the level of loss absorbing capacity of the institution;

(b) the institution’s ability to meet its short- and long-term obligations;

(c) the stability and variety of the institutions sources of funding and its unencumbered highly liquid assets and the degree to which the institution’s assets are encumbered;

(d) the institution’s contribution to overall systemic risks and its size, its complexity and its degree of interconnection with other institutions and the ease at which its critical functions can be segregated from other functions;

(e) the quality of the institution’s assets, in particular the proportion of non-performing exposures, are defined in Article 47a of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;

(f) the institution’s business model and management, as well as the structural complexity of the group to which it belongs;

(g) the institution’s level of diversification of its sovereign exposures.

Or. en

Amendment 315

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Section 2 – title (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Section 2

PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS

Or. en

Amendment 316

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79 c (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 79c

Preliminary information

Where a participating DGS has been informed by the competent authority about, or has otherwise become aware of, circumstances relating to a credit institution affiliated to that participating DGS that are likely to result in a payout event or its use in resolution proceedings, it shall inform the Board about such circumstances without delay if it intends to use the EU credit line. In this case the participating DGS shall also provide the Board with an estimate of the expected liquidity shortfall or liquidity need.

Or. en

Amendment 317

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79d (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 79d

Notification

1. Where a participating DGS faces a liquidity shortfall in the conditions described in Article 12 of Directive 2014/49/EU it shall immediately notify the Board and submit all necessary information in order to allow the Board to assess whether the conditions for the provision of funding are met.

2. The participating DGS shall inform the Board in particular about: (a) the amount of covered deposits of the credit institution concerned; (b) its available financial means at the time of the use of preventive or alternative measures or payout event or use in resolution; (c) in case of a payout event, an estimate of the extraordinary contributions it can raise within three days from that event; (d) any circumstances which would prevent it from meeting its obligations under national law transposing Directive 2014/49/EU and possible remedies.

Or. en

Amendment 318

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79e (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 79e

Determination of the amount of funding

1. After receiving the notification under Article 79d, the Board shall decide within 24 hours, in its executive session, that the conditions for the use of the EU credit line have been met and shall determine the amount of funding that it will provide to the participating DGS.

2. The Board shall immediately inform the participating DGS about its decision under paragraphs 1. The participating DGS may request a review of the Board’s decision within 24 hours after it has been informed. It shall state the reasons why it considers an amendment to the Board’s decision necessary, in particular with respect to the amount of funding. The Board shall take a decision on the request within another 24 hours.

Or. en

Amendment 319

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 i (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Section 3 – title (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Section 3

Administration of the EU credit line

Or. en

Amendment 320

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79h (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 79h

Composition of the Board in deposit insurance fund composition

1. Decisions on the use of the EU credit line shall be adopted by the Board in its deposit insurance fund composition.

2. The Board in deposit insurance fund composition shall be composed of the members referred to in Article 43 and a member appointed by each participating Member State, representing their designated authority.

Or. en

Amendment 321

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 79i (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 79i

Tasks of the Board in deposit insurance fund composition

1. The Board in deposit insurance fund composition shall:

a) take the decisions referred to in Articles 79a, 79b and 79e of this Regulation;

b) provide an annual report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the use of the EU credit line and on the available financial means of the fund;

c) prepare a report by [entry into force +18 months] on the feasibility and modalities of establishing a loss-coverage mechanism for participating DGS.

Or. en

Amendment 322

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 43 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 93

Present text

Amendment

(43a) Article 93 is replaced by the following:

Article 93

"Article 93

Exercise of the delegation

1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.

2. The delegation of power referred to in Article 19(8), Article 65(5), Article 69(5), Article 71(3) and Article 75(4) shall be conferred for an indeterminate period of time from the relevant dates referred to in Article 99.

2. The delegation of power referred to in Article 19(8), Article 65(5), Article 69(5), Article 71(3) , Article 75(4) and Article 79b (2) shall be conferred for an indeterminate period of time from the relevant dates referred to in Article 99.

3. The Commission shall ensure consistency between delegated acts adopted pursuant to this Regulation and delegated acts adopted pursuant to Directive 2014/59/EU.

4. The delegation of power referred to in Article 19(8), Article 65(5), Article 69(5), Article 71(3) and Article 75(4) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision of revocation shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.

4. The delegation of power referred to in Article 19(8), Article 65(5), Article 69(5), Article 71(3) , Article 75(4) and Article 79b (2) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision of revocation shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.

5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council.

6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 19(8), Article 65(5), Article 69(5), Article 71(3) and Article 75(4) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of three months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by three months at the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council.

6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 19(8), Article 65(5), Article 69(5), Article 71(3) , Article 75(4) and Article 79b (2) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of three months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by three months at the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council.

7. The Commission shall not adopt delegated acts where the scrutiny time of the European Parliament is reduced through recess to less than five months, including any extension.

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)

Amendment 323

Pedro Marques, Costas Mavrides, Irene Tinagli, Jonás Fernández, Aurore Lalucq, René Repasi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 43 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 94 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(43a) in Article 94(1), the following point is added:

(aa) the interplay between the existing framework and the establishment of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme;

Or. en

Amendment 324

Ernest Urtasun

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 43 b (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

Article 94 – paragraph 3 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(43b) in Article 94, the following paragraph is added:

3a. By [entry into force of this amending Regulation +2 years], the Commission, after consulting the Board, shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the functioning of the Deposit Insurance Fund established under Article 79a.

The report shall at least assess:

(a) whether and under which modalities the DIF could provide loss coverage to the national DGS;

(b) the appropriateness of the DIF target level defined in Article 79a(2);

Where appropriate, the Commission shall accompany this report by a legislative proposal.

Or. en

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)

Amendment 325

Marco Zanni, Valentino Grant, Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

It shall apply from … [OP please insert the date = 18 months from the date of entry into force of this amending Regulation].

It shall apply from … [OP please insert the date = 24 months from the date of entry into force of this amending Regulation].

Or. en

Amendment 326

Irene Tinagli

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 2a

Transitional period

1. Institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU whose preferred resolution strategy will change depending on the entry into force of this Regulation should comply with the requirements referred to in Articles 45e or 45f of Directive 2014/59/EU or with requirements that result from the application of Article 45b(4), (5) or (7) of that Directive, as appropriate, within five years as from the date of the approval of the resolution plan including the new preferred resolution strategy.

2. During the transitional period referred to in paragraph 1, in the cases referred to in point (b), of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 of Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU, where the transfer to the recipient includes deposits that are not covered deposits or other bail-inable liabilities, by way of derogation from the second subparagraph of that paragraph, the deposit guarantee scheme shall contribute to the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of deposits, including deposits that are not covered, of senior bail-inable liabilities held by retail clients, as defined in point 11 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, and of the liabilities with the same or higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to the recipient.

Or. en