Sittings · Document

Draft report (2025/2238(INI)) 2026-02-03

Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2024

Committee on Budgetary Control

AM_Com_NonLegReport

Amendment 1

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Citation 5 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy1a (Common Provisions Regulation),

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1a OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.

Or. en

Amendment 2

Bert-Jan Ruissen

Motion for a resolution

Citation 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– having regard to Special Report 22/2025 of the European Court of Auditors, 'Financial corrections in Cohesion policy - A complex framework and only one decision adopted by the Commission so far'

Or. nl

Amendment 3

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Citation 21 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgetary Control for the Bureau on the Political group Identity and Democracy - Dissolution and final financial report 2024 (CONT/10/03763)1c,

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1c Adopted 4 September 2025.

Or. en

Amendment 4

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Recital B

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

B. whereas the sound management of the EU’s resources, both for expenditure and for revenue, and the protection of the EU’s financial interests, should form key components of any EU policy, so as to foster their efficient implementation, ensure that taxpayers’ money is used properly and effectively and increase citizens’ confidence in the European institutions;

B. whereas the sound management of the EU’s resources, both for expenditure and for revenue, and the protection of the EU’s financial interests, should form key components of any EU policy, so as to foster their efficient implementation, ensure that taxpayers’ money is spent effectively and transparently, and increase citizens’ confidence in the European institutions;

Or. en

Amendment 5

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Recital B a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

B a. whereas the CJEU has established and confirmed, in various rulings, the clear relationship between respect for the rule of law and the efficient implementation of the EU budget, in accordance with the principles of sound financial management and the protection of the EU’s financial interests;

Or. en

Amendment 6

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Recital B b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

B b. whereas the Conditionality Regulation empowers the EU to adopt, in a timely manner, proportionate financial measures to safeguard its financial interests where breaches of the rule of law in a Member State affect, or seriously risk affecting, the sound financial management of the EU budget; whereas the regulation was adopted as part of the package on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), following long and difficult negotiations between the co-legislators, notably because of attempts by some of the Member States to link the negotiations on the MFF with the negotiations on the rule of law conditionality mechanism; whereas it has been binding for all Member States since its entry into force on 1 January 2021;

Or. en

Amendment 7

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Recital C a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

C a. whereas on 6 May 2025, the European Parliament adopted its resolution on the protection of the Union’s financial interests for 2023, calling for the PIF report to serve as a tool to strengthen the governance of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture and to adopt a more holistic approach;

Or. en

Amendment 8

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

D. whereas the description and analysis in the PIF Report of the measures adopted to combat fraud and irregularities should make it possible to identify and implement more targeted actions at both EU and national level;

D. whereas the description and analysis in the PIF Report of the measures adopted to combat fraud and irregularities should make it possible to identify and implement more targeted actions at both EU and national level; whereas the detection of fraudulent irregularities continues to improve across the Union, recovery actions remain uneven in some Member States; whereas effective protection of the Union’s financial interests requires both comprehensive detection and consistent judicial and administrative follow-up to prevent, correct, and deter misuse of EU funds;

Or. en

Amendment 9

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

E. whereas the protection of the EU’s financial interests must be supported by an analysis based on reliable data;

E. whereas the protection of the EU’s financial interests must be supported by an analysis based on reliable data and coherent and systematic rules on transparency and strong internal control mechanisms;

Or. en

Amendment 10

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Recital E a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

E a. whereas the potential of digital tools, including risk-scoring systems and interoperable databases to prevent and detect fraud should be promoted, while noting that the deployment of advanced analytics and predictive tools remains limited; whereas fostering the development and adoption of such tools contributes to more efficient and effective management of Union funds and strengthens the protection of the Union’s financial interes;

Or. en

Amendment 11

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Recital F

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

F. whereas, considering the disparities between the Member States, in particular as regards the detection and reporting of irregularities, the diversity of administrative systems in the Member States hinders the implementation of the objective of a common level of national management, control and reporting systems in the Union; whereas, if the diversity of administrative systems in the Member States is not addressed in a consistent manner by enhancing interoperability and digitalisation, it risks undermining the reliability, comparability and usefulness of data and reports; whereas, to this end, it seems necessary that genuine common guidelines worthy of the name and robust standard procedures be implemented effectively and more efficiently in order to achieve a more standardised and uniform management and treatment of European funds and the protection of the Union’s financial interests in the same way in all Member States;

F. whereas, considering the disparities between the Member States, in particular as regards the detection and reporting of irregularities, the diversity of administrative systems in the Member States hinders the implementation of the objective of a common level of national management, control and reporting systems in the Union; whereas a limited number of Member States have adopted fully comprehensive anti-fraud strategies covering all relevant sectors; whereas strengthening governance structures, ensuring coordination among authorities, and establishing measurable objectives at national level are essential to protect the Union budget and improve the effectiveness of EU-wide anti-fraud measures; whereas, if the diversity of administrative systems in the Member States is not addressed in a consistent manner by enhancing interoperability and digitalisation, it risks undermining the reliability, comparability and usefulness of data and reports; whereas, to this end, it seems necessary that genuine common guidelines worthy of the name and robust standard procedures be implemented effectively and more efficiently in order to achieve a more standardised and uniform management and treatment of European funds and the protection of the Union’s financial interests in the same way in all Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 12

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Recital F

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

F. whereas, considering the disparities between the Member States, in particular as regards the detection and reporting of irregularities, the diversity of administrative systems in the Member States hinders the implementation of the objective of a common level of national management, control and reporting systems in the Union; whereas, if the diversity of administrative systems in the Member States is not addressed in a consistent manner by enhancing interoperability and digitalisation, it risks undermining the reliability, comparability and usefulness of data and reports; whereas, to this end, it seems necessary that genuine common guidelines worthy of the name and robust standard procedures be implemented effectively and more efficiently in order to achieve a more standardised and uniform management and treatment of European funds and the protection of the Union’s financial interests in the same way in all Member States;

F. whereas, considering the disparities between the Member States, in particular as regards the detection and reporting of irregularities, the diversity of administrative systems in the Member States hinders the implementation of the objective of a common level of national management, control and reporting systems in the Union; whereas, if the diversity of administrative systems in the Member States is not addressed in a consistent manner by enhancing interoperability and digitalisation, it risks undermining the reliability, comparability and usefulness of data and reports; whereas, to this end, it seems necessary that common guidelines and robust standard procedures be implemented effectively and more efficiently in order to achieve a more standardised and uniform management and treatment of European revenue and expenditure;

Or. en

Amendment 13

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Recital G a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

G a. whereas effective protection of the EU budget requires a solid cooperation between authorities conducting administrative investigations and those conducting criminal investigations at both EU and Member State level should be encouraged; whereas not only cooperation but also systematic coordination is needed; whereas regular information-sharing, joint risk analysis would avoid fragmented protection and ensure timely and coherent action against fraud and irregularities;

Or. en

Amendment 14

Bert-Jan Ruissen

Motion for a resolution

Recital G a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ga. whereas the European Commission is obliged to apply financial corrections to Member States in order to exclude from Union financing expenditure incurred in breach of applicable law;

Or. nl

Amendment 15

Céline Imart, Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Recital H a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

H a. whereas concerning and worrying phenomena of entryism have been highlighted in several Member States; calls on the Commission to exercise the utmost vigilance and to put in place the necessary checks to ensure that Union funds do not indirectly encourage or support such movements that run counter to the values upheld by the European Union;

Or. en

Amendment 16

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Recital L

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

L. whereas conflicts of interest are not duly and fully reported in the current monitoring databases; whereas they deserve the highest consideration, as they represent a serious threat to the credibility of institutions and supporting authorities and a breach of taxpayers’ trust;

L. whereas conflicts of interest are reported via the IMS, although the quality and quantity of data vary between the Member States; whereas they deserve the highest consideration, as they represent a serious threat to the credibility of institutions and supporting authorities and a breach of taxpayers’ trust;

Or. en

Amendment 17

Céline Imart, Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Recital L a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

L a. whereas transparency in the allocation of European funds by NGOs is essential to ensure the sound management of public resources and to prevent undue influence on the Union’s decision-making process;

Or. en

Amendment 18

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Recital M

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

M. whereas the protection of the Union’s financial interests must be fully integrated into all EU external action instruments, given that financial support to non-EU countries inherently entails an increased risk of fraud, misappropriation and misuse of funds compared to direct implementation, and must therefore be accompanied by robust safeguard measures ensuring the consistent use of Union funds, as well as mechanisms allowing for protective interventions at all times in order to prevent, detect and correct possible breaches;

M. whereas the protection of the Union’s financial interests must be fully integrated into all EU external action instruments and must be accompanied by robust safeguard measures ensuring the consistent use of Union funds, as well as mechanisms allowing for protective interventions at all times in order to prevent, detect, and correct possible breaches;

Or. en

Amendment 19

Céline Imart, Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Recital M

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

M. whereas the protection of the Union’s financial interests must be fully integrated into all EU external action instruments, given that financial support to non-EU countries inherently entails an increased risk of fraud, misappropriation and misuse of funds compared to direct implementation, and must therefore be accompanied by robust safeguard measures ensuring the consistent use of Union funds, as well as mechanisms allowing for protective interventions at all times in order to prevent, detect and correct possible breaches;

M. whereas the protection of the Union’s financial interests must be fully integrated into all EU external action instruments, given that financial support to non-EU countries inherently entails an increased risk of fraud, misappropriation and misuse of funds compared to direct implementation, and must therefore be accompanied by robust safeguard measures ensuring the consistent use of Union funds, as well as mechanisms allowing for protective interventions at all times in order to prevent, detect and correct possible breaches of the rule of law or entryism attempts;

Or. en

Amendment 20

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

1. Takes note of the 2024 PIF report, endorses its four recommendations but considers them insufficiently ambitious, particularly regarding transparency and the means by which citizens and their elected representatives can monitor the use of funds, as annual reports alone offer only a partial and filtered view of the real problems;

1. Takes note of the 2024 PIF report and endorses its four recommendations, while but consideringthem insufficiently ambitious, in particular as regards transparency and accountability; stresses that citizens and their elected representatives must be able to effectively monitor how Union funds are used; notes annual reporting alone provides only a partial overview of the real problems;

Or. en

Amendment 21

Dick Erixon, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

1. Takes note of the 2024 PIF report, endorses its four recommendations but considers them insufficiently ambitious, particularly regarding transparency and the means by which citizens and their elected representatives can monitor the use of funds, as annual reports alone offer only a partial and filtered view of the real problems;

1. Takes note of the 2024 PIF report, endorses its four recommendations but considers them insufficiently ambitious, particularly regarding transparency and the means by which citizens and their elected representatives can monitor the use of funds, as annual reports alone offer only a partial and filtered view of the real problems; stresses that enhanced transparency is essential for demonstrating value for money and ensuring that EU funds generate a positive impact on economic growth and competitiveness;

Or. en

Amendment 22

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

1. Takes note of the 2024 PIF report, endorses its four recommendations but considers them insufficiently ambitious, particularly regarding transparency and the means by which citizens and their elected representatives can monitor the use of funds, as annual reports alone offer only a partial and filtered view of the real problems;

1. Takes note of the 2024 PIF report, endorses its four recommendations, but considers them insufficiently ambitious; underlines that more efforts should be made to increase transparency and allow better scrutiny of the use of EU funds by civil society and media organisations focused on these issues and by the European Parliament; considers the annual report an important instrument which, however, provides only a partial view of the complex context of EU funding systems and does not provide the focused analysis required to tackle these issues;

Or. en

Amendment 23

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

1. Takes note of the 2024 PIF report, endorses its four recommendations but considers them insufficiently ambitious, particularly regarding transparency and the means by which citizens and their elected representatives can monitor the use of funds, as annual reports alone offer only a partial and filtered view of the real problems;

1. Welcomes the 2024 PIF report; takes notes of its analyses on the relevant findings and endorses its recommendations; recalls that the annual PIF report is an important source of information on the protection of the Union’s financial interests; encourages the Commission to keep improving the quality, consistency and analytical value of data used in the report, in order to support meaningful transparency and effective democratic scrutiny;

Or. en

Amendment 24

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

1. Takes note of the 2024 PIF report, endorses its four recommendations but considers them insufficiently ambitious, particularly regarding transparency and the means by which citizens and their elected representatives can monitor the use of funds, as annual reports alone offer only a partial and filtered view of the real problems;

1. Takes note of the 2024 PIF report, endorses its four recommendations but considers them insufficiently ambitious, particularly regarding transparency and the means by which citizens and their elected representatives can monitor the use of funds, as annual reports alone offer only a partial view of the real problems;

Or. en

Amendment 25

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

1 a. Considers that accountability in the area of the protection of the Union’s financial interests cannot rely exclusively on aggregated annual reporting; calls on the Commission to explore periodic, structured and Parliament-accessible reporting mechanisms, more strongly oriented towards risks and results, which would allow for more timely monitoring of the main risks, ongoing investigations, corrective measures and progress in recoveries, without prejudice to the confidentiality of investigations;

Or. en

Amendment 26

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

1 a. Underlines that transparency plays an important role in the management of public funds; encourages the Commission and the Member States to maximise transparency in the use of funds, including with regard to information about final beneficiaries; in this context, recalls that Parliament, as the discharge authority, has an important role to fulfil towards citizens to make sure that EU funds are not misused;

Or. en

Amendment 27

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

1 b. Reiterates that communication about the use of EU funds and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the media in general, and investigative journalism in particular, to enhance awareness; underlines the central role played by the media and investigative journalism in the fight against fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, and other misuse of public funds; considers that it is essential to safeguard the media from political pressure and influence, and to protect its independence and its role as a watchdog of democracy and of the sound management of public funds;

Or. en

Amendment 28

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

1 b. Considers that the European Parliament, in particular its Committee on Budgetary Control, should play a more structured and continuous role in monitoring the protection of the Union’s financial interests; invites the Commission to explore periodic reporting formats that would allow for effective parliamentary scrutiny beyond the annual PIF reporting cycle;

Or. en

Amendment 29

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

2. Reiterates that the protection of the Union’s financial interests faces significant challenges in an increasingly complex and rapidly evolving context and that its effectiveness can only be achieved through joint and coordinated actions by judicial and administrative authorities, the European institutions and entities and the Member States;

2. Reiterates that the protection of the Union’s financial interests faces significant challenges in an increasingly complex and rapidly evolving context and that its effectiveness can only be ensured through joint and coordinated actions by judicial and administrative authorities, the European institutions and entities and the Member States; stresses that cooperation must include systematic information-sharing, joint risk analysis and operational coordination; urges Member States to adopt a proactive stance in safeguarding the Union’s financial interests, strengthening information exchange both among national authorities and with EU bodies and agencies, in order to detect and address emerging risks and fraud patterns promptly;

Or. en

Amendment 30

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

2. Reiterates that the protection of the Union’s financial interests faces significant challenges in an increasingly complex and rapidly evolving context and that its effectiveness can only be achieved through joint and coordinated actions by judicial and administrative authorities, the European institutions and entities and the Member States;

2. Reiterates that the protection of the Union’s financial interests faces significant challenges in an increasingly complex and rapidly evolving context and that its effectiveness can be achieved through joint and coordinated actions by judicial and administrative authorities, the European institutions and entities, and the Member States, as well as through involvement of civil society organisations, research institutions, and independent media organisations;

Or. en

Amendment 31

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

2 a. Recalls that the rule of law is one of the founding values of the EU and that respect for the rule of law is an essential prerequisite for the sound financial management and protection of the EU financial interests in all Member States; furthermore, considers that, while the Conditionality Regulation is primarily designed to protect the EU budget from risks deriving from breaches of the rule of law, there is merit in exploring ways of strengthening the protection of the EU budget against violations of the other values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; recalls that the EU budget is not neutral to breaches of democracy, equality and fundamental rights, which can have tangible financial implications; is of the opinion that Article 6 of the Financial Regulation provides the legal basis for action in cases of such breaches; invites the Commission to assess the extension of conditionality instruments in cases where serious and systemic violations of other Article 2 TEU values affect the EU budget;

Or. en

Amendment 32

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

2 a. Regrets that not all Member States participate in the EPPO, creating enforcement gaps for crimes affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that in 2024 the EPPO issued a significant number of European Investigation Orders and mutual legal assistance requests involving non-participating Member States; reiterates the call on remaining non-participating Member States to join the EPPO;

Or. en

Amendment 33

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

3. Stresses that only enhanced digitalisation, including through national anti-fraud strategies, process digitalisation and the use of common digital tools, will enable knowledge sharing, accessibility and data processing, as well as the comprehensive reporting necessary for results-based governance in the protection of the Union’s financial interests; notes that only enhanced digitalisation can provide the foundation for genuine transparency to citizens and their elected representatives, which is essential when public money is at stake;

3. Stresses that only enhanced digitalisation, including through national anti-fraud strategies, process digitalisation and the use of common digital tools, is essential to enable effective knowledgesharing, data accessibility and processing, as well as the comprehensive reporting necessary for results-based governance in the protection of the Union’s financial interests; underlinesthat digitalisation can provide the foundation for genuine transparency to citizens and their elected representatives, which is essential when public money is at stake; recalls that such as digitalisation must move from analytical reflection to operational deployment, while respecting data protection, cybersecurity and appropriate human oversight;

Or. en

Amendment 34

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

3. Stresses that only enhanced digitalisation, including through national anti-fraud strategies, process digitalisation and the use of common digital tools, will enable knowledge sharing, accessibility and data processing, as well as the comprehensive reporting necessary for results-based governance in the protection of the Union’s financial interests; notes that only enhanced digitalisation can provide the foundation for genuine transparency to citizens and their elected representatives, which is essential when public money is at stake;

3. Stresses that only enhanced digitalisation, including through national anti-fraud strategies, process digitalisation and the use of common digital tools, will enable knowledge sharing, accessibility and data processing, as well as the comprehensive reporting necessary for results-based governance in the protection of the Union’s financial interests; notes that only enhanced digitalisation can provide the foundation for genuine transparency to citizens and their elected representatives, which is essential when public money is at stake; stresses that digitalisation will only deliver added value if it is accompanied by clear operational objectives, effective interoperability between national and Union systems, and sufficient analytical capacities to translate data into early detection, risk prioritisation and measurable corrective actions;

Or. en

Amendment 35

Dick Erixon, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

3. Stresses that only enhanced digitalisation, including through national anti-fraud strategies, process digitalisation and the use of common digital tools, will enable knowledge sharing, accessibility and data processing, as well as the comprehensive reporting necessary for results-based governance in the protection of the Union’s financial interests; notes that only enhanced digitalisation can provide the foundation for genuine transparency to citizens and their elected representatives, which is essential when public money is at stake;

3. Stresses that only enhanced digitalisation, including through national anti-fraud strategies, process digitalisation and the use of common digital tools, will enable knowledge sharing, accessibility and data processing, as well as the comprehensive reporting necessary for results-based governance in the protection of the Union’s financial interests; notes that only enhanced digitalisation can provide the foundation for genuine transparency to citizens and their elected representatives, which is essential when public money is at stake; underlines that digitalisation and result-oriented indicators could significantly simplify controls, reduce bureaucracy for beneficiaries, and ensure that taxpayers' money is used more efficiently; considers that if the Commission introduced result-oriented measurable indicators into its programmes, controls could be simpler, bureaucracy for beneficiaries could be reduced, and taxpayers' money would be used more efficiently;

Or. en

Amendment 36

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

4. Notes that the number of irregularities reported by EU competent authorities and national authorities in 2024 was slightly lower than in 2023 (totalling 13 589 in 2024, 13 947 in 2023 and 12 455 in 2022), while the corresponding irregular amounts were reported to be relatively stable (EUR 1.84 billion in 2024 compared to EUR 1.90 billion in 2023, reaching EUR 1.77 billion in 2022); observes that fraud cases account for around 10 % of the total irregularities reported, the number having increased sharply to 1 364 (26 % more than in 2023); notes that the financial amounts related to these fraud cases also increased to EUR 548.8 million in 2024 (+ 138.7 % compared to 2023); points out that since checks are not systematic but are often carried out by sampling, these figures should be interpreted with caution;

4. Notes that the number of irregularities reported by EU competent authorities and national authorities in 2024 was slightly lower than in 2023 (totalling 13 589 in 2024, 13 947 in 2023 and 12 455 in 2022), while the corresponding irregular amounts were reported to be relatively stable (EUR 1.84 billion in 2024 compared to EUR 1.90 billion in 2023, reaching EUR 1.77 billion in 2022); observes that fraud cases account for around 10 % of the total irregularities reported, the number having increased sharply to 1 364 (26 % more than in 2023); notes that the financial amounts related to these fraud cases also increased to EUR 548.8 million in 2024 (+ 138.7 % compared to 2023); recalls that the information reported in the IMS is primarily based on data transmitted by the Member States, which rely on a variety of detection sources and methods; recalls that since checks often rely on risk-based analysis, these figures should be interpreted in their proper methodological context; calls therefore for strengthened risk analysis, more harmonised control practices in Member States and improved qualitative assessment of cases, in order to enhance the reliability and comparability of reported data;

Or. en

Amendment 37

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

4 a. Notes that the significant increase in detected fraud cases may reflect improvements in detection, but also points to a structural underestimation of fraud in previous financial years; considers that the available data do not yet allow for an assessment of the actual scale of fraud affecting the Union budget and calls on the Commission to explicitly address this analytical gap;

Or. en

Amendment 38

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

7. Notes that the EPPO’s activities have steadily increased since June 2021, in terms of the number of investigations opened (in 2024, 1 504 investigations, compared to 1 371 in 2023 and 865 in 2022), the number of investigations currently ongoing (2 666 in 2024 compared to 1 927 in 2023 and 1 117 in 2022), the number of indictments (205 in 2024 compared to 139 in 2023 and 87 in 2022), the number of judicial convictions (102 criminal cases were closed in 2024 with one conviction compared to 48 cases in 2023 and 20 cases in 2022) and the number of freezing orders obtained (in 2024 for EUR 2.42 billion compared to EUR 1.5 billion in 2023, EUR 359.1 million in 2022);

7. Notes that the EPPO’s activities have steadily increased since June 2021, in terms of the number of investigations opened (in 2024, 1 504 investigations, compared to 1 371 in 2023 and 865 in 2022), the number of investigations currently ongoing (2 666 in 2024 compared to 1 927 in 2023 and 1 117 in 2022), the number of indictments (205 in 2024 compared to 139 in 2023 and 87 in 2022), the number of judicial convictions (102 criminal cases were closed in 2024 with one conviction compared to 48 cases in 2023 and 20 cases in 2022) and the number of freezing orders obtained (in 2024 for EUR 2.42 billion compared to EUR 1.5 billion in 2023, EUR 359.1 million in 2022); stresses, however, that the sustained growth in the EPPO’s activities should be assessed not only in terms of the number of investigations and convictions, but also in terms of effective budgetary impact, including the recovery of funds and the deterrent effect; calls for this dimension to be systematically integrated into future PIF reports;

Or. en

Amendment 39

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

7 a. Notes that EPPO caseload and estimated damage continued to increase sharply in 2024; stresses that the effectiveness of prosecutions and timely handling of cases depends on adequate staffing of both the central office and European Delegated Prosecutors; calls on the Commission and the budgetary authority to ensure sufficient resources commensurate with workload and case complexity;

Or. en

Amendment 40

Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8. Notes that in 2024, the EPPO reported that Europol had provided support (information exchange, analytical support and expertise) in response to 83 requests and that by the end of 2024, 25 cases were ongoing with the support of Eurojust’s national offices; notes that in 2024, OLAF sent 74 cases to the EPPO for the opening of a criminal investigation, and that the EPPO opened 69 cases on the basis of OLAF’s contributions, and that in the same year OLAF closed 26 additional investigations and opened 17; expects that the revision of the anti-fraud architecture will provide opportunities to strengthen this cooperation and set ambitious targets aligned with EU priorities;

8. Observes an appreciable level of cooperation amongst some of the AFA authorities; notes that in 2024, the EPPO reported that Europol had provided support (information exchange, analytical support and expertise) in response to 83 requests and that by the end of 2024, 25 cases were ongoing with the support of Eurojust’s national offices; notes that in 2024, OLAF sent 74 cases to the EPPO for the opening of a criminal investigation, and that the EPPO opened 69 cases on the basis of OLAF’s input, and that in the same year OLAF closed 26 complementary investigations and opened 17 (in 2023, 22 complementary investigations were opened by OLAF and four supporting investigations were requested by the EPPO); maintains that the use of complementary investigations (ex Article 12(f) of the OLAF Regulation) and investigations in support (ex Article 12(e) of the OLAF Regulation) is still suboptimal and reiterates its call on the Commission to address the legal and operational causes of this when reviewing the relevant regulations; expects, in this vein, that the revision of the anti-fraud architecture will provide opportunities to strengthen this cooperation and set ambitious targets aligned with the EU’s financial interests;

Or. en

Amendment 41

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8. Notes that in 2024, the EPPO reported that Europol had provided support (information exchange, analytical support and expertise) in response to 83 requests and that by the end of 2024, 25 cases were ongoing with the support of Eurojust’s national offices; notes that in 2024, OLAF sent 74 cases to the EPPO for the opening of a criminal investigation, and that the EPPO opened 69 cases on the basis of OLAF’s contributions, and that in the same year OLAF closed 26 additional investigations and opened 17; expects that the revision of the anti-fraud architecture will provide opportunities to strengthen this cooperation and set ambitious targets aligned with EU priorities;

8. Notes that in 2024, the EPPO reported that Europol had provided support (information exchange, analytical support, including financial information, joint operations, operational meetings, action days and expertise) in response to 83 requests and that by the end of 2024, a steep increase compared to 2023; , 25 cases were ongoing with the support of Eurojust’s national offices; notes that in 2024, OLAF sent 74 cases to the EPPO for the opening of a criminal investigation, and that the EPPO opened 69 cases on the basis of OLAF’s contributions, and that in the same year OLAF closed 26 additional investigations and opened 17; expects that the revision of the anti-fraud architecture, as launched by the Commission to better safeguard the Union’s financial interests and to ensure more efficient cooperation between EU anti-fraud actors and Members States, will meaningfully strengthen operational cooperation, strategic coordination and data sharing between OLAF, EPPO, Eurojust, Europol and national authorities and set ambitious and results-oriented targets aligned with EU priorities; underlines that this review should prioritise interoperabiity, risk analysis and use of modern technologies while respecting data protection and the rule of law.

Or. en

Amendment 42

Bert-Jan Ruissen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8. Notes that in 2024, the EPPO reported that Europol had provided support (information exchange, analytical support and expertise) in response to 83 requests and that by the end of 2024, 25 cases were ongoing with the support of Eurojust’s national offices; notes that in 2024, OLAF sent 74 cases to the EPPO for the opening of a criminal investigation, and that the EPPO opened 69 cases on the basis of OLAF’s contributions, and that in the same year OLAF closed 26 additional investigations and opened 17; expects that the revision of the anti-fraud architecture will provide opportunities to strengthen this cooperation and set ambitious targets aligned with EU priorities;

8. Notes that in 2024, the EPPO reported that Europol had provided support (information exchange, analytical support and expertise) in response to 83 requests and that by the end of 2024, 25 cases were ongoing with the support of Eurojust’s national offices; notes that in 2024, OLAF sent 74 cases to the EPPO for the opening of a criminal investigation, and that the EPPO opened 69 cases on the basis of OLAF’s contributions, and that in the same year OLAF closed 26 additional investigations and opened 17; notes that the European Court of Auditors1 b found in 40 cases that OLAF independently concluded that there was no suspected criminal conduct, without consulting the EPPO; points out that only the EPPO and the national public prosecutors' offices are competent to assess whether conduct is likely to be criminal; notes that OLAF does not have access to reports dismissed by the EPPO, which, according to the Court of Auditors, hinders OLAF's ability to take relevant administrative measures; expects that the revision of the anti-fraud architecture will provide opportunities to strengthen this cooperation and set ambitious targets aligned with EU priorities; calls on the Commission to prioritise improving the coordination process, in line with the Court of Auditors' analysis;

_________________

1 b ECA Special Report 26/2025

Or. nl

Amendment 43

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8 a. Recalls that, in accordance with internal EP Rules, the Parliament administration has conducted a risk-based ex-post verification of the 2024 accounts of the former political group Identity & Democracy (ID group), and it found that at least EUR 4 333 635,78 of budget item 400 appropriations were unduly spent by the group over the 2019-2024 term, exposing Parliament to significant financial and reputational risks; notes that EPPO announced that it opened an investigation into the alleged misuse of Union funds by the ID group between 2019 and 2024; recalls that the CONT Committee transmitted an opinion to the Bureau, which decided to wait for the outcome of the EPPO’s investigation before taking any recovery action; considers that the Parliament’s administration may take - parallel to the EPPO’s criminal investigation - administrative measures to protect the Union’s financial interests and Parliament’s reputation; considers it of utmost importance that recovery actions are started as soon as possible, in full compliance with Article 3(3) of the Working Arrangement between the European Parliament and the European Public Prosecutor's Office; recalls that in its opinion to the Bureau, the CONT committee noted that, unless evidence to the contrary is presented, several elements may collectively satisfy the logical basis of the economic-continuity doctrine and therefore justify treating Patriots for Europe as a successor group for the purpose of recovery; invites the EP administration to carefully analyse the 2024 accounts of the PfE group to make sure that the irregularities identified by DG FINS for ID group are not reproduced by the new political group;

Or. en

Amendment 44

Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8 a. Reminds that the operational protection of the Union’s financial interests from fraud, irregularities and other illicit activities is entrusted to national authorities, OLAF and the EPPO; stresses the added value that EU bodies bring to the protection of the financial interests of the Union and the fight against fraud, especially when it comes to cross-border crime, as shown by the operational results of the EPPO and OLAF; welcomes, in this vein, the integration of OLAF and EPPO findings in the 2024 PIF Report; underlines that a deeper analysis of the interaction between the AFA components is needed and encourages to further engage in holistic reporting to provide a clearer, more complete and more concrete picture of the overall state of play of the protection of the Union’s financial interests, encompassing the entirety of anti-fraud action at both national and EU levels; believes that the analysis to be run in the circumstance of the revision of the AFA will offer the opportunity to address the so far not fully satisfactory completeness of the current reporting;

Or. en

Amendment 45

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8 a. Considers that the coexistence of multiple actors within the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, in particular OLAF and the EPPO, requires a structural evaluation based on efficiency, the coherence of the anti-fraud cycle and the optimal use of public resources; calls on the Commission, in the context of the review of the anti-fraud architecture, to assess in a transparent manner whether the current allocation of functions allows for the maximisation of detection, investigation, recovery and deterrence, or whether more far-reaching adaptations of the model are necessary;

Or. en

Amendment 46

Bert-Jan Ruissen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8a. Points out that the European Court of Auditors concludes that the procedures for exchanging reports between the EPPO and OLAF are not sufficiently efficient, and recommends that reports of suspected fraud be registered centrally so that procedures can be carried out efficiently; calls on the Commission to act swiftly on this recommendation;

Or. nl

Amendment 47

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8 a. Highlights that the upcoming revisions of the mandate of key EU entities, such as Europol and EPPO, foreseen in 2026, offers a unique opportunity to consolidate a well-functioning and effective cross-agency operational framework to counter, among others, PIF-related organised criminal organisations;

Or. en

Amendment 48

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8 b. Stresses the need to close persistent information gaps between national authorities, OLAF and the EPPO; calls on the Commission to strengthen operational information-sharing channels and ensure timely, structured and secure exchanges of relevant information throughout the anti-fraud cycle, in order to avoid delays, fragmentation and loss of effectiveness;

Or. en

Amendment 49

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9. Stresses that the fight against fraud requires a comprehensive approach, involving a wide range of actors and interconnected processes that influence each other and cover the four main stages of the anti-fraud cycle, namely prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution, as well as recovery and sanctions;

9. Stresses that the fight against fraud requires a comprehensive approach, involving a wide range of actors and interconnected processes that influence each other and cover the four main stages of the anti-fraud cycle, namely prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution, as well as recovery and sanctions; insists that the effective and timely recovery of funds and the application of appropriate sanctions remain the weakest links in the anti-fraud cycle and that, without substantial progress in these stages, efforts in prevention and detection lose part of their deterrent effect;

Or. en

Amendment 50

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9. Stresses that the fight against fraud requires a comprehensive approach, involving a wide range of actors and interconnected processes that influence each other and cover the four main stages of the anti-fraud cycle, namely prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution, as well as recovery and sanctions;

9. Stresses that the fight against fraud requires a comprehensive and coherent governance approach, involving a wide range of actors and interconnected processes covering all main stages of the anti-fraud cycle, namely prevention, detection, investigation.prosecution, recovery and sanctions; stresses that weaknesses or fragmentation at any stage reduce the effectiveness of the entire system;

Or. en

Amendment 51

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9 a. Considers that a truly comprehensive approach to the fight against fraud requires not only coordination across the different stages of the anti-fraud cycle, but also a common framework of result indicators allowing for a coherent and comparable assessment of the effectiveness of actions undertaken in the areas of prevention, detection, investigation, recovery and sanctioning; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with OLAF, the EPPO and the competent national authorities, to develop and apply harmonised indicators at Union level enabling the assessment of the real budgetary impact of anti-fraud policies and guiding decision-making and the allocation of resources;

Or. en

Amendment 52

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9 a. Underlines that the Rule of Law is a cornerstone of the Union and essential for protecting EU financial interests; stresses that the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism must be applied where breaches directly affect the EU budget; calls on the Commission to ensure consistent and proportionate use of the mechanism, while respecting Member States’ primary responsibility for upholding rule of law principles and ensuring coherence across EU instruments.

Or. en

Amendment 53

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

10. Recalls that the fight against fraud must not be carried out only a posteriori, but must concern all the European institutions as soon as funding schemes, instruments and programmes are drawn up; stresses, therefore, that better involvement of stakeholders in the anti-fraud architecture and of Parliament at the stage of developing the arrangements, instruments and programmes would certainly lead to better protection of the Union’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to take note of this and to better involve all actors upstream;

10. Recalls that the fight against fraud must not be carried out only a posteriori, but must be integrated from the outset into the design of funding schemes, instruments and programmes and fostered by all European institutions; stresses, therefore, that better involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the anti-fraud architecture and of Parliament at the stage of developing the arrangements, instruments and programmes would certainly lead to better protection of the Union’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to better involve all actors upstream and to integrate anti-fraud considerations at an early stage of programme design, including risk-based assessment and clear assignment of responsibilities;

Or. en

Amendment 54

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

10. Recalls that the fight against fraud must not be carried out only a posteriori, but must concern all the European institutions as soon as funding schemes, instruments and programmes are drawn up; stresses, therefore, that better involvement of stakeholders in the anti-fraud architecture and of Parliament at the stage of developing the arrangements, instruments and programmes would certainly lead to better protection of the Union’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to take note of this and to better involve all actors upstream;

10. Recalls that the fight against fraud should be seen as a systematic process which should start from the design of funding schemes, instruments and programmes; stresses, therefore, that better involvement of stakeholders in the anti-fraud architecture and of Parliament at the stage of developing the arrangements, instruments and programmes would certainly lead to better protection of the Union’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to take note of this and to better involve all actors upstream;

Or. en

Amendment 55

Céline Imart, Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

10 a. Stresses that transparency is essential for the protection of the Union’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to publish the list of final beneficiaries of European funding granted to NGOs and related organisations, including their subcontractors and partners, in order to ensure full traceability of funds and to prevent any misuse of public resources;

Or. en

Amendment 56

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

11. Stresses that, in addition to the necessary efforts to limit fraud through the design of public policies, a more determined proactive effort is also needed to detect and combat fraud; highlights that artificial intelligence is one of the tools to be used to optimise this fight;

11. Stresses that, in addition to the necessary efforts to limit fraud through the design of public policies, a more determined proactive effort is also needed to detect and combat fraud; highlights that artificial intelligence and advanced analytics are amongthe tools that should be effectively deployedto optimise fraud detection, in a proportionate manner, subject to appropriate human oversight;

Or. en

Amendment 57

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

11. Stresses that, in addition to the necessary efforts to limit fraud through the design of public policies, a more determined proactive effort is also needed to detect and combat fraud; highlights that artificial intelligence is one of the tools to be used to optimise this fight;

11. Stresses that, in addition to the necessary efforts to limit fraud through the design of public policies, a more determined proactive effort is also needed to detect and combat fraud; highlights that artificial intelligence is one of the tools that could be used to optimise this fight, provided that human oversight is ensured, together with the additional necessary safeguards;

Or. en

Amendment 58

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

11 a. Stresses that the increasing use of digital technologies and artificial intelligence by fraudulent networks poses new and complex risks to the protection of the Union’s financial interests, while also recognising that these technologies offer significant opportunities to modernise and enhance the effectiveness of the anti-fraud architecture if their deployment is accelerated; notes in particular the growing technological gap between increasingly sophisticated fraudulent practices and the slower pace of digital transformation of public authorities; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the EPPO, Europol and OLAF, to assess the need for a specific anti-fraud strategy to address emerging digital threats, including investment in advanced forensic and analytical capacities;

Or. en

Amendment 59

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12. Notes that infringement reports submitted to the EPPO, information on potential investigative interests transmitted to OLAF and the reporting of irregularities, as well as the periodic updates to them submitted to the Commission through the IMS, are the main source of data for assessing detection levels; notes that detection levels vary from one Member State to another and among the sources of information, and maintains that the level of detection in a geographical area or a budgetary or political sector does not necessarily correspond to the actual incidence of fraud or other misconduct in that area or sector; stresses, furthermore, that the results of detection efforts vary considerably across sectors and countries;

12. Notes that infringement reports submitted to the EPPO, information on potential investigative interests transmitted to OLAF and the reporting of irregularities, as well as the periodic updates to them submitted to the Commission through the IMS, are the main source of data for assessing detection levels; notes that detection levels vary from one Member State to another and among the sources of information, and maintains that the level of detection in a geographical area or a budgetary or political sector does not necessarily correspond to the actual incidence of fraud or other misconduct in that area or sector; stresses, furthermore, that the results of detection efforts vary considerably across sectors and countries; calls on the Commission to develop a standardised Risk and Efficiency Benchmark to identify underperforming, high-risk programmes and allow for the reallocation of funds toward initiatives with lower risk and higher added value for Union citizens;

Or. en

Amendment 60

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12. Notes that infringement reports submitted to the EPPO, information on potential investigative interests transmitted to OLAF and the reporting of irregularities, as well as the periodic updates to them submitted to the Commission through the IMS, are the main source of data for assessing detection levels; notes that detection levels vary from one Member State to another and among the sources of information, and maintains that the level of detection in a geographical area or a budgetary or political sector does not necessarily correspond to the actual incidence of fraud or other misconduct in that area or sector; stresses, furthermore, that the results of detection efforts vary considerably across sectors and countries;

12. Notes that infringement reports submitted to the EPPO, information on potential investigative interests transmitted to OLAF and the reporting of irregularities, as well as the periodic updates to them submitted to the Commission through the IMS, are the main source of data for assessing detection levels; notes that detection levels vary from one Member State to another and among the sources of information, and maintains that the level of detection in a geographical area or a budgetary or political sector does not necessarily correspond to the actual incidence of fraud or other misconduct in that area or sector; stresses, furthermore, that the results of detection efforts vary considerably across sectors and countries; emphasises the need for improved harmonisation of definitions and reporting standards to enable meaningful comparison of detection levels across Member States and sectors;

Or. en

Amendment 61

Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12. Notes that infringement reports submitted to the EPPO, information on potential investigative interests transmitted to OLAF and the reporting of irregularities, as well as the periodic updates to them submitted to the Commission through the IMS, are the main source of data for assessing detection levels; notes that detection levels vary from one Member State to another and among the sources of information, and maintains that the level of detection in a geographical area or a budgetary or political sector does not necessarily correspond to the actual incidence of fraud or other misconduct in that area or sector; stresses, furthermore, that the results of detection efforts vary considerably across sectors and countries;

12. Notes that infringement reports submitted to the EPPO, information on potential investigative interests transmitted to OLAF and the reporting of irregularities, as well as the periodic updates to them submitted to the Commission through the IMS, are the main source of data for assessing detection levels; notes that detection levels vary from one Member State to another and among the sources of information, and maintains that the level of detection in a geographical area or a budgetary or policy sector does not necessarily correspond to the actual incidence of fraud or other misconduct in that area or sector; stresses, furthermore, that the results of detection efforts vary considerably across sectors and countries;

Or. en

Amendment 62

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12 a. Reiterates the view that the IMS should have greater interoperability with other key tools used by the Commission to protect the EU financial interests, such as ARACHNE and EDES, and with digital tools in the Member States; understands that interoperability with IMS will be part of the broader assessment of the interoperability amongst different Commission databases with ARACHNE+ in view of the post-2027 MFF, and that the Commission is currently running a survey across Member States on the interface IMS-EDES, in the framework of the extension of EDES to shared management; asks the Commission to promptly inform Parliament about the progresses of the specific EDES-IMS-ARACHNE interface;

Or. en

Amendment 63

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12 b. Observes that the 2024 recast of the Financial Regulation introduced a legal basis for a modernised data-mining and risk-scoring tool, named “ARACHNE+”, to be available for the post-2027 MFF and to be used for all management modes with mandatory feeding of relevant data categories by European institutions and bodies, Member States, and other entities implementing the Union budget; points out that, currently, the use of ARACHNE+ by the Member States is voluntary and that Commission, Council and Parliament committed, in the Joint Declaration of 7 December 2023, to examine and re-discuss the mandatory use of the corporate tool by Member States for the post-2027 MFF based on an assessment of the tool’s readiness by the end of 2027; stresses that, irrespective of the national digital systems in use by the Member States, ARACHNE has a peculiar orientation towards cross-border fraud detection and a unique effectiveness in evaluating the risk of fraud, conflicts of interest, and irregularities affecting transnational operations and cooperation; believes that, to effectively improve prevention and detection through its profiling and pattern recognition, ARACHNE has to meet the specific needs and challenges within each national framework, and that the Commission is expected to provide robust support mechanisms and to allow for the adaptations needed to maximise ARACHNE’s positive effects; points out that Member States have highlighted the need for comprehensive training and support in order to maximise the tool’s effectiveness;

Or. en

Amendment 64

Bert-Jan Ruissen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13. Notes that, in the common agricultural policy (CAP), cohesion policy and fisheries sectors, during the period 2020-2024, risk analysis still only marginally contributed to the detection of fraud, with no improvement compared to the previous period (2015-2019); notes that the detection of fraud based on alerts by whistleblowers remains low, as fraud has only been detected once as a result of information published in the media in the context of direct payments, while in the cohesion and fisheries sectors the role of information from civil society has increased, with around 18 % of irregularities detected on this basis; stresses that for irregularities affecting the CAP, the analysis of the detection concentration presented in the 2024 PIF Report shows a higher concentration for fraudulent irregularities than for non-fraudulent irregularities, suggesting that differentiated approaches to investigations and criminal prosecutions may have been a determining factor in these detection levels; notes, furthermore, that for the detection of non-fraudulent irregularities, neither risk analysis nor civil society information play a significant role and recalls that in 2023, a significant level of error persisted under the heading ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, reaching 9.3 %; reiterates its concerns about the excessive length of procedures needed to finalise cases where irregularities are detected, noting that in the period 2020-2024, it took on average more than four years in the CAP sector between the start of the irregularity and the suspicion of a fraudulent irregularity, and then about three more years to close the case after informing the Commission, while in the cohesion sector almost two years were needed to detect a suspicion of fraud and almost two and a half more years to finalise the case; understands that in both sectors the average duration is shorter for non-fraudulent irregularities, possibly due to higher obstacles to verification in cases of fraud and the need to mobilise specialised resources that are generally limited; stresses that the length of these procedures hampers the adoption of effective recovery or mitigation measures and deprives the actions taken of their deterrent effect; considers, lastly, that the modalities and timing of the initial handling of cases have a decisive influence on the subsequent conduct of proceedings and calls on the Commission to consider adopting appropriate measures to speed up these processes, in particular by intensifying its dialogue with the authorities of the Member States, which is in the interest of protecting the financial interests of the Union;

13. Regrets that, in the common agricultural policy (CAP), cohesion policy and fisheries sectors, during the period 2020-2024, risk analysis still only marginally contributed to the detection of fraud, with no improvement compared to the previous period (2015-2019); calls on the European Commission to analyse the reasons for this and to draw up an action plan to improve the quality of risk analyses in cooperation with the responsible authorities in the Member States; notes that the detection of fraud based on alerts by whistleblowers remains low, as fraud has only been detected once as a result of information published in the media in the context of direct payments, while in the cohesion and fisheries sectors the role of information from civil society has increased, with around 18 % of irregularities detected on this basis; stresses that for irregularities affecting the CAP, the analysis of the detection concentration presented in the 2024 PIF Report shows a higher concentration for fraudulent irregularities than for non-fraudulent irregularities, suggesting that differentiated approaches to investigations and criminal prosecutions may have been a determining factor in these detection levels; notes, furthermore, that for the detection of non-fraudulent irregularities, neither risk analysis nor civil society information play a significant role and recalls that in 2023, a significant level of error persisted under the heading ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, reaching 9.3 %; reiterates its concerns about the excessive length of procedures needed to finalise cases where irregularities are detected, noting that in the period 2020-2024, it took on average more than four years in the CAP sector between the start of the irregularity and the suspicion of a fraudulent irregularity, and then about three more years to close the case after informing the Commission, while in the cohesion sector almost two years were needed to detect a suspicion of fraud and almost two and a half more years to finalise the case; understands that in both sectors the average duration is shorter for non-fraudulent irregularities, possibly due to higher obstacles to verification in cases of fraud and the need to mobilise specialised resources that are generally limited; stresses that the length of these procedures hampers the adoption of effective recovery or mitigation measures and deprives the actions taken of their deterrent effect; considers, lastly, that the modalities and timing of the initial handling of cases have a decisive influence on the subsequent conduct of proceedings and calls on the Commission to consider adopting appropriate measures to speed up these processes, in particular by intensifying its dialogue with the authorities of the Member States, which is in the interest of protecting the financial interests of the Union;

Or. nl

Amendment 65

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13. Notes that, in the common agricultural policy (CAP), cohesion policy and fisheries sectors, during the period 2020-2024, risk analysis still only marginally contributed to the detection of fraud, with no improvement compared to the previous period (2015-2019); notes that the detection of fraud based on alerts by whistleblowers remains low, as fraud has only been detected once as a result of information published in the media in the context of direct payments, while in the cohesion and fisheries sectors the role of information from civil society has increased, with around 18 % of irregularities detected on this basis; stresses that for irregularities affecting the CAP, the analysis of the detection concentration presented in the 2024 PIF Report shows a higher concentration for fraudulent irregularities than for non-fraudulent irregularities, suggesting that differentiated approaches to investigations and criminal prosecutions may have been a determining factor in these detection levels; notes, furthermore, that for the detection of non-fraudulent irregularities, neither risk analysis nor civil society information play a significant role and recalls that in 2023, a significant level of error persisted under the heading ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, reaching 9.3 %; reiterates its concerns about the excessive length of procedures needed to finalise cases where irregularities are detected, noting that in the period 2020-2024, it took on average more than four years in the CAP sector between the start of the irregularity and the suspicion of a fraudulent irregularity, and then about three more years to close the case after informing the Commission, while in the cohesion sector almost two years were needed to detect a suspicion of fraud and almost two and a half more years to finalise the case; understands that in both sectors the average duration is shorter for non-fraudulent irregularities, possibly due to higher obstacles to verification in cases of fraud and the need to mobilise specialised resources that are generally limited; stresses that the length of these procedures hampers the adoption of effective recovery or mitigation measures and deprives the actions taken of their deterrent effect; considers, lastly, that the modalities and timing of the initial handling of cases have a decisive influence on the subsequent conduct of proceedings and calls on the Commission to consider adopting appropriate measures to speed up these processes, in particular by intensifying its dialogue with the authorities of the Member States, which is in the interest of protecting the financial interests of the Union;

13. Notes that, in the common agricultural policy (CAP), cohesion policy and fisheries sectors, during the period 2020-2024, risk analysis still only marginally contributed to the detection of fraud, with no improvement compared to the previous period (2015-2019); notes that the detection of fraud based on alerts by whistleblowers remains low, as fraud has only been detected once as a result of information published in the media in the context of direct payments, while in the cohesion and fisheries sectors the role of information from civil society has increased, with around 18 % of irregularities detected on this basis; stresses that for irregularities affecting the CAP, the analysis of the detection concentration presented in the 2024 PIF Report shows a higher concentration for fraudulent irregularities than for non-fraudulent irregularities, suggesting that differentiated approaches to investigations and criminal prosecutions may have been a determining factor in these detection levels; notes, furthermore, that for the detection of non-fraudulent irregularities, risk analysis and external alerts played a limited role ; stresses the need to reinforce risk analysis methodologies, improve data mining tools and strengthen their systematic use, as well as to further promote secure and effective reporting channels for whistleblowers; recalls that in 2023, a significant level of error persisted under the heading ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, reaching 9.3 %; reiterates its concerns about the excessive length of procedures needed to finalise cases where irregularities are detected, noting that in the period 2020-2024, it took on average more than four years in the CAP sector between the start of the irregularity and the suspicion of a fraudulent irregularity, and then about three more years to close the case after informing the Commission, while in the cohesion sector almost two years were needed to detect a suspicion of fraud and almost two and a half more years to finalise the case; understands that in both sectors the average duration is shorter for non-fraudulent irregularities, possibly due to higher obstacles to verification in cases of fraud and the need to mobilise specialised resources that are generally limited; stresses that the length of these procedures hampers the adoption of effective recovery or mitigation measures and deprives the actions taken of their deterrent effect; considers, lastly, that the modalities and timing of the initial handling of cases have a decisive influence on the subsequent conduct of proceedings and calls on the Commission to consider adopting appropriate measures to speed up these processes, in particular by intensifying its dialogue with the authorities of the Member States, which is in the interest of protecting the financial interests of the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 66

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13. Notes that, in the common agricultural policy (CAP), cohesion policy and fisheries sectors, during the period 2020-2024, risk analysis still only marginally contributed to the detection of fraud, with no improvement compared to the previous period (2015-2019); notes that the detection of fraud based on alerts by whistleblowers remains low, as fraud has only been detected once as a result of information published in the media in the context of direct payments, while in the cohesion and fisheries sectors the role of information from civil society has increased, with around 18 % of irregularities detected on this basis; stresses that for irregularities affecting the CAP, the analysis of the detection concentration presented in the 2024 PIF Report shows a higher concentration for fraudulent irregularities than for non-fraudulent irregularities, suggesting that differentiated approaches to investigations and criminal prosecutions may have been a determining factor in these detection levels; notes, furthermore, that for the detection of non-fraudulent irregularities, neither risk analysis nor civil society information play a significant role and recalls that in 2023, a significant level of error persisted under the heading ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, reaching 9.3 %; reiterates its concerns about the excessive length of procedures needed to finalise cases where irregularities are detected, noting that in the period 2020-2024, it took on average more than four years in the CAP sector between the start of the irregularity and the suspicion of a fraudulent irregularity, and then about three more years to close the case after informing the Commission, while in the cohesion sector almost two years were needed to detect a suspicion of fraud and almost two and a half more years to finalise the case; understands that in both sectors the average duration is shorter for non-fraudulent irregularities, possibly due to higher obstacles to verification in cases of fraud and the need to mobilise specialised resources that are generally limited; stresses that the length of these procedures hampers the adoption of effective recovery or mitigation measures and deprives the actions taken of their deterrent effect; considers, lastly, that the modalities and timing of the initial handling of cases have a decisive influence on the subsequent conduct of proceedings and calls on the Commission to consider adopting appropriate measures to speed up these processes, in particular by intensifying its dialogue with the authorities of the Member States, which is in the interest of protecting the financial interests of the Union;

13. Notes that, in the common agricultural policy (CAP), cohesion policy and fisheries sectors, during the period 2020-2024, risk analysis still only marginally contributed to the detection of fraud, with no improvement compared to the previous period (2015-2019); notes that the detection of fraud based on alerts by whistleblowers remains low, as fraud has only been detected once as a result of information published in the media in the context of direct payments, while in the cohesion and fisheries sectors the role of information from civil society has increased, with around 18 % of irregularities detected on this basis; stresses that for irregularities affecting the CAP, the analysis of the detection concentration presented in the 2024 PIF Report shows a higher concentration for fraudulent irregularities than for non-fraudulent irregularities, suggesting that differentiated approaches to investigations and criminal prosecutions may have been a determining factor in these detection levels; notes, furthermore, that in 2023, a significant level of error persisted under the heading ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, reaching 9.3 %; reiterates its concerns about the excessive length of procedures needed to finalise cases where irregularities are detected, noting that in the period 2020-2024, it took on average more than four years in the CAP sector between the start of the irregularity and the suspicion of a fraudulent irregularity, and then about three more years to close the case after informing the Commission, while in the cohesion sector almost two years were needed to detect a suspicion of fraud and almost two and a half more years to finalise the case; understands that in both sectors the average duration is shorter for non-fraudulent irregularities, possibly due to higher obstacles to verification in cases of fraud and the need to mobilise specialised resources that are generally limited; stresses that the length of these procedures hampers the adoption of effective recovery or mitigation measures and deprives the actions taken of their deterrent effect; considers, lastly, that the modalities and timing of the initial handling of cases have a decisive influence on the subsequent conduct of proceedings and calls on the Commission to consider adopting appropriate measures to speed up these processes, in particular by intensifying its dialogue with the authorities of the Member States, which is in the interest of protecting the financial interests of the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 67

Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

14. Notes that, in the area of direct management, during the period 2020-2024, OLAF was presumably the main source of detection of recovery elements related to fraudulent irregularities, accounting for 89.8 % of cases and 96.9 % of the total amounts recovered, while the Commission’s expost controls detected an additional 6.0 % of these elements, corresponding to 1.9 % of the amounts recovered; notes furthermore that around 95.7 % of the recovery items classified as non-fraudulent irregularities were detected through Commission controls, both ex ante and ex post; notes, in this regard, the analysis of the 2024 PIF Report on the relationship between the source of detection and the amounts to be recovered, which shows that the Commission’s expost controls and OLAF investigations led to the highest amounts recovered for non-fraudulent and fraudulent irregularities, respectively;

14. Notes that, according to the PIF Report 2024, in the area of direct management, during the period 2020-2024, OLAF was the main source of detection of recovery elements related to fraudulent irregularities, accounting for 89.8 % of cases and 96.9 % of the total amounts recovered, while the Commission’s ex post controls detected an additional 6.0 % of this type of recovery item, accounting for 1.9 % of the amounts recovered; notes furthermore that around 95.7 % of the recovery items classified as non-fraudulent irregularities were detected through Commission controls, both ex ante and ex post; notes, in this regard, the analysis of the 2024 PIF Report on the relationship between the source of detection and the amounts to be recovered, which shows that the Commission’s ex post controls and OLAF investigations led to the highest amounts recovered for non-fraudulent and fraudulent irregularities, respectively;

Or. en

Amendment 68

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

15. Notes that in recent years, the increase in detection by Union bodies has been proportionately lower than that by private whistleblowers or national authorities (in 2024, reports of offences to the EPPO by private whistleblowers increased by 85 %, those by national authorities by 13 % and those by the EU’s institutions, bodies, office and agencies by 5 %, and in 2023, reports of offences from private whistleblowers, national authorities and IBOA increased by 30 %, 24 % and 5 % respectively compared to 2022); reiterates its call on the Commission and other EU authorities to promote detection by facilitating reporting processes and strengthening staff and management awareness initiatives and internal communication;

15. Notes that in recent years, the increase in detection by Union bodies has been proportionately lower than that by private whistleblowers or national authorities (in 2024, reports of offences to the EPPO by private whistleblowers increased by 85 %, those by national authorities by 13 % and those by the EU’s institutions, bodies, office and agencies by 5 %, and in 2023, reports of offences from private whistleblowers, national authorities and IBOA increased by 30 %, 24 % and 5 % respectively compared to 2022); reiterates its call on the Commission and other EU authorities to promote detection by facilitating reporting processes and strengthening staff and management awareness initiatives and internal communication; is concerned that this low level of detection may raise concerns about the Commission’s ability to oversee EU funds;

Or. en

Amendment 69

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

15 a. Maintains that whistleblowers play a key role in boosting fraud detection; observes with concern the remarks presented in the 2024 Commission report on the implementation and application of the Whistleblowers Directive 1a on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, indicating that the transposition process appears to be still far from completion; regrets that, in March 2025, the CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union) fined five Member States 2a with financial penalties for failing to properly transpose the directive; welcomed, on 25 August 2025, the launch by the Commission of a public consultation on its forthcoming Action Plan on Whistleblower Protection, which is part of the Commission’s broader directive evaluation; calls on the Commission to take into the utmost consideration the feedback from relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, trade unions, research institutions and their staff, and individual whistleblowers on the implementation of the Directive, and to introduce measures to fill the identified gaps; points out that also Parliament is expected to adapt its internal rules in line with the Directive to safeguard its own whistleblowers, as stemming from the Judgment of the General Court in Case T-793/22 of 11 September 2024 according to which the current framework fails to provide balanced and effective protection against retaliation;

_________________

1a Commission report of 3 July 2024 on the implementation and application of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (COM(2024)0269).

2a Germany, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Hungary

Or. en

Amendment 70

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

15 b. Emphasises that public authorities have a crucial role in fostering a zero-tolerance culture against fraud, and stresses, in particular, the importance of fraud prevention to ensure that fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, and other misuse of funds do not occur in the first place;

Or. en

Amendment 71

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

15 c. Highlights that independent media and investigative journalism play an important role in the fight against fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, and other forms of misuse of public funds; encourages the Commission to provide support in the form of training programmes, funding, and any other measures in line with EU fundamental rights and the rule of law, including awareness campaigns on how fraud cases, unaddressed conflicts of interests, and corruption can affect the well-being of EU citizens;

Or. en

Amendment 72

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

16. Reminds the Commission that for fraud to be detected, checks are needed and that although this may cost money, it also makes it possible to bring in – sometimes significant – additional revenue and/or to avoid irregular expenditure; notes therefore that it is essential to provide resources to those involved in the anti-fraud architecture to enable them to carry out more frequent checks;

16. Reminds the Commission that for fraud to be detected, checks are needed and that although this may cost money, it also makes it possible to bring in – sometimes significant – additional revenue and/or to avoid irregular expenditure; notes therefore that it is essential to provide resources to those involved in the anti-fraud architecture to enable them to carry out more frequent checks; calls for a strategic and targeted allocation of resources to high-risk sectors and cross-border investigations, combined with enhanced training and capacity-building for national authorities, in order to ensure a results-driven approach, strengthen budgetary accountability, and safeguard every euro of the EU budget.

Or. en

Amendment 73

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

16. Reminds the Commission that for fraud to be detected, checks are needed and that although this may cost money, it also makes it possible to bring in – sometimes significant – additional revenue and/or to avoid irregular expenditure; notes therefore that it is essential to provide resources to those involved in the anti-fraud architecture to enable them to carry out more frequent checks;

16. Reminds the Commission that for fraud to be detected, checks are needed, and that, although this may cost money, it also makes it possible to bring in sometimes significant additional revenue and/or to avoid irregular expenditure, which helps preventing the misuse of taxpayers’ contributions; notes, therefore, that it is essential to provide the necessary resources to all the organisations involved in the anti-fraud architecture to enable them to operate effectively and to carry out more frequent checks;

Or. en

Amendment 74

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

16 a. Underlines the importance of protecting the Union’s financial interests through the set up and enforcement of clear rules about taxation and transparency for businesses, particularly those operating on a transnational level, especially in the context of EU-backed investments.

Or. en

Amendment 75

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17. Considers that the excessive length of investigations and administrative procedures undermines the effectiveness of the protection of the Union’s financial interests, in particular as regards monitoring, recovery and prosecution;

17. Considers that the excessive length of investigations, often caused by limited financing and understaffing, undermines the effectiveness of the protection of the Union’s financial interests, in particular with regard to monitoring, recovery, and prosecution;

Or. en

Amendment 76

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17 a. Stresses the need for proportionate responses to detected irregularities; calls for the introduction of clear proportionality safeguards to ensure that investigations into localised or minor fraud do not result in disproportionate, broad funding suspensions that unfairly penalise entire regions or major projects; underlines that the proportionality principle must be consistently applied when considering the suspension of payments, taking into account the severity and systemic nature of any failures identified;

Or. en

Amendment 77

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18 a. Recalls that Member States manage the largest share of Union expenditure and are therefore the first line of defence for the protection of the Union’s financial interests; notes that, in 2024, all 27 Member States reported having some form of strategy in place to protect the Union’s financial interests; observes, however, that approaches differ significantly, with only 10 Member States having a dedicated national anti-fraud strategy (NAFS), while 17 do not, including 7 currently in the process of adopting one; regrets that the adoption of comprehensive national anti-fraud strategies remains uneven across Member States and stresses that such strategies are essential to ensure effective coordination, risk analysis and follow-up of fraud cases at national and Union level; calls on Member States to adopt and regularly update their NAFS in order to better identify and address emerging fraud risks, with the support of the Commission; regrets furthermore that information collected in 2024 shows limited progress in strengthening national anti-fraud governance compared to previous years, despite the Commission's recommendations to establish or improve dedicated national anti-fraud networks; welcomes that, following repeated calls by the European Parliament, the Commission has included national anti-fraud strategies among the key requirements for national management and control systems in its proposal for the 2028–2034 programming period; reiterates that Member States would benefit from regular evaluations or peer reviews of their anti-fraud frameworks, in order to improve consistency and ensure high standards across the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 78

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18 b. Notes that while all Member States report having some form of national anti-fraud strategy, only a limited number have fully developed and comprehensive strategies in place; calls on the Commission to assess the quality, scope and effective implementation of national anti-fraud strategies and to provide guidance and support to ensure that such strategies are coherent, comprehensive and results-oriented;

Or. en

Amendment 79

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18 a. Considers that persistent disparities among Member States in terms of administrative capacities, human resources and analytical tools weaken the protection of the Union’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of defining common minimum anti-fraud capacity standards for the competent national authorities, in particular AFCOS services, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity;

Or. en

Amendment 80

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Stresses that information on the EPPO’s ongoing investigations should be forwarded to the Commission where the conditions laid down in Article 103 of the EPPO Regulation23 so permit; notes, however, that according to the 2024 PIF Report, from the start of the implementation of the RRF until 27 May 2025, the Commission received only 75 notifications from the EPPO, of which 64 concerned ongoing cases, while 279 investigations related to the RRF existed at the end of 2024, with an estimated total financial damage of EUR 2.7 billion; observes that this prevents a full understanding of the state of play of the implementation of the RRF;

19. Stresses that information on the EPPO’s ongoing investigations should be forwarded to the Commission where the conditions laid down in Article 103 of the EPPO Regulation23 so permit; notes, however, that according to the 2024 PIF Report, from the start of the implementation of the RRF until 27 May 2025, the Commission received only 75 notifications from the EPPO, of which 64 concerned ongoing cases, while 279 investigations related to the RRF existed at the end of 2024, with an estimated total financial damage of EUR 2.7 billion; observes that this prevents a full understanding of the state of play of the implementation of the RRF; calls for improved, timely and structured information-sharing, fully respecting the EPPO’s independence, in particular for high-risk programmes such as the RRF;

_________________

_________________

23 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).

23 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).

Or. en

Amendment 81

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Stresses that information on the EPPO’s ongoing investigations should be forwarded to the Commission where the conditions laid down in Article 103 of the EPPO Regulation23 so permit; notes, however, that according to the 2024 PIF Report, from the start of the implementation of the RRF until 27 May 2025, the Commission received only 75 notifications from the EPPO, of which 64 concerned ongoing cases, while 279 investigations related to the RRF existed at the end of 2024, with an estimated total financial damage of EUR 2.7 billion; observes that this prevents a full understanding of the state of play of the implementation of the RRF;

19. Stresses that information on the EPPO’s ongoing investigations should be forwarded to the Commission where the conditions laid down in Article 103 of the EPPO Regulation23 so permit; notes that the number of Article 103 notifications received by the Commission does not automatically correspond to the total number of EPPO investigations, since notifications require a case-by-case assessment of confidentiality and of whether Commission measures are possible and relevant; nevertheless calls on the Commission and the EPPO to improve, within legal limits, structured information flows enabling timely precautionary and recovery measures; observes that this prevents a full understanding of the state of play of the implementation of the RRF;

_________________

_________________

23 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).

23 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).

Or. en

Amendment 82

Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19 a. Acknowledges that the EPPO investigations can be launched only if information has reached the prosecutors and expects Member States to comply with legal obligations and to report all relevant cases to the EPPO; notes with concern that some Member States have been declaring criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union as national cases instead of acknowledging the Competence of the EPPO; expresses its concerns that these conflicts of competence can have a possible negative impact on investigations including the loss of evidence or for the belated collection of evidences; observes that in spite of the EPPO’s competence being clearly outlined in Article 22(1) and (2), and in Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, questions of competence between the national authorities and the EDPs come up frequently including several in 2024; underlines that these cases should be handled in compliance with the EPPO Regulation, which refers them to the national judicial authority competent for deciding cases of conflict of competences between national prosecutors, under the condition that its decision can be subject to a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice as foreseen by Article 25(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 echoing Article 267 TFEU, which provides that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provision on conflicts of competence between the EPPO and national authorities; reiterates that since the current situation lacks legal clarity since in many Member States the national authority’s decision on the conflict of competence cannot be the subject of a preliminary ruling in front to the Court of Justice; encourages Member States in doubt about the competence of EPPO to submit a preliminary question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU and Article 42(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939; calls on the Commission to collect and assess the information regarding cases of conflicts of competence, with a view to have relevant data and to address the matter at the revision of the EPP Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 83

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20. Acknowledges that recovery is a complex process that requires cooperation within the Commission and with other actors and national authorities; reiterates its calls on the Commission to ensure effective follow-up of OLAF recommendations and of EPPO proceedings in order to reliably measure the actual impact of their actions and to provide further evidence in support of results-oriented policymaking;

20. Acknowledges that recovery is a complex process that requires cooperation within the Commission and with other actors and national authorities; notes that the main obstacles to recovery stem from lengthy administrative and judicial proceedings, restrictive conditions for recovering funds under certain measures, and strict limitation periods in sectoral legislation; reiterates its calls on the Commission to ensure effective follow-up of OLAF recommendations and of EPPO proceedings in order to reliably measure the actual impact of their actions and to provide further evidence in support of results-oriented policymaking; calls on the Commission to develop a benchmarking system to measure recovery effectiveness, including indicators such as the ratio between amounts recommended for recovery and those established for recovery, the delay between the end of investigation and recovery decision, and the length of recovery procedures linked to results;

Or. en

Amendment 84

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20. Acknowledges that recovery is a complex process that requires cooperation within the Commission and with other actors and national authorities; reiterates its calls on the Commission to ensure effective follow-up of OLAF recommendations and of EPPO proceedings in order to reliably measure the actual impact of their actions and to provide further evidence in support of results-oriented policymaking;

20. Acknowledges that recovery is a complex process that requires cooperation within the Commission and with other actors and national authorities; reiterates its calls on the Commission to ensure effective follow-up of OLAF recommendations and of EPPO proceedings in order to reliably measure the actual impact of their actions and to provide further evidence in support of results-oriented policymaking; calls on the Commission to establish a structured feedback loop on recoveries and precautionary measures following EPPO cases, so that outcomes can be tracked and analysed without diverting EPPO resources from prosecution; notes that the EPPO currently receives only informal updates on recovery outcomes;

Or. en

Amendment 85

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20. Acknowledges that recovery is a complex process that requires cooperation within the Commission and with other actors and national authorities; reiterates its calls on the Commission to ensure effective follow-up of OLAF recommendations and of EPPO proceedings in order to reliably measure the actual impact of their actions and to provide further evidence in support of results-oriented policymaking;

20. Acknowledges that recovery is a powerful deterrent and an effective tool to tackle serious and organised crime as well as complex process that requires cooperation within the Commission and with other actors and national authorities, as well; reiterates its calls on the Commission to ensure effective follow-up of OLAF recommendations and of EPPO proceedings in order to reliably measure the actual impact of their actions and to provide further evidence in support of results-oriented policymaking, calls on the Commission to propose the creation of an EU asset recovery office at Europol, in the framework of the upcoming revision of Europol mandate, foreseen in 2026;

Or. en

Amendment 86

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20 a. Recalls that the protection of the Union’s financial interests applies equally to all beneficiaries of Union funds, including political groups operating within the European Parliament; notes that recent investigations and recovery actions concerning the suspected misuse of Union funds by the former Identity and Democracy Group highlight the importance of robust internal controls, effective ex post verification and swift recovery mechanisms; stresses that the credibility of the Union’s anti-fraud policy requires the consistent application of transparency, accountability and recovery rules without any double standards, irrespective of political affiliation or institutional position;

Or. en

Amendment 87

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. Expresses its disagreement with the Commission’s reply to its resolution of 6 May 2025, in which it stated that the information on recovery would be accurate and available; stresses that detailed data on effective recoveries following OLAF’s financial recommendations are published neither in the OLAF Annual Report nor in any other Commission official report; regrets that only aggregated data is made available; highlights the persistence of the significant gap between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered from the economic operators; reiterates its call on the Commission to provide data with an adequate level of granularity on recovery and to assess and publish the reasons explaining any such gap;

21. Expresses its disagreement with the Commission’s reply to its resolution of 6 May 2025, in which it stated that the information on recovery would be accurate and available; stresses that detailed data on effective recoveries following OLAF’s financial recommendations are published neither in the OLAF Annual Report nor in any other Commission official report; regrets that only aggregated data is made available; notes that, following repeated calls by the European Parliament, the PIF Report 2024 includes figures on recoveries following OLAF recommendations for the period 2022-2024, indicating recovered amounts of EUR 4.5 billion ; notes, however, that this figure largely reflects the outcome of a single major case (C-213/19), accounting for more than EUR 2.7 billion, which limits its value as a benchmark for assessing the overall impact of OLAF’s activities on the Union budget; points out that other Commission data indicate that, over the period 2015-2024, OLAF issued 982 financial recommendations on expenditure, amounting to EUR 3.3 billion; stresses that effective recovery rates remain limited and vary significantly depending on the budget implementation mode, with approximately 38 % under shared management, 14 % under indirect management and 7 % under direct management, resulting in total effective recoveries of EUR 974 million over the same period; expresses concern about the persistence of the significant gap between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered from the economic operators; reiterates its call on the Commission to provide data with an adequate level of granularity on recovery and to assess and publish the reasons explaining any such gap;

Or. en

Amendment 88

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. Expresses its disagreement with the Commission’s reply to its resolution of 6 May 2025, in which it stated that the information on recovery would be accurate and available; stresses that detailed data on effective recoveries following OLAF’s financial recommendations are published neither in the OLAF Annual Report nor in any other Commission official report; regrets that only aggregated data is made available; highlights the persistence of the significant gap between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered from the economic operators; reiterates its call on the Commission to provide data with an adequate level of granularity on recovery and to assess and publish the reasons explaining any such gap;

21. Expresses its disagreement with the Commission’s reply to its resolution of 6 May 2025, in which it stated that the information on recovery would be accurate and available; stresses that detailed data on effective recoveries following OLAF’s financial recommendations are published neither in the OLAF Annual Report nor in any other Commission official report; regrets that only aggregated data is made available; highlights the persistence of the significant gap between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered from the economic operators; reiterates its call on the Commission to provide data with an adequate level of granularity on recovery and to assess and publish the reasons explaining any such gap; calls on the Commission to publish, annually and in a comparable format, data on the full recovery chain for OLAF financial recommendations, recommended and or recovered, including average timelines and reasons for gaps, so that the Parliament can assess real impact and deterrence;

Or. en

Amendment 89

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. Expresses its disagreement with the Commission’s reply to its resolution of 6 May 2025, in which it stated that the information on recovery would be accurate and available; stresses that detailed data on effective recoveries following OLAF’s financial recommendations are published neither in the OLAF Annual Report nor in any other Commission official report; regrets that only aggregated data is made available; highlights the persistence of the significant gap between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered from the economic operators; reiterates its call on the Commission to provide data with an adequate level of granularity on recovery and to assess and publish the reasons explaining any such gap;

21. Expresses its disagreement with the Commission’s reply to its resolution of 6 May 2025, in which it stated that the information on recovery would be accurate and available; stresses that detailed data on effective recoveries following OLAF’s financial recommendations are published neither in the OLAF Annual Report nor in any other Commission official report; regrets that only aggregated data is made available; highlights the persistence of the significant gap between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered from the economic operators; reiterates its call on the Commission to provide data with an adequate level of granularity on recovery and to assess and publish the reasons explaining any such gap; calls on the Commission to publish an annual breakdown of the legal and administrative bottlenecks preventing recovery, with a comparative analysis of recovery rates across Member States; followed up with recommendations on best practice;

Or. en

Amendment 90

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. Expresses its disagreement with the Commission’s reply to its resolution of 6 May 2025, in which it stated that the information on recovery would be accurate and available; stresses that detailed data on effective recoveries following OLAF’s financial recommendations are published neither in the OLAF Annual Report nor in any other Commission official report; regrets that only aggregated data is made available; highlights the persistence of the significant gap between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered from the economic operators; reiterates its call on the Commission to provide data with an adequate level of granularity on recovery and to assess and publish the reasons explaining any such gap;

21. Expresses its disagreement with the Commission’s reply to its resolution of 6 May 2025, in which it stated that the information on recovery is accurate and available; stresses that detailed data on effective recoveries following OLAF’s financial recommendations are not published neither in the OLAF Annual Report nor in any other Commission official report; regrets that only aggregated data is made available; highlights the persistence of the significant gap between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered from the economic operators; reiterates its call on the Commission to provide data with an adequate level of granularity on recovery and to assess and publish the reasons explaining any such gap;

Or. en

Amendment 91

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21 a. Reiterates its call on the Commission to ensure proper follow up of OLAF recommendations and EPPO prosecutions, in order to assess in a reliable manner the impact of their actions on the protection of the Union’s budget; welcomes the establishment in 2024 of the OLAF Monitoring Site, which allows for centralised and real time communication within the Commission and its executive agencies, and contributes to more accurate financial and administrative monitoring of the follow-up of OLAF cases;

Or. en

Amendment 92

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21 a. Calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic analysis of the causes underlying the gap between amounts recommended for recovery, amounts established as recoverable and amounts effectively recovered, including factors such as the length of procedures, limitation periods, the insolvency of economic operators or the lack of judicial follow-up, and to use that analysis to improve procedures and prioritise actions with the greatest budgetary impact;

Or. en

Amendment 93

Bert-Jan Ruissen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21a. Draws attention to the findings of the European Court of Auditors on financial corrections in cohesion policy1 a; regrets that it took more than 10 years for the Commission to adopt its first financial correction decision for the 2014-2020 period in September 2025 and that several proposed corrections were reduced or even withdrawn entirely without proper justification.

_________________

1 a ECA Special Report 22/2025

Or. nl

Amendment 94

Bert-Jan Ruissen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21b. Calls on the Commission to remedy the shortcomings identified by the European Court of Auditors in the application of the financial corrections instrument; points out the need to clarify the legal framework for financial corrections and to work with a clearly defined timeframe for procedures in future, in order to avoid unnecessary delays.

Or. nl

Amendment 95

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21 b. Recalls the recent adoption of Directive (EU) 2024/1260 on asset recovery and confiscation, which requires Member States to ensure that the rights of victims of crime are taken into account when assets are frozen or confiscated; considers that the transposition of this Directive into national procedural law could provide an important tool to ensure the restitution of assets to the EU budget; highlights that the upcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation will offer an opportunity to clarify and better align existing provisions such as Article 4, which currently limits EPPO's competence until a case is finally disposed of, and Article 38, which leaves the disposal of confiscated assets to national law; stresses the need to clarify how to protect the EU’s financial interests once assets are confiscated, and to take into account the differences between national rules on the execution of judicial decisions, including whether European Delegated Prosecutors should be granted appropriate powers at this stage;

Or. en

Amendment 96

Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21 a. Welcomes the availability expressed by Eurojust, in the context of the yearly inter-institutional exchange of views in November 2025, to play a bigger role in the recovery process, with specific reference to the contribution that Eurojust contact points could have in the identification and assessment of relevant property in the Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 97

Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21 b. Calls on the Commission to propose those amendments to the existing regulatory framework that are necessary to ensure effective, comprehensive, updated, constant reporting in IMS; calls on OLAF to live up to its responsibility to support Member States by giving advice and guidance in establishing internal procedures and organisational arrangements which are built upon the national experiences of the Member States learned in the specific sector and which must be embedded into specific guidelines for reporting and for monitoring, as well as for the setting of NAFS and for the organisation of AFCOS;

Or. en

Amendment 98

Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21 c. Understands that after the necessary corrective actions have been taken, the carrying out of further analysis would allow learning from that cases of fraud and improving the measures that could prevent similar cases from occurring in the future; asks the Commission to support Member States through the analysis of the enabling factors behind fraud, because this analysis would allow appropriate assessment of the need to revise the national management and control systems accordingly;

Or. en

Amendment 99

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22. Notes that the EPPO reported 385 offences under investigation concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up until the end of 2024 (the EPPO’s 2023 annual report referred to 209 investigations concerned PIF-focused criminal organisations); is aware that the true overall involvement of organised crime and its impact on the deployment of EU resources is not precisely quantifiable; notes that, according to data and analysis provided by the EPPO, in the majority of cases, the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) focus their investigations on the underlying PIF offences (misappropriation, fraud, corruption) and not on the criminal organisation per se, as the EPPO Regulation limits the competence of the EPPO to organised criminal groups whose activity focuses on the commission of PIF offences (Article 22(2) EPPO Regulation); recalls that Eurojust can provide assistance in coordinating investigations into crimes against the Union’s financial interests linked to organised crime; stresses that the reality of organised criminal activity on the ground is apparent from an assessment of the extent of the financial damages attributed to VAT fraud, excise duty fraud and customs fraud, where a strong component of organised crime is often present, and which always occurs when large financial volumes are involved;

22. Notes that the EPPO reported 385 offences under investigation concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up until the end of 2024 (the EPPO’s 2023 annual report referred to 209 investigations concerned PIF-focused criminal organisations); is aware that the true overall involvement of organised crime and its impact on the deployment of EU resources is not precisely quantifiable; notes that, according to data and analysis provided by the EPPO, in the majority of cases, the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) focus their investigations on the underlying PIF offences (misappropriation, fraud, corruption) and not on the criminal organisation per se, as the EPPO Regulation limits the competence of the EPPO to organised criminal groups whose activity focuses on the commission of PIF offences (Article 22(2) EPPO Regulation); recalls that Eurojust can provide assistance in coordinating investigations into crimes against the Union’s financial interests linked to organised crime; stresses that the reality of organised criminal activity on the ground is apparent from an assessment of the extent of the financial damages attributed to VAT fraud, excise duty fraud and customs fraud, where a strong component of organised crime is often present, and which always occurs when large financial volumes are involved; considers that the increasing involvement of organised crime in offences affecting the Union’s financial interests requires a strategic prioritisation of resources towards areas with the greatest financial impact, in particular in the area of revenue, without prejudice to the respect of the competences laid down in the applicable legal framework;

Or. en

Amendment 100

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22. Notes that the EPPO reported 385 offences under investigation concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up until the end of 2024 (the EPPO’s 2023 annual report referred to 209 investigations concerned PIF-focused criminal organisations); is aware that the true overall involvement of organised crime and its impact on the deployment of EU resources is not precisely quantifiable; notes that, according to data and analysis provided by the EPPO, in the majority of cases, the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) focus their investigations on the underlying PIF offences (misappropriation, fraud, corruption) and not on the criminal organisation per se, as the EPPO Regulation limits the competence of the EPPO to organised criminal groups whose activity focuses on the commission of PIF offences (Article 22(2) EPPO Regulation); recalls that Eurojust can provide assistance in coordinating investigations into crimes against the Union’s financial interests linked to organised crime; stresses that the reality of organised criminal activity on the ground is apparent from an assessment of the extent of the financial damages attributed to VAT fraud, excise duty fraud and customs fraud, where a strong component of organised crime is often present, and which always occurs when large financial volumes are involved;

22. Notes that the EPPO reported 385 offences under investigation concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up until the end of 2024 (the EPPO’s 2023 annual report referred to 209 investigations concerned PIF-focused criminal organisations); is aware that the true overall involvement of organised crime and its impact on the deployment of EU resources is not precisely quantifiable; notes that, according to data and analysis provided by the EPPO, in the majority of cases, the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) focus their investigations on the underlying PIF offences (misappropriation, fraud, corruption) and not on the criminal organisation per se, as the EPPO Regulation limits the competence of the EPPO to organised criminal groups whose activity focuses on the commission of PIF offences (Article 22(2) EPPO Regulation); recalls that Eurojust can provide assistance in coordinating investigations into crimes against the Union’s financial interests linked to organised crime; underlines that, despite legal limitations, EPPO brings an important added value to the fight against fraud, allowing the EU to fill the gap left by uncoordinated national initiatives, hence representing the most effective instrument to disrupt transnational criminal activities and to intervene in the protection of the Union’s financial interests; stresses that the reality of organised criminal activity on the ground is apparent from an assessment of the extent of the financial damages attributed to VAT fraud, excise duty fraud, and customs fraud, where a strong component of organised crime is often present, and which often occurs when large financial volumes are involved;

Or. en

Amendment 101

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22. Notes that the EPPO reported 385 offences under investigation concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up until the end of 2024 (the EPPO’s 2023 annual report referred to 209 investigations concerned PIF-focused criminal organisations); is aware that the true overall involvement of organised crime and its impact on the deployment of EU resources is not precisely quantifiable; notes that, according to data and analysis provided by the EPPO, in the majority of cases, the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) focus their investigations on the underlying PIF offences (misappropriation, fraud, corruption) and not on the criminal organisation per se, as the EPPO Regulation limits the competence of the EPPO to organised criminal groups whose activity focuses on the commission of PIF offences (Article 22(2) EPPO Regulation); recalls that Eurojust can provide assistance in coordinating investigations into crimes against the Union’s financial interests linked to organised crime; stresses that the reality of organised criminal activity on the ground is apparent from an assessment of the extent of the financial damages attributed to VAT fraud, excise duty fraud and customs fraud, where a strong component of organised crime is often present, and which always occurs when large financial volumes are involved;

22. Notes that the EPPO reported 385 offences under investigation concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up until the end of 2024 (the EPPO’s 2023 annual report referred to 209 investigations concerned PIF-focused criminal organisations); is aware that the true overall involvement of organised crime and its impact on the deployment of EU resources is not precisely quantifiable; notes that, according to data and analysis provided by the EPPO, in the majority of cases, the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) focus their investigations on the underlying PIF offences (misappropriation, fraud, corruption) and not on the criminal organisation per se, as the EPPO Regulation limits the competence of the EPPO to organised criminal groups whose activity focuses on the commission of PIF offences (Article 22(2) EPPO Regulation); recalls that Eurojust can provide assistance in coordinating investigations into crimes against the Union’s financial interests linked to organised crime; recalls that Europol supports and strengthens action by the competent authorities of the member states and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime, including those against the EU financial interests, stresses that the reality of organised criminal activity on the ground is apparent from an assessment of the extent of the financial damages attributed to VAT fraud, excise duty fraud and customs fraud, where a strong component of organised crime is often present, and which always occurs when large financial volumes are involved;

Or. en

Amendment 102

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22. Notes that the EPPO reported 385 offences under investigation concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up until the end of 2024 (the EPPO’s 2023 annual report referred to 209 investigations concerned PIF-focused criminal organisations); is aware that the true overall involvement of organised crime and its impact on the deployment of EU resources is not precisely quantifiable; notes that, according to data and analysis provided by the EPPO, in the majority of cases, the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) focus their investigations on the underlying PIF offences (misappropriation, fraud, corruption) and not on the criminal organisation per se, as the EPPO Regulation limits the competence of the EPPO to organised criminal groups whose activity focuses on the commission of PIF offences (Article 22(2) EPPO Regulation); recalls that Eurojust can provide assistance in coordinating investigations into crimes against the Union’s financial interests linked to organised crime; stresses that the reality of organised criminal activity on the ground is apparent from an assessment of the extent of the financial damages attributed to VAT fraud, excise duty fraud and customs fraud, where a strong component of organised crime is often present, and which always occurs when large financial volumes are involved;

22. Notes that the EPPO reported 385 offences under investigation concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up until the end of 2024 (the EPPO’s 2023 annual report referred to 209 investigations concerned PIF-focused criminal organisations); recalls that the presence of organised crime in fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests is likely higher than what is recorded as a formal offence in case-management systems, due to fragmented national legislation and the narrow definition of organised crime in the EPPO Regulation; calls for legislative follow-up to ensure definitions and tools reflect operational reality; is aware that the true overall involvement of organised crime and its impact on the deployment of EU resources is not precisely quantifiable; notes that, according to data and analysis provided by the EPPO, in the majority of cases, the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) focus their investigations on the underlying PIF offences (misappropriation, fraud, corruption) and not on the criminal organisation per se, as the EPPO Regulation limits the competence of the EPPO to organised criminal groups whose activity focuses on the commission of PIF offences (Article 22(2) EPPO Regulation); recalls that Eurojust can provide assistance in coordinating investigations into crimes against the Union’s financial interests linked to organised crime; stresses that the reality of organised criminal activity on the ground is apparent from an assessment of the extent of the financial damages attributed to VAT fraud, excise duty fraud and customs fraud, where a strong component of organised crime is often present, and which always occurs when large financial volumes are involved;

Or. en

Amendment 103

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22 a. Notes that criminal organisations are involved in complex corporate structures used as opaque front legal vehicles deployed across multiple jurisdictions having unequal levels of enforcement of Union law, increasingly across all EU funds and RRF; underlines that the fight against organised crime in the Union can only be made effective by an improved data analysis capacity at the Union level and by appropriate resources provided to the bodies in charge of the fight against fraud, at the different levels of the cycle;

Or. en

Amendment 104

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22 a. Is aware of the increasing risk of AI-generated content used to compromise procurement procedures or financial operations and to mislead investigations or to falsify contracts and for digital identity theft; understands that increased cross-border cooperation and data-sharing mechanisms between Member States and Union’s authorities is necessary to counter AI-enabled fraud, particularly in high-risk areas such as VAT, customs and financial aid distribution; deems it necessary to launch a dedicated EU-wide initiative to develop AI-driven fraud detection mechanisms by OLAF, the EPPO, and Europol focused on financial crimes against the Union’s budget; calls on the Commission and the Member States to integrate AI and data analytics into fraud detection systems, ensuring interoperability between national and EU-level databases while maintaining strong data protection safeguards; reiterates its call for establishing mandatory forensic verification process for all digital evidence submitted in financial fraud cases, ensuring the authenticity of documents and audio and video material used in investigations;

Or. en

Amendment 105

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

23. Notes that there is an increasing number of reported cases of VAT fraud, that in 2023 it was present in around 20 % of the EPPO’s ongoing cases, with 873 cases, and that in 2024, there were a total of 1 287 VAT infringement cases, accounting for 20.29 % of all infringements, causing an estimated loss of EUR 13.5 billion, representing 53 % of the total estimated loss;

23. Notes that there is an increasing number of reported cases of VAT fraud, that in 2023 it was present in around 20 % of the EPPO’s ongoing cases, with 873 cases, and that in 2024, there were a total of 1 287 VAT infringement cases, accounting for 20.29 % of all infringements, causing an estimated loss of EUR 13.5 billion, representing 53 % of the total estimated loss; observes that the current threshold of EUR 10 million, set in the PIF Directive, is not an effective criterion to establish the competence of the Office in VAT cases due to inconsistent approaches on interpretation, on damage calculation methods and on complexity of the cases, weakening the uniform and consistent handling of VAT fraud cases; reiterates its call on the Commission to review the threshold and to guarantee consistent interpretation of the total damage, providing more explicit instructions and clear guidance to Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 106

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25 a. Stresses the importance of strengthening cross-border cooperation and targeted data-sharing between Member States to prevent and combat AI-enabled fraud, notably in high-risk areas such as VAT, customs, and EU financial aid; calls on the Commission to support Member States through the development of a coordinated EU-level intelligence hub to monitor and respond to AI-driven fraudulent activity efficiently and in real time.

Or. en

Amendment 107

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25 a. Maintains that both OLAF and EPPO require direct and timely access to relevant VAT data in order to carry out effective and efficient investigations into intra-Community VAT fraud; welcomes, in this regard, the proposal of 14 November 2025 to amend Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 which would improve access to VAT information at Union level for both bodies, strengthen cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO and significantly enhance the effectiveness of investigations; calls for the swift adoption and implementation of the proposed amended regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 108

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25 a. Notes the early-warning and risk-analysis role of Eurofisc in detecting cross-border VAT carousel fraud; calls for stronger, legally sound information flows between national tax authorities, Eurofisc, OLAF and the EPPO, in order to shorten reaction times and disrupt organised criminal networks;

Or. en

Amendment 109

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25. Stresses that OLAF’s limited and indirect access to certain customs and tax data is a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union; recalls that, in order to obtain certain essential information, especially in the field of VAT, OLAF must go through the competent national administrations, resulting in delays that are incompatible with the speed of fraud mechanisms; calls, therefore, for OLAF’s access to relevant data to be improved without delay, in line with the applicable legal framework;

25. Stresses that OLAF’s limited and indirect access to certain customs and tax data is a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union; recalls that, in order to obtain certain essential information, especially in the field of VAT, OLAF must go through the competent national administrations, resulting in delays that are incompatible with the speed of fraud mechanisms; calls, therefore, for OLAF’s access to relevant data to be improved without delay, in line with the applicable legal framework; considers that limitations in access to tax and customs data do not affect OLAF alone but the anti-fraud architecture as a whole; calls on the Commission to assess structural solutions allowing for faster and more secure access to relevant data for all competent actors, in full respect of the applicable legal framework;

Or. en

Amendment 110

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Main threats - rule of law deficiencies

Or. en

Amendment 111

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25 a. Regrets that, despite successive worrying findings in the Commission’s annual rule of law reports, as well as findings by OLAF, made public in the Commission’s annual reports on the protection of the EU’s financial interests, and findings by the EPPO, pointing to budgetary risks in several Member States, only two formal notifications have been sent and measures decided in a single case under the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that the gap between findings and enforcement undermines the regulation’s credibility and weakens its preventive function in protecting the EU’s financial interests; recalls the ECA warning that decisions on blocking or releasing funds, which require a qualified majority in the Council, are often intertwined with unrelated high-level negotiations that require unanimity; underlines that decisions to protect EU financial interests must be based on technical and legal findings and cannot be subjected to bargaining under the threat of blocking decisions requiring unanimity in the Council;

Or. en

Amendment 112

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25 b. Emphasises that Conditionality Regulation must not be used only as a measure of last resort, since it also allows for partial suspensions at an early stage, namely as soon as rule of law breaches have been identified that could seriously risk affecting the EU budget; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to make full and timely use of the instrument;

Or. en

Amendment 113

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25 c. Calls on the Commission to make systematic cross references between infringement proceedings and measures adopted in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulation and pending conditionality screenings, so that the Member States cannot exploit procedural silos and so that the EU’s financial interests are protected, regardless of the legal instrument used;

Or. en

Amendment 114

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 d (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25 d. Reiterates its warning that the reallocation or reshuffling of frozen appropriations to other programmes or objectives exposes EU financial interests to already established risks; believes that the spirit of the Conditionality Regulation precludes any such transfer and therefore urges the Commission to reject any requests for transfer to other programmes or priorities under the same programme that would lead to a circumvention of measures under the Conditionality Regulation; reiterates its request that the Commission submit to Parliament the full text of any such transfer request so that democratic scrutiny can precede, not follow, the Commission decision;

Or. en

Amendment 115

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

26. Is aware that corruption is a crime closely linked to many serious forms of misconduct; notes that corruption is intrinsically linked to money laundering and that money laundering is one of the main drivers of illegal activities of organised crime, as it allows criminals to transfer the proceeds of their crime into the legal economy; observes that corruption is also detected on a recurrent basis in cases of fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union and notes in this regard the analysis that explores the relationship between corruption and fraud presented in the 2024 PIF Report, targeting corruption cases reported since 2007 for the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 programming periods in the area of cohesion; underlines that the proposed anti-corruption directive (COM(2023)0234), currently under consideration by the co-legislators, recognises the link between corruption and money laundering and provides for a specific aggravating circumstance for entities engaging in corruption offences; recognises that heterogeneous national systems and fragmented application of the EU anti-money laundering framework have made it difficult to prevent, detect and combat money laundering;

26. Is aware that corruption is a crime closely linked to many serious forms of misconduct; notes that corruption is intrinsically linked to money laundering and that money laundering is one of the main drivers of illegal activities of organised crime, as it allows criminals to transfer the proceeds of their crime into the legal economy; observes that corruption is also detected on a recurrent basis in cases of fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union and notes in this regard the analysis that explores the relationship between corruption and fraud presented in the 2024 PIF Report, targeting corruption cases reported since 2007 for the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 programming periods in the area of cohesion; underlines that the proposed anti-corruption directive (COM(2023)0234), currently under consideration by the co-legislators, recognises the link between corruption and money laundering and provides for a specific aggravating circumstance for entities engaging in corruption offences; recognises that heterogeneous national systems and fragmented application of the EU anti-money laundering framework have made it difficult to prevent, detect and combat money laundering; calls on the Commission, in the framework of the process of revision of the EPPO Regulation, to strengthen the EPPO’s powers in this area fostering its future cooperation with AMLA, via joint analysis teams and use of secure communication channels;

Or. en

Amendment 116

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 26 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

26 a. Supports the objective of combating money laundering and tax fraud; stresses, however, that the means must be effective and their benefits evaluated on the basis of relevant data; considers that the most effective solution for combating money laundering and tax evasion lies in more precisely defined criteria for the use of public funds paid from taxes; underlines that closer cooperation in the fight against money laundering and tax fraud should not be confused with the harmonisation of direct taxes, which would eliminate beneficial tax competition between Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 117

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 27

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

27. Stresses that, with regard to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 191 offences investigated at the end of 2024 (compared to 131 at the end of 2023 and 87 in 2022); notes that the 2024 PIF report revealed that 56 cases were reported to the Commission through the IMS by seven countries between 2020 and 2024; stresses that the comparison of data from different sources and an analysis based on data from 2007 to 2023 clearly indicate that Member States do not report sufficient fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS; notes that, when reported, corruption mainly concerns public procurement, with around 20 % of these corruption cases detected by a control having started following alerts by whistleblowers or information published in the media; notes that 25 % of irregularities were instead detected due to a control that started in the absence of specific allegations or suspicions, thus due to a similar chance or situation and not due to an appropriate risk analysis; concludes that reporting and detection are not optimal and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to strengthen the use of specific analysis-based detection tools; calls also for greater transparency for the general public through wider publication on the internet of the use of European funds, the identity of final beneficiaries and the results of public procurement procedures;

27. Stresses that, with regard to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 191 offences investigated at the end of 2024 (compared to 131 at the end of 2023 and 87 in 2022); notes that the 2024 PIF report revealed that 56 cases were reported to the Commission through the IMS by seven countries between 2020 and 2024; stresses that the comparison of data from different sources and an analysis based on data from 2007 to 2023 clearly indicate that Member States do not report sufficient fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS; notes that, when reported, corruption mainly concerns public procurement, with around 20 % of these corruption cases detected by a control having started following alerts by whistleblowers or information published in the media; notes that 25 % of irregularities were instead detected due to a control that started in the absence of specific allegations or suspicions, thus due to a similar chance or situation and not due to an appropriate risk analysis; concludes that reporting and detection are not optimal and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to strengthen the use of specific analysis-based detection tools; calls also for greater transparency for the general public through wider publication on the internet of the use of European funds, the identity of final beneficiaries and the results of public procurement procedures; considers that the low level of reporting of fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS points to structural deficiencies in detection and reporting systems; calls on the Commission to assess the quality and completeness of the data transmitted by Member States and to issue specific recommendations to address these deficiencies;

Or. en

Amendment 118

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 27

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

27. Stresses that, with regard to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 191 offences investigated at the end of 2024 (compared to 131 at the end of 2023 and 87 in 2022); notes that the 2024 PIF report revealed that 56 cases were reported to the Commission through the IMS by seven countries between 2020 and 2024; stresses that the comparison of data from different sources and an analysis based on data from 2007 to 2023 clearly indicate that Member States do not report sufficient fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS; notes that, when reported, corruption mainly concerns public procurement, with around 20 % of these corruption cases detected by a control having started following alerts by whistleblowers or information published in the media; notes that 25 % of irregularities were instead detected due to a control that started in the absence of specific allegations or suspicions, thus due to a similar chance or situation and not due to an appropriate risk analysis; concludes that reporting and detection are not optimal and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to strengthen the use of specific analysis-based detection tools; calls also for greater transparency for the general public through wider publication on the internet of the use of European funds, the identity of final beneficiaries and the results of public procurement procedures;

27. Stresses that, with regard to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 191 offences investigated at the end of 2024 (compared to 131 at the end of 2023 and 87 in 2022); notes that the 2024 PIF report revealed that 56 cases were reported to the Commission through the IMS by seven countries between 2020 and 2024; stresses that the comparison of data from different sources and an analysis based on data from 2007 to 2023 clearly indicate that Member States do not report sufficient fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS; underlines that organised criminal groups increasingly exploit corruption to infiltrate public administrations to distort procurement processes and secure illicit economic advantages; notes that, when reported, corruption mainly concerns public procurement, with around 20 % of these corruption cases detected by a control having started following alerts by whistleblowers or information published in the media; notes that 25 % of irregularities were instead detected due to a control that started in the absence of specific allegations or suspicions, thus due to a similar chance or situation and not due to an appropriate risk analysis; concludes that reporting and detection are not optimal and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to strengthen the use of specific analysis-based detection tools; calls also for greater transparency for the general public through wider publication on the internet of the use of European funds, the identity of final beneficiaries and the results of public procurement procedures;

Or. en

Amendment 119

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 27

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

27. Stresses that, with regard to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 191 offences investigated at the end of 2024 (compared to 131 at the end of 2023 and 87 in 2022); notes that the 2024 PIF report revealed that 56 cases were reported to the Commission through the IMS by seven countries between 2020 and 2024; stresses that the comparison of data from different sources and an analysis based on data from 2007 to 2023 clearly indicate that Member States do not report sufficient fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS; notes that, when reported, corruption mainly concerns public procurement, with around 20 % of these corruption cases detected by a control having started following alerts by whistleblowers or information published in the media; notes that 25 % of irregularities were instead detected due to a control that started in the absence of specific allegations or suspicions, thus due to a similar chance or situation and not due to an appropriate risk analysis; concludes that reporting and detection are not optimal and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to strengthen the use of specific analysis-based detection tools; calls also for greater transparency for the general public through wider publication on the internet of the use of European funds, the identity of final beneficiaries and the results of public procurement procedures;

27. Stresses that, with regard to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 191 offences investigated at the end of 2024 (compared to 131 at the end of 2023 and 87 in 2022); notes that the 2024 PIF report revealed that 56 cases were reported to the Commission through the IMS by seven countries between 2020 and 2024; stresses that the comparison of data from different sources and an analysis based on data from 2007 to 2023 clearly indicate that Member States do not report sufficient fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS; notes that, when reported, corruption mainly concerns public procurement, with around 20 % of these corruption cases detected by a control having started following alerts by whistleblowers or information published in the media; notes that 25 % of irregularities were instead detected due to a control that started in the absence of specific allegations or suspicions, thus due to a similar chance or situation and not due to an appropriate risk analysis; concludes that reporting and detection are not optimal, and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to strengthen the use of specific analysis-based detection tools; also calls for greater transparency through wider publication - online and through other channels accessible to the general public - of detailed information about the use of European funds, the identity of final beneficiaries, the outcomes of subsidised programmes and projects, and the results of public procurement procedures;

Or. en

Amendment 120

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 27

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

27. Stresses that, with regard to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 191 offences investigated at the end of 2024 (compared to 131 at the end of 2023 and 87 in 2022); notes that the 2024 PIF report revealed that 56 cases were reported to the Commission through the IMS by seven countries between 2020 and 2024; stresses that the comparison of data from different sources and an analysis based on data from 2007 to 2023 clearly indicate that Member States do not report sufficient fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS; notes that, when reported, corruption mainly concerns public procurement, with around 20 % of these corruption cases detected by a control having started following alerts by whistleblowers or information published in the media; notes that 25 % of irregularities were instead detected due to a control that started in the absence of specific allegations or suspicions, thus due to a similar chance or situation and not due to an appropriate risk analysis; concludes that reporting and detection are not optimal and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to strengthen the use of specific analysis-based detection tools; calls also for greater transparency for the general public through wider publication on the internet of the use of European funds, the identity of final beneficiaries and the results of public procurement procedures;

27. Stresses that, with regard to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 191 offences investigated at the end of 2024 (compared to 131 at the end of 2023 and 87 in 2022); notes that the 2024 PIF report revealed that 56 cases were reported to the Commission through the IMS by seven countries between 2020 and 2024; stresses that the comparison of data from different sources and an analysis based on data from 2007 to 2023 clearly indicate that Member States do not report sufficient fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS; notes that, when reported, corruption mainly concerns public procurement, with around 20 % of these corruption cases detected by a control having started following alerts by whistleblowers or information published in the media; notes that 25 % of irregularities were instead detected due to a control that started in the absence of specific allegations or suspicions, thus due to a similar chance or situation and not due to an appropriate risk analysis; concludes that reporting and detection are not optimal and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to strengthen targeted, risk-based detection tools and proactive investigation strategies, rather than relying on non-systematic controls; calls also for greater transparency for the general public through wider publication on the internet of the use of European funds, the identity of final beneficiaries and the results of public procurement procedures;

Or. en

Amendment 121

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 27 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

27 a. Notes that within the Annual Rule of Law Reports the fight against corruption is a key element, and that the targeted recommendations that the Commission transmits to EU Member States include the anti-corruption area; observes that key reforms at the national level have been launched by Member States on more than two thirds of the recommendations made in the 2022-2024 Rule of Law Report; acknowledges that anti-corruption strategies are in place in the Member States, but underlines that their evaluation and a periodical revision are needed; encourages the Commission to monitor the progress of the actions launched in the Member States and to provide periodic updates and analyses reporting;

Or. en

Amendment 122

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 27 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

27 b. Welcomes the publication, on 4 November 2024, of a study on high-risk corruption areas with a dedicated section on overlaps between fraud and corruption which follows the May 2023 anti-corruption package; observes that public procurement, construction and infrastructure, and healthcare were amongst the areas most at risk; encourages the follow-up studies to investigate actions that mitigate corruption in these high-risk areas;

Or. en

Amendment 123

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 28

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

28. Calls, before any further enlargement of the EU, for a thorough examination of the state of corruption in the candidate countries, especially if they become net beneficiaries of the budget after accession, in order to guard against any drift and any damage to the financial interests of the Union by a future Member State;

28. Stresses the importance of rigorous anti-corruption standards, effective control systems and robust safeguards for the protection of the Union’s financial interests throughout the accession process; underlines that candidate countries must demonstrate their capacity to prevent, detect and address fraud and corruption affecting public funds, in line with EU rules and standards;

Or. en

Amendment 124

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 28

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

28. Calls, before any further enlargement of the EU, for a thorough examination of the state of corruption in the candidate countries, especially if they become net beneficiaries of the budget after accession, in order to guard against any drift and any damage to the financial interests of the Union by a future Member State;

28. Calls, before any further enlargement of the EU, for a thorough examination of the state of corruption in the candidate countries, including the effectiveness of their anti-corruption frameworks, judicial independence and administrative capacity; especially if they become net beneficiaries of the budget after accession, and stresses effective controls and post-accession monitoring are essential; in order to guard against any drift and any damage to the financial interests of the Union by a future Member State;

Or. en

Amendment 125

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 28

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

28. Calls, before any further enlargement of the EU, for a thorough examination of the state of corruption in the candidate countries, especially if they become net beneficiaries of the budget after accession, in order to guard against any drift and any damage to the financial interests of the Union by a future Member State;

28. Calls, before any further enlargement of the EU, for a thorough examination of the state of corruption in the candidate countries, in order to guard against any drift and any damage to the financial interests of the Union by a future Member State;

Or. en

Amendment 126

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 28 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

28 a. Stresses that the protection of the Union’s financial interests must be fully integrated into enlargement policy through strict, measurable anti-corruption and rule-of-law benchmarks, robust audit arrangements and effective cooperation with the Union’s anti-fraud architecture; underlines that strengthened pre-accession safeguards can reduce risks and support reforms rather than serving as a pretext for blanket scepticism towards enlargement;

Or. en

Amendment 127

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 31 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

31 a. Reaffirms that respect for the rule of law, including judicial independence, the separation of powers, effective and impartial law inforcement and prosecution, as well as the fight against corruption, constitutes a fundamental value of the Union as enshrined in Article 2 TEU; expresses deep concern at the increasing attacks on these values within and outside the Union; stresses that any systemic weakening of the rule of law or democratic safeguards directly undermines the sound financial management of the Union budget, as well as the credibility of Union’s action;

Or. en

Amendment 128

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 31 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

31 a. Welcomes the Commission’s ongoing revision of the Handbook on reporting irregularities in shared management, in cooperation with Member State experts, and expects reporting of conflict of interest cases in the IMS to be comprehensive, detailed, and legally certain, allowing clear and proportionate assessment; commends as well the dedicated focus group on conflict of interest prevention and detection held during the 2024 annual technical working meeting with national audit bodies for the RRF; calls for the provisions on conflicts of interests to be applied in a way that ensures legal certainty, to be ased on a clear and proportionate assessment of the risks and allow a practical application by the competent authorities;

Or. en

Amendment 129

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

32. Recalls that the budgetary conditionality mechanism established by the Conditionality Regulation is a legally regulated tool to prevent risks to the Union budget; notes that its application can, however, be justified only where there is a direct, real and demonstrated link between the failures found and the harm to the financial interests of the Union; expresses its concern that any extension of its scope beyond this budgetary purpose would be contrary to the spirit of the Treaties and the principle of proportionality; recalls that the legitimacy of this mechanism is based on a strictly objective application, free from any political considerations, and respectful of equal treatment between Member States;

32. Recalls that the budgetary conditionality mechanism established by the Conditionality Regulation is a legally regulated tool to prevent risks to the Union budget; recalls that the Conditionality Regulation is a budgetary safeguard designed to protect the Union budget where breaches of the principles of the rule of law affect or seriously risk affecting sound financial management or the Union’s financial interests; stresses that systemic shortcomings in judicial independence, prosecution, control and sanctioning systems can create structural vulnerabilities for fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to apply the mechanism consistently and transparently on the basis of objective evidence and to ensure that remedial measures are verifiable and durable before any funds are released;

Or. en

Amendment 130

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

32. Recalls that the budgetary conditionality mechanism established by the Conditionality Regulation is a legally regulated tool to prevent risks to the Union budget; notes that its application can, however, be justified only where there is a direct, real and demonstrated link between the failures found and the harm to the financial interests of the Union; expresses its concern that any extension of its scope beyond this budgetary purpose would be contrary to the spirit of the Treaties and the principle of proportionality; recalls that the legitimacy of this mechanism is based on a strictly objective application, free from any political considerations, and respectful of equal treatment between Member States;

32. Recalls that the budgetary conditionality mechanism established by the Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 is a specific legal instrument designed to protect Union budget against risks arising from breaches of the Rule of law; notes that its implementation has raised practical and operational challenges, as highlighted by the European Court of Auditors in its Special Report 03/2024 on the rule of law in the EU; underlines therefore the need to further improve the application of this Regulation in order to enhance its effectiveness while clearly distinguishing it from the broader principle of respect for the rule of law;

Or. en

Amendment 131

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

32 a. Reiterates the importance of preserving the integrity and reputation of the European Union institutions, including the European Parliament, and of all Union bodies and entities, as a core element of citizen’s trust and democratic legitimacy; emphasises the urgency of ensuring that no political group, body or entity benefiting from EU funds can evade financial responsibility in cases of fraud investigations or serious irregularities involving the use of Union funds, including through the dissolution, succession or reconfiguration of a political group or legal structure; stresses that effective mechanisms must be in place to ensure the continuity of financial responsibility and where appropriate, individual responsibility as well; calls for strengthened oversight mechanisms, including a broad and independent selection of external auditors, in order to guarantee sound financial management, effective controls and full accountability for public funds; underlines that requirements related to transparency, accountability and the protection of the Union’s financial interests must apply equally and without exception within each Union institution;

Or. en

Amendment 132

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Additional threats - misuse of EU funds

Or. en

Amendment 133

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

32 a. Recalls that, in accordance with Articles 1.3.2, 2.7.1 and 2.7.2 of the Rules on the use of appropriations from budget item 400, the former political group Identity & Democracy (ID Group) submitted its final financial report on 8 October 2024 covering the period 1 January to 15 July 2024; recalls that the Parliament’s administration received the ID Group’s full financial archive in both electronic and paper format and conducted a risk-based ex post verification of the 2024 accounts, focusing on consistency checks and sample testing of high-risk contracts and donations; recalls the findings of Parliament’s administration that at least EUR 4 333 635,78 of budget item 400 appropriations were unduly spent by the group over the 2019-2024 term, exposing Parliament to a significant financial and reputational risk; notes that shortcomings in the public procurement procedures were identified, and represent significant reputational risks for Parliament and for all political groups and Members;

Or. en

Amendment 134

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

32 b. Notes that the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) announced in July 2025 that it had opened an investigation into the alleged misuse of Union funds by the ID Group between 2019 and 2024; stresses that Parliament’s administration has transmitted the case file and cooperates fully with the EPPO’s investigation; notes that the Bureau wishes to know the outcome of the EPPO’s investigation before taking any recovery action; recommends that the Chief Prosecutor be invited to an in camera hearing with the EP Bureau to provide concrete elements on timeline;considers that Parliament’s administration should take the urgent and relevant administrative measures to protect the Union’s financial interests and Parliament’s reputation; considers it of utmost importance that recovery actions are started as soon as possible to recover the full amount of ineligible expenditure, in light of the substantial amount of evidence collected by DG FINS, in full compliance with Article 3(3) of the Working Arrangement between the European Parliament and the European Public Prosecutor's Office;

Or. en

Amendment 135

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

32 c. Calls on the Bureau to ensure that the external auditors fully comply with the letter of engagement, to reinforce the oversight by external auditors for groups by making more hours available for external auditors to perform their oversight role and to provide clearer guidance from DG FINS on the correct interpretation of rules for budget item 400 to avoid discrepancy between considerations of external auditors and DG FINS, in particular as regards procurement, and for DG FINS to provide more training and support on procurement to groups;

Or. en

Amendment 136

Céline Imart, Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

32 b. Calls on the Commission to implement stronger transparency rules with regard to EU funds being granted to third countries, in particular to better prevent serious crimes, violence, terrorism and misuse of EU funds and to stop contracts immediately when there is evidence of such;

Or. en

Amendment 137

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 33

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

33. Stresses that at a time when European institutions are regularly debating introducing new own resources, priority should instead be given to enhancing fraud detection through strengthened controls, which would enable the recovery of funds legitimately owed to the EU and currently lost;

33. Stresses that, in parallel to ongoing discussions on new own resources, efforts should also focus on enhancing fraud detection, prevention and controls, which would enable the recovery of funds legitimately owed to the EU and currently lost;

Or. en

Amendment 138

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 33

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

33. Stresses that at a time when European institutions are regularly debating introducing new own resources, priority should instead be given to enhancing fraud detection through strengthened controls, which would enable the recovery of funds legitimately owed to the EU and currently lost;

33. Stresses that at a time when European institutions are regularly debating introducing new own resources, priority should instead be given to enhancing fraud detection through strengthened controls, which would enable the recovery of funds legitimately owed to the EU and currently lost; considers that the debate on new own resources should be accompanied by a rigorous analysis of the potential for recovering revenue currently lost due to fraud and evasion, and that strengthening the protection of existing revenue represents a direct and sustainable means of reinforcing the Union budget;

Or. en

Amendment 139

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 33

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

33. Stresses that at a time when European institutions are regularly debating introducing new own resources, priority should instead be given to enhancing fraud detection through strengthened controls, which would enable the recovery of funds legitimately owed to the EU and currently lost;

33. Stresses that at a time when European institutions are regularly debating introducing new own resources, priority should instead be given to enhancing fraud detection through strengthened controls, which would enable the recovery of funds legitimately owed to the EU and currently lost; recalls that every euro recovered through effective anti-fraud measures is a euro that does not need to be raised through additional taxation of Union citizens;

Or. en

Amendment 140

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 33

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

33. Stresses that at a time when European institutions are regularly debating introducing new own resources, priority should instead be given to enhancing fraud detection through strengthened controls, which would enable the recovery of funds legitimately owed to the EU and currently lost;

33. Stresses that, at a time when European institutions are regularly debating introducing new own resources, priority should instead be given to enhancing fraud prevention and detection through strengthened controls; to improving the effectiveness of recovery actions to avoid any loss in EU revenue; to increasing the amount of traditional own resources made available to the EU budget; and to reducing the VAT compliance gap;

Or. en

Amendment 141

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 33 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

33 a. Stresses that strengthening own resources and improving fraud detection are complementary objectives; calls on the Commission to both enhance controls and enforcement to reduce revenue losses and ensure that the VAT and customs gaps are effectively addressed, while continuing work on a fair and resilient own-resources system;

Or. en

Amendment 142

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 34

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

34. Stresses that VAT remains an essential resource for the EU budget24 and reiterates its concerns about the substantial financial damage caused by cross-border fraud, including VAT fraud, due to the increasing involvement of organised crime groups; stresses that at the end of 2024, the EPPO reported 767 active investigations with a cross-border dimension, of which 573 (74 %) related to revenue, including 416 related to VAT fraud, 86 to non-VAT fraud and 71 to combined fraud; notes that the estimated total financial damage amounted to EUR 13.6 billion, representing 87 % of the financial damage related to cross-border fraud, with a significant negative impact on national budgets, tax fairness and fair competition; considers, however, that the analysis and quantification of these phenomena should be based on homogeneous data and uniform reporting standards, taking into account the system of own resources of the Union;

34. Stresses that VAT remains an essential resource for the EU budget24 and reiterates its concerns about the substantial financial damage caused by cross-border fraud, including VAT fraud; considers that the scale and sophistication of fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests, particulary on the revenue side of the budger, point to the significant involvement of serious and organised crime groups; stresses that at the end of 2024, the EPPO reported 767 active investigations with a cross-border dimension, of which 573 (74 %) related to revenue, including 416 related to VAT fraud, 86 to non-VAT fraud and 71 to combined fraud; notes that the estimated total financial damage amounted to EUR 13.6 billion, representing 87 % of the financial damage related to cross-border fraud, with a significant negative impact on national budgets, tax fairness and fair competition; considers, however, that the analysis and quantification of these phenomena should be based on homogeneous data and uniform reporting standards, taking into account the system of own resources of the Union;

_________________

_________________

24 In the EU system of own resources, the VAT is based on a rate of 0.3 % applied to each EU country’s harmonised VAT base (reduced to 0.15 % for few Member States), which is capped at 50 % of its gross national income (GNI): only this percentage (0.15-0.30 %) of the overall VAT collected by Member States is transferred to the Union’s budget. Overall, the VAT-based own resource accounted in the last Union’s budget for about 10 % to 17 % of the EU’s total own resources.

24 In the EU system of own resources, the VAT is based on a rate of 0.3 % applied to each EU country’s harmonised VAT base (reduced to 0.15 % for few Member States), which is capped at 50 % of its gross national income (GNI): only this percentage (0.15-0.30 %) of the overall VAT collected by Member States is transferred to the Union’s budget. Overall, the VAT-based own resource accounted in the last Union’s budget for about 10 % to 17 % of the EU’s total own resources.

Or. en

Amendment 143

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 34

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

34. Stresses that VAT remains an essential resource for the EU budget24 and reiterates its concerns about the substantial financial damage caused by cross-border fraud, including VAT fraud, due to the increasing involvement of organised crime groups; stresses that at the end of 2024, the EPPO reported 767 active investigations with a cross-border dimension, of which 573 (74 %) related to revenue, including 416 related to VAT fraud, 86 to non-VAT fraud and 71 to combined fraud; notes that the estimated total financial damage amounted to EUR 13.6 billion, representing 87 % of the financial damage related to cross-border fraud, with a significant negative impact on national budgets, tax fairness and fair competition; considers, however, that the analysis and quantification of these phenomena should be based on homogeneous data and uniform reporting standards, taking into account the system of own resources of the Union;

34. Stresses that VAT remains an essential resource for the EU budget24 and reiterates its concerns about the substantial financial damage caused by cross-border fraud, including VAT fraud, due to the increasing involvement of organised crime groups; stresses that at the end of 2024, the EPPO reported 767 active investigations with a cross-border dimension, of which 573 (74 %) related to revenue, including 416 related to VAT fraud, 86 to non-VAT fraud and 71 to combined fraud; notes that the estimated total financial damage amounted to EUR 13.6 billion, representing 87 % of the financial damage related to cross-border fraud, with a significant negative impact on national budgets, tax fairness and fair competition; considers, however, that the analysis and quantification of these phenomena should be based on homogeneous data and uniform reporting standards, taking into account the system of own resources of the Union, in particular when quantifying the financial impact of the EPPO’s activitiesand the recovery expectations;

_________________

_________________

24 In the EU system of own resources, the VAT is based on a rate of 0.3 % applied to each EU country’s harmonised VAT base (reduced to 0.15 % for few Member States), which is capped at 50 % of its gross national income (GNI): only this percentage (0.15-0.30 %) of the overall VAT collected by Member States is transferred to the Union’s budget. Overall, the VAT-based own resource accounted in the last Union’s budget for about 10 % to 17 % of the EU’s total own resources.

24 In the EU system of own resources, the VAT is based on a rate of 0.3 % applied to each EU country’s harmonised VAT base (reduced to 0.15 % for few Member States), which is capped at 50 % of its gross national income (GNI): only this percentage (0.15-0.30 %) of the overall VAT collected by Member States is transferred to the Union’s budget. Overall, the VAT-based own resource accounted in the last Union’s budget for about 10 % to 17 % of the EU’s total own resources.

Or. en

Amendment 144

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 34 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

34 a. Considers that, in view of the disproportionate financial impact of fraud on revenue, in particular in VAT and customs, the protection of the Union’s revenue should become a strategic priority of the anti-fraud architecture, reflected both in the allocation of resources and in the operational planning of the competent actors at Union and national level;

Or. en

Amendment 145

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 34 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

34 a. Calls for the EU to promote the adoption across Member States of a fairer system of progressive taxation, the creation of a net wealth tax, a proportionate taxation on corporate profits, and to intensify efforts to end tax avoidance and tax evasion;

Or. en

Amendment 146

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 36

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

36. Notes the need to strengthen operational cooperation between the EPPO, OLAF, the customs and tax authorities of the Member States and European law enforcement authorities; stresses that the massive customs and VAT fraud uncovered reveals persistent loopholes in the chain of control, from customs clearance to the distribution of goods within the internal market; considers that stricter surveillance of high-risk imports and better exchange of data in real time are essential conditions for preventing the recurrence of systemic fraud of this magnitude; notes, in particular, that many ports in Europe are vulnerable places jeopardising the protection of the Union’s financial interests and that a major plan should be launched to make these gateways safer and better controlled, bearing in mind that, while the means put in place to monitor them cost money, they also make it possible to bring in additional, sometimes significant, revenue;

36. Notes the need to strengthen operational cooperation between the EPPO, OLAF, the customs and tax authorities of the Member States and European law enforcement authorities; stresses that the massive customs and VAT fraud uncovered reveals persistent loopholes in the chain of control, from customs clearance to the distribution of goods within the internal market; considers that stricter surveillance of high-risk imports and better exchange of data in real time are essential conditions for preventing the recurrence of systemic fraud of this magnitude; notes, in particular, that many ports in Europe are vulnerable places jeopardising the protection of the Union’s financial interests and that a major plan should be launched to make these gateways safer and better controlled, bearing in mind that, while the means put in place to monitor them cost money, they also make it possible to bring in additional, sometimes significant, revenue; underlines that better controls and improved collection of existing revenues should go hand in hand with discussions on new own resources;

Or. en

Amendment 147

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 37

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

37. Maintains that, when assessing models for the implementation of EU spending, account should be taken of exposure to the risks of fraud and other misuse; regrets that the remarks repeatedly made by Parliament and the ECA and inspired by the design and implementation of the RRF have been neglected in the proposed design of future EU funding instruments, notably in the post-2027 MFF; stresses that shortcomings have been identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud and double funding, lack of transparency, limited data accessibility and opaque overall management, and that they should have served as a lesson for future EU financial frameworks; reiterates its opposition to any replication of the RRF model in its current form and calls for any future performance-based funding to be provided with significantly stricter safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms in order to ensure the proper management of EU funds;

37. Maintains that, when assessing models for the implementation of EU spending, account should be taken of exposure to the risks of fraud and other misuse; regrets that the remarks repeatedly made by Parliament and the ECA and inspired by the design and implementation of the RRF have not been sufficiently reflected in the proposed design of future EU funding instruments, notably in the post-2027 MFF; stresses that shortcomings have been identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud and double funding, lack of transparency and limited data accessibility and that these shortcomings should serve as a lesson for improving the design and governance of the future EU financial frameworks; recalls that the RRF is an exceptional and temporary instrument; underlines that any future performance-based funding should build on theses lessons and be accompanied with appropriate safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms in order to ensure the proper management of EU funds;

Or. en

Amendment 148

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 37

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

37. Maintains that, when assessing models for the implementation of EU spending, account should be taken of exposure to the risks of fraud and other misuse; regrets that the remarks repeatedly made by Parliament and the ECA and inspired by the design and implementation of the RRF have been neglected in the proposed design of future EU funding instruments, notably in the post-2027 MFF; stresses that shortcomings have been identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud and double funding, lack of transparency, limited data accessibility and opaque overall management, and that they should have served as a lesson for future EU financial frameworks; reiterates its opposition to any replication of the RRF model in its current form and calls for any future performance-based funding to be provided with significantly stricter safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms in order to ensure the proper management of EU funds;

37. Maintains that, when assessing models for the implementation of EU spending, account should be taken of exposure to the risks of fraud and other misuse; stresses that the shortcomings made by Parliament and the ECA on the design and implementation of the RRF , including risks of fraud and double funding, lack of transparency and insufficient traceability of final recipients, and limited data accessibility, should be addressed in the future MFF; calls for significantly stricter safeguards, robust auditability, and enforceable transparency requirements as a precondition for any similar instruments; stresses that despite some difficulties, the RRF, with its focus on performance and links between milestones and targets and investments and budgetary support, has helped to drive national investments and reforms that would not otherwise have taken place;

Or. en

Amendment 149

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 37

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

37. Maintains that, when assessing models for the implementation of EU spending, account should be taken of exposure to the risks of fraud and other misuse; regrets that the remarks repeatedly made by Parliament and the ECA and inspired by the design and implementation of the RRF have been neglected in the proposed design of future EU funding instruments, notably in the post-2027 MFF; stresses that shortcomings have been identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud and double funding, lack of transparency, limited data accessibility and opaque overall management, and that they should have served as a lesson for future EU financial frameworks; reiterates its opposition to any replication of the RRF model in its current form and calls for any future performance-based funding to be provided with significantly stricter safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms in order to ensure the proper management of EU funds;

37. Maintains that, when assessing models for the implementation of EU spending, account should be taken of exposure to the risks of fraud and other misuse; regrets that the remarks repeatedly made by Parliament and the ECA and inspired by the design and implementation of the RRF have been neglected in the proposed design of future EU funding instruments, notably in the post-2027 MFF; stresses that shortcomings have been identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud and double funding, lack of transparency, limited data accessibility and opaque overall management, and that they should have served as a lesson for future EU financial frameworks; reiterates its opposition to any replication of the RRF model in its current form and calls for any future performance-based funding to be provided with significantly stricter safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms in order to ensure the proper management of EU funds; underlines that performance-based instruments must demonstrate clear added value for Union citizens and comply with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness;

Or. en

Amendment 150

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 38

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

38. Reiterates its concerns about the financial impact of irregularities detected and reported in the field of agriculture, recalling that, according to the ECA, the rural development area is exposed to a higher risk of error than direct payments to farmers; notes furthermore that in 2024, Member States reported the first fraudulent irregularities related to expenditure under their new CAP Strategic Plans, with around 25 % of fraudulent irregularities reported that year related to expenditure under those plans, almost all linked to climate and environment programmes;

38. Reiterates its concerns about the financial impact of irregularities detected and reported in the field of agriculture, recalling that, according to the ECA, the rural development area is exposed to a higher risk of error than direct payments to farmers; notes furthermore that in 2024, Member States reported the first fraudulent irregularities related to expenditure under their new CAP Strategic Plans, with around 25 % of fraudulent irregularities reported that year related to expenditure under those plans, almost all linked to climate and environment programmes; calls for strengthened controls without undermining the Union’s climate objectives;

Or. en

Amendment 151

José Cepeda

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 40

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

40. Is concerned about the ECA’s findings that the stock of EU loans increased by more than 30 % in 2024, as a direct result of the use of capital markets to finance large-scale programmes such as SURE and NGEU; notes that the total outstanding debt of the Union could exceed EUR 900 billion by 2027, almost 10 times higher than the level observed in 2020 before the creation of NGEU; notes the absence of a clear, predictable and credible deleveraging strategy, even though the rapid and continuous growth of debt exposes the EU budget to increased sustainability risks, particularly in times of high interest rates; stresses that the dramatic increase in the Union’s indebtedness is automatically restricting the budgetary margins available in the MFF; calls on the Commission to present without delay a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s debt sustainability, including medium- and long-term management scenarios, and to identify the measures necessary to ensure that debt developments do not jeopardise fiscal stability or the protection of the EU’s financial interests; urges the Commission to increase transparency on emissions, borrowing costs and associated risks, in line with the recommendations of the ECA;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 152

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 40

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

40. Is concerned about the ECA’s findings that the stock of EU loans increased by more than 30 % in 2024, as a direct result of the use of capital markets to finance large-scale programmes such as SURE and NGEU; notes that the total outstanding debt of the Union could exceed EUR 900 billion by 2027, almost 10 times higher than the level observed in 2020 before the creation of NGEU; notes the absence of a clear, predictable and credible deleveraging strategy, even though the rapid and continuous growth of debt exposes the EU budget to increased sustainability risks, particularly in times of high interest rates; stresses that the dramatic increase in the Union’s indebtedness is automatically restricting the budgetary margins available in the MFF; calls on the Commission to present without delay a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s debt sustainability, including medium- and long-term management scenarios, and to identify the measures necessary to ensure that debt developments do not jeopardise fiscal stability or the protection of the EU’s financial interests; urges the Commission to increase transparency on emissions, borrowing costs and associated risks, in line with the recommendations of the ECA;

40. notes that the total outstanding debt of the Union could exceed EUR 900 billion by 2027, almost 10 times higher than the level observed in 2020 before the creation of NGEU; notes the absence of a clear, predictable and credible deleveraging strategy, even though the rapid and continuous growth of debt exposes the EU budget to increased sustainability risks, particularly in times of high interest rates; stresses that the increase in the Union’s indebtedness is automatically restricting the budgetary margins available in the current MFF; calls on the Commission to present without delay a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s debt sustainability, including medium- and long-term management scenarios, and to identify the measures necessary to ensure that debt developments do not jeopardise fiscal stability or the protection of the EU’s financial interests; urges the Commission to increase transparency on emissions, borrowing costs and associated risks, in line with the recommendations of the ECA;

Or. en

Amendment 153

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 40

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

40. Is concerned about the ECA’s findings that the stock of EU loans increased by more than 30 % in 2024, as a direct result of the use of capital markets to finance large-scale programmes such as SURE and NGEU; notes that the total outstanding debt of the Union could exceed EUR 900 billion by 2027, almost 10 times higher than the level observed in 2020 before the creation of NGEU; notes the absence of a clear, predictable and credible deleveraging strategy, even though the rapid and continuous growth of debt exposes the EU budget to increased sustainability risks, particularly in times of high interest rates; stresses that the dramatic increase in the Union’s indebtedness is automatically restricting the budgetary margins available in the MFF; calls on the Commission to present without delay a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s debt sustainability, including medium- and long-term management scenarios, and to identify the measures necessary to ensure that debt developments do not jeopardise fiscal stability or the protection of the EU’s financial interests; urges the Commission to increase transparency on emissions, borrowing costs and associated risks, in line with the recommendations of the ECA;

40. Is deeply concerned about the ECA’s findings that the stock of EU loans increased by more than 30 % in 2024, as a direct result of the use of capital markets to finance large-scale programmes such as SURE and NGEU; notes that the total outstanding debt of the Union could exceed EUR 900 billion by 2027, almost 10 times higher than the level observed in 2020 before the creation of NGEU; notes the absence of a clear, predictable and credible deleveraging strategy, even though the rapid and continuous growth of debt exposes the EU budget to increased sustainability risks, particularly in times of high interest rates; stresses that the dramatic increase in the Union’s indebtedness is automatically restricting the budgetary margins available in the MFF; calls on the Commission to present without delay a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s debt sustainability, including medium- and long-term management scenarios, and to identify the measures necessary to ensure that debt developments do not jeopardise fiscal stability or the protection of the EU’s financial interests; urges the Commission to increase transparency on emissions, borrowing costs and associated risks, in line with the recommendations of the ECA; insists that this unprecedented fiscal pressure mandates rigorous cost-benefit analysis for all new EU spending programmes;

Or. en

Amendment 154

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 41

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

41. Notes that there are still inconsistencies in the reports, for example on NGEU and the RRF, thus demonstrating the limitations of the flexible instruments that the Commission intends to replicate, for which, in 2023, the EPPO reported having many ongoing investigations (233) into the recovery and resilience programmes whose estimated related financial losses were worrying (EUR 1.86 billion); notes that at the end of 2024, the EPPO was handling 311 NGEU-related active cases, including 307 from the RRF, corresponding to around 17 % of all active investigations into expenditure fraud; notes that, according to the EPPO, the estimated damage to the financial interests of the Union amounts to EUR 2.8 billion, corresponding to 30 % of the total estimated damage for expenditure fraud (compared to 25 % last year); stresses, however, that in the 2023 PIF report, EPPO cases were not included in the analysis of fraud and irregularities affecting expenditure, unlike in other expenditure items, and that in the 2024 PIF Report different data is reported on EPPO investigations related to the RRF (279 investigations instead of 307, for an estimated total damage of EUR 2.7 billion instead of EUR 2.8 billion);

41. Notes with concern that in 2023, the EPPO reported having many ongoing investigations (233) into the recovery and resilience programmes whose estimated related financial losses were at EUR 1.86 billion; notes that at the end of 2024, the EPPO was handling 311 NGEU-related active cases, including 307 from the RRF, corresponding to around 17 % of all active investigations into expenditure fraud; notes that, according to the EPPO, the estimated damage to the financial interests of the Union amounts to EUR 2.8 billion, corresponding to 30 % of the total estimated damage for expenditure fraud (compared to 25 % last year); stresses, however, that in the 2023 PIF report, EPPO cases were not included in the analysis of fraud and irregularities affecting expenditure, unlike in other expenditure items, and that in the 2024 PIF Report different data is reported on EPPO investigations related to the RRF (279 investigations instead of 307, for an estimated total damage of EUR 2.7 billion instead of EUR 2.8 billion); calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the EPPO, to ensure consistent and clearly explained reporting of RRF and NGEU case figures across Commission and EPPO publications, including transparent reconciliation of methodological differences, to avoid weakening oversight and public trust;

Or. en

Amendment 155

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 44 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

44 a. Underlines that the RRF has played a crucial role in the EU’s post-pandemic recovery, but even at the current expectedly advanced implementing stage, the scarce information on results and the lack of information on actual costs is concerning;

Or. en

Amendment 156

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 45

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

45. Stresses the need for greater transparency in the implementation of the RRF and recalls that the ‘final beneficiary’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, so that information on the ‘final beneficiary’ must be made available; regrets that Member States are only required to publish information on the 100 final beneficiaries receiving the highest amounts, which constitutes an arbitrary limit preventing any visibility on the actual majority of beneficiaries and on the potential risks of fraud, mismanagement or conflicts of interest; points out that the examination of national practices reveals significant discrepancies in disclosure methods because some Member States report the amounts actually disbursed, others the amounts simply allocated, while others are limited to partial data or combined with national funding, which undermines the comparability, readability and reliability of the information published;

45. Stresses the need for greater transparency in the implementation of the RRF and recalls that the ‘final beneficiary’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, so that information on the ‘final beneficiary’ must be made available; welcome the fact that the Member States are required to publish information on the 100 final beneficiaries receiving the highest amounts; considers however that publishing information beyond the 100 final beneficiaries would enhance visibility on the full range of beneficiaries and support the effective identification of risks related to fraud, mismanagement or conflicts of interest; points out that the examination of national practices reveals significant discrepancies in disclosure methods, as some Member States report amounts actually disbursed, others amounts simply allocated, while others provide partial data or data combined with national funding, which undermines the comparability, readability and reliability of the information published; therefore calls harmonised EU wide publication standards, including common definitions and machine readable formats, to ensure consistent, comparable and usable information across Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 157

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 45

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

45. Stresses the need for greater transparency in the implementation of the RRF and recalls that the ‘final beneficiary’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, so that information on the ‘final beneficiary’ must be made available; regrets that Member States are only required to publish information on the 100 final beneficiaries receiving the highest amounts, which constitutes an arbitrary limit preventing any visibility on the actual majority of beneficiaries and on the potential risks of fraud, mismanagement or conflicts of interest; points out that the examination of national practices reveals significant discrepancies in disclosure methods because some Member States report the amounts actually disbursed, others the amounts simply allocated, while others are limited to partial data or combined with national funding, which undermines the comparability, readability and reliability of the information published;

45. Stresses the need for greater transparency in the implementation of the RRF; regrets that Member States are only required to publish information on the 100 final beneficiaries receiving the highest amounts, which constitutes an arbitrary limit preventing any visibility on the actual majority of beneficiaries and on the potential risks of fraud, mismanagement or conflicts of interest; points out that the examination of national practices reveals significant discrepancies in disclosure methods because some Member States report the amounts actually disbursed, others the amounts simply allocated, while others are limited to partial data or combined with national funding, which undermines the comparability, readability and reliability of the information published; calls for the publication of the full list of final recipients and beneficial owners for RRF-funded measures in a harmonised, machine-readable format across Member States, in order to enable effective public scrutiny and risk analysis, while ensuring full compliance with data-protection rules; stresses the need for a single audit trail in the future MFF allowing for the tracing of the budget contributions to the projects funded and the final beneficiaries, defined as the economic operators, not the receiving administrative entities;

Or. en

Amendment 158

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 45

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

45. Stresses the need for greater transparency in the implementation of the RRF and recalls that the ‘final beneficiary’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, so that information on the ‘final beneficiary’ must be made available; regrets that Member States are only required to publish information on the 100 final beneficiaries receiving the highest amounts, which constitutes an arbitrary limit preventing any visibility on the actual majority of beneficiaries and on the potential risks of fraud, mismanagement or conflicts of interest; points out that the examination of national practices reveals significant discrepancies in disclosure methods because some Member States report the amounts actually disbursed, others the amounts simply allocated, while others are limited to partial data or combined with national funding, which undermines the comparability, readability and reliability of the information published;

45. Stresses the need for greater transparency in the implementation of the RRF and recalls that the ‘final beneficiary’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, so that information on the ‘final beneficiary’ must be made available; regrets that Member States are only required to publish information on the 100 final beneficiaries receiving the highest amounts, which constitutes an arbitrary limit preventing any visibility on the actual majority of beneficiaries and on the potential risks of fraud, mismanagement or conflicts of interest; points out that the examination of national practices reveals significant discrepancies in disclosure methods because some Member States report the amounts actually disbursed, others the amounts simply allocated, while others are limited to partial data or combined with national funding, which undermines the comparability, readability and reliability of the information published; calls for the publication of complete lists of all final beneficiaries with standardised reporting formats across all Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 159

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 45 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

45 a. Calls on the Commission to introduce mandatory fraud and irregularity reporting via the Irregularity Management System (IMS) for all RRF-related cases, ensuring that irregularities and fraud affecting RRF funds are systematically recorded, comparable and monitored;

Or. en

Amendment 160

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 46

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

46. Reiterates its call on the Commission to strengthen its controls on the risk of double funding resulting from the financing, by both the EU budget and the RRF, of similar measures in similar areas, such as transport and energy infrastructure, which is enabled by the standard complementarity between the RRF and other EU instruments; recalls that the RRF is not linked to the reimbursement of costs actually incurred, but rather rewards the achievement of milestones and targets that could have been fully financed by funds other than the RRF, without this being noted due to the absence of a link in the RRF with the reimbursement of costs actually incurred; considers that limited data exchanges and insufficient use of data mining tools such as ARACHNE, together with a lack of direct access to the full list of RRF final beneficiaries, increase the level of risk; welcomes the precautions taken by some Member States to avoid combining the RRF with other Union instruments in order to mitigate the risk of double funding;

46. Reiterates its call on the Commission to strengthen its controls on the risk of double funding resulting from the financing, by both the EU budget and the RRF, of similar measures in similar areas, such as transport and energy infrastructure, which is enabled by the standard complementarity between the RRF and other EU instruments; recalls that the RRF is not linked to the reimbursement of costs actually incurred, but rather rewards the achievement of milestones and targets that could have been fully financed by funds other than the RRF, without this being noted due to the absence of a link in the RRF with the reimbursement of costs actually incurred; considers that limited data exchanges and insufficient use of data mining tools such as ARACHNE, together with a lack of direct access to the full list of RRF final beneficiaries, increase the level of risk; welcomes the precautions taken by some Member States to avoid combining the RRF with other Union instruments in order to mitigate the risk of double funding; reiterates its calls on the Commission to maintain adequate ex post audit procedures and to pay close attention to the risk of reversal after payment for the achievement of targets previously audited and assessed as satisfactorily fulfilled;

Or. en

Amendment 161

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 46

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

46. Reiterates its call on the Commission to strengthen its controls on the risk of double funding resulting from the financing, by both the EU budget and the RRF, of similar measures in similar areas, such as transport and energy infrastructure, which is enabled by the standard complementarity between the RRF and other EU instruments; recalls that the RRF is not linked to the reimbursement of costs actually incurred, but rather rewards the achievement of milestones and targets that could have been fully financed by funds other than the RRF, without this being noted due to the absence of a link in the RRF with the reimbursement of costs actually incurred; considers that limited data exchanges and insufficient use of data mining tools such as ARACHNE, together with a lack of direct access to the full list of RRF final beneficiaries, increase the level of risk; welcomes the precautions taken by some Member States to avoid combining the RRF with other Union instruments in order to mitigate the risk of double funding;

46. Reiterates its call on the Commission to strengthen its controls on the risk of double funding resulting from the financing, by both the EU budget and the RRF, of similar measures in similar areas, such as transport and energy infrastructure, which is enabled by the standard complementarity between the RRF and other EU instruments; recalls that the RRF is not linked to the reimbursement of costs actually incurred, but rather rewards the achievement of milestones and targets that could have been fully financed by funds other than the RRF, without this being noted due to the absence of a link in the RRF with the reimbursement of costs actually incurred; considers that limited data exchanges and insufficient use of data mining tools such as ARACHNE, together with a lack of direct access to the full list of RRF final beneficiaries, increase the level of risk; welcomes the precautions taken by some Member States to avoid combining the RRF with other Union instruments in order to mitigate the risk of double funding; calls on the Commission to accelerate work to enable direct, structured cooperation between Eurofisc and the EPPO and to maximise the use of data-mining tools (including ARACHNE) to prevent double funding and detect cross-border patterns;

Or. en

Amendment 162

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 46 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

46 a. Observes that the Commission mainly relies on Member States to detect and correct serious irregularities affecting RRF and to ensure compliance with EU and national rules, but the national controls systems do have weaknesses that could not find remedies in the implementation stage; stresses that this results in a substantial lack of sufficient assurance that control systems adequately protect the EU's financial interests, in the context of an error-prone facility, weakened by ambiguities in the legal framework, with often vaguely defined milestones/targets and where fraud risk is high; reiterates its call on the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 163

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 47

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

47. Appreciates the Union’s efforts, on the recommendation of the ECA, to ensure that anti-corruption measures are integrated into the EU’s external action instruments; maintains its recommendation to suspend budget support and withdraw funds from non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities clearly do not take any concrete action against widespread corruption, without compromising support to citizens;

47. Appreciates the Union’s efforts, on the recommendation of the ECA, to ensure that anti-corruption measures are integrated into the EU’s external action instruments; maintains its recommendation to suspend budget support and withdraw funds from non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities fail to take effective action against widespread corruption, while ensuring that support to citizens, civil society and humanitarian action is preserved;

Or. en

Amendment 164

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 47

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

47. Appreciates the Union’s efforts, on the recommendation of the ECA, to ensure that anti-corruption measures are integrated into the EU’s external action instruments; maintains its recommendation to suspend budget support and withdraw funds from non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities clearly do not take any concrete action against widespread corruption, without compromising support to citizens;

47. Appreciates the Union’s efforts, on the recommendation of the ECA, to ensure that anti-corruption measures are integrated into the EU’s external action instruments; maintains its recommendation to suspend budget support and withdraw funds from non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities clearly do not take any concrete action against widespread corruption, without compromising support to citizens; calls, before any further merit based enlargement of the EU, for a thorough and independent examination of the state of corruption and the rule of law in all candidate countries, with particular attention to those that would become net beneficiaries of the Union budget after accession, in order to prevent any damage to the financial interests of the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 165

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 48

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

48. Takes note of the conclusions of ECA special report 15/2025 on EU humanitarian aid under remote management, recognising that this management approach provides a useful framework for providing life-saving assistance in hard-to-reach areas, but that there are weaknesses in its design and implementation; observes that the Commission recognises that remote management is inherently more risky than direct implementation and that fraud and aid diversion are among the main risks, as the inability of humanitarian organisations and donors to monitor action on the ground increases the level of risk; notes that the Commission has a dedicated team, as do all donors, to deal with suspected cases of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses, however, that its risk register does not take into account the impact that remote management may have on the likelihood and impact of non-critical risks identified, such as the risk of reputational damage in the event of fraud, misuse of aid or non-compliance with ethical standards; stresses, in particular, that the insufficient integration of the risks inherent in remote management into its risk management, control and audit strategy may limit its ability to prevent, detect and adequately manage those risks, which entails a risk of damage to its reputation in the event of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses that the control strategy does not provide for any specific checks to address the inherent risks of remote management and that it does not take into account the impact of remote management on control tasks related to the fight against fraud or audits on the ground; underlines that, in fact, in the Commission’s 2021-2027 audit strategy, actions managed remotely do not automatically receive a higher risk rating in the risk-based selection of actions to be audited, despite the specific difficulties these actions face; agrees with the ECA’s recommendations, fully accepted by the Commission, on the need to improve the approach and guidance on remote management, to strengthen the certification process for non-governmental organisation partners, to verify the information provided by partners and to report on remote management to stakeholders; urges the Commission to act accordingly and to implement the ECA’s recommendation, which is fully accepted;

48. Takes note of the conclusions of ECA special report 15/2025 on EU humanitarian aid under remote management, recognising that this management approach provides a useful framework for providing life-saving assistance in hard-to-reach areas, but that there are weaknesses in its design and implementation; observes that Commission funds are managed remotely only as a last resort, that is in situations where humanitarian access is limited by security concerns or by decisions imposed by de jure or de facto authorities; stresses that the intrinsically difficult conditions under which the remote management is delivered makes it riskier than direct implementation, to which the Commission reverts as soon as possible, and it can also occasionally limit the ability of humanitarian organisations and donors to monitor action on the ground; notes that the Commission has a dedicated team, as do all donors, to deal with suspected cases of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses, however, that its risk register does not take into account the impact that remote management may have on the likelihood and impact of non-critical risks identified, such as the risk of reputational damage in the event of fraud, misuse of aid or non-compliance with ethical standards; stresses, in particular, that the insufficient integration of the risks inherent in remote management into its risk management, control and audit strategy may limit its ability to prevent, detect and adequately manage those risks, which entails a risk of damage to its reputation in the event of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses that the control strategy does not provide for any specific checks to address the inherent risks of remote management and that it does not take into account the impact of remote management on control tasks related to the fight against fraud or audits on the ground; underlines that, in fact, in the Commission’s 2021-2027 audit strategy, actions managed remotely do not automatically receive a higher risk rating in the risk-based selection of actions to be audited, despite the specific difficulties these actions face; agrees with the ECA’s recommendations, fully accepted by the Commission, on the need to improve the approach and guidance on remote management, to strengthen the certification process for non-governmental organisation partners, to verify the information provided by partners and to report on remote management to stakeholders; urges the Commission to act accordingly and to implement the ECA’s recommendation, which is fully accepted;

Or. en

Amendment 166

Damian Boeselager

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 48

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

48. Takes note of the conclusions of ECA special report 15/2025 on EU humanitarian aid under remote management, recognising that this management approach provides a useful framework for providing life-saving assistance in hard-to-reach areas, but that there are weaknesses in its design and implementation; observes that the Commission recognises that remote management is inherently more risky than direct implementation and that fraud and aid diversion are among the main risks, as the inability of humanitarian organisations and donors to monitor action on the ground increases the level of risk; notes that the Commission has a dedicated team, as do all donors, to deal with suspected cases of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses, however, that its risk register does not take into account the impact that remote management may have on the likelihood and impact of non-critical risks identified, such as the risk of reputational damage in the event of fraud, misuse of aid or non-compliance with ethical standards; stresses, in particular, that the insufficient integration of the risks inherent in remote management into its risk management, control and audit strategy may limit its ability to prevent, detect and adequately manage those risks, which entails a risk of damage to its reputation in the event of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses that the control strategy does not provide for any specific checks to address the inherent risks of remote management and that it does not take into account the impact of remote management on control tasks related to the fight against fraud or audits on the ground; underlines that, in fact, in the Commission’s 2021-2027 audit strategy, actions managed remotely do not automatically receive a higher risk rating in the risk-based selection of actions to be audited, despite the specific difficulties these actions face; agrees with the ECA’s recommendations, fully accepted by the Commission, on the need to improve the approach and guidance on remote management, to strengthen the certification process for non-governmental organisation partners, to verify the information provided by partners and to report on remote management to stakeholders; urges the Commission to act accordingly and to implement the ECA’s recommendation, which is fully accepted;

48. Takes note of the conclusions of ECA special report 15/2025 on EU humanitarian aid under remote management, recognising that this management approach provides a useful framework for providing life-saving assistance in hard-to-reach areas, but that there are weaknesses in its design and implementation; observes that the Commission recognises that remote management is inherently more risky than direct implementation and that fraud and aid diversion are among the main risks, as the inability of humanitarian organisations and donors to monitor action on the ground increases the level of risk; notes that the Commission has a dedicated team, as do all donors, to deal with suspected cases of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses, however, that its risk register does not take into account the impact that remote management may have on the likelihood and impact of non-critical risks identified, such as the risk of reputational damage in the event of fraud, misuse of aid or non-compliance with ethical standards; stresses, in particular, that the insufficient integration of the risks inherent in remote management into its risk management, control and audit strategy may limit its ability to prevent, detect and adequately manage those risks, which entails a risk of damage to its reputation in the event of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses that the control strategy does not provide for any specific checks to address the inherent risks of remote management and that it does not take into account the impact of remote management on control tasks related to the fight against fraud or audits on the ground; underlines that, in fact, in the Commission’s 2021-2027 audit strategy, actions managed remotely do not automatically receive a higher risk rating in the risk-based selection of actions to be audited, despite the specific difficulties these actions face; agrees with the ECA’s recommendations, fully accepted by the Commission, on the need to improve the approach and guidance on remote management, to strengthen the certification process for non-governmental organisation partners, to verify the information provided by partners and to report on remote management to stakeholders; urges the Commission to act accordingly, including by ensuring that remote management systematically results in a higher risk rating for audit selection, reinforced verification of partner-reported information and strengthened fraud-prevention and whistleblowing channels in high-risk environments, and to implement the ECA’s recommendation, which is fully accepted;

Or. en

Amendment 167

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 48 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

48 a. Stresses that Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction needs are considerable and will require sustained international support over the coming years; recalls that public funding alone will not be sufficient and that private sector involvement will be essential, alongside continued reforms to improve governance, accountability and the business environment; expresses concerns about recent reports of corruption cases, including allegations involving high-level officials, while acknowledging the progress made by Ukraine in advancing reforms on anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and accountability; highlights the efforts undertaken by Ukraine in the midst a full-fledged invasion; encourages Ukraine to continue these reforms, including efforts to address the influence of oligarchs, and calls on the Commission to further strengthen its oversight of EU funded activities in the country; stresses that EU support to Ukraine must be accompanied by robust measures to protect the Union’s financial interests, including effective prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities, in order to ensure that EU funds are properly monitored and reach their intended beneficiaries; recalls that the Ukraine Facility, established by Regulation (EU) 2024/792, is the Union’s main instrument to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and reforms, providing up to EUR 50 billion for the period 2024–2027; underlines the conditionality linked to the implementation of agreed reforms and respect for EU values; notes the role of the Framework Agreement between the EU and Ukraine in setting out safeguards to prevent and address fraud and corruption affecting the Union’s financial interests, including cooperation with OLAF; welcomes the designation of the Ukrainian State Audit Service as the national anti-fraud coordination point; appreciates the work of OLAF and the EPPO in protecting EU funds deployed in Ukraine, including recent investigations into serious irregularities in EU funded procurement; calls the Commission to further strengthen controls on EU support to Ukraine, including where fraud risks involve economic operators located outside Ukraine; encourages continued cooperation between EU bodies and the Ukrainian authorities;

Or. en

Amendment 168

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 48 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

48 a. Stresses that the unprecedented volume of financial support received by Ukraine from the EU in recent years, deployed in the extremely adverse conditions imposed by the ongoing war, requires the adoption of appropriate measures to ensure that such resources are employed as intended, in particular where they are aimed at benefitting people in need; appreciates, in this context, the important work carried out by OLAF and EPPO in protecting the EU financial interests, reminding that EPPO competences extend to EU funds even when used in third states;

Or. en

Amendment 169

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 48 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

48 a. Calls on the Commission to apply particular vigilance to the management of EU funds in the external dimension, including humanitarian aid and pre-accession assistance; stresses that remote management of humanitarian aid, while necessary in certain contexts, increases the risk of fraud and aid diversion; calls on the Commission to fully implement the ECA's recommendations on improving the approach to remote management, strengthening the certification process for NGO partners, and verifying the information provided by partners;

Or. en

Amendment 170

Rudi Kennes

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 48 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

48 b. Welcomes the decision not to adopt the legislation voted in Ukraine’s Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) in July 2025 which would have weakened the effectiveness of the actions by the Ukrainian specialised anti-corruption prosecutor’s office (SAPO) and by the national anti-corruption bureau (NABU), in particular in view of the recent cases of high-level corruption reported by the media, which underline the need for a precautionary and prudent approach when dealing with corruption offences, and the importance of the Ukrainian efforts to effectively pursue transparency goals;

Or. en

Amendment 171

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 48 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

48 b. Reiterates the need to strengthen the enforcement of EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus and underlines the role of Member States, OLAF and the EPPO in preventing sanctions’ circumvention and protecting the Union’s financial interests;

Or. en