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REPORT (2023/2072(INI))

On the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union

A-9-2023-0401

Committee on Foreign Affairs · Rapporteur: Klemen Grošelj

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✦ In short · AI summary of this text, generated 26 Sept 2026

Written by a language model from the full text only; every figure comes from the text. The paragraph links open the paragraph a statement rests on — check the text itself before relying on it.

Parliament's resolution examines the security and defence risks of China's influence over EU critical infrastructure, especially through its military-civil fusion strategy. It calls for screening of investments, diversification of supply chains, exclusion of Chinese 5G equipment and a rapid response mechanism for dual-use infrastructure. It warns about Chinese stakes in European ports, undersea cables and technology, and about dependencies on Chinese rare earths and critical raw materials. It asks the Commission to map critical assets, strengthen FDI screening and extend de-risking to EU partners.

Committee position. The Committee on Foreign Affairs proposes that Parliament adopt the resolution, which sets out concerns about China's military-civil fusion strategy and calls for stronger screening, diversification and protection of EU critical infrastructure.

Key points

  1. Underlines that China's military-civil fusion strategy is a state-led programme to acquire cutting-edge technologies and strengthen the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army.
  2. Warns that Chinese companies' international activities support the CCP's goals of expanding influence, undermining geopolitical rivals and increasing China's influence.
  3. Urges Member States to increase regulatory oversight and introduce background checks on individuals and entities with direct ties to the Chinese government.
  4. Calls for diversifying sources of critical raw materials and rare earths, establishing strategic partnerships with reliable third countries and assisting Member States in projects for greater independence from Chinese production.
  5. Calls on the Council and Commission to exclude equipment and software from manufacturers based in the PRC in core network functions, and on the Commission to propose additional security standards for 5G and 6G suppliers.
  6. Welcomes the suspension of TikTok on EU institutions' devices and considers the app a potential risk and source of Chinese-backed disinformation.
  7. Calls on the Commission to compile an exhaustive inventory of critical assets and systematically evaluate their vulnerability to external influences.
  8. Calls for expanded screening procedures for all stakeholders in EU critical infrastructure projects, including collaborative ventures, partnerships and technology transfers, and for due-diligence standards.
  9. Calls on the Commission to design a rapid response mechanism for detecting dual use or misuse of EU infrastructures under Chinese ownership, participation or concession.
  10. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate security risks from undersea cable system suppliers, including stricter monitoring of ownership structures.
  11. Calls on the Commission and EEAS to extend de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies to EU accession countries and neighbourhood partners.
  12. Calls on the Commission to present an EU strategic policy framework to reduce and limit influence and operational control by China and other regimes in European ports.

Who is affected

  • EU Member States, which are urged to implement FDI screening, increase oversight and reduce espionage risks in critical infrastructure.
  • The Commission, which is asked to propose new legislative frameworks, compile an inventory of critical assets and report annually to Parliament.
  • Chinese companies with links to the Chinese government or military, which face exclusion from core network functions and screening of their participation in EU projects.
  • EU accession countries and neighbourhood partners, to which de-risking and diversification measures should be extended.

Figures and deadlines

  • European ports with Chinese state-owned company stakes handle more than 10 % of Europe's total shipping container capacity.
  • The three largest Chinese shareholders in European ports have assets in almost half the ports (14 out of 29) located close to naval bases or providing logistical support to NATO forces.
  • 98 % of EU demand for rare earths is met by the PRC.
  • China produces 70 % of the world's batteries, accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production.
  • China produces 94 % of global gallium and around 60 % of germanium, and is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing.
  • China produces 84 % of the world's nickel and 85 % of its cobalt.
  • The EU's record trade deficit with China was EUR 396 billion in 2022.
  • 100 % of the 5G RAN in Cyprus is composed of Chinese equipment, and 59 % in the case of Germany.

Legal basis: Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy.