On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents
AFET-PA-750145
Committee on Foreign Affairs · Rapporteur: Dragoş Tudorache
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This is the draft opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the proposed regulation on EU cybersecurity solidarity and capacities. It amends the proposal to add a defence dimension, reduce reliance on high-risk suppliers, and extend support to third countries.¶¶¶ The amendments add a 'defence pillar' to National and Cross-border Security Operations Centres and link them to the cyber defence community, EU-CyCLONe, the CSIRTs network and the Commission.¶¶¶ They require de-risking from high-risk suppliers of critical products, including replacement and phasing out of such equipment, and set conditions for trusted providers.¶¶¶ They extend the EU Cybersecurity Reserve and Cyber Emergency Mechanism to third countries, in particular EU candidate countries, CSDP missions and countries with an EPF assistance measure.¶¶¶ They adjust funding rules for joint procurement and carry-over, and require the Commission to report on evaluation every two years after an initial three-year period.¶¶¶
Committee position. The rapporteur proposes amendments to the Commission proposal to add a defence dimension, reduce dependencies on high-risk suppliers, and extend support to third countries, including EU candidate countries and those with CSDP missions or EPF measures.¶¶¶
Key points
- Recital 2 is amended to state that the gravity of cyber threats became more relevant due to the return of war on the continent, beyond Russia's military aggression on Ukraine.¶
- A new recital states that cybersecurity is crucial to keep the Union safe and prevent malicious state and non-state actors from undermining democracy, economy and security.¶
- Recital 3 is amended to add that the Union should increase capacities on collection and analysis of data on cybersecurity threats and incidents and ability to react.¶
- Recital 4 is amended to add that the EU-NATO task force recommended making full use of synergies, including exchange of best practices between civilian and military actors.¶
- Recital 6 is amended to stress the need for enhanced civil-military coordination, and a new recital calls for crisis management structures involving the cyber defence community and CSDP operations.¶¶
- Recital 11 is amended to allow longer-term financial support for joint procurement of next-generation ultra-secure tools and infrastructure using AI and data analytics.¶
- National SOCs should allow participation of defence entities as a 'defence pillar', and Cross-border SOCs should include a defence pillar and share military data when necessary with safeguards.¶¶
- Cross-border SOCs should cooperate with MICNET and share information with EU-CyCLONe, the CSIRTs network, the cyber defence community and the Commission, including the High Representative and EEAS for third-country matters.¶¶¶
- Entities in the European Cyber Shield should use state-of-the-art tools excluding high-risk suppliers, and a new recital calls for minimising exposure to high-risk suppliers through a common strategic framework for EU economic security.¶¶
- The Cyber Emergency Mechanism should support third countries, especially EU candidate countries aligned with CFSP and CSDP, in particular Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, and coordinate with the EPF, CFSP and NDICI.¶¶
- The EU Cybersecurity Reserve should be open to third countries associated to DEP and those with a CSDP mission or EPF assistance measure, and may support CSDP missions.¶¶¶
- The Commission shall report on evaluation and review every two years after an initial three-year period.¶
Who is affected
- Member States' National SOCs, which must include a defence pillar and meet security and procurement conditions.¶¶¶
- Cross-border SOCs, which must include a defence pillar and share information with EU bodies and the cyber defence community.¶¶¶
- Private providers of managed security services, which must meet criteria including independence from systemic rivals.¶¶¶
- Third countries, especially EU candidate countries and those with CSDP missions or EPF measures, which may receive support.¶¶¶
- Entities operating in critical and highly critical sectors, which are subject to coordinated testing and may receive assistance.¶¶
Figures and deadlines
- Union financial contribution covers up to 50% of acquisition costs and up to 50% of operation costs for National SOCs.¶
- Union financial contribution covers up to 75% of acquisition costs and up to 50% of operation costs for the Hosting Consortium.¶
- The Commission shall submit an evaluation report three years after the date of application and every two years after.¶