Sittings · Document
10.6.2026 A10-0106/41
Amendment 41
Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0106/2026
Nacho Sánchez Amor
2025 Commission report on Türkiye
(2025/2256(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
10. Notes with regret that even though EU enlargement policy is currently regaining new momentum, Türkiye is missing this window of opportunity because of a lack of democratic reforms; further notes that a first step to seizing this opportunity would be to abide by the rulings of the rECtHR and the Constitutional Court of Türkiye; continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, and in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark Constitutional Court and ECtHR rulings, which undermines legal certainty and perpetuates systemic violations; takes note with regret of the prolonged infringement proceedings by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, which have resulted in a failure to act effectively to enforce ECtHR judgments and ensure compliance with them; calls on the Commission and the Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and to consider applying relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings; condemns in the strongest possible terms the Turkish authorities’ sustained and deliberate decision to illegally keep imprisoned, on political grounds, prominent figures such as former HDP party co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ –for more than 9 years – and human rights defender Osman Kavala –for more than 8 years –, despite the relevant ECtHR rulings; calls for their immediate and unconditional release; is appalled to see that, instead of being immediately freed, Selahattin Demirtaş received on 6 January 2026 an additional prison sentence of more than one year in a different case based on speeches delivered back in 2015, despite the now three landmark rulings by the ECtHR calling for his release, the last of which was made final on 3 November 2025; considers these actions a grave abuse of power and a display of flagrant contempt for the rule of law; urges Türkiye once again to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution, including the ECtHR’s 2023 ruling in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v Türkiye and related cases; takes note of the ECtHR decision not to award compensation or cover legal costs in the thousands of follow-up cases, which could be potentially unfair to applicants and inconsistent with prior practice of the court; calls on Türkiye to also respect judgements related to missing persons and properties in Cyprus, including the ECtHR decision of 24 January 2008 in the case of the murders of Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou; calls on the Turkish authorities to execute the international arrest warrants issued against the suspects in these murders and to surrender these individuals to the Republic of Cyprus;
10. Notes with regret that even though EU enlargement policy is currently regaining new momentum, Türkiye is missing this window of opportunity because of a lack of democratic reforms; further notes that a first step to seizing this opportunity would be to abide by the rulings of the rECtHR and the Constitutional Court of Türkiye; continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, and in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark Constitutional Court and ECtHR rulings, which undermines legal certainty and perpetuates systemic violations; takes note with regret of the prolonged infringement proceedings by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, which have resulted in a failure to act effectively to enforce ECtHR judgments and ensure compliance with them; calls on the Commission and the Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and to consider applying relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings; condemns in the strongest possible terms the Turkish authorities’ sustained and deliberate decision to illegally keep imprisoned, on political grounds, prominent figures such as former HDP party co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ –for more than 9 years – and human rights defender Osman Kavala –for more than 8 years –, despite the relevant ECtHR rulings; calls for their immediate and unconditional release; is appalled to see that, instead of being immediately freed, Selahattin Demirtaş received on 6 January 2026 an additional prison sentence of more than one year in a different case based on speeches delivered back in 2015, despite the now three landmark rulings by the ECtHR calling for his release, the last of which was made final on 3 November 2025; considers these actions a grave abuse of power and a display of flagrant contempt for the rule of law; urges Türkiye once again to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution, including the ECtHR’s 2023 ruling in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v Türkiye and related cases; takes note of the ECtHR decision not to award compensation or cover legal costs in the thousands of follow-up cases, which could be potentially unfair to applicants and inconsistent with prior practice of the court; calls on Türkiye to also respect judgements related to missing persons, the enclaved population in the occupied part of Cyprus and properties in Cyprus, including the ECtHR decision of 24 January 2008 in the case of the murders of Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou; calls on the Turkish authorities to execute the international arrest warrants issued against the suspects in these murders and to surrender these individuals to the Republic of Cyprus;
Or. en
10.6.2026 A10-0106/42
Amendment 42
Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0106/2026
Nacho Sánchez Amor
2025 Commission report on Türkiye
(2025/2256(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
35a. Remains deeply concerned about Türkiye being considered by the EU as a ‘safe country of origin’ in the light of widespread evidence of persecution and serious harm against its citizens; highlights that this constitutes a breach of Article 61(1) of the Asylum Procedure Regulation1a, which states that a third country may only be designated as a safe country of origin where, on the basis of the legal situation, the application of the law within a democratic system and the general political circumstances, it can be shown that there is no persecution as defined in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 and no real risk of serious harm as defined in Article 15 of that Regulation;
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1a Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU (OJ L, 2024/1348, 22.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1348/oj).
Or. en
10.6.2026 A10-0106/43
Amendment 43
Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan
on behalf of The Left Group
Costas Mavrides
Report A10-0106/2026
Nacho Sánchez Amor
2025 Commission report on Türkiye
(2025/2256(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
37. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to work on a constructive, and not assertive or aggressive, approach in its neighbourhood; welcomes the continued dialogue between Greece and Türkiye, including high-level meetings such as the summit between Prime Minister Mitsotakis and President Erdoğan in February 2026, which can foster a constructive environment and further de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is of paramount importance amid the dangerous escalation of conflicts in the wider region; reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the region and encourages all sides to further advance in this line of dialogue and cooperation with the aim of resolving any pending dispute and difference within the framework of international law; expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli), which is inconceivable among allies and good neighbours; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine, the significant increase in violations of Greek airspace compared to 2024 – although these remain at relatively low levels – the political instrumentalisation of the NAVTEX system, the violation of the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone by impeding the progress of projects for EU connectivity, such as the Great Sea Interconnector and EastMed Pipeline, which have been designated as a EU project of common interest, the objection to Greece’s establishment of a marine park in the Aegean Sea entirely within Greek territorial waters, or the considerable increase, since 2024, of illegal fishing activities by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace in accordance with EU and international law, including under UNCLOS, and including the right to delimitate Exclusive Economic Zones; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on the delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third countries, does not comply with the law of the sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third countries;
37. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to work on a constructive, and not assertive or aggressive, approach in its neighbourhood; welcomes the continued dialogue between Greece and Türkiye, including high-level meetings such as the summit between Prime Minister Mitsotakis and President Erdoğan in February 2026, which can foster a constructive environment and further de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is of paramount importance amid the dangerous escalation of conflicts in the wider region; reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the region and encourages all sides to further advance in this line of dialogue and cooperation with the aim of resolving any pending dispute and difference within the framework of international law; expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli), which is inconceivable among allies and good neighbours; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine, the significant increase in violations of Greek airspace compared to 2024 – although these remain at relatively low levels – the political instrumentalisation of the NAVTEX system, the violation of the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone by impeding the progress of projects for EU connectivity, such as the Great Sea Interconnector and EastMed Pipeline, which have been designated as a EU project of common interest, the objection to Greece’s establishment of a marine park in the Aegean Sea entirely within Greek territorial waters, the considerable increase, since 2024, of illegal fishing activities by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters or the interference with military aircraft carrying European officials to a meeting of EU defence ministers in Cyprus; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace in accordance with EU and international law, including under UNCLOS, and including the right to delimitate Exclusive Economic Zones; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on the delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third countries, does not comply with the law of the sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third countries;
Or. en
10.6.2026 A10-0106/44
Amendment 44
Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0106/2026
Nacho Sánchez Amor
2025 Commission report on Türkiye
(2025/2256(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
40. Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UNFICYP, to cease and reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone, and to refrain from any further such actions and provocations, including harassment and intimidation of farmers; reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, in order to reduce tensions and contribute to a conducive environment for the resumption of the UN-led negotiations; calls on Türkiye to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action that would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance; strongly condemns Türkiye’s attempts to upgrade the status of the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, including via the Organisation of Turkic States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and calls on all states to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty as outlined in UNSC resolutions; condemns the ongoing efforts by Türkiye to ‘open’ Varosha and have it settled by people other than its lawful inhabitants, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions and to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, as called for by UNSC Resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992); deplores any effort to turn Varosha into a dark tourism attraction, which sensationalises tragedy and insults the dignity and rights of the lawful inhabitants; condemns the continued usurpation, sale and illegal development of properties belonging to Greek Cypriots in the occupied areas; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the ECHR with regard to respecting freedom of religion, freedom of opinion and expression and the right to access and worship, including the right to conduct religious ceremonies and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; commends the work of the bi-communal technical committee on cultural heritage in restoring many of the affected monuments; regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with international civil aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation to fully implement, in a non-discriminatory manner, the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus, and to implement the obligations it assumed with regard to the EU as per the negotiating framework of October 2005;
40. Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UNFICYP, to cease and reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone, and to refrain from any further such actions and provocations, including harassment and intimidation of farmers; reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, in order to reduce tensions and contribute to a conducive environment for the resumption of the UN-led negotiations; calls on Türkiye to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action that would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance; strongly condemns Türkiye’s attempts to upgrade the status of the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, including via the Organisation of Turkic States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and calls on all states to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty as outlined in UNSC resolutions; condemns the ongoing efforts by Türkiye to ‘open’ Varosha and have it settled by people other than its lawful inhabitants, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions and to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, as called for by UNSC Resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992); deplores any effort to turn Varosha into a dark tourism attraction, which sensationalises tragedy and insults the dignity and rights of the lawful inhabitants; condemns the continued usurpation, sale and illegal development of properties belonging to Greek Cypriots in the occupied areas; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the judgments of the ECtHR and comply with the ECHR with regard to respecting freedom of religion, freedom of opinion and expression and the right to access and worship, including the right to conduct religious ceremonies and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; commends the work of the bi-communal technical committee on cultural heritage in restoring many of the affected monuments; regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with international civil aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation to fully implement, in a non-discriminatory manner, the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus, and to implement the obligations it assumed with regard to the EU as per the negotiating framework of October 2005;
Or. en
10.6.2026 A10-0106/45
Amendment 45
Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0106/2026
Nacho Sánchez Amor
2025 Commission report on Türkiye
(2025/2256(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
40a. Expresses concern regarding the ongoing process of granting 6 000 acres of land in occupied Karpasia to Istanbul Technical University; emphasises that such an action raises very serious concerns regarding the attempt to consolidate negative faits accompli in the occupied territories at the expense of the rights of lawful owners and of the prospects of resolving the property issue; notes that, at the same time, the inclusion of a 3 500-acre tract of forest land, as reported in the media, violates EU law regarding the protection of the natural environment;
Or. en
10.6.2026 A10-0106/46
Amendment 46
Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0106/2026
Nacho Sánchez Amor
2025 Commission report on Türkiye
(2025/2256(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
41a. Condemns the Turkish Government’s ongoing practice of placing Turkish Cypriots on a blacklist that bars them from entering Türkiye under the N-82 and G-87, which have been in effect in the Republic of Türkiye since 2019; notes that the aim of this practice is to intimidate Turkish Cypriot politicians, trade unionists, journalists, intellectuals, activists and cultural figures who, through their public statements and actions, voice criticism of Türkiye’s illegal interventions in the occupied territories, a practice that violates freedom of expression, which is protected, among other international conventions, by the Council of Europe’s ECHR;
Or. en
10.6.2026 A10-0106/47
Amendment 47
Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0106/2026
Nacho Sánchez Amor
2025 Commission report on Türkiye
(2025/2256(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 b (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
41b. Condemns the establishment of an office of Türkiye’s ruling Justice and Development Party in occupied Nicosia, which is intended to strengthen the de facto illegal administrative and political control of the occupied areas, as well as the socio-economic and cultural assimilation of the Turkish Cypriot community; expresses, at the same time, particular concern over the fact that the office in question is operating in a historic building that is a cultural heritage site, triggering further reactions even within the Turkish Cypriot community itself; calls for the reversal of the above-mentioned unilateral action, which exacerbates the negative atmosphere and undermines the ongoing efforts led by the UN Secretary-General to resume negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem within the agreed framework;
Or. en
10.6.2026 A10-0106/48
Amendment 48
Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0106/2026
Nacho Sánchez Amor
2025 Commission report on Türkiye
(2025/2256(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
43a. Rejects the use of Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as the legal basis for the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative, emphasising that this provision, intended for exceptional financial assistance in the event of serious difficulties, is not appropriate for a common security and defence instrument; underlines that participation of non-EU countries with which the EU has established a security and defence partnership within the framework of SAFE must be based on unanimity among Member States and contingent upon the strict fulfilment of conditions safeguarding the security and defence interests of all its Member States without discrimination;
Or. en
10.6.2026 A10-0106/49
Amendment 49
Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0106/2026
Nacho Sánchez Amor
2025 Commission report on Türkiye
(2025/2256(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 b (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
43b. Calls on all EU Member States, in view of Türkiye’s militarised foreign policy, to stop all arms exports to Türkiye;
Or. en
10.6.2026 A10-0106/50
Amendment 50
Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0106/2026
Nacho Sánchez Amor
2025 Commission report on Türkiye
(2025/2256(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
44. Recognises, as regards Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye’s efforts in terms of its facilitation and potential mediation role, as underpinned by its hosting of several direct talks between both sides in Istanbul, as well as through the provision of military, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, including defence equipment, which has contributed to Ukraine’s defence efforts; acknowledges that Türkiye has traditionally maintained a position of not supporting sanctions adopted outside the UN framework; nevertheless continues to regret the fact, that Türkiye does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia, while welcoming the measures it has taken to prevent the circumvention of sanctions via Turkish territory, such as to prevent the re-export of common high priority items, which are delivering some results, and calls for alignment with the EU sanctions framework against Russia; urges the Turkish authorities to increase their efforts to detect and prevent the circumvention of restrictive measures, in particular on advanced technology items used for military purposes by Russia, to prevent the ‘false transit’ of these items to Russia via Central Asia, to extend these measures to other economically critical goods, to reduce the use of energy resources originating from Russia, and to address the risks linked with Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ in terms of maritime and environmental safety; further expresses concern that Türkiye has not restricted the operations of Russian state-controlled media in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; notes the widespread presence of pro-Russian narratives and Russia-linked disinformation in the Turkish information space, particularly on Ukraine, NATO and energy security; calls on Türkiye to strengthen efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and disinformation; notes with concern that, through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines, Türkiye is a major importer of Russian natural gas, as well as a major source of oil and petroleum products; reiterates its concern about Türkiye’s close cooperation with Russia on the development of large nuclear power plants, including the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which is expected to become operational in 2026, and which is owned and will be operated by Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom; urges the Turkish Government to join the Espoo Convention, which commits its parties to notifying neighbouring countries on major projects under consideration that are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries;
44. Recognises, as regards Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye’s efforts in terms of its facilitation and potential mediation role, as underpinned by its hosting of several direct talks between both sides in Istanbul, as well as through the provision of military, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, including defence equipment, which has contributed to Ukraine’s defence efforts; acknowledges that Türkiye has traditionally maintained a position of not supporting sanctions adopted outside the UN framework; nevertheless continues to regret the fact, that Türkiye does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia, while welcoming the measures it has taken to prevent the circumvention of sanctions via Turkish territory, such as to prevent the re-export of common high priority items, which are delivering some results, and calls for alignment with the EU sanctions framework against Russia; urges the Turkish authorities to increase their efforts to detect and prevent the circumvention of restrictive measures, in particular on advanced technology items used for military purposes by Russia, to prevent the ‘false transit’ of these items to Russia via Central Asia, to extend these measures to other economically critical goods, to reduce the use of energy resources originating from Russia, and to address the risks linked with Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ in terms of maritime and environmental safety; further expresses concern that Türkiye has not restricted the operations of Russian state-controlled media in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; notes the widespread presence of pro-Russian narratives and Russia-linked disinformation in the Turkish information space, particularly on Ukraine, NATO and energy security; calls on Türkiye to strengthen efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and disinformation; notes with concern that, through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines, Türkiye is a major importer of Russian natural gas, as well as a major source of oil and petroleum products; reiterates its concern about Türkiye’s close cooperation with Russia on the development of large nuclear power plants, including the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which is expected to become operational in 2026 in a region prone to severe earthquakes, as recent devastating experience underlines, hence posing a major threat to the entire Mediterranean region, and which is owned and will be operated by Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom; urges the Turkish Government to join the Espoo Convention, which commits its parties to notifying neighbouring countries on major projects under consideration that are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries; asks, to this end, the Turkish Government to involve, or at least consult, the governments of its neighbouring countries in relation to any further developments in the Akkuyu venture;
Or. en