On opportunities and challenges presented by a comprehensive artificial intelligence strategy for EU trade

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on opportunities and challenges presented by a comprehensive artificial intelligence strategy for EU trade

(2025/2112(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act)1,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)2,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Chips Act)3,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA))4

– having regard to the outcomes of the Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington DC on 4 February 2026, and to ongoing EU-US cooperation to diversify and strengthen secure, sustainable critical raw materials supply chains essential for the EU’s competitiveness, advanced technologies and resilience in global markets,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union5,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries6,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items7 (Dual-Use Regulation),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 November 2025 entitled ‘Data union strategy – unlocking data for AI’ (COM(2025)0835),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 January 2024 entitled ‘Advancing European economic security: an introduction to five new initiatives’ (COM(2024)0024),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 December 2025 entitled ‘Strengthening EU economic security’ (JOIN(2025)0977),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 June 2025 entitled ‘An International Digital Strategy for the European Union’ (JOIN(2025)0140),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 9 April 2025 on the AI Continent Action Plan (COM(2025)0165),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 October 2025 entitled ‘Apply AI Strategy’ (COM(2025)0723),

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a Market’ (Letta report),

– having regard to its resolution of 9 July 2025 on product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports8,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2025 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement on Digital Trade between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore9,

– having regard to the principal role the World Trade Organization (WTO) plays in upholding a rules-based multilateral trading system, and to its importance for the deployment of emerging technologies including artificial intelligence in international trade,

– having regard to WTO rules, in particular the principles of non-discrimination and of transparency regarding export restrictions,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0122/2026),

A. whereas artificial intelligence (AI) is a general-purpose technology reshaping EU trade across goods, services and data flows; whereas AI has the potential to lower information and compliance costs, transform supply-chain management and expand digitally delivered services; whereas AI and the power dynamics of the ownership of technology present significant challenges and transformative opportunities to the EU’s trade competitiveness; whereas EU trade policy is pivotal to ensuring a holistic external AI strategy that combines openness, transparency and safety with resilience and respect for fundamental rights, and supports predictable cross-border operations; whereas AI presents significant opportunities to enhance the efficiency and security of customs controls and market surveillance in the European Union, combating fraud, counterfeiting and unfair trade practices;

B. whereas the rapid diffusion and deployment of AI is contributing to structural changes in the organisation, geography and governance of international services trade, with implications for competitiveness, employment and development; whereas AI open-source solutions offer significant advantages, including reduced costs and enhanced data privacy via local deployment, contributing to an increase in healthy competition in AI and reduced dependence from non-EU providers; whereas these changes interact with existing gaps in production capacity, infrastructure and skills within the EU and beyond; whereas maintaining an open, resilient and inclusive sustainable trade model requires a coherent and holistic strategy to manage AI-driven change; whereas the EU’s external economic relations, including with partners in the Global South, should support inclusive AI uptake and shared value creation, while promoting a human-centric model based on an ethics-by-default principle focused on supporting human dignity;

C. whereas cross-border data flows and access to data are critical for AI development, training and deployment, but need to be examined carefully in order to ensure that a high level of data protection remains guaranteed, notably for sensitive personal data such as health data; whereas digital trade rules increasingly shape AI competitiveness, underlining the need for provisions on regulatory cooperation in future trade agreements and the modernisation of existing ones; whereas the EU’s human-centric framework, anchored in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Artificial Intelligence Act, provides a credible model for trustworthy AI that, if promoted internationally, can become a competitive advantage in markets valuing transparency and rights-respecting governance; whereas the WTO could be the appropriate forum for multilateral discussions on AI and trade to address competitive distortions, trade barriers, and risks of regulatory fragmentation, ensuring predictable, fair, and rights-respecting digital trade;

D. whereas AI use remains uneven across sectors, regions and company sizes, with advantages accruing to actors controlling data, computing power and skills, risking widened productivity and export gaps for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and companies adopting AI at a later stage; whereas AI-enabled trade competitiveness depends on access to data, computing capacity, energy, connectivity, capital and skills, and many of these factors are influenced by trade and investment relations; whereas the EU attracted only 6 % of global investment in AI start-ups in the first half of 2024, creating structural dependencies which have an impact on trade relations and European strategic autonomy; whereas fair access to AI infrastructure is essential for SMEs to remain competitive, as they face significant hurdles compared to large corporations, including high costs of compute resources, limited data access, and a shortage of technical talent;

E. whereas AI remains a rapidly evolving technology; whereas premature or excessive regulatory intervention risks undermining innovation, investment and competitiveness; whereas a proportionate, risk-based and innovation-friendly approach is essential;

F. whereas the AI supply chain is highly concentrated in a small number of countries and regions, creating a risk of dependencies for access to critical computing power, raw materials and semiconductors; whereas foreign-owned critical AI infrastructure increases the risk of foreign information manipulation and interference; whereas the misuse of algorithms can undermine democracy and add to current geopolitical trade tensions; whereas intensifying global technological competition marked by divergent AI governance models, tariff escalation, and export controls on critical technologies, heightens the risk that access to key AI inputs will be used as geopolitical leverage; whereas some external interference risks diluting the EU’s high standards in transparency, accountability, and fundamental rights protection, thereby compromising the Union’s ability to uphold its values, ensure a level playing field for businesses, and protect citizens from the risks of unregulated AI and digital technologies; whereas the EU should continue defending these standards; whereas the EU should strengthen strategic autonomy by diversifying supply chains and deepening cooperation with trusted partners that share democratic values and a commitment to open and rules-based trade;

G. whereas AI development and adoption rely on access to global markets and technologies, which are impacted by trade policy frameworks; whereas the WTO supports AI development and adoption by enabling more open, transparent and predictable trade in AI-enabled goods and services; whereas existing WTO agreements already make significant contributions to AI development and adoption, including the Information Technology Agreement, which lowers AI hardware deployment costs, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which promotes regulatory transparency and international standards, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, which facilitates AI-related services trade, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which supports AI development and dissemination;

H. whereas the dual-use nature and growing militarisation of AI, including its deployment in contemporary conflicts such as Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are accelerating a shift from safety-focused cooperation towards AI-driven geo-economic and security competition; whereas AI governance, export controls, and standards are increasingly used as tools of strategic influence and power projection;

I. whereas AI can be employed in weapons systems and mass surveillance tools; whereas such practices will create profound ethical and human rights concerns; whereas the United Nations Secretary General has called for a global ban on lethal autonomous weapon systems, machines capable of taking human lives without human oversight;

AI for trade facilitation and regulatory enforcement

1. Recognises that AI can accelerate EU exports and imports, especially for SMEs, by reducing market-entry barriers and compliance costs, enabling firms to reach markets that were previously beyond their reach, provided that SMEs have fair access to AI infrastructure; calls on the Commission to integrate trustworthy AI advisory services into the Access2Markets portal and the Single Entry Point to navigate tariffs, rules of origin and regulatory requirements; calls on the Commission to prioritise SME-friendly AI tools and ensure that digital compliance solutions remain simple, affordable and accessible;

2. Notes that AI can help cut delays and costs in EU supply chains by improving planning and coordination; calls on the Commission to make paperless trade the norm and promote the sharing of reliable information between operators and authorities; calls for investment in AI-enabled logistics that ease bottlenecks at ports and corridors, and support for greener logistics through smarter routing and maintenance; calls on the Commission to incentivise open-source AI solutions that contribute to increased competition and reduce dependence on non-EU providers; emphasises that digitalisation and AI-enabled logistics should lead to greater productivity, efficiency and supply chain management, lower trade costs and reduced administrative burdens;

3. Notes the potential role of AI in strengthening customs controls amid market overcapacity and the limitations of human inspections in the face of the challenges posed by the influx of goods, in particular small parcels coming from China; calls on the Commission to provide resources and skills to market surveillance and customs authorities, also through the strengthened cooperation among Member States in the EU Customs Data Hub, to ensure that AI use enhances enforcement capacity and data sharing among authorities; calls on the Commission to investigate the potential of AI to uphold compliance of imported goods with EU law, enhance real-time traceability and customs control of imported products and market surveillance, deploy secure and dedicated AI tools to systematically analyse data from small parcels or secure product traceability throughout the supply chain in order to combat counterfeit goods, customs fraud, unfair trade practices and circumvention of EU-imposed sanctions; highlights that such AI systems would constitute critical infrastructure and should therefore remain independent and sovereign; calls on the Commission to ensure that these tools strictly comply with the relevant EU legislation;

4. Notes that AI can be a useful tool for companies, customs authorities and market surveillance authorities to uphold the protection of human rights by facilitating effective implementation and compliance with EU rules such as the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive10, the Deforestation Regulation11, or the EU Forced Labour Regulation12, and uphold consumer protection by facilitating effective implementation and compliance with EU rules such as the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH), CE marking, and the General Product Safety Regulation13;

AI and structural changes in goods and services trade, and trade and sustainable development

5. Acknowledges that Europe’s competitiveness in goods trade will increasingly depend on AI-enabled productivity and quality gains in strategic industrial value chains, including manufacturing, automotive, pharmaceutical and energy technologies; calls on the Commission to reflect these interests systematically in trade negotiations by securing effective market access, robust disciplines on non-tariff barriers, and enforceable provisions that maintain a level playing field by preventing unfair competition and technology-related distortions, while recognising the EU’s right to regulate;

6. Recognises that AI is reshaping trade in digitally delivered services by commoditising expertise thus requiring additional efforts to preserve Europe’s historic comparative advantage in high-value professional, technical and business services; underlines that responding to intensified global competition in services trade requires mobilising investment and improving access to finance as envisaged in the Draghi and Letta reports; urges the Commission to mobilise trade and investment partnerships to attract capital and talent and to scale up European companies;

7. Recognises AI’s potential to reshape work and labour markets globally; warns of displacement risks from automation, AI-enabled services trade, and widening skills gaps in the EU workforce; highlights therefore the need to adopt strategies in order to anticipate these changes and adapt the workforce accordingly; notes that the development and deployment of AI models and systems have negative environmental consequences, including increased electricity demand and water consumption; calls on the Commission to analyse, within the impact assessments of free trade agreements, which sectors are likely to be affected by AI and to assess the impact of AI use on workers’ rights and on the environment;

8. Warns that the digital divide risks excluding partners in the Global South from AI-driven growth opportunities, increasing dependency on imported models; stresses that cooperation supporting AI tool use in developing countries should reinforce the multilateral trading system and be promoted through the WTO framework; calls on the Commission to make use of digital inclusion provisions in trade and sustainable development chapters and digital trade agreements to support AI adoption and productivity gains as well as to foster inclusive and trustworthy AI through dedicated international cooperation programmes and capacity-building initiatives under existing EU external instruments, including training programmes and access to digital and AI infrastructure; calls on the Commission to focus Global Gateway capacity building on open-source and ethical AI ecosystems and local capabilities, fostering resilient, mutually beneficial trade and investment relations;

9. Notes that open-source AI solutions, by enabling transparent reuse and independent testing, offer significant advantages, including reduced costs and enhanced data privacy via local deployment, contributing to an increase in healthy competition in AI and reduced dependence on non-EU providers, while supporting auditable, locally adapted AI solutions co-developed with partners in the Global South; stresses that embedding such cooperation in EU trade policy and Digital Partnerships can diversify partnerships, reduce reliance on a few proprietary ecosystems, and strengthen long-term geopolitical ties; calls on the Commission to incentivise open-source AI solutions, which contribute to reducing the dependence from non-EU providers; underlines that open-source collaboration should include projects relating to AI for the public good, such as tackling climate change, supporting the clean transition, and improving healthcare and food security;

Digital trade governance, regulatory cooperation and multilateral rules

10. Highlights the strategic role of digital partnerships and Trade and Technology Councils with like-minded partners, which share democratic values, high standards of governance and a commitment to open and rules-based trade in projecting the EU’s value-driven, human-centric and risk-based approach to AI; calls for Parliament’s enhanced inclusion in Trade and Technology Councils; calls on the Commission to implement the International Digital Strategy through coordinated positions in the G7, G20, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations, and structured regulator-to-regulator cooperation to drive global convergence on high standards of AI safety and fundamental rights protection;

11. Stresses the need to defend and promote, particularly in multilateral forums, the EU’s human-centric AI model as an international standard and the Artificial Intelligence Act as a benchmark that can help align transparency and safety standards while keeping trade open and predictable; calls on the Commission to strengthen cooperation on AI standards, technological innovation and secure supply chains with trusted partners and like-minded countries, including through bilateral partnerships and multilateral forums, prioritising partners that uphold democratic values and the rules-based international order; notes that advanced AI systems create cross-border challenges, and calls on the Commission to work towards a global minimum floor of protections against the most serious risks as a basis for interoperable and trustworthy governance, notably through international initiatives such as the Global Partnership on AI, the OECD’s AI principles, and the UNESCO’s AI ethics framework;

12. Underlines that, beyond a global minimum floor of protections, a coalition of like-minded partners who share the EU human-centric approach is needed to move faster on implementing high standards of AI safety, transparency, accountability, and fundamental rights, notably through structured regulatory dialogue to address disputes, exchange best practices and adapt commitments in the light of technological developments; further calls on the Commission to couple regulatory convergence on high safety and fundamental-rights standards with concrete capacity-building, including joint investment in secure and affordable computing and testing capabilities, talent and skills partnerships to reduce strategic dependence and create credible implementation models that partner countries can align with, strengthening trustworthy AI as a foundation for open and resilient digital trade;

13. Underlines that lawful and secure data flows are essential for AI-enabled trade; recalls the need for EU digital trade agreements to comply with the Commission’s horizontal provisions on cross-border data flows and protection of personal data and privacy in the Digital Trade Title of EU trade agreements, which allow the Union to include measures facilitating cross-border data flows in trade agreements while preserving individuals’ fundamental rights to data protection and privacy, highlighting that they should include dedicated provisions on regulatory cooperation on AI, facilitating mutual understanding of regulatory approaches and invites the Commission to include such provisions in all future digital trade chapters and agreements; reaffirms that safeguards meeting GDPR or equivalent standards are minimum requirements for EU personal data transfers; calls for digital trade agreements to protect regulatory autonomy and preserve the technical access needed by regulators to enforce the AI Act and ensure transparency, auditability, fairness, safety and accountability of AI systems, while ensuring civil society and independent researchers have access to systems’ source code and algorithms;

14. Recalls the EU’s commitment to a rules-based multilateral trading system; underlines that the WTO should meaningfully contribute to the development of a robust, safe, inclusive and trusted AI governance framework for trade, including through the establishment of a dedicated WTO Working Group on Artificial Intelligence to facilitate dialogue, knowledge-sharing, and cooperation among members on AI regulations and policies; stresses that balanced rules on electronic commerce are vital to unlock AI-enabled trade; calls on the Commission to ensure that any WTO text on electronic commerce ensures policy space for democratic AI governance, including enforceable safeguards for workers and consumers; calls on the Commission to drive forward discussions on AI and trade within the WTO framework and promote global cooperation that facilitates trusted data flows and digital trade, as well as access to AI-enabled services and tools, particularly in developing countries;

15. Warns that diverging AI compliance regimes risk fragmenting markets and raising trade costs; stresses the role of international cooperation in preventing regulatory fragmentation; calls on the Commission to use international standards and WTO technical barriers to trade (TBT) and transparency disciplines as tools to prevent regulatory divergence from becoming an unjustified trade barrier, while preserving and leveraging the EU’s AI governance framework to facilitate trusted digital trade and foster a global level playing field for trustworthy AI;

Economic security and strategic dependencies in the AI value chain

16. Stresses that secure access to advanced semiconductors and affordable computing power is fundamental to the EU’s technological sovereignty and competitiveness; notes that the Chips Act and the AI factories agenda risk falling short due to fragmented delivery and limited scale; calls on the Commission to accelerate their implementation, to pursue its raw-material diplomacy and to leverage trade agreements, framework and partnership agreements with trusted partners to diversify supply chains and reduce strategic dependencies; in this context, recognises the critical role of advanced chip manufacturing ecosystems in like-minded partner economies in underpinning global AI computing capacity, and encourages deepening cooperation with such partners on semiconductor supply chain resilience; highlights, furthermore, the urgency of strengthening European production of advanced semiconductors, in particular by supporting European initiatives such as the proposed revision of the Chips Act (Chips Act 2.0); calls on the Commission to have a clearer strategy on how the EU could develop as a key player in the AI ecosystem and to integrate strong provisions into trade agreements to ensure fair access to critical technologies and raw materials;

17. Considers strategic partnerships on critical minerals supply chain resilience as potentially meaningful instruments to further coordination with allies on access to AI-critical inputs, including rare earth elements and advanced semiconductor materials; insists that EU engagement must be conditional on coherence with the Critical Raw Materials Act benchmarks and the EU’s open strategic autonomy objectives, reducing vulnerabilities rather than shifting dependencies; calls on the Commission to ensure that any plurilateral trade instruments emerging from such partnerships, including price floors or offtake mechanisms, are compatible with WTO commitments and serve EU interests; calls for strengthened dialogue and cooperation among trusted partners to safeguard international trade flows and reinforce the integrity and resilience of AI-related industrial ecosystems;

18. Warns that cloud infrastructure concentration in non-EU countries exposes the EU to external jurisdictional vulnerabilities; calls on the Commission, through the proposed Cloud and AI Development Act and Industrial Accelerator Act (COM(2026)0100), to establish graduated sovereignty frameworks prioritising EU-based providers for critical services through public procurement, while ensuring open strategic autonomy by maintaining non-discriminatory access for like-minded providers meeting EU certification and interoperability requirements;

19. Calls on the Commission to ensure its economic security doctrine coordinates foreign direct investment screening, paying specific attention to strategic digital sectors such as AI platforms, cloud services, and data centres, export controls, the Anti-Coercion Instrument and trade defence as a coherent system preventing the weaponisation of AI dependencies; warns that export restrictions on critical raw materials and growing geopolitical volatility require strengthened coordination and enforcement to protect Europe’s AI ecosystem; calls on the Commission to propose a targeted revision of the Dual-Use Regulation to more comprehensively address advanced artificial intelligence in view of its potential use by third countries in security, surveillance or defence applications;

20. Expresses concern over China’s repetitive export restrictions on rare earth elements (REEs), which significantly disrupt supply chains vital for semiconductor companies as well as the broader AI value chain; considers that China’s action is unjustified and calls on the Commission to closely monitor the situation and respond appropriately in order to ensure that the global economy and resilience of international trade are not affected;

21. Underlines the need for the EU to accelerate the implementation of the CRMA and diversify supply chains to strengthen economic resilience; stresses the urgent need to secure investments in the strategic projects approved under the CRMA and in other projects to boost extraction, refining, processing and recycling that contribute to de-risking from China;

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22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming a general-purpose capability that changes how trade is organised, how firms compete, and how economic power is exercised. It affects goods, services, and data-dependent business models simultaneously, developing in a geopolitical context where technology leadership, access to critical inputs, and rule-setting are increasingly contested. For the EU, AI is therefore not only a question of digital policy but a trade policy question, because the conditions for AI deployment, market access, and cross-border operations will shape Europe’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy.

This report argues for an integrated approach bringing together AI in trade (deployment for competitiveness and enforcement) and trade of AI (open strategic autonomy over critical inputs and rules-based international cooperation), so that Europe can compete globally while safeguarding its social model.

AI IN TRADE: COMPETITIVENESS THROUGH DEPLOYMENT AND PREDICTABILITY

AI adoption is fundamental to EU export competitiveness and trade facilitation. The technology reduces information asymmetries, lowers market-entry costs, and improves compliance predictability, enabling smaller firms to access opportunities previously reserved for large operators with dedicated compliance teams. For small and medium enterprises central to the EU’s industrial base and export potential, AI-powered advisory services for navigating tariffs, rules of origin, and regulatory requirements across multiple markets can substantially reduce the disproportionate costs they face from regulatory complexity and fragmented procedures.

AI deployment by customs authorities can help address critical enforcement challenges at scale. Rising cross-border volumes, faster transaction cycles, and increasingly data-driven commerce create capacity constraints that traditional administrative approaches cannot manage. AI-enabled risk analysis, pattern detection, and supply chain optimisation can strengthen the EU’s ability to ensure fair competition and effective enforcement of agreed rules, sustaining confidence that compliance is rewarded rather than circumvented. This enforcement capacity is inseparable from the EU’s commitment to open and fair markets.

Furthermore, AI is fundamentally altering services trade through increased tradability of tasks and accelerated cross-border delivery, intensifying competition in areas where Europe has historically been strong. This transformation requires the EU to support widespread adoption, investment, and scale-up so that European firms compete globally from a position of strength. Trade agreements and partnerships should promote inclusive AI governance frameworks that enable European service providers to benefit from productivity gains while addressing labour market transitions. The EU’s external engagement must ensure that AI-driven productivity gains translate into broadly shared prosperity and that regulatory cooperation prevents fragmentation from becoming a structural barrier to digital trade and services exports.

TRADE OF AI: OPEN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY THROUGH RESILIENT INPUTS AND RULES-BASED GOVERNANCE

As AI becomes embedded in trade, Europe’s competitiveness will not only depend on deployment, but on access to critical upstream inputs that make AI possible. These inputs, notably advanced semiconductors, frontier compute and cloud infrastructure, are concentrated in very few hands and are increasingly shaped by geopolitical rivalry, export controls and industrial policy. When access to chips, equipment or cloud services can be restricted, conditioned or disrupted, dependency becomes leverage, and leverage becomes a trade risk for European firms and public administrations.

The report therefore argues for open strategic autonomy as a practical trade and economic security strategy. The objective is not autarky, but derisking through diversification with trusted partners, targeted capacity-building in Europe, and coherent use of the EU’s economic security toolbox to deter coercion and manage shocks without undermining legal certainty for operators. This is about keeping Europe open, but less exposed, and ensuring that trade and investment relations support, rather than constrain, Europe’s ability to compete in AI-enabled sectors.

Resilience must be matched by rule-shaping. In a context of accelerating competition and fragmented governance, Europe should project its human-centric, risk-based approach, anchored in the first horizontal AI framework of its kind, through partnerships with like-minded partners, including via Trade and Technology Councils, Digital Partnerships and international standardisation, to facilitate convergence on trustworthy AI.

Finally, the WTO remains essential to prevent digital fragmentation from hardening into new trade barriers, notably through balanced digital trade and data rules that advance ‘data flows with trust’, protect regulatory autonomy, and preserve predictable cross-border conditions that are essential for AI development and deployment. Without credible multilateral guardrails, regulatory fragmentation and data restrictions risk becoming the next generation of trade barriers, particularly for AI-enabled services, undermining predictability for businesses and weakening the rules-based system the EU depends on.

The EU stands at a crossroads. One path leads toward permanent technological dependence, where European firms consume AI developed elsewhere, operate on infrastructure controlled externally, and adjust regulations to accommodate foreign standards. The alternative path, pursued in this report, demands simultaneous action across trade facilitation, sectoral adoption, supply chain resilience, and international rule-making. It requires mobilising investment at unprecedented scale, embedding worker protections and development cooperation in trade policy, diversifying semiconductor and compute supply, and projecting Europe’s governance framework through partnerships that value trustworthy AI.

This comprehensive strategy reflects a fundamental conviction: Europe can achieve AI-enabled competitiveness without sacrificing the social model and fundamental rights protections that define its identity. Trade policy becomes the mechanism through which these objectives converge, facilitating the deployment that drives productivity, securing the inputs that enable autonomy, and shaping the rules that make trustworthy AI the global standard. The question is not whether Europe will participate in the AI-driven transformation of international trade, but whether it will do so on its own terms or on conditions set by others.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the draft report, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

AmChamEU

BEUC

DG CNECT

DG TRADE

Digital Europe

EDRi

European Economic and Social Committee

Information Technology Industry Council

United Nations Industrial Development Organization

World Trade Organisation

2. Representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies

none.

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted

16.4.2026

Result of final vote

+ : 31

- : 2

0 : 3

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

31

+

ECR

Rihards Kols, Daniele Polato, Francesco Torselli, Jessika van Leeuwen

PPE

Wouter Beke, Daniel Buda, Andrzej Halicki, Ilia Lazarov, Miriam Lexmann, Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

PfE

Christophe Bay, Tomasz Buczek, Eniko Gyori

Renew

Benoit Cassart, Barry Cowen, Bart Groothuis, Karin Karlsbro

S&D

Brando Benifei, Udo Bullmann, Jean-Marc Germain, Bernd Lange, Cristina Maestre, Kathleen Van Brempt

Verts/ALE

Markéta Gregorová, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Catarina Vieira

2

-

ESN

Markus Buchheit

The Left

Marina Mesure

3

0

NI

Branislav Ondrus

The Left

Lynn Boylan, Rudi Kennes

Key:

+ : in favour

- : against

0 : abstentions