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Follow-up to the European Parliament non-legislative resolution on safeguarding and promoting financial stability amid economic uncertainties
MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
Rapporteur: Johan VAN OVERTVELDT (ECR / BE)
on safeguarding and promoting financial stability amid economic uncertainties
References: 2025/2051(INI) / A10-0232/2025 / P10_TA(2026)0004
(2025/2051(INI))
Date of adoption of the resolution: 20 January 2026
The European Parliament,
Competent Parliamentary Committee: Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)
– having regard to the Commission report of 24 January 2024 on the macroprudential review for credit institutions, the systemic risks relating to Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries (NBFIs) and their interconnectedness with credit institutions, under Article 513 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (COM(2024)0021),
Brief analysis/ assessment of the resolution and requests made in it:
– having regard to the European Central Bank (ECB) Financial Stability Review of November 2024,
The resolution positions financial stability as a precondition for competitiveness and growth, within a context of geopolitical fragmentation, high leverage, market concentration and growing non-bank intermediation. Against this backdrop, the resolution addresses a number of requests to the Commission.
– having regard to the ECB Financial Stability Review of May 2025,
On Banking Union and Capital Markets Union (as part of the Savings and Investment Union), the report calls:
– having regard to the Quarterly Review of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) of March 2025 on international banking and financial market developments,
on the Commission to prioritise a Capital Markets Union (CMU) agenda that supports EU competitiveness while not hampering financial stability (para 2).
– having regard to the letter from the Chair of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of 21 February 2025,
it emphasises the CMU’s goal to mobilise private capital more effectively and to correct structural imbalances in the EU financial system. It recognises that the completion of the Banking Union must be a strategic priority in the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union (para 3, 4). It also suggests the need to weigh the benefits of a single market and the economies of scale stemming from cross-border banking consolidation with ‘too big to fail’ risks and the potential weakening of smaller financial centres (para 6).
– having regard to the FSB status report of 22 October 2024 entitled ‘G20 Crypto-asset Policy Implementation Roadmap’,
On bank regulation, the report calls for:
– having regard to the FSB report of October 2021 entitled ‘Policy proposals to enhance money market fund resilience: Final report’,
The full implementation of the Basel III framework to enhance the resilience and global competitiveness of EU banks, underlining that financial stability itself can be seen as a competitive advantage (para 20).
– having regard to the response of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) of November 2024 to the Commission’s consultation assessing the adequacy of macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediation, entitled ‘A system-wide approach to macroprudential policy’,
A sound macroprudential framework while ensuring simplification and harmonisation in the design of macroprudential buffers and more consistency regarding their application by Member States, while systematically applying the principles of proportionality, cost-efficiency and digital simplification where possible and without jeopardising financial stability (para 21).
– having regard to the ESRB’s compliance report of February 2025 on the ESRB recommendation of 2 December 2021 on reform of money market funds (ESRB/2021/9),
On Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries (NBFIs) (NBFIs), the report calls for:
– having regard to the update of the Joint Committee of European Supervisory Authorities of 31 March 2025 on risks and vulnerabilities in the EU financial system – spring 2025,
A thorough review of regulatory gaps, including in less regulated areas such as family offices and supply chain finance companies (para 26).
– having regard to the opinion of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) of 14 February 2022 on the review of the Money Market Fund Regulation,
Tools to better capture the scale and speed of liquidity outflows from margin calls during systemic events, especially for energy utilities and NBFIs (para 29).
– having regard to the Global Financial Stability Report of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of 22 April 2025,
Greater transparency and macroprudential oversight in margining practices, including stress testing and scenario analysis, drawing on FSB’s recent work on the topic (para 31).
– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),
A holistic, more coherent system-wide and activity-based supervisory approach, including a coherent supervision by ESMA for systemic cross-border NBFIs. It stresses the need for enhanced data availability, analytics and data-sharing between national and EU authorities, to support a more comprehensive risk monitoring framework and system-wide stress-testing capabilities (para 39, 41, 45).
– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’ (Letta report),
Stronger international cooperation (International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank of International Settlements (BIS), Basel Committee, Financial Stability Board (FSB) to address cross-border risks (para 46).
– having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2011 on the financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken1,
The report also calls on the Commission to act on specific files and areas:
– having regard to the report of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 26 March 2025 on Banking Union – annual report 2024,
On Money Market Funds, the report calls for a reform of the Money Market Funds Regulation in line with international standards, regulatory progress made in other jurisdictions and the recommendations of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (para 27).
– having regard to the hearing by its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 19 March 2025 on assessing the adequacy of the macroprudential framework for non-bank financial institutions in the EU,
On Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) and stablecoins, the report stresses the importance of the timely and consistent implementation of the EU prudential framework for crypto-assets and calls on the Commission to monitor remaining regulatory gaps (para 34). The report also expresses its concern regarding growing interlinkages between crypto-assets and decentralised finance markets and the traditional financial system; notes the largely speculative nature of crypto-assets and their important role in illicit transactions and urges the Commission to assess whether there are potential channels of contagion, as in the case of multi-issuance (para 32, 33, 35).
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
On ICT interdependencies and Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), the report encourages innovation in the field of digital finance and extensive investment in cyber-resilience to protect financial infrastructure against external threats. It also calls on the Commission and the ECB to map and address dependencies of the European financial system on non-EU digital service providers, single points of failure and the risk of hybrid attacks (para 36).
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0232/2025),
On enforcement of fiscal rules, the report specifically calls on the Commission to enforce compliance with the EU’s economic governance framework and ensure convergence with the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact to maintain sustainable public finance (para 14, 15).
A. whereas financial stability remains a cornerstone of economic resilience and growth, requiring vigilance in the face of significant economic uncertainty, external shocks and systemic risks;
On sovereign debt risk, the report focuses on sovereign debt risks and recalls the drivers of the 2008 financial crisis and the euro area crisis, namely sovereign debt sustainability and inadequate banking regulatory framework. (para 13) The report takes note of calls to mitigate systemic vulnerabilities but stresses that any future developments should not undermine national fiscal responsibilities. (para 14).
B. whereas the global financial crisis has demonstrated the risks to advanced economies of financial instabilities that assume global proportions;
On bank resolution, the report emphasises the importance of a robust and credible crisis management framework; highlights the role of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in ensuring the effective resolution of failing institutions and supports the European Central Bank’s function as lender of last resort to safeguard liquidity and trust during crises; notes that a backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) is still missing; (para 40).
C. whereas Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine and the economic consequences thereof have led to inflationary pressures, volatility in energy markets and financial uncertainty;
On margin preparedness and central counterparties (CCPs), the report emphasises the need for robust collateral frameworks and coordinated supervision of CCPs, specifically noting concerns regarding European dependence on non-EU CCPs. It calls for tools to better capture the scale and speed of liquidity outflows resulting from margin calls during systemic events, especially for energy utilities and NBFIs. (para 29, 30).
D. whereas the imposition of tariffs contributes to the fragmentation of global trade, exacerbating supply chain disruptions and posing additional risks to financial markets and the broader economy;
On securitisation, the report notes the ongoing debate on the securitisation package and suggests that simplification of post-2008 reforms should go hand in hand with clear benefits to the real economy (para 22).
E. whereas a well-integrated capital markets union (CMU) is essential for absorbing shocks and fostering investment within the EU and further integrating the single market;
On vulnerabilities in commercial real estate and the role of NBFI, the report calls for the ESRB to closely monitor the role of NBFIs active in real estate markets and issue relevant recommendations; recognises, in addition, the high levels of household indebtedness; (para 23).
F. whereas the stability of NBFIs will be even more important if the European Union shifts more of its financing to capital markets;
Response to requests and overview of actions taken, or intended to be taken, by the Commission:
G. whereas NBFIs operate across very diverse sectors;
Savings and Investments Union, including the Banking Union and Capital Markets Union (point 1 above)
H. whereas lagging economic growth, aggravated by trade tensions, has adverse effects on leveraged entities and will increase credit risk for financial institutions;
The Commission welcomes the call for completing the Single Market as a way to foster a more competitive financial sector and economy as well as to strengthen its financial stability through private risk sharing.
I. whereas high asset valuations in equity and corporate debt markets raise concerns about the possibility of a market correction with systemic consequences;
In line with the Savings and Investments Union (SIU) strategy, in 2025 the Commission adopted ambitious proposals to improve the way the EU financial system channels savings to productive investments and to complete the Single Market for financial services (package on Market Integration and Supervision – MISP). Progress on these proposals is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In 2026, the Commission will continue to deliver on its priorities in the SIU strategy, including with the adoption of measures promoting EU venture and growth capital funds.
J. whereas the residential real estate sector, which has benefited from the low-interest rate environment, plays a pivotal role in financial stability on account of its central place in the economy, the significant share of household wealth concentrated in property assets, the key involvement of the financial sector in funding real estate investments, and the crucial function of real estate as collateral in credit markets;
Regarding the Banking Union deliverables of the SIU, see points below on banking regulation and bank resolution.
K. whereas complexity and interconnection among financial sectors has gained importance, with NBFIs being net lenders to banks and the wider economy;
Banking regulation (point 2 above)
L. whereas the footprint of NBFIs in strategic financial markets, such as sovereign bond markets, has grown, as demonstrated by the unwinding of cash-futures basis trades by hedge funds in the US treasury market during the tariff crisis of April 2025;
Increasing cross-border integration and facilitating cross-border provision of banking services is key to EU banks’ scale-up and to encourage competition among them to the benefit of citizens and companies. Scale is needed to be competitive as banking is a business with increasing returns to scale.
M. whereas targeted reforms could enhance the resilience of EU money market funds in line with international standards;
The fragmentation of the Single Market impairs the ability of the banking sector to support citizens and businesses, but also the financing of EU priorities in critical areas.
N. whereas the financial sector remains vulnerable to cyber threats, hybrid warfare tactics and hidden leverage that could destabilise critical financial infrastructure;
As announced in the SIU strategy, later this year, the Commission will publish a comprehensive report assessing the competitiveness within the Single Market in banking. It will focus on how to increase the competitiveness of the EU banking sector, advance the Banking Union and address undue complexity in the regulatory framework.
Banking Union and CMU: shock absorption and resilience
The Commission has launched a targeted public consultation (closed on 19 April 2026) to gather feedback and evidence on the competitiveness of the EU banking sector and on how to make our framework more efficient, less complex, and better designed to enhance the competitiveness of the banking sector and its contribution to the EU economy. This includes gathering feedback on how to simplify and tackle undue complexities in the regulatory framework for banks, and unintended overlaps across the microprudential, macroprudential and resolution frameworks.
1. Welcomes the renewed debate on the need to boost EU productivity and competitiveness, inter alia through better integrated capital markets and a resource-efficient economy, as outlined in the Draghi and Letta reports;
Having implemented the major part of the Basel III standards from 1 January 2025, with the exception of the new market risk prudential framework, in 2026, the Commission will be making use of the powers granted to it by the co-legislators to ensure an international level playing field in relation to the market risk capital requirements.
2. Calls on the Commission to prioritise a CMU agenda that supports EU competitiveness while not hampering financial stability;
Non-Bank Financial Intermediation - NBFI (point 3 above)
3. Emphasises the CMU’s goal to mobilise private capital more effectively to close the EU’s investment gap and the role it can play as a shock absorber; stresses that the CMU agenda should also contribute to correcting structural imbalances in the EU’s financial system; regrets the persistence of a tax-induced debt-equity bias;
The report warns about the difficulty to identify financial stability threats in today’s complex financial markets, where activities of banks and non-banks are increasingly interconnected and systemic liquidity and leverage risks remain high.
4. Recognises that the completion of the Banking Union must be a strategic priority in the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union;
As announced in the Market Integration and Supervision Package (MISP)Communication on the further development of capital market integration and supervision within the Union, the Commission is considering targeted actions for 2026 to strengthen macroprudential oversight and enhance the EU financial system’s resilience.
5. Notes the challenges stemming from more integrated financial markets in the absence of more coherent supervision, including the trade-off between efficient risk sharing and diversification, on the one hand, and contagion, spillover and amplification risks, on the other;
The Commission is also exploring the feasibility of more effective and well-coordinated tools for macroprudential authorities to address systemic risk threats and spillover risks across the EU, as well as lead to more regulatory and supervisory convergence and to better data sharing.
6. Recognises the trade-off with regard to cross-border banking consolidation between geographic diversification, cross-border financial services, economies of scale, and a potential weakening of the bank-sovereign nexus, on the one hand, and the ‘too big to fail’ problem, the potential weakening of smaller financial centres and links to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and local economies on the other;
The report also calls for the Commission to act in specific areas:
7. Notes that systemic risk may also arise from smaller institutions, as they may exhibit highly correlated balance sheets;
Money Market Funds (MMFs) reforms (point 4 above)
8. Stresses the importance of access to capital, especially for SMEs, such as venture capital going to growth companies, while preserving financial stability, ensuring that growth and resilience go hand in hand;
The Commission duly notes the recommendations by EU and international authorities and undertook further analyses showing that most MMFs in the EU already maintain levels of liquidity buffers above regulatory minimum.
Macro-financial risks and geopolitical fragility
The Commission is exploring ways to ensure that these higher liquidity buffers are maintained by all MMFs in regular market conditions. Other measures to address liquidity concerns are also being implemented as part of the recent review of the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities and Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directives.
9. Highlights the ECB’s primary objective of maintaining price stability and the key role of the ESRB, European supervisory authorities and central banks in contributing to financial stability in the Union;
MiCAR and stablecoins (point 5 above)
10. Recalls that the Eurosystem has been built on the principle of monetary dominance; calls for the preservation of the ECB’s independence as a factor supporting financial stability;
The Commission believes that the Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation strikes the right balance between supporting innovation and mitigating risks when it comes to stablecoins. At the same time, the Commission continues to closely monitor market and policy developments in other key jurisdictions.
11. Underlines that certain central bank market interventions come with the risk of market distortions that might affect financial stability;
The Commission services are closely working with European Supervisory Authorities and National Competent Authorities to ensure a consistent application of the Regulation by Member States, among other, by providing guidance and monitoring that national implementing laws are not in contrast with the legislative text.
12. Notes the Union’s exposure to external shocks via strong interlinkages with foreign financial markets and entities, reliance of the EU financial sector on non-EU service providers and pressures from rising trade tensions amid geopolitical uncertainty;
As part of the MISP package, the Commission proposes to increase ESMA’s role in the supervision of crypto asset service providers (‘CASPs’) with the aim to address supervisory fragmentation, enhance financial stability, and ensure consistent implementation of EU rules.
13. Emphasises the risks of high sovereign debt and deficits; recalls that market concerns about sovereign debt sustainability, the inadequate banking regulatory framework at the time, and contagion through interconnected financial systems drove the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent euro area crisis;
Finally, the Commission is planning a holistic consultation later this year to gather views on the ongoing MiCAR implementation and activities outside of its scope, such as on decentralised finance.
14. Warns of spillover effects to the financial sector; takes note in this regard of calls to mitigate systemic vulnerabilities; stresses, however, that any future developments should not undermine national fiscal responsibilities;
ICT interdependencies and DORA (point 6 above)
15. Calls on the Commission to enforce compliance with the EU’s economic governance framework and convergence with fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact to ensure sound and sustainable public finances;
On the need to address dependencies of the European financial system on non-EU digital service providers, progress has been made with the implementation of the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), which introduced requirements for financial entities to map critical ICT dependencies. It also established an EU-level Oversight Framework for critical ICT third-party service providers, which oversees dependencies on non-EU providers. An important milestone was reached in November 2025 when the European Supervisory Authorities published a list of such providers.
16. Recognises that structural reforms to strengthen the euro area’s financial and institutional architecture and reduction of market fragmentation could elevate the international role of the euro and potentially bolster financial and monetary stability; notes the ongoing discussions on the digital euro;
Enforcement of fiscal rules (point 7 above)
17. Highlights the potential instability stemming from highly leveraged financial institutions, while acknowledging they can play economic roles such as hedging, improving market liquidity, price discovery or risk sharing;
The Commission enforces compliance with the EU’s economic governance framework and convergence with the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact as part of its EU fiscal surveillance process and is committed to continue doing so in the future. Ensuring sound and sustainable public finances is one of the main objectives of the reformed EU economic governance framework which entered into force in 2024. The Commission shares the Parliament’s view that this objective is essential for preserving financial stability in a context of heightened economic uncertainty.
18. Stresses the importance of coordination among macroprudential supervisors through systemic risk analysis and oversight and alignment with microprudential supervision to ensure compatibility;
The Commission has applied the reformed EU fiscal rules to all Member States when assessing their medium-term fiscal-structural plans and these rules are proving fit-for-purpose overall by establishing the medium-term budgetary constraint for each Member State. This followed a thorough technical dialogue and a common framework conducive to differentiation according to the specific debt sustainability challenges of each Member State. The Commission has fully complied with all its obligations under Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 (the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact). Moreover, when necessary, the Commission has recommended that a Member State enter into the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact and has fully complied with its role and obligations under Regulation 1467/1997 (the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact).
19. Acknowledges the potential risks to financial stability arising from more frequent manifestations of physical risks of climate and nature hazards and climate-related transition risks;
Sovereign debt risk (point 8 above)
Banking sector stress and NBFI oversight
The European Commission acknowledges the risks associated with high sovereign debt and deficits, which remain an area of focus. We would like to emphasise the fact that, while in the EU the general government debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 65.1% in 2008 to 86.9% in 2014, since then, the ratio has been on a downward trend, with the exception of the COVID-19 pandemic period. In 2024, the ratio was at 80.7% of GDP, i.e., below the peak in 2014. Of course, the current economic and geopolitical environment continues exerting pressure on public finances.
20. Emphasises the need to ensure the implementation of the Basel III framework to enhance the resilience and global competitiveness of EU banks; notes the continued lack of clarity concerning implementation of the Basel III standards in some major non-EU-country jurisdictions and the need for the Union’s banking system to remain competitive in an international context; emphasises the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Basel framework, underlining that financial stability itself can be seen as a competitive advantage;
The Commission would like to note that after the great financial crisis, the EU fiscal oversight was strengthened and reformed to support debt sustainability. In parallel, the euro area sovereign crisis-management architecture was reinforced, including through the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism. Additionally, the EU has substantially overhauled the banking regulatory framework to ensure the financial system is more resilient to future shocks. The implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism represent another pillar designed to prevent and manage more effectively banking crises. The stress tests performed by the European Banking Authority demonstrated the resilience of the banking sector, even under an extreme scenario. These reforms, together with further progress on the Banking Union and the Savings and Investments Union, will contribute to further addressing sovereign-bank linkages by strengthening bank resilience, improving crisis management, and supporting more diversified financing channels.
21. Highlights the importance of keeping a sound macroprudential framework while ensuring simplification, legal clarification and burden reduction, particularly for smaller entities; highlights that there is room for simplification and harmonisation in the design and application of macroprudential buffers; calls on the Commission and supervisory authorities to systematically apply the principles of proportionality, cost-efficiency and digital simplification where possible and without jeopardising financial stability;
Bank resolution (point 9 above)
22. Stresses that simplification of the post-2008 financial crisis reforms should be considered if there are clear and substantiated benefits to the real economy and if there are no risks to financial stability; takes note of the debate on the securitisation package;
The Commission agrees with the importance of having a robust and credible crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework. The 2025 agreed reform of the framework, which includes amendments to the Single Resolution Mechanism to make it more effective, is expected to strengthen EU bank crisis management by focusing on more effective resolution for small and medium-sized banks. It is expected to reduce use of public funds for interventions in banks, maintain financial stability, and better protect depositors.
23. Takes note of the ECB analysis on persistent vulnerabilities in commercial real estate markets, compounded by rising interest rates and NBFI exposures, which deserve close monitoring; calls, in this context, for the ESRB to closely monitor the role of NBFIs active in real estate markets and issue relevant recommendations; recognises, in addition, the high levels of household indebtedness;
As part of the SIU deliverables, the Commission will identify a way forward on a European Deposit Insurance System, building on the CMDI review and taking national specificities into account.
24. Urges the ECB to assess financial institutions’ exposure to geopolitical risks, including indirect effects of sanctions, tariffs and economic fragmentation as part of the regular Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process in the context of strategic autonomy;
The Commission continues to regard the ratification of the amended ESM Treaty as an important step to allow for the operationalisation of the backstop by the ESM to the Single Resolution Fund. This would enhance the robustness and credibility of the Banking Union crisis management architecture and improve the euro area’s resilience to financial crises.
25. Acknowledges the growing systemic relevance of NBFIs, which comprise over 40 % of the EU financial sector’s assets; considers that such entities may contribute to financial stability risks when insufficiently regulated;
On Margin preparedness and CCPs supervision (point 10 above)
26. Notes the diversity of NBFIs’ business models and their important financing role; highlights that for many sectors, there is already European sectoral regulation in place, such as for hedge funds (Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive2), money market funds (Money Market Funds Regulation3), insurance undertakings (Solvency II), investment firms (Investment Firms Directive4 and Regulation5) or pension funds (Directive on institutions for occupational retirement provision6); notes that the current framework, however, focuses primarily on investor protection and market integrity rather than on reducing systemic risks7; calls for a thorough review of regulatory gaps regarding NBFIs, including in less regulated areas such as family offices and supply chain finance companies;
The Commission agrees with the need for robust collateral frameworks and coordinated supervision of central counterparties. European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), as amended by EMIR 3, pursues the overarching objective of ensuring safe, resilient and well-functioning clearing infrastructures, including through robust risk management and collateral frameworks, in order to safeguard financial stability. Within this framework, EMIR 3 addresses several of the concerns raised by strengthening both systemic risk monitoring and supervisory coordination. In particular, it establishes the Joint Monitoring Mechanism (JMM) as a forum for enhanced cooperation and information exchange among authorities to monitor risks related to derivatives markets and central clearing, including risks arising from margining practices and market stress. EMIR 3 also significantly reinforces the role of ESMA in CCP supervision, notably by making ESMA a co-chair of CCP colleges and by expanding its access to supervisory information, supporting more consistent and effective oversight of CCPs.
27. Takes note of the Commission’s 2023 report on the functioning of money market funds and recent amendments to the Money Market Funds framework; calls on the Commission to come forward with a reform of the Money Market Funds Regulation8 in line with international standards, regulatory progress made in other jurisdictions and the recommendations of the ESRB and ESMA;
Building on these measures, the recently adopted market integration package proposal under the SIU further advances supervisory integration by envisaging more centralised oversight, including granting ESMA powers to act as the sole competent authority for significant CCPs.
Liquidity, margining and digital risks
To address concerns regarding the EU’s dependence on non-EU, in particular UK-based, CCPs, EMIR 3 also introduces the active account requirement, aimed at fostering clearing capacity within the Union and reducing excessive external reliance. It is important to note that the measures introduced in EMIR 3 are still in the process of being operationalised.
28. Highlights the fact that procyclical margin calls during crises such as COVID-19 and the 2022 energy turmoil drove significant liquidity stress; notes the importance of liquidity preparedness, and generally of leverage and capital buffers in this regard;
Securitisation (point 11 above)
29. Calls for tools to better capture the scale and speed of liquidity outflows resulting from margin calls during systemic events, especially for energy utilities and NBFIs;
The review of the securitisation framework responds to significant EU investment needs and a political mandate to strengthen the financing of the real economy. It recognises the importance of securitisation as a supportive—though not on its own a silver bullet—tool that facilitates financing for the real economy.
30. Stresses the need for resilient clearing infrastructure, robust collateral frameworks and coordinated supervision of central counterparties (CCPs); notes the Commission’s decision to extend the equivalence regime for UK-based CCPs and notes continuing concerns regarding European dependence on non-EU CCPs;
The June 2025 securitisation package has been broadly welcomed, reflecting recognition that parts of the current framework are overly restrictive and hinder market development. The proposal strikes a careful balance, focusing on measures with the greatest potential impact on the EU market, while acknowledging the legacy of the Global Financial Crisis and preserving the key safeguards for financial stability embedded in the securitisation framework. The Council obtained a Coreper negotiating mandate in December 2025.
31. Supports greater transparency and macroprudential oversight in margining practices, including stress testing and scenario analysis, drawing on the FSB's recent work on liquidity preparedness for margin and collateral calls;
Commercial real estate and NBFI (point 12 above)
32. Expresses its concern regarding growing interlinkages between crypto-asset and decentralised finance markets and the traditional financial system; supports the FSB, the standard-setting bodies and the ESRB in their efforts to install a regulatory framework and harmonise its classification;
The Commission acknowledges that there may be vulnerabilities that demand close macroprudential monitoring, notably on the role of NBFIs active in real estate markets in light of past market stress events. The Commission monitors developments in the real estate sector as part of the procedures to assess macroeconomic imbalances. Moreover, the ESRB has also been monitoring the Commercial Real Estate (CRE) sector since 2015 and published reports on vulnerabilities in the EEA CRE sector. The ESRB also issued a recommendation in January 2023 that identifies CRE-related systemic risks and specifies the remedial actions to be taken in response to those systemic risks. One of the identified vulnerabilities for the non-banking sector is liquidity mismatches in open-ended real estate investment funds. Real estate investment funds generally are at risk of an asset price correction if the frequency of valuation is too low. This requires appropriate tools to manage liquidity and redemption requests. While acknowledging that capital and borrower-based measures and other macroprudential measures are already available to EEA countries, the ESRB also recommends national authorities to consider reciprocating macroprudential measures in different EEA countries to ensure the effectiveness of national macroprudential measures and prevent the shifting of systemic risk from one jurisdiction to another.
33. Takes note of the FSB’s analysis that for the time being, financial stability risks arising from crypto-asset markets appear limited9; flags, however, the potentially systemic relevance of developments in the markets for crypto-assets; notes the largely speculative nature of crypto-assets and their important role in illicit transactions; urges the Commission and the ESRB to closely follow evolutions in this field;
34. Welcomes the fact that the European Union has put in place a prudential framework for crypto-assets (MiCAR); stresses the importance of timely and consistent implementation and calls on the Commission to monitor remaining regulatory gaps;
35. Highlights the fast growth of the stablecoin market, which remains so far largely restricted to the crypto ecosystem; notes that the regulatory landscape with regard to stablecoins in major non-EU-country jurisdictions is rapidly changing; urges the Commission to assess whether there are potential channels of contagion, such as in the case of multi-issuance;
36. Highlights that the Union has adopted measures to strengthen the digital resilience of financial entities, most notably through the Digital Operational Resilience Act10; encourages innovation in the field of digital finance and extensive investment in cyber-resilience to protect financial infrastructure against external threats; calls on the Commission and the ECB to map and address dependencies of the European financial system on non-EU digital service providers, single points of failure and the risk of hybrid attacks;
37. Underlines that improvements in financial literacy can contribute to individual resilience, more stable financial markets, and increased participation in the CMU;
38. Notes that maintaining reasonable and reliable logistics and infrastructure for cash availability remains an essential element of financial stability and public trust;
Enhancing supervisory coherence, data capabilities and crisis preparedness
39. Supports a holistic, more coherent system-wide and activity-based supervisory approach identifying and addressing risks and vulnerabilities associated with different types of activity across the financial sector, such as lending, transactions and asset management;
40. Emphasises the importance of a robust and credible crisis management framework; highlights the role of the Single Resolution Mechanism in ensuring the effective resolution of failing institutions and supports the ECB’s function as lender of last resort to safeguard liquidity and trust during crises; notes that a backstop for the Single Resolution Fund is still missing;
41. Supports the ECB, the ESRB, the European and national supervisory authorities and the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in safeguarding EU financial stability and addressing emerging global financial risks, including coherent supervision by ESMA for systemic cross-border NBFIs;
42. Warns against regulatory arbitrage and underlines the need to address hidden leverage vulnerabilities revealed in past disruptions;
43. Calls on the Commission to uphold a high level of ambition in implementing the FSB recommendations on leverage in the EU;
44. Underscores that authorities, both at national and EU level, should have qualitative, easily accessible data and have adequate resources to analyse the data;
45. Calls for enhanced transparency, data analytics capabilities and streamlined data-sharing mechanisms between national and EU authorities, with respect of data protection safeguards, in order to support a more comprehensive risk monitoring framework and system-wide stress-testing capabilities, including on cyber-resilience, energy outages and the collateral framework; notes that some national authorities have already communicated their intention to carry out stress tests on interconnections between the banking sector and the NBFI sector;
46. Calls for strengthened cooperation with international financial institutions, including the IMF, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the BIS and the FSB, to tackle cross-border stability risks;
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47. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
Financial stability is a cornerstone of the EU’s economic resilience, especially in an era marked by significant geopolitical uncertainty, heightened market volatility, and structural changes. Recent events, such as energy market disruptions, geo-military tensions, trade wars, and financial market turmoil, have demonstrated the urgent need to address emerging risks and vulnerabilities before they escalate into systemic crises.
A well-functioning and fully integrated Capital Markets Union (CMU) is critical for both the stability and future growth of the EU. While deeper market integration can enhance investment flows and economic resilience, your Rapporteur believes that it is at least equally important to balance these benefits with adequate safeguards to mitigate potential risks. He highlights the importance of moving forward with reforms along the lines of those proposed in the Draghi and Letta reports to ensure that the EU’s capital markets are competitive but also stable.
The draft report also identifies several macro-financial risks, including rising sovereign debt levels, exposure to external shocks, and vulnerabilities in the non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI) sector. High asset valuations, the growing influence of decentralised finance, and the risks posed by margining practices are all factors that require careful regulatory attention. In addressing these concerns, your Rapporteur stresses the need for robust crisis preparedness mechanisms to safeguard the EU’s financial system.
Finally, it is crucial that financial supervision across the EU be enhanced to reflect the increasingly complex and interconnected global financial environment. Effective coordination between macro-prudential supervisors, access to granular data, and an ability to respond quickly to emerging risks are fundamental for safeguarding financial stability. Your rapporteur also highlights the need for stronger cooperation with international financial bodies to manage cross-border risks and ensure a coordinated response to financial instability.
ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT
The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure1.
INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE
Date adopted
5.11.2025
Result of final vote
+ : 43
- : 5
0 : 3
Members present for the final vote
Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Gilles Boyer, Giovanni Crosetto, Fabio De Masi, Siegbert Frank Droese, Marco Falcone, Markus Ferber, Jonás Fernández, Claire Fita, Dirk Gotink, Michalis Hadjipantela, Eero Heinäluoma, Jaroslav Knot, Kinga Kollár, Aurore Lalucq, Rada Laykova, Marlena Maląg, Jorge Martín Frías, Costas Mavrides, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Denis Nesci, Luděk Niedermayer, Ľudovít Ódor, Nikos Papandreou, Gaetano Pedulla', Kira Marie Peter-Hansen, Sirpa Pietikäinen, Pierre Pimpie, Jaroslava Pokorná Jermanová, Evelyn Regner, Jussi Saramo, Paulius Saudargas, Ralf Seekatz, Irene Tinagli, Pasquale Tridico, Lara Wolters, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Substitutes present for the final vote
Marc Botenga, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Fernand Kartheiser, Arba Kokalari, Morten Løkkegaard, Marco Squarta, Mariateresa Vivaldini
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote
Jaroslav Bžoch, Ana Catarina Mendes, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Birgit Sippel
FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE
43
+
ECR
Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Crosetto Giovanni, Malag Marlena, Nesci Denis, Squarta Marco, Vivaldini Mariateresa
NI
Kartheiser Fernand
PPE
Aftias Georgios, Benjumea Benjumea Isabel, Falcone Marco, Ferber Markus, Gotink Dirk, Gronkiewicz-Waltz Hanna, Hadjipantela Michalis, Kokalari Arba, Kollár Kinga, Motreanu Dan-Stefan, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Niedermayer Ludek, Pietikäinen Sirpa, Saudargas Paulius, Seekatz Ralf
PfE
Bzoch Jaroslav, Knot Jaroslav, Martín Frías Jorge, Pokorná Jermanová Jaroslava
Renew
Boyer Gilles, Løkkegaard Morten, Ódor Ludovít, Yon-Courtin Stéphanie
S&D
Fernández Jonás, Fita Claire, Heinäluoma Eero, Lalucq Aurore, Mavrides Costas, Mendes Ana Catarina, Papandreou Nikos, Regner Evelyn, Sippel Birgit, Tinagli Irene, Wolters Lara
Verts/ALE
Andresen Rasmus, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie
5
-
PfE
Pimpie Pierre
The Left
Botenga Marc, Pedulla' Gaetano, Saramo Jussi, Tridico Pasquale
3
0
ESN
Droese Siegbert Frank, Laykova Rada
NI
De Masi Fabio
Key:
+ : in favour
- : against
0 : abstentions