Sittings · Document
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2024
22.4.2026 A10-0080/40
Amendment 40
Tomáš Zdechovský
on behalf of the PPE Group
Report A10-0080/2026
Julien Sanchez
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2024
(2025/2238(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
23. Emphasises that public authorities have a crucial role in fostering a zero-tolerance culture against fraud, and stresses, in particular, the importance of fraud prevention to ensure that fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, and other types of misuse of funds do not occur in the first place;
23. Emphasises that public authorities have a crucial role in fostering a zero-tolerance culture against fraud, and stresses, in particular, the importance of fraud prevention to ensure that fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, and other types of misuse of funds do not occur in the first place; stresses that sound and accountable public administration is a prerequisite for a credible zero-tolerance policy against fraud;
Or. en
22.4.2026 A10-0080/41
Amendment 41
Tomáš Zdechovský
on behalf of the PPE Group
Report A10-0080/2026
Julien Sanchez
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2024
(2025/2238(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
29. Underlines the strategic role of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS) at all stages of the anti-fraud cycle and calls on the Commission to strengthen their activities; considers that persistent disparities among Member States in terms of administrative capacity, human resources and analytical tools weaken the protection of the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of defining common minimum anti-fraud capacity standards for the competent national authorities, in particular AFCOS, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity;
29. Underlines the strategic role of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS) at all stages of the anti-fraud cycle and calls on the Commission to strengthen their activities; considers that persistent disparities among Member States in terms of administrative capacity, human resources and analytical tools weaken the protection of the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of defining common minimum anti-fraud capacity standards for the competent national authorities, in particular AFCOS, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity; stresses that effective administrative capacity must be supported by a functioning legal and judicial environment that ensures the effective enforcement of administrative and criminal decisions related to the protection of the Union budget;
Or. en
22.4.2026 A10-0080/42
Amendment 42
Tomáš Zdechovský
on behalf of the PPE Group
Report A10-0080/2026
Julien Sanchez
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2024
(2025/2238(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
32. Acknowledges that EPPO investigations can only be launched if information has reached the prosecutors; expects the Member States to comply with their legal obligations and to report all relevant cases to the EPPO; notes with concern that some Member States have been declaring criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the EU as national cases instead of acknowledging the competences of the EPPO; expresses its concern that these conflicts of competence can have a possible negative impact on investigations, including the loss of evidence or the belated collection of evidence; observes that, in spite of the EPPO’s competences being clearly outlined in Article 22(1) and (2) and in Article 23 of the EPPO Regulation, questions of competence between the national authorities and the European Delegated Prosecutors come up frequently, including several in 2024; underlines that, as things stand, these cases should be handled in compliance with the EPPO Regulation, which states that they should be referred to the national judicial authority with the competence to decide cases of conflict of competences between national prosecutors, under the condition that its decision can be subject to a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice, as provided for by Article 25(6) of the EPPO Regulation, drawing on Article 267 TFEU, which provides that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provision on conflicts of competence between the EPPO and national authorities; reiterates that the current situation lacks legal clarity since, in many Member States, the national authority’s decision on the conflict of competence cannot be the subject of a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice; calls on the Commission to collect and assess information regarding cases of conflicts of competence, with a view to obtaining the relevant data and to addressing the matter during the revision of the EPPO Regulation;
32. Acknowledges that EPPO investigations can only be launched if information has reached the prosecutors; expects the Member States to comply with their legal obligations and to report all relevant cases to the EPPO; notes with concern that some Member States have been declaring criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the EU as national cases instead of acknowledging the competences of the EPPO; expresses its concern that these conflicts of competence can have a possible negative impact on investigations, including the loss of evidence or the belated collection of evidence; observes that, in spite of the EPPO’s competences being clearly outlined in Article 22(1) and (2) and in Article 23 of the EPPO Regulation, questions of competence between the national authorities and the European Delegated Prosecutors come up frequently, including several in 2024; underlines that, as things stand, these cases should be handled in compliance with the EPPO Regulation, which states that they should be referred to the national judicial authority with the competence to decide cases of conflict of competences between national prosecutors, under the condition that its decision can be subject to a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice, as provided for by Article 25(6) of the EPPO Regulation, drawing on Article 267 TFEU, which provides that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provision on conflicts of competence between the EPPO and national authorities; reiterates that the current situation lacks legal clarity since, in many Member States, the national authority’s decision on the conflict of competence cannot be the subject of a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice; calls on the Commission to collect and assess information regarding cases of conflicts of competence, with a view to obtaining the relevant data and to addressing the matter during the revision of the EPPO Regulation; stresses that delays or uncertainties in the judicial qualification of cases at national level may affect the timeliness and effectiveness of investigations and the protection of the Union’s financial interests;
Or. en
22.4.2026 A10-0080/43
Amendment 43
Tomáš Zdechovský
on behalf of the PPE Group
Report A10-0080/2026
Julien Sanchez
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2024
(2025/2238(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
33. Acknowledges that recovery is a powerful deterrent and an effective tool to tackle serious and organised crime and that it is a complex process that requires cooperation within the Commission and with other actors and national authorities as well; notes that the main obstacles to recovery stem from lengthy administrative and judicial proceedings, restrictive conditions for recovering funds under certain measures, and strict limitation periods in sector-specific legislation; calls on the Commission to develop a benchmarking system to measure recovery effectiveness, including indicators such as the ratio between amounts recommended for recovery and those established for recovery, the length of time between the end of the investigation and the recovery decision, and the relationship between the duration of recovery procedures and the results;
33. Acknowledges that recovery is a powerful deterrent and an effective tool to tackle serious and organised crime and that it is a complex process that requires cooperation within the Commission and with other actors and national authorities as well; notes that the main obstacles to recovery stem from lengthy administrative and judicial proceedings, restrictive conditions for recovering funds under certain measures, and strict limitation periods in sector-specific legislation; calls on the Commission to develop a benchmarking system to measure recovery effectiveness, including indicators such as the ratio between amounts recommended for recovery and those established for recovery, the length of time between the end of the investigation and the recovery decision, and the relationship between the duration of recovery procedures and the results; notes that recovery effectiveness is also dependent on the efficiency and independence of judicial and administrative enforcement systems at national level;
Or. en
22.4.2026 A10-0080/44
Amendment 44
Tomáš Zdechovský
on behalf of the PPE Group
Report A10-0080/2026
Julien Sanchez
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2024
(2025/2238(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
40. Notes that the EPPO reported 385 offences under investigation concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up until the end of 2024 (the EPPO’s 2023 annual report referred to 209 investigations concerned PIF-focused criminal organisations); is aware that the true overall involvement of organised crime and its impact on the deployment of EU resources is not precisely quantifiable; notes that, according to data and analysis provided by the EPPO, in the majority of cases, the European Delegated Prosecutors focus their investigations on the underlying PIF offences (misappropriation, fraud, corruption) and not on the criminal organisation per se, as the EPPO Regulation limits the competence of the EPPO to organised criminal groups whose activity focuses on the commission of PIF offences (Article 22(2) of the EPPO Regulation); recalls that Eurojust can provide assistance in coordinating investigations into crimes against the EU’s financial interests linked to organised crime; underlines that the EPPO brings added value to the fight against fraud; recalls that Europol supports and strengthens action by the competent authorities of the Member States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime, including those against the EU’s financial interests; stresses that the reality of organised criminal activity on the ground is apparent from an assessment of the extent of the financial damages attributed to VAT fraud, excise duty fraud and customs fraud, where a strong component of organised crime is often present, and which always occurs when large financial volumes are involved; considers that the increasing involvement of organised crime in offences affecting the EU’s financial interests requires improved data analysis capacity at the EU level and the provision of adequate resources for the bodies responsible for combating fraud, as the work carried out by these bodies contributes to generating revenue for the EU budget;
40. Notes that the EPPO reported 385 offences under investigation concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up until the end of 2024 (the EPPO’s 2023 annual report referred to 209 investigations concerned PIF-focused criminal organisations); is aware that the true overall involvement of organised crime and its impact on the deployment of EU resources is not precisely quantifiable; notes that, according to data and analysis provided by the EPPO, in the majority of cases, the European Delegated Prosecutors focus their investigations on the underlying PIF offences (misappropriation, fraud, corruption) and not on the criminal organisation per se, as the EPPO Regulation limits the competence of the EPPO to organised criminal groups whose activity focuses on the commission of PIF offences (Article 22(2) of the EPPO Regulation); recalls that Eurojust can provide assistance in coordinating investigations into crimes against the EU’s financial interests linked to organised crime; underlines that the EPPO brings added value to the fight against fraud; recalls that Europol supports and strengthens action by the competent authorities of the Member States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime, including those against the EU’s financial interests; stresses that the reality of organised criminal activity on the ground is apparent from an assessment of the extent of the financial damages attributed to VAT fraud, excise duty fraud and customs fraud, where a strong component of organised crime is often present, and which always occurs when large financial volumes are involved; considers that the increasing involvement of organised crime in offences affecting the EU’s financial interests requires improved data analysis capacity at the EU level and the provision of adequate resources for the bodies responsible for combating fraud, as the work carried out by these bodies contributes to generating revenue for the EU budget; underlines that the effectiveness of the Union’s response to organised crime affecting the EU budget also depends on the robustness of national judicial systems and their capacity to ensure timely prosecution and enforcement of decisions;
Or. en
22.4.2026 A10-0080/45
Amendment 45
Tomáš Zdechovský
on behalf of the PPE Group
Report A10-0080/2026
Julien Sanchez
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2024
(2025/2238(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
41. Notes that there is an increasing number of reported cases of VAT fraud, that in 2023 it was present in around 20 % of the EPPO’s ongoing cases, with 873 cases, and that in 2024, there were a total of 1 287 VAT infringement cases, accounting for 20.29 % of all infringements, causing an estimated loss of EUR 13.5 billion, representing 53 % of the total estimated loss; observes that the current threshold of EUR 10 million, set in the PIF Directive, is not an effective criterion to establish the competence of the EPPO in VAT cases because of inconsistent approaches on interpretation, damage calculation methods and complexity of the cases, weakening the uniform and consistent handling of VAT fraud cases; reiterates its call on the Commission to review the threshold and to guarantee consistent interpretation of the total damage, providing clearer and explicit guidance to Member States;
41. Notes that there is an increasing number of reported cases of VAT fraud, that in 2023 it was present in around 20 % of the EPPO’s ongoing cases, with 873 cases, and that in 2024, there were a total of 1 287 VAT infringement cases, accounting for 20.29 % of all infringements, causing an estimated loss of EUR 13.5 billion, representing 53 % of the total estimated loss; observes that the current threshold of EUR 10 million, set in the PIF Directive, is not an effective criterion to establish the competence of the EPPO in VAT cases because of inconsistent approaches on interpretation, damage calculation methods and complexity of the cases, weakening the uniform and consistent handling of VAT fraud cases; reiterates its call on the Commission to review the threshold and to guarantee consistent interpretation of the total damage, providing clearer and explicit guidance to Member States, and to ensure that such interpretation is harmonised across all Member States in order to prevent fragmentation in EPPO competences and enforcement outcomes;
Or. en
22.4.2026 A10-0080/46
Amendment 46
Tomáš Zdechovský
on behalf of the PPE Group
Report A10-0080/2026
Julien Sanchez
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2024
(2025/2238(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
47. Stresses that, with regard to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 191 offences investigated at the end of 2024 (compared to 131 at the end of 2023 and 87 in 2022); notes that the 2024 PIF Report revealed that 56 cases were reported to the Commission through the IMS by seven countries between 2020 and 2024; stresses that the comparison of data from different sources and an analysis based on data from 2007 to 2023 clearly indicate that Member States do not report sufficient fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS; underlines that organised criminal groups are increasingly exploiting corruption to infiltrate public administrations to distort procurement processes and secure illicit economic advantages; observes that the study on high-risk corruption areas of 4 November 202423 indicates that public procurement, construction and infrastructure, and healthcare are the areas most at risk of overlaps between fraud and corruption; notes that, when reported, corruption mainly concerns public procurement, with around 20 % of these corruption cases detected by a control having started following alerts by whistleblowers or information published in the media; notes that 25 % of irregularities were instead detected due to a control that started in the absence of specific allegations or suspicions, thus not due to an appropriate risk analysis; concludes that reporting and detection are not optimal and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to strengthen targeted, risk-based detection tools and proactive investigation strategies, rather than relying on non-systematic controls; calls also for greater transparency for the general public through wider publication – online and through other channels accessible to the general public – of detailed information about the use of EU funds, the full identity of final beneficiaries, given that this concerns public money, the outcomes of subsidised programmes and projects, and the results of public procurement procedures; considers that the low level of reporting of fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS points to structural deficiencies in detection and reporting systems; calls on the Commission itself to lead by example and assess the quality and completeness of the data transmitted by Member States and to issue specific recommendations to address these deficiencies; acknowledges that anti-corruption strategies are in place in the Member States, but underlines that their evaluation and periodical revision are needed; encourages the Commission to monitor the progress of the actions launched in the Member States, provide periodic updates and report on the analyses carried out by the competent authorities of the Member States, and to lead by example itself;
47. Stresses that, with regard to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 191 offences investigated at the end of 2024 (compared to 131 at the end of 2023 and 87 in 2022); notes that the 2024 PIF Report revealed that 56 cases were reported to the Commission through the IMS by seven countries between 2020 and 2024; stresses that the comparison of data from different sources and an analysis based on data from 2007 to 2023 clearly indicate that Member States do not report sufficient fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS; underlines that organised criminal groups are increasingly exploiting corruption to infiltrate public administrations to distort procurement processes and secure illicit economic advantages; observes that the study on high-risk corruption areas of 4 November 202423 indicates that public procurement, construction and infrastructure, and healthcare are the areas most at risk of overlaps between fraud and corruption; notes that, when reported, corruption mainly concerns public procurement, with around 20 % of these corruption cases detected by a control having started following alerts by whistleblowers or information published in the media; notes that 25 % of irregularities were instead detected due to a control that started in the absence of specific allegations or suspicions, thus not due to an appropriate risk analysis; concludes that reporting and detection are not optimal and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to strengthen targeted, risk-based detection tools and proactive investigation strategies, rather than relying on non-systematic controls; calls also for greater transparency for the general public through wider publication – online and through other channels accessible to the general public – of detailed information about the use of EU funds, the full identity of final beneficiaries, given that this concerns public money, the outcomes of subsidised programmes and projects, and the results of public procurement procedures; considers that the low level of reporting of fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS points to structural deficiencies in detection and reporting systems; calls on the Commission itself to lead by example and assess the quality and completeness of the data transmitted by Member States and to issue specific recommendations to address these deficiencies, including the introduction of minimum reporting standards and harmonised classification criteria for corruption-related irregularities across all Member States; acknowledges that anti-corruption strategies are in place in the Member States, but underlines that their evaluation and periodical revision are needed; encourages the Commission to monitor the progress of the actions launched in the Member States, provide periodic updates and report on the analyses carried out by the competent authorities of the Member States, and to lead by example itself;
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23 23 European Commission, ‘High-risk areas of corruption in the EU: A mapping and in-depth analysis’, 2024.
23 23 European Commission, ‘High-risk areas of corruption in the EU: A mapping and in-depth analysis’, 2024.
Or. en
22.4.2026 A10-0080/47
Amendment 47
Tomáš Zdechovský
on behalf of the PPE Group
Report A10-0080/2026
Julien Sanchez
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2024
(2025/2238(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
53. Recalls that the budgetary conditionality mechanism established by the Conditionality Regulation is a legally regulated tool to prevent risks to the EU budget; notes that its application can, however, be justified only where there is a direct, real and demonstrated link between the failures found and the harm to the financial interests of the EU; expresses its concern that any extension of its scope beyond this budgetary purpose would be contrary to the spirit of the Treaties and the principle of proportionality; recalls that the legitimacy of this mechanism is based on a strictly objective application, free from any political considerations, and respectful of equal treatment between Member States; notes that its implementation has raised practical and operational challenges, as highlighted by ECA special report 03/2024 on the rule of law in the EU; calls on the Commission to apply the mechanism consistently and transparently on the basis of objective evidence;
53. Recalls that the budgetary conditionality mechanism established by the Conditionality Regulation is a legally regulated tool to prevent risks to the EU budget; notes that its application can, however, be justified only where there is a direct, real and demonstrated link between the failures found and the harm to the financial interests of the EU; expresses its concern that any extension of its scope beyond this budgetary purpose would be contrary to the spirit of the Treaties and the principle of proportionality; recalls that the legitimacy of this mechanism is based on a strictly objective application, free from any political considerations, and respectful of equal treatment between Member States; notes that its implementation has raised practical and operational challenges, as highlighted by ECA special report 03/2024 on the rule of law in the EU; calls on the Commission to apply the mechanism consistently and transparently on the basis of objective evidence and to ensure that any evaluation of compliance issues is systematically supported by a clearly substantiated quantification of their direct impact on the EU budget;
Or. en
22.4.2026 A10-0080/48
Amendment 48
Tomáš Zdechovský
on behalf of the PPE Group
Report A10-0080/2026
Julien Sanchez
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2024
(2025/2238(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
58. Notes that in 2024, the Commission estimated the 2022 VAT compliance gap at EUR 89.3 billion, representing 7.0 % of the total VAT liability; recalls that the VAT compliance gap measures the difference between the VAT revenue that would be collected in case of full compliance and the actual revenue collected and that it is not only the result of fraud, evasion or other misconduct, but also of insolvency, bankruptcy and administrative errors; maintains, however, that VAT fraud contributes significantly to VAT non-compliance and considers that digital tools and enhanced cooperation between national tax authorities and relevant EU investigative bodies are effective means to address this issue and should be encouraged and further developed; understands that, based on this data, the gap has been narrowing since 2018, when it was estimated at EUR 121.2 billion, representing 11.2 % of the total VAT due;
58. Notes that in 2024, the Commission estimated the 2022 VAT compliance gap at EUR 89.3 billion, representing 7.0 % of the total VAT liability; recalls that the VAT compliance gap measures the difference between the VAT revenue that would be collected in case of full compliance and the actual revenue collected and that it is not only the result of fraud, evasion or other misconduct, but also of insolvency, bankruptcy and administrative errors; maintains, however, that VAT fraud contributes significantly to VAT non-compliance and considers that digital tools and enhanced cooperation between national tax authorities and relevant EU investigative bodies are effective means to address this issue and should be encouraged and further developed; understands that, based on this data, the gap has been narrowing since 2018, when it was estimated at EUR 121.2 billion, representing 11.2 % of the total VAT due; calls on the Commission to ensure a harmonised EU methodology for calculating the VAT gap in order to guarantee the comparability and legal reliability of the data used for policy and enforcement purposes;
Or. en
22.4.2026 A10-0080/49
Amendment 49
Tomáš Zdechovský
on behalf of the PPE Group
Report A10-0080/2026
Julien Sanchez
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2024
(2025/2238(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 70
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
70. Underlines that at the current expectedly advanced implementing stage of the RRF, the scarce information on results and the lack of information on actual costs is concerning; observes that the Commission mainly relies on Member States to detect and correct serious irregularities affecting the RRF and to ensure compliance with EU and national rules, but that national controls systems have weaknesses for which remedies could not be found at the implementation stage; stresses that this results in a substantial lack of sufficient assurance that control systems adequately protect the EU’s financial interests, in the context of an error-prone facility, weakened by ambiguities in the legal framework, with often vaguely defined milestones and targets and where the fraud risk is high; reiterates its call on the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;
70. Underlines that at the current expectedly advanced implementing stage of the RRF, the scarce information on results and the lack of information on actual costs is concerning; observes that the Commission mainly relies on Member States to detect and correct serious irregularities affecting the RRF and to ensure compliance with EU and national rules, but that national controls systems have weaknesses for which remedies could not be found at the implementation stage; stresses that this results in a substantial lack of sufficient assurance that control systems adequately protect the EU’s financial interests, in the context of an error-prone facility, weakened by ambiguities in the legal framework, with often vaguely defined milestones and targets and where the fraud risk is high; reiterates its call on the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States, including, where necessary, the suspension of payments and the activation of corrective financial measures in cases of systemic control failure;
Or. en