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Report (COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD)) 2026-04-22

Generalised scheme of tariff preferences

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22.4.2026 A9-0147/132

Amendment 132

Markus Buchheit

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A9-0147/2022

Bernd Lange

Generalised scheme of tariff preferences

(COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3) The Union's common commercial policy is to be consistent with and to consolidate the objectives of the Union policy in the field of development cooperation, laid down in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular the eradication of poverty and the promotion of sustainable economic, social, and environmental development and good governance in the developing countries. It is to comply with World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) requirements, in particular with the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the ‘Enabling Clause’), adopted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) in 1979, under which WTO Members may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries.

(3) The Union's common commercial policy, including the scheme of generalised tariff preferences, should primarily promote international trade and economic development in partner countries while safeguarding the competitiveness of Union industry. It shall comply with World Trade Organisation (WTO) requirements, in particular with the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the ‘Enabling Clause’), adopted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1979, under which WTO Members may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries. The scheme should not be turned into an instrument for pursuing broader external, climate or social policy aims going beyond the Union’s explicit trade competences under the Treaties.

Or. en

22.4.2026 A9-0147/133

Amendment 133

Markus Buchheit

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A9-0147/2022

Bernd Lange

Generalised scheme of tariff preferences

(COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 and to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry’s interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/200815 .

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support economic growth and diversification in beneficiary countries by granting unilateral trade preferences, while averting harm to the interests of Union industry. The scheme should promote mutually beneficial trade relations and create incentives for market-based development, without binding the Union to the broader political agenda and targets contained in Agenda 2030 and other non-binding international frameworks.

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15 Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

Or. en

22.4.2026 A9-0147/134

Amendment 134

Markus Buchheit

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A9-0147/2022

Bernd Lange

Generalised scheme of tariff preferences

(COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 9

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.

(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme’s tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. The determination of GSP-eligible countries shall be based on objective, transparent economic criteria and shall not be used as a tool for the geopolitical exclusion of specific countries or country groups. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.

Or. en

22.4.2026 A9-0147/135

Amendment 135

Markus Buchheit

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A9-0147/2022

Bernd Lange

Generalised scheme of tariff preferences

(COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 203018 . In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

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18 United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld

Or. en

22.4.2026 A9-0147/136

Amendment 136

Markus Buchheit

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A9-0147/2022

Bernd Lange

Generalised scheme of tariff preferences

(COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(17) For the purposes of monitoring of implementation and, where applicable, withdrawal of tariff preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. However, such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the Commission, including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes, and through other sources of information, provided they are accurate and reliable. This could include information from the European Parliament and the Council, governments, international organisations, civil society, social partners, or complaints received through the SEP provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. Shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the Commission’s future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner.

(17) For the purposes of monitoring of implementation and, where applicable, withdrawal of tariff preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. Such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the Commission, provided it is accurate and reliable. This may include information from the European Parliament and the Council, governments and international organisations. Information submitted by private actors shall not confer upon them any special complaint, control or co-decision rights within the framework of this Regulation. Shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the Commission’s future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner.

Or. en

22.4.2026 A9-0147/137

Amendment 137

Markus Buchheit

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A9-0147/2022

Bernd Lange

Generalised scheme of tariff preferences

(COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 24

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(24) Product graduation should be based on criteria related to sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff. Product graduation should apply in respect of a section or sub-section in order to reduce cases where heterogeneous products are graduated. The graduation of a section or a sub-section (made up of chapters) for a beneficiary country should be applied when the section meets the criteria for graduation over three consecutive years, in order to increase predictability and fairness of graduation by eliminating the effect of large and exceptional variations in the import statistics. Product graduation should not apply to the beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) and the beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the least-developed countries (EBA) as they share a very similar economic profile rendering them vulnerable because of a low, non-diversified export base.- The tariff preferences provided for in this Regulation apply to products originating in the beneficiary countries in accordance with the rules of origin laid down in the Union Customs Code and the legal acts adopted in accordance with the powers conferred by that Code, in particular Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/244619 . and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/244720 . Regional cumulation between countries of different regional groups and extended cumulation should be granted provided that the applicant beneficiary country brings sufficient evidence that cumulation responds to its development, financing and trade needs, thus leading, amongst others, to economic growth, elimination of poverty, diversification of exports and industrialisation, and provided that it does not impact negatively on the situation of other countries, especially EBA beneficiary countries. When assessing whether granting cumulation responds to the requesting country’s development, financing and trade needs, the Commission should take into account the beneficiary country’s dependency on the supplying country and future perspectives with regard to the products in question.

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19 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 1).

20 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 558–893).

Or. en

22.4.2026 A9-0147/138

Amendment 138

Markus Buchheit

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A9-0147/2022

Bernd Lange

Generalised scheme of tariff preferences

(COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 25

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance,so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union’s zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights and good governance,so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union’s zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI. Temporary withdrawal should be based exclusively on clearly defined, serious and systematic violations of core human and labour rights and on the other specific grounds explicitly set out in this Regulation, and should not be used as a tool to promote broader climate, environmental or social policy agendas.

Or. en

22.4.2026 A9-0147/139

Amendment 139

Markus Buchheit

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A9-0147/2022

Bernd Lange

Generalised scheme of tariff preferences

(COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 27 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(27 a) The unilateral trade preferences under this Regulation should also take into account the Union’s legitimate interests in the field of migration. Beneficiary countries are expected to cooperate effectively with the Union and its Member States on the return and readmission of their own nationals and certain third-country nationals who reside unlawfully in the Union. In cases of insufficient cooperation on readmission, temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences should be possible.

Or. en