Sittings · Document

DRAFT OPINION (COM(2021)0421 – C90340/2021 – 2021/0240(COD)) 2022-02-14

On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) 1094/2010, (EU) 1095/2010

Committee on Budgets · Rapporteur: Niclas Herbst

PA_Legam

SHORT JUSTIFICATION

According to Europol, around 1% of the EU’s GDP is involved in suspect financial activity. Money laundering and use of laundered illicit proceeds to finance terrorism pose a serious threat to the EU’s economy, to the wider financial system and to the security of Union citizens. Effective measures at EU level to tackle money laundering and counter terrorism financing are therefore essential.

The Commission’s proposal to establish a new decentralised agency - the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) - stems from the May 2020 ‘Action Plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and terrorist financing’ and is part of a package of four legislative proposals presented in July 2021. Under the proposal, AMLA would be responsible for coordinating national supervisory authorities to ensure correct and consistent application of EU rules and for supporting Financial Intelligence Units to enhance their analytical capacity and ability to provide effective financial intelligence for use in law enforcement. It would also directly supervise some of the riskiest financial institutions operating in a number of Member States or requiring immediate action to address imminent risks.

Your Rapporteur welcomes the central aims of the proposal and is convinced that AMLA can help improve the detection of suspicious transactions and close loopholes currently being exploited by criminals and terrorists. Nevertheless, in line with his approach to decentralised agency files, he considers that the policy substance of the proposal should be dealt with by the lead committees.

As such, the draft opinion focuses on those areas where the Committee on Budgets can add value, therefore in particular on the financial provisions, governance rules and provisions relating to reporting and evaluation to ensure proper parliamentary scrutiny. Your Rapporteur assesses the proposal notably against the 2019 Schoepflin report, the Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on decentralised agencies of 19 July 2012 and the Common Approach and the Framework Financial Regulation governing decentralised agencies.

Budgetary impact and financial provisions

According to the Commission proposal, AMLA will need to be fully resourced by the end of 2025 to enable direct supervision to begin in early 2026. AMLA would then have estimated annual outgoings of EUR 45.6 million and a staff of 250. The agency would be partially self-financed through fees, as is the case with a handful of existing agencies, such as the European Medicines Agency. The Commission intends that 75% of the agency’s revenue would come from fees levied on entities subject to anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism rules (‘obliged entities’) and the remaining 25% from the EU budget. The EU budget contribution is to come from the margin under Heading 1, which is to be welcomed as the creation of AMLA should therefore have no direct impact on existing programmes or other expenditure lines.

Your Rapporteur introduces a set of targeted amendments: a) to emphasise the need for the agency to be resourced in a manner commensurate with its tasks and responsibilities and to have the necessary autonomy over contract agent recruitment, learning the lessons from the early staffing challenges of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, b) to ensure that fees are calculated in such a way as to provide a stable revenue stream and thus predictability for the EU budget and c) to enhance transparency regarding all AMLA revenue. It will be essential in discussions on the scope of AMLA’s mandate to bear in mind the budgetary impact of any changes and to consider where potential additional resources may be found.

Governance, parliamentary scrutiny and evaluation

Your Rapporteur introduces a number of more technical amendments to ensure that provisions in the AMLA regulation comply fully with the principles in the Common Approach. This includes removing the Commission’s veto right over administrative and budgetary decisions taken by the Executive Board where it in any case has a voting right in accordance with standard practice in agency governance. Autonomy in budgetary and administrative decision-making is important for the Authority’s effectiveness.

Other amendments seek to enhance parliamentary scrutiny and accountability with respect to multiannual programming and the appointment of the Chair of the Authority and to ensure that the performance of the agency is fully assessed on a five-yearly basis to ensure that EU funds are being spent effectively.

AMENDMENTS

The Committee on Budgets calls on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, as the committee responsible, to take into account the following amendments:

Amendment 1

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6) Combining both direct and indirect supervisory competences over obliged entities, and also functioning as a support and cooperation mechanism for FIUs, is the most appropriate means of bringing about supervision and cooperation between FIUs at Union level. This should be achieved by creating an Authority which should combine independence and a high level of technical expertise and which should be established in line with the Joint Statement and Common Approach of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on decentralised agencies32 .

(6) Combining both direct and indirect supervisory competences over obliged entities, and also functioning as a support and cooperation mechanism for FIUs, is the most appropriate means of bringing about supervision and cooperation between FIUs at Union level. This should be achieved by creating an Authority which should combine independence and a high level of technical expertise. The Authority should be established and governed in accordance with the principles set out in the Joint Statement and Common Approach of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on decentralised agencies32 .

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32 https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/default/files/docs/body/joint_statement_and_common_approach_2012_en.pdf.

Or. en

Amendment 2

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(7) A seat agreement should be established between the Authority and the host Member State, stipulating the conditions of establishment of the seat and advantages conferred by the Member State on the Authority and its staff.

(7) The arrangements concerning the Authority’s seat should be laid down in a headquarters agreement between the Authority and the host Member State. That agreement should stipulate the conditions of establishment of the seat and the facilities to be provided by the Member State to the Authority and its staff.

Or. en

Justification

This brings the Recital into line with the wording in Article 87 and the Common Approach.

Amendment 3

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 37

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(37) The establishment of a solid governance structure within the Authority is essential for ensuring effective exercise of the tasks granted to the Authority, and for an efficient and objective decision-making process. Due to the complexity and variety of the tasks conferred on the Authority in both the supervision and FIU areas, the decisions cannot be taken by a single governing body, as is often the case in decentralised agencies. Whereas certain types of decisions, such as decisions on adoption of common instruments, need to be taken by representatives of appropriate authorities or FIUs, and respect voting rules of the TFEU, certain other decisions, such as the decisions towards individual selected obliged entities, or individual authorities, require a smaller decision-making body, whose members should be subject to appropriate accountability arrangements. Therefore, the Authority should comprise a General Board, and an Executive Board composed of five full-time independent members and of the Chair of the Authority.

(37) The establishment of a solid governance structure within the Authority is essential for ensuring effective exercise of the tasks granted to the Authority, and for an efficient and objective decision-making process. Due to the complexity and variety of the tasks conferred on the Authority in both the supervision and FIU areas, the decisions cannot be taken by a single governing body, as is often the case in decentralised agencies. Whereas certain types of decisions, such as decisions on adoption of common instruments, need to be taken by representatives of appropriate authorities or FIUs, and respect voting rules of the TFEU, other decisions, such as the decisions addressed to individual selected obliged entities or individual authorities, should be taken by a smaller decision-making body, the members of which should be subject to appropriate accountability arrangements. Therefore, the Authority should comprise a General Board, and an Executive Board composed of five full-time independent members and of the Chair of the Authority.

Or. en

Justification

To improve the clarity of the drafting.

Amendment 4

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 39

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(39) For a smooth decision making process, the tasks should be clearly divided: the General Board in FIU composition should decide on the relevant measures for FIUs, the General Board in supervisory composition should decide on delegated acts, guidelines and similar measures for obliged entities. The General Board in supervisory composition should also be able to provide its opinion and advice to the Executive Board on all draft decisions towards individual selected obliged entities proposed by the Joint Supervisory Teams. In absence of such opinion or advice, the decisions should be taken by the Executive Board. Whenever the Executive Board deviates from the advice provided by the General Board in supervisory composition in the final decision, it should explain the reasons thereof in writing.

(39) For a smooth decision-making process, the tasks should be clearly divided: the General Board in FIU composition should decide on the relevant measures for FIUs, while the General Board in supervisory composition should decide on delegated acts, guidelines and similar measures for obliged entities. The General Board in supervisory composition should also be able to provide its opinion and advice to the Executive Board before it adopts decisions addressed to individual selected obliged entities proposed by the Joint Supervisory Teams. Whenever the Executive Board deviates from the advice provided by the General Board in supervisory composition in the final decision, it should explain the reasons therefor in writing.

Or. en

Justification

It is stipulated elsewhere in the text that the Executive Board takes the decision in all cases and providing an opinion or advice is just an option for the General Board.

Amendment 5

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 40

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(40) For the purposes of voting and taking decisions, each Member State should have one voting representative. Therefore, the heads of public authorities should appoint a permanent representative as the voting member of the General Board in supervisory composition. Alternatively, depending on the subject-matter of the decision or agenda of a given General board meeting, public authorities of a Member State may decide on an ad-hoc representative. The practical arrangements related to decision-making and voting by the General Board members in supervisory composition should be laid down in the Rules of Procedure of the General Board, to be developed by the Authority.

(40) For the purposes of voting and taking decisions, each Member State should have one voting representative. Therefore, the heads of public authorities should either appoint a permanent representative as the voting member of the General Board in supervisory composition or decide on an ad-hoc representative depending on the subject-matter of the decision or agenda of a given General Board meeting. The practical arrangements related to decision-making and voting by the General Board members in supervisory composition should be laid down in the Rules of Procedure of the General Board, to be developed by the Authority.

Or. en

Justification

A simplification and clarification of the drafting to bring it into line with the articles.

Amendment 6

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 41

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(41) The Chair of the Authority should chair the General Board meetings and have a right to vote when decisions are taken by simple majority. The Commission should be a non-voting member on the General Board. To establish good cooperation with other relevant institutions, the General Board should also be able to admit other non-voting observers, such as a representative of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and of each of the three European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA) for the General Board in its Supervisory Composition and Europol, the EPPO and Eurojust for the General Board in its FIU composition, where matters that fall under their respective mandates are discussed or decided upon. To allow a smooth decision making process, decisions of the General Board should be taken by a simple majority, except for decisions concerning draft regulatory and implementing technical standards, guidelines and recommendations which should be taken by a qualified majority of Member State representatives in accordance with voting rules of the TFEU.

(41) The Chair of the Authority should chair the General Board meetings and have a right to vote when decisions are taken by simple majority. The Commission should be a non-voting member on the General Board. To establish good cooperation with other relevant institutions, the General Board should also be able to admit other non-voting observers. In particular, the General Board should invite a representative of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and of each of the three European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA) in its Supervisory Composition and Europol, the EPPO and Eurojust for the General Board in its FIU composition, where matters that fall under their respective mandates are discussed or decided upon. To allow a smooth decision-making process, decisions of the General Board should be taken by a simple majority, except for decisions concerning draft regulatory and implementing technical standards, guidelines and recommendations which should be taken by a qualified majority of Member State representatives in accordance with voting rules of the TFEU.

Or. en

Justification

To bring the wording into line with Article 46(4).

Amendment 7

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 42

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(42) The governing body of the Authority should be the Executive Board composed of the Chair of the Authority and of five full time members, appointed by the General Board based on the shortlist by the Commission. With the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision making process, the Executive Board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the Authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the General Board. In order to ensure objectivity and appropriate rapidity of the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities, the Executive Board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. In addition, together with a representative of the Commission the Executive Board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the Authority. The consent of the Commission should be required when the Executive Board is taking decisions related to the budget administration, procurement, recruitment, and audit of the Authority, given that a portion of funding of the Authority will be provided from Union budget.

(42) The governing body of the Authority should be the Executive Board composed of the Chair of the Authority and of five full-time members, appointed by the General Board based on a shortlist drawn up by the Commission. With the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision-making process, the Executive Board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the Authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the General Board. In order to ensure that the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities is objective and swift, the Executive Board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. In addition, together with a representative of the Commission, the Executive Board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the Authority.

Or. en

Justification

In line with changes in the article, this removes the veto right for the Commission, which is not in line with standard practice in agency governance or the Common Approach.

Amendment 8

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 43

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(43) To allow for swift decisions, all decisions of the Executive Board, including the decision where the Commission has a right to vote, should be taken by simple majority, with the Chair holding a casting vote in case of a tied vote. To ensure sound financial management of the Authority, the Commission’s consent should be required for decisions related to budget, administration and recruitment. The voting members of the Executive Board other than the Chair should be selected by the General Board, based on a short-list established by the Commission.

(43) To allow for swift decisions, all decisions of the Executive Board, including the decisions where the Commission has a right to vote, should be taken by simple majority, with the Chair holding a casting vote in case of a tied vote. The members of the Executive Board other than the Chair should be selected by the General Board, based on a shortlist established by the Commission.

Or. en

Justification

In line with changes in the article, this removes the veto right for the Commission, which is not in line with standard practice in agency governance or the Common Approach.

Amendment 9

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 44

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(44) To ensure the independent functioning of the Authority the five Members of the Executive Board and the Chair of the Authority should act independently and in the interest of the Union as a whole. They should behave, both during and after their term of office, with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. To avoid giving any impression that a Member of the Executive Board might use its position as a Member of the Executive Board of the Authority to get a high-ranking appointment in the private sector after his term of office and to prevent any post-public employment conflicts of interests, a cooling-off period for the five Members of the Executive Board, including the Chair of the Authority, should be introduced.

(44) To ensure the independent functioning of the Authority the five Members of the Executive Board and the Chair of the Authority should act independently and in the interest of the Union as a whole. They should behave, both during and after their term of office, with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. In order to avoid a Member of the Executive Board potentially using his or her position to get a high-ranking appointment in the private sector after his term of office and to prevent any post-public employment conflicts of interests, a cooling-off period for the five Members of the Executive Board, including the Chair of the Authority, should be introduced such that they do not take up gainful employment in a selected obliged entity or in any other role that may give rise to a real or perceived conflict of interests.

Or. en

Justification

To more clearly explain the nature of the cooling-off period for Members of the Executive Board.

Amendment 10

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 46

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(46) The Executive Director of the Authority should be appointed by the Executive Board based on a shortlist from the Commission. The Executive Director of the Authority should be a senior administrative official of the Authority, in charge of the day-to-day management of the Authority, and responsible for budget administration, procurement, and recruitment and staffing.

(46) The Executive Director of the Authority should be appointed by the Executive Board based on a shortlist from the Commission. The Executive Director of the Authority should be in charge of the day-to-day management of the Authority, and responsible for budget administration, procurement, and recruitment and staffing.

Or. en

Justification

The Executive Director's tasks are stipulated in the regulation and he/she is by definition the senior official.

Amendment 11

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 48

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(48) To guarantee the proper functioning of the Authority, funding should be provided by a combination of fees levied on certain obliged entities and a contribution from the Union budget, depending on the tasks and functions. The budget of the Authority should be part of the Union budget, confirmed by the Budgetary Authority on the basis of a proposal from the Commission. The Authority should submit to the Commission a draft budget and an internal financial regulation for approval.

(48) It is necessary to provide the Authority with the requisite human and financial resources so that it can fulfil the objectives, tasks and responsibilities assigned to it under this Regulation. In order to ensure that the Authority can respond flexibly to human resource needs, it is in particular appropriate that it has autonomy regarding the recruitment of contract agents. To guarantee the proper functioning of the Authority, funding should be provided by a combination of fees levied on certain obliged entities and a contribution from the Union budget. The budget of the Authority should be part of the Union budget. The contribution from the Union budget is to be decided by the Budgetary Authority through the budgetary procedure. To that end, the Authority should submit to the Commission a statement of estimates. It should also adopt financial rules after consulting the Commission.

Or. en

Justification

To properly reflect the role of the Budgetary Authority and to make clear that adequate staffing and funding is required to enable AMLA to function. This may require a revision of the financial statement if the scope is expanded. Moreover, in light of experience with EPPO, emphasises the need for AMLA to have autonomy over contract agent recruitment.

Amendment 12

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 49

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(49) To ensure that the Authority can also fulfil its tasks as direct and indirect supervisor of obliged entities, an adequate mechanism for the determination and the collection of the fees should be introduced. As regards the fees levied on selected obliged entities and certain non-selected obliged entities, the methodology for their calculation and the process of collection of fees should be developed in a delegated act of the Commission. The methodology should be based on the risk of the directly and indirectly supervised entities as well as their turnover or revenue.

Or. en

Amendment 13

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 50

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(50) The rules on establishment and implementation of the budget of the Authority, as well as the presentation of annual accounts of the Authority, should follow the provisions of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/71536 as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations.

(50) The rules on establishment and implementation of the budget of the Authority, as well as the presentation of annual accounts of the Authority, should follow the provisions of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/71536 including as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations.

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36 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 122, 10.5.2019, p. 1).

Or. en

Justification

Cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF is one of many provisions in the Delegated Financial Regulation, which applies in full.

Amendment 14

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 51

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(51) In order to prevent and effectively combat internal fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity within the Authority, it should be subject to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations. The Authority should accede to Interinstitutional Agreement concerning internal investigations by OLAF, which should be able, to carry out on-the-spot checks within the area of its competence.

(51) In order to prevent and effectively combat internal fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity within the Authority, it should be subject to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. The Authority should accede to Interinstitutional Agreement concerning internal investigations by OLAF, which should be able, to carry out on-the-spot checks within the area of its competence.

Or. en

Justification

Regulation 883/2013 is the OLAF regulation so relates only to OLAF's role in conducting investigations etc.

Amendment 15

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 64 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(64a) At five-yearly intervals after the Authority becomes fully operational, the Commission should conduct a thorough review of the Authority’s performance in relation to its mandate, objectives, tasks and value for money.

Or. en

Justification

In line with the amendment to Article 88, the evaluation should review the Authority's performance every five years.

Amendment 16

Proposal for a regulation

Article 46 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The heads of the supervisory authorities referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b) in each Member State shall share a single vote and shall agree on a single common representative for each meeting and voting procedure. That common representative shall be the ad-hoc voting member for the purposes of that meeting or voting procedure. The public authorities in a Member State may also agree on a single permanent common representative who shall be a permanent voting member. Where items to be discussed by the General Board in supervisory composition concern the competence of several public authorities, the ad-hoc or permanent voting member may be accompanied by a representative from up to two other public authorities, who shall be non-voting.

The heads of the supervisory authorities referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b) in each Member State shall share a single vote and shall appoint a single common representative, either a permanent voting representative or an ad-hoc voting representative for the purposes of a specific meeting or voting procedure. Where items to be discussed by the General Board in supervisory composition concern the competence of several public authorities, the single common representative may be accompanied by a representative from up to two other public authorities, who shall be non-voting.

Or. en

Justification

Proposed simplification of drafting.

Amendment 17

Proposal for a regulation

Article 46 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Each public authority that has a voting member under ad-hoc or permanent agreement shall be responsible for nominating a high-level alternate from its authority, who may replace the voting member of the General Board referred to in the second sub-paragraph where that person is prevented from attending.

Each public authority that has a voting member under ad-hoc or permanent agreement shall be responsible for appointing an alternate from its authority, who may replace the voting member of the General Board referred to in the second sub-paragraph where that person is prevented from attending.

Or. en

Justification

The meaning of 'high-level' is unclear and it should be for the authority to decide freely on alternate that replaces the voting member and therefore casts a vote on behalf of the authority.

Amendment 18

Proposal for a regulation

Article 52 – paragraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. The term of office of the five members of the Executive Board shall be four years. In the course of the 12 months preceding the end of the four-year term of office of the Chair of the Authority and five members of the Executive Board, the General Board in both compositions or a smaller committee selected among General Board members including a Commission representative shall carry out an assessment of performance of the Executive Board. The assessment shall take into account an evaluation of the Executive Board members’ performance and the Authority’s future tasks and challenges. Based on the assessment, the General Board in both compositions may extend their term of office once.

4. The term of office of the five members of the Executive Board shall be four years. In the course of the 12 months preceding the end of the four-year term of office of the Chair of the Authority and five members of the Executive Board, the General Board in both compositions or a smaller committee selected among General Board members and including a Commission representative shall carry out an assessment of performance of the Executive Board. The assessment shall take into account the Executive Board members’ performance and the Authority’s future tasks and challenges. Based on the assessment, the General Board in both compositions may renew their term of office once.

Or. en

Amendment 19

Proposal for a regulation

Article 53 – paragraph 4 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) adopt, by 30 November of each year, on the basis of a proposal by the Executive Director, the draft Single Programming Document, and shall transmit it for information to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission by 31 January the following year, as well as any other updated version of the document ;

(a) adopt, by 30 November of each year, on the basis of a proposal by the Executive Director, the draft Single Programming Document in accordance with Article 54, and shall transmit it for information to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission by 31 January the following year, as well as any other updated version of the document ;

Or. en

Amendment 20

Proposal for a regulation

Article 54 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

By 30 November each year the Executive Board shall adopt a Single Programming Document containing multiannual and annual programming, based on a draft put forward by the Executive Director, taking into account the opinion of the Commission and in relation to multiannual programming after consulting the European Parliament. If the Executive Board decides not to take into account elements of the opinion of the Commission, it shall provide a thorough justification therefor. The obligation to provide a thorough justification shall also apply to the elements raised by the European Parliament when it is consulted. The Executive Board shall forward the Single Programming Document to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.

Or. en

Justification

This provision is included, for example, in the Frontex Regulation and strengthens accountability.

Amendment 21

Proposal for a regulation

Article 55 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. A representative of the Commission shall have a right to vote whenever matters pertaining to Article 53(4) points (a) to (l) are discussed and decided upon. For the purposes of taking the decisions referred to in Article 53(4), points (f) and (g), the representative of the Commission shall have one vote. The decisions referred to in Article 53(4), points (b) to (e) and (h) to (l) may only be taken if the representative of the Commission casts a positive vote. For the purposes of taking the decisions referred to in Article 53(4), point (a), the consent of the representative of the Commission shall only be required on the elements of the decision not related to the annual and multi-annual working programme of the Authority.

2. A representative of the Commission shall have a right to vote whenever matters pertaining to Article 53(4) points (a) to (l) are discussed and decided upon.

Or. en

Justification

Granting the Commission a veto right in such cases is not in line with standard agency governance or the Common Approach.

Amendment 22

Proposal for a regulation

Article 56 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The Chair of the Authority shall be selected on the basis of merit, skills, knowledge, recognised standing and experience in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and other relevant qualification, following an open selection procedure which shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Commission shall draw up a shortlist of two qualified candidates for the position of the Chair of the Authority. The Council, after approval by the European Parliament, shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair of the Authority.

1. The Chair of the Authority shall be selected on the basis of merit, skills, knowledge, recognised standing and experience in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and other relevant qualification, following an open selection procedure which shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Commission shall draw up a shortlist of two qualified candidates for the position of the Chair of the Authority. The shortlisted candidates shall be invited to appear before the Council and the competent committees of the European Parliament. The Council shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair of the Authority having obtained the consent of the European Parliament.

Or. en

Justification

The intention of the draft provision lacks clarity. Furthermore, the Chair of the Authority should be heard by both Council and Parliament and Parliament should give its consent to his/her appointment.

Amendment 23

Proposal for a regulation

Article 58 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. The Executive Director shall perform his duties in the interests of the Union, and independently of any specific interests.

2. The Executive Director shall perform his or her duties in the interests of the Union, and independently of any specific interests.

Or. en

Amendment 24

Proposal for a regulation

Article 59 – paragraph 1 – point i

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(i) preparing the Authority’s draft statement of estimates of revenue and expenditure and implementing its budget;

(i) preparing the Authority’s draft statement of estimates of revenue and expenditure as part of the draft Single Programming Document pursuant to Article 66 and implementing its budget pursuant to Article 67;

Or. en

Justification

This task is repeated in point (l). Point (l) is therefore deleted and all the detail is added to point (i).

Amendment 25

Proposal for a regulation

Article 59 – paragraph 1 – point l

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(l) drawing up a draft statement of estimates of the Authority’s revenue and expenditure as part of Authority’s Single Programming Document pursuant to Article 66 and shall implement the budget of the Authority pursuant to Article 67;

deleted

Or. en

Justification

Covered in point (i).

Amendment 26

Proposal for a regulation

Article 59 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. The Executive Director shall decide whether it is necessary to locate one or more staff in one or more Member States for the purpose of carrying out the Authority's tasks in an efficient and effective manner. Before deciding to establish a local office, the Executive Director shall obtain the prior consent of the Commission, the Executive Board and the Member State(s) concerned. The decision shall specify the scope of the activities to be carried out at the local office in a manner that avoids unnecessary costs and duplication of administrative functions of the Authority. A headquarters agreement with the Member State(s) concerned shall be concluded.

3. The Executive Director shall decide whether it is necessary to locate one or more staff in one or more Member States for the purpose of carrying out the Authority's tasks in an efficient and effective manner. Before deciding to establish a local office, the Executive Director shall obtain the prior consent of the Commission, the Executive Board and the Member State(s) concerned. The decision shall specify the scope of the activities to be carried out at the local office in a manner that avoids unnecessary costs and duplication of administrative functions of the Authority. An agreement with the Member State(s) concerned shall be concluded accordingly.

Or. en

Justification

The agreement does not relate to the headquarters of the agency, but to a satellite office.

Amendment 27

Proposal for a regulation

Article 64 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The amount and origin of any revenue referred to in points (b) and (c) of the first sub-paragraph of this paragraph shall be included in the annual accounts of the Authority and clearly detailed in the annual report on the Authority’s budgetary and financial management referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 68.

Or. en

Justification

To ensure transparency of revenue and safeguard the role of the budgetary authority.

Amendment 28

Proposal for a regulation

Article 65 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1a. The fees to be levied shall be calculated in such a way as to ensure stable revenue for the Agency.

Or. en

Justification

It is important that fees provide stable and predictable revenue so as to ensure stability and predictability for the EU budget.

Amendment 29

Proposal for a regulation

Article 88 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. By 31 December 2029, and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall assess the Authority’s performance in relation to its objectives, mandate, tasks and location(s), in accordance with the Commission's guidelines. The evaluation shall, in particular, address:

1. By 31 December 2028, and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall assess the Authority’s performance in relation to its objectives, mandate, tasks and location(s), in accordance with the Commission's guidelines. Based on the results of the Authority, the evaluation shall examine whether the continuation of the Authority is still justified with regard to its objectives, mandate and tasks. It shall, in particular, address:

Or. en

Justification

AMLA is operational from 1 January 2024 and the five-year cycle should apply from the beginning. Moreover, there is no need to assess results and continuation of the Authority only every 10 years. Proper use of Union funds requires more frequent analysis.

Amendment 30

Proposal for a regulation

Article 88 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. On the occasion of every second evaluation, there shall be an assessment of the results achieved by the Authority having regard to its objectives, mandate and tasks, including an assessment of whether the continuation of the Authority is still justified with regard to these objectives, mandate and tasks.

deleted

Or. en

Justification

See amendment above. Proper use of Union funding requires frequent assessment of results, including an evaluation whether the continuation of the Authority is still justified.