What changed

Follow-up to the European Parliament of 8 May 2025 on competition policy – annual report 2024

P10_TA(2025)0104

1. Rapporteur: Lara WOLTERS (S&D / NL)

Competition policy – annual report 2024

2. References: 2024/2079(INI) / A10-0071/2025 / P10_TA(2025)104

Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

3. Date of adoption of the resolution: 8 May 2025

PE765.240

4. Competent Parliamentary Committee: Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)

European Parliament resolution of 8 May 2025 on competition policy – annual report 2024 (2024/2079(INI))

5. Brief assessment of the resolution and the requests made in it

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to Articles 101 to 109 thereof,

The European Parliament Resolution concerns the Commission’s Annual Report on Competition Policy 2023 (COM(2024) 115 final) and its accompanying Staff Working Document (SWD (2024) 53 final), adopted on 6 March 2024. The Commission recognises the comprehensiveness of the European Parliament’s Report on Competition Policy 2024 and appreciates the overall positive views on competition policy and its enforcement.

– having regard to the publication of 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen entitled ‘Europe’s choice – political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024–2029’,

Regarding State aid control, the Parliament invites the Commission to investigate the lack of harmonisation in clawback mechanisms (point 6); calls on the Commission to monitor the effects of State aid and to ensure the integrity of the single market, not to engage in subsidy competition, and to enhance State aid reporting and transparency (point 8). Furthermore, the Parliament calls on the Commission to complete important projects of common European interest (IPCEI) notifications within six months (point 9), to assess an exemption related to services of general economic interest (SGEI) for affordable housing (point 16), and to explore flexible funding options for islands, outermost regions and economically depressed areas in the EU (point 17).

– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

As regards antitrust, the Parliament calls on the Commission to analyse how the proposed 'new competition tool' could complement existing framework (point 13). It reiterates its request for a greater use of structural remedies and of interim measures (point 15) and calls on the Commission to address the length of antitrust investigations (point 25).

– having regard to the report of 18 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

Regarding merger control, the Parliament calls on the Commission to enhance the scrutiny of potential ‘killer acquisitions’ (point 19); to develop further the ‘innovation defence’ and to take matters of public interest into account (point 22). The Parliament asks the Commission to identify barriers preventing it from defining the EU as the relevant market in merger assessments and to adopt a forward-looking approach to EU consolidation (point 23). It also calls for updating merger assessment frameworks to reflect digital economy realities (point 24), progressing swiftly on the implementation of the existing interoperability obligations for messaging services under the Digital Markets Act (DMA), starting work on the review of the DMA for May 2026, implementing existing interoperability obligations under the DMA and looking into extending interoperability obligations to online social networking services (point 24), and scrutinising dominant digital players' market leveraging (point 30).

– having regard to the European Court of Auditors Special Report 21/2024 of 23 October 2024 entitled ‘State aid in times of crisis – Swift reaction but shortcomings in the Commission’s monitoring and inconsistencies in the framework to support the EU’s industrial policy objectives’,

Furthermore, the Parliament calls on the Commission to consider adding generative AI as a new core platform service under the DMA (point 29), to ensure adequate staffing for enforcement (point 33), to analyse the effects of buying alliances in food supply chains (point 37) to review the Interchange Fee Regulation (point 39) and for the Executive Vice-President Ribera to maintain close contact with the Parliament's committee competent for competition and its working group on competition policy (point 41).

– having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation),

6. Response by the Commission to key points in the resolution including overview of action taken or intended to be taken

– having regard to Article 11 TFEU, which mandates the integration of environmental protection requirements into the definition and implementation of all EU policies and activities, with a view to promoting sustainable development,

Points related to State aid control

– having regard to Article 3 of Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030, which provides that environmentally harmful subsidies, in particular fossil fuel subsidies, should be phased out without delay,

On point 6: State aid may be authorised provided that it is limited to the minimum necessary to achieve certain defined policy objectives, that is to say that the State aid must be proportional. In certain situations, State aid is calculated on the basis of funding gaps, identifying the required support, including a reasonable profit for the beneficiary to undertake a specific project. If such a project is more successful than expected, it may generate cash-flows exceeding the aid recipient’s own expectations. Exceeding amounts lead to higher-than-expected profits, which means that the recipient company can contribute more of its own funds to the project and that less State aid is necessary. Clawback mechanisms ensure such ‘excess’ profits are followed by corresponding reductions of the State aid already granted and are therefore essential elements for the proportionality assessment. Without such an instrument, the aid would lead to overcompensation with potential detrimental effects on other players in the Single Market. Such mechanisms are typical for large investment projects of varying types in volatile market conditions and with different characteristics such as Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) or large-scale semiconductor manufacturing investments approved directly under Article 107(3)c of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) in line with the principles outlined in the Chips Act Communication. The Commission advises Member States in each individual case so that they can design clawback mechanisms suitable for particular projects.

– having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 3 September 2024 in Case C‑611/22 P, Illumina v Commission, of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑465/20 P, European Commission v Ireland and Others, and of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑48/22 P (Google and Alphabet v Commission),

The core principles need to be ensured, namely that profits exceeding the expectations of the beneficiary need to be shared with the granting Member State to avoid overcompensation and protect the level playing field in the Single Market. In view of the different scopes of application, a certain degree of flexibility is necessary to ensure that a clawback mechanism addresses the specificities of each case.

– having regard to the Commission’s report of June 2024 entitled ‘Protecting competition in a changing world – Evidence on the evolution of competition in the EU during the past 25 years’,

On point 8: The Commission monitors the implementation of State aid measures over time. In addition to the annual reporting cycle, several surveys were carried out by the Commission to get timely information on the implementation of the crisis-related measures. The Commission’s data shows that State aid expenditure in 2023 has increasingly reverted to long-term key EU priorities. While overall State aid expenditure in relative terms (i.e. compared to GDP) remained higher in 2023 (accounting for 1.09% of EU GDP) compared to pre-crisis levels in 2019 (0.92% of the EU GDP), it remained lower in relative terms (0.8% of EU GDP in 2023 compared to 0.92% in 2019) when excluding the aid expenditure to address the consequences of the latest crises, i.e. the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its weaponisation of energy supply, as well as the residual expenditures related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This indicates that, despite the consistent increase between 2022 and 2023, non-crisis aid has not yet returned to pre-crisis levels. Compared to 2019, in 2023 there is also less spread in the relative aid expenditure across Member States. Furthermore, when comparing the aid expenditure for non-crisis objectives to their national GDP, the largest spenders are Malta, which spent around 1.65% of its own GDP for these State aid measures, followed by Denmark, Croatia, Hungary and Poland.

– having regard to the study entitled ‘The role of commodity traders in shaping agricultural markets’, published by its Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in November 2024,

It is essential to ensure that State aid facilitates the development of economic activities, in particular via public investments that contribute to EU competitiveness, without fragmenting the Single Market, undermining fair competition or leading to destructive subsidy competition. Therefore, EU level coordination of industrial policies is crucial to prevent such developments. The Commission is currently enhancing its reporting and transparency practices taking into account the recommendations made by the European Court of Auditors.

– having regard to the report of 20 December 2023 by the European Securities and Markets Authority entitled ‘CRA Market Share Report: 2023 edition’,

On point 9: For the Commission, supporting innovation and major open infrastructure projects in cross-border projects through IPCEIs is a priority. The Commission is doing its utmost to streamline IPCEI notifications and support IPCEIs over their entire lifecycle, from identification, design, assessment to implementation.

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Given that IPCEIs involve vast amounts of aid the Commission needs to ensure that the planned aid to individual companies is well targeted and limited to what is strictly necessary to minimise distortions of competition. The length of the IPCEI procedure depends on various factors, including the number and complexity of projects included in an IPCEI and in particular on the quality of the submissions and the involvement of the national authorities. As the assessment of an integrated IPCEI requires a concomitant and joint assessment of all participating projects, it is the slowest of the projects that determines the pace of the assessment.

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0071/2025),

The Commission of course agrees that increasing speed for IPCEIs is important; this is one of the objectives of the Competitiveness Compass. To improve and speed up the IPCEI process, the Commission cooperates closely with Member States in the Joint European Forum for IPCEIs (JEF-IPCEI).

A. whereas the current challenging economic, climate and geopolitical contexts, marked by uncertainty and unpredictability, require a renewed approach to European competitiveness and concrete strategies to boost economic growth;

One concrete example of recent action to speed up the IPCEI process is the creation of the Design Support Hub, namely targeted support offered by the Commission services already during the design phase of an IPCEI (i.e. before assessment), which aims at identifying and tackling potential issues at an early-stage, and providing guidance on and preliminary assessment of individual projects. This support is expected to streamline and accelerate the State aid assessment during the notification phase.

B. whereas the proper enforcement of the EU competition policy framework leads to lower prices, higher quality, greater choice for consumers, faster innovation and a fairer and more resilient economy, and protects entry conditions for operators in the internal market, tackling abuses of dominant position, monopolies and practices distortive to the internal market;

On point 16: The current Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI) rules allow Member States to subsidise social housing, provided that they are targeted on disadvantaged citizens or socially less-advantaged groups. The Commission intends to review the SGEI rules to facilitate support also for affordable and energy-efficient housing. This task requires careful analysis to avoid (regulatory) spill-over effects, for instance, to avoid detrimental effects on social housing and to minimise distortions of the commercial housing market. In June 2025, the Commission launched a call for evidence and public consultation to inform its review of the SGEI rules for affordable and energy-efficient housing.

C. whereas the Draghi report underlines that the EU has a broad and diversified industrial innovation base, with a strong comparative advantage in green technologies, but that sustained efforts are needed in order to retain that advantage; whereas the integration of climate and environmental considerations into competition policy is essential, in that regard; whereas the Letta report maintains that the lack of EU integration in the financial, energy and electronic communications sectors is a primary reason for Europe’s declining competitiveness;

On point 17: State aid may contribute to remedy market failures that prevent efficient outcomes in the common interest, for instance in rural or peripheral areas. These include the outermost regions, which are the most remote EU regions, in line with Art. 349 TFEU. Therefore, the current EU State aid rules already include numerous possibilities to address efficiency, equity, and cohesion issues. The main framework for investment aid in assisted areas is in the General Block Exemption Regulation and in the Regional Aid Guidelines. Further, using SGEIs (including cohesion policy funds), the Commission may under certain conditions allow State aid which creates incentives for regional investments. Such regional investments may include social transport aid for people in remote regions, including in the EU outermost regions, supporting energy-supplying micro-enterprises, backing the deployment and take-up of broadband networks and subsidising the provision of universal postal services. Flexibilities under the general de minimis Regulation and specific sectoral provisions for de minimis State aid also contribute to remedy market failures in rural and remote areas, including the outermost regions.

D. whereas the EU’s competition policy could contribute to bolstering the resilience of the internal market, as well as achieving the goals of the European Green Deal, the 2030 Digital Compass and the Competitiveness Compass, for which international exchange and cooperation are essential;

Points related to antitrust policy

E. whereas the Commission and the national competition authorities need to act in an impartial and objective way in order to preserve the credibility of the EU’s competition policy; whereas the political independence of national competition authorities is of utmost importance to ensure the impartiality and credibility of competition policy;

On point 13: The Commission notes the Parliament’s invitation to consider how a ‘new competition tool’ would complement the Commissions existing powers to carry out sector enquiries. To meaningfully introduce a new competition tool, it would first be necessary to identify an enforcement gap of sufficient magnitude to warrant adopting a new piece of legislation. It should be noted that the EU toolkit has been recently expanded with new instruments (the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR)) to address identified gaps. The Commission already has far-reaching powers to conduct sector enquiries, under Regulation 1/2003 for antitrust and under the FSR. In the past, antitrust sector enquiries have been successfully used to identify competition concerns in particular sectors. The Commission has then followed up on the identified issues by opening antitrust investigations. At this stage, the Commission has not identified any specific gaps which the current EU toolkit cannot address, and the Commission’s current priority is enforcing the full range of existing instruments as efficiently as possible.

General considerations

On point 15: In antitrust, remedies are based on Regulation 1/2003, which grants the Commission broad powers to impose remedies under Article 7 (prohibition decisions) as well as making binding commitments proposed by undertakings under Article 9 (commitment decisions). Article 7 allows the Commission to unilaterally impose proportionate behavioural or structural remedies on undertakings. Structural remedies are considered a last resort, as Article 7 prescribes that they can only be imposed when there is no equally effective behavioural remedy. The Commission is open to consider the possibility of structural remedies in antitrust cases, where appropriate and necessary. As part of its ongoing reflection on the possible revision of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission is exploring ways to increase the scope for using structural remedies more frequently. The reflection will consider ways to make recourse to structural solutions easier, for instance by removing the legal ‘hierarchy’ in Regulation 1/2003 between structural and behavioural remedies. This was suggested by stakeholders during the evaluation of Regulation 1/2003.

1. Considers that EU competition law seeks to shield against excessive levels of concentration and accumulation of market power, and reaffirms the role of competition policy in encouraging efficiency, innovation and growth, creating a level playing field and protecting consumers, by assuring that markets remain competitive, efficient, dynamic and innovative, delivering high-quality products and services at fair prices and with a wider range of choice;

Interim measures ensure that competition is preserved while an antitrust investigation is ongoing. The Commission agrees with the Parliament that interim measures may play a larger role in the future, in particular in dynamic and rapidly evolving digital markets. Therefore, the Commission stands ready to use interim measures more frequently in the future, when the relevant legal conditions set out in Regulation 1/2003 are met, while fully respecting companies’ rights of defence. In a possible revision of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission would explore ways to facilitate and expedite the imposition of interim measures. The possible revision could include changes to the conditions and the procedures for adopting interim measures.

2. Reiterates that competition policy should contribute to all of the EU’s policies, notably in the fields of sustainability, energy, defence and digitalisation; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to a new State aid framework to accompany the Clean Industrial Deal, so as to ensure competitiveness through mobilising the necessary public support for the energy transition to decarbonise EU industry, while ensuring that this does not hinder innovation, increase prices or reduce competition in the internal market; reiterates that State aid should not distort fair and effective competition;

On point 25: The Commission recognises that proceedings may be lengthy. There are several valid reasons explaining the overall length of many antitrust investigations, including the need to meet high standards of proof, the increasing complexity of investigations, and the significant increase of data to be processed. The Commission is making substantial efforts to streamline its proceedings wherever possible, for example by using voluntary confidentiality rings. Moreover, a possible revision of Regulation 1/2003 will identify areas of improvement to enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of antitrust proceedings.

3. Emphasises that the global strength and importance of the EU single market derives not only from its internal and external competitiveness but also from its ability to set common standards and guarantee territorial cohesion; notes that at the same time, policymakers should take due account of international regulatory and market developments and calls on the Commission to strive for continued dialogue and cooperation at international level, including via second-generation cooperation agreements that allow for more effective information exchange between competition authorities, and the development of influence on competition policy, globally; highlights the importance of the European Competition Network (ECN) and calls on the Commission to prioritise sustained constructive dialogue and cooperation, in this regard, at international level; calls for the coordination between national competition authorities to ensure the uniform application of competition rules and underlines the necessity of increasing collaboration between antitrust and other sectoral regulators;

Points related to merger control

A competitive Union

On point 19: The Commission takes note of the Parliament's call to enhance the scrutiny of potential 'killer acquisitions'. The Commission supports Member States that wish to expand their competences so that they cover potential killer acquisitions, including via merger control call-in mechanisms. Such national provisions would also enable these Member States to refer relevant cases to the Commission under Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation. Moreover, the Commission continues to monitor markets for potential killer acquisitions targeting SMEs and mid-caps that may fall below the EU and national turnover-based notification thresholds and alerts Member States when such cases arise.

4. Supports the Commission’s commitment to investing in sustainable competitiveness; welcomes the Draghi report’s emphasis on innovation, investments, market integration, decarbonisation and resilience, and the Letta report’s focus on integration, autonomy and solidarity; encourages policies that promote innovation, competitiveness and sustainable and inclusive growth;

On point 22: The Commission takes note of the Parliament’s invitation to analyse and develop further the 'innovation defence' as outlined in the Draghi report. In all merger assessments, the Commission takes into consideration the proposed merger’s potential impact on innovation and investment. It identifies positive merger-specific effects and weighs them against potential negative effects which risk stifling innovation and may discourage investment. The Commission’s existing case practice already de facto encompasses an ‘innovation defence’. When such claims are made by the merging firms, the Commission analyses possible efficiencies linked to innovation. Such efficiencies may lead to a merger being cleared, provided that they benefit consumers, are sufficiently likely to materialise and are merger specific.

5. Underlines the need for coordinated, targeted and truly European industrial policy to boost competitiveness; notes that this must not result in market dominance or abuse thereof, price distortion or economic inefficiencies, and points to the need for effective merger control procedures;

The ongoing review of the Merger Guidelines examines how to further give adequate weight in merger assessment to considerations having an impact on markets and competition, such as innovation or efficiencies, for example through the aggregation of data to develop innovative products or services. Mergers may impact workers. Where this relates to effects due to corporate restructuring or offshoring, these are not the result of a change in market power and therefore not covered by the EU Merger Regulation (and therefore cannot be addressed by the Commission in the context of a merger review). However, where a merger increases the market power of the merging firms on labour markets, it could have a negative impact on workers. For this reason, the currently ongoing public consultation on the review of the Merger Guidelines is also seeking feedback from stakeholders on whether the Merger Guidelines should provide guidance on the assessment of the impact of mergers on labour markets – the current Merger Guidelines do not explicitly cover this topic.

6. Considers that any State aid granted should be consistent with EU policy objectives; notes the Commission’s intention to provide guidance on the compatibility of State aid with innovation, climate and economic security considerations, as well as its actions to scale down and phase out fossil fuel subsidies under the Clean Industrial Deal, and encourages the Member States to consider the introduction of further conditions for the receipt of State aid; calls for companies structured through non-EU tax havens to be barred from receiving State aid; invites the Commission to investigate the lack of harmonisation of clawback mechanisms;

On point 23: The Parliament asks the Commission to identify the national barriers preventing it from defining the EU as the relevant market in merger investigations. However, it is not possible to identify a limited set of barriers which prevents markets in general from becoming EU-wide. As a general matter and matter of principle, the geographic scope of a market is intrinsically linked to the competitive dynamics at play on such market which may, by nature, be narrower than the EU. In each notified merger, the Commission analyses the relevant geographic market(s). The Commission frequently defines relevant geographic markets as EU-wide when the prevailing competitive conditions warrant it. Further, barriers to market integration tend to be industry and market specific. Similarly, it is not possible to remove all barriers to integration by including them in a single piece of legislation. The level of market integration in the Single Market varies from industry to industry and market to market. Therefore, the Single Market is created and deepened in different industries by introducing multiple pieces of sector-specific legislation, where barriers to integration may be removed in successive steps.

7. Takes note of the Commission’s report asserting that market concentration, markups and profits have increased over the past 25 years, while industry dynamism has decreased, despite the active enforcement of competition law; also takes note that this increase in markups was found to be driven by market share reallocation towards the largest firms; further notes that weak levels of competition have had significant negative impacts on consumers, purchasing power, and on the competitiveness of EU firms and overall economic growth; recalls that the application of competition law should focus on ensuring open, competitive markets free from anti-competitive practices;

The Commission always takes a forward-looking approach when investigating proposed mergers. Analysing and predicting how competition will evolve in a market after firms with market power merge with each other, is the entire rationale behind merger control. The relevant time horizon for assessing possible anti-competitive effects is typically three years but may vary greatly depending on the industries and markets concerned. The possibilities to scale up production, create better investment conditions and drive innovation are included in the competitive analysis whenever it is relevant for the case at hand.

8. Points out that State aid is increasingly used to support industrial policy objectives; recalls that such aid, as permitted under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, must not adversely affect trading conditions or the common interest; notes the divergent fiscal capabilities of the Member States and warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field; calls on the Commission to monitor these effects and to ensure the integrity of the single market, which can be done through a common financing instrument for a European industrial policy, such as a European Competitiveness Fund, as proposed by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines; calls on the Commission and the Member States not to engage in subsidy competition, which only exacerbates market distortions, notably when financing undertakings that are not efficient; concludes that temporary State aid frameworks have failed to prevent further market fragmentation and notes that only two of the Member States accounted for 77 % of State aid notified; calls for stricter State aid notification monitoring and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency, in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors;

On point 24: The Commission agrees that merger control in the digital economy poses specific challenges due to prevalent ecosystem business models and the existence of strong network effects. Innovation is also a key parameter of competition in digital markets, where competitive success is often determined by firms’ capacity to innovate and rapidly bring new products and services to market, sometimes resulting in winner-takes-all market dynamics (‘market tipping’). The ongoing review of the Merger Guidelines examines how to better factor-in some of the main economic transformations, such as digitalisation, that the EU market and economy have undergone over the past 20 years.

9. Underlines the importance of the important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs) for financing projects within the EU with a cross-border dimension; stresses that IPCEIs should have genuine EU added value, which means that they should have a positive impact on more than one Member State; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any such State aid notification is completed within six months at the latest;

On point 30: In May 2025, the Commission launched a public consultation to seek feedback on its ongoing review of the Merger Guidelines, which provide the framework for assessing the competitive impact of mergers on markets. The public consultation is twofold, with a general consultation, open to all, including high-level questions on how the Commission should assess mergers and on the principles that should underpin its revised Merger Guidelines, and an in-depth consultation encompassing seven focussed papers elaborating on a wide range of current challenges and on the legal and economic parameters used in its merger control assessment. The papers aim at stimulating discussion and cover topics that are key for the EU economy, namely competitiveness and resilience, market power, innovation, decarbonisation, digitalisation, efficiencies, defence and labour considerations.

10. Takes note of the Draghi report’s estimate that, in order to protect our EU competitiveness, an additional EUR 800 billion per year is needed; acknowledges the importance of public and private investment in this context; underlines that the EU budget needs to be properly equipped to that end; regards the completion of the Savings and Investments Union as important for mobilising private investment, addressing the fragmentation of the internal market and supporting the EU’s industrial strategy; acknowledges the urgent need for reforms alongside the effective implementation of the three action areas outlined in the Draghi report: (i) closing the innovation gap with the US and China; (ii) a common plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness to accelerate the energy transition and reduce energy costs; and (iii) enhancing security and reducing dependencies;

Other points

11. Welcomes the protection of the level playing field of European markets and European companies and their workers granted by anti-dumping measures that correct for distortive foreign State aid; calls on the Commission to make swift use of available trade instruments on procurement and foreign subsidies to prevent unfair competition in the internal market;

On point 25: The Commission has initiated the work on the review of the DMA, which will include an assessment as to whether the scope of Article 7 may be extended to online social networking services. As regards the interoperability obligations under the DMA, the Commission observes that Meta, in relation to its designated messaging services WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger, published the respective reference offers which serve as a basis for interoperability of other messaging services with them. Finally, the Commission adopted on 19 March two specification decisions assisting Apple by detailing the measures needed for enabling interoperability with iOS for third-party connected devices and by streamlining the process put in place by Apple to handle future requests for interoperability with iPhone and iPad devices.

Enforcement priorities

On point 29: While generative AI is not classified as a separate core platform service under the DMA, its functionalities may be integrated or embedded into existing designated core platform services. In such cases, these functionalities may be subject to some of the DMA obligations. The Commission is actively evaluating how gatekeepers are incorporating these AI-powered services and is committed to ensuring full compliance with the DMA obligations.

12. Observes changes in business practices, highlighting a decline in cartel cases; cautions, however, against new forms of harmful conduct like tacit collusion and algorithmic collusion, and emphasises the need to align enforcement priorities with this evolving landscape;

On point 33: The Commission welcomes the Parliament’s call for adequate staffing. There is a need to recruit staff from diversified backgrounds, in particular for the Directorates General dealing with the FSR and DMA. The Commission currently operates under a stable staffing principle and any increase of the workload is addressed by reallocation and redeployment within the services.

13. Notes the Draghi report’s proposal for a ‘new competition tool’ as a flexible market investigation tool designed to address structural competition problems that do not result from anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominance, and to impose market-wide, forward-looking structural or behavioural remedies, including by lowering entry barriers for competitors, with the aim of increasing competitiveness, incentivising innovation and protecting vulnerable consumers; invites the Commission to analyse how this tool would complement the existing framework for sector investigations;

On point 37: In the agricultural sector, Directive 2019/633 on Unfair Trading Practices (UTP Directive) protects farmers and weaker suppliers against stronger buyers within the agri-food supply chain. In 2024, the Commission put forward a proposal for a new Regulation on cooperation among enforcement authorities responsible for the enforcement of the rules against unfair trading practices under the UTP Directive. The proposal aims to strengthen the position of farmers in the supply chain. The proposed Regulation would apply to unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain, when suppliers of agricultural products (for example farmers) and buyers (for example retailers) are located in different Member States.

14. Recalls that under the Treaty, the Commission is empowered to address exploitative abuses;

On point 39: The Commission does not currently envisage making another assessment of the impact of the Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR). The latest assessment was done in 2024. Previous assessments show that the IFR works well and that revising the IFR is not called for in the near future. Separately, regarding scheme fees that are not covered under the IFR, the Commission monitors possible anticompetitive practices and stands ready to intervene where concrete evidence is found.

15. Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; is aware that EU competition rules stipulate that structural remedies should only be used as a last resort if behavioural remedies have proven ineffective, but nonetheless regrets the reluctance of the Commission to address market dominance through structural remedies; reiterates its invitation to make better use of structural remedies and end the primacy given to behavioural remedies, and encourages further efforts to strengthen their application when necessary; calls on the Commission to make better use of the interim measures instrument to stop any practice that would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

On point 41: Since taking office, Executive Vice-President Ribera has exchanged views with the Parliament on several occasions. She has held a structured dialogue with the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and has exchanged views with the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) and the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). Executive Vice-President Ribera is committed to continue liaising closely with the Parliament.

16. Welcomes the priority given to housing by the 2024-2029 Commission; calls on the Commission to assess how EU competition principles affect the supply of services of general economic interest (SGEI); calls on the Commission to assess the position of social services of general interest and an SGEI exemption for affordable housing;

17. Stresses the importance of State aid as a tool for closing the economic gap between more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, outermost regions and economically depressed areas; recalls that allowing State aid in the context of SGEIs remains essential for the survival of these areas, especially in the context of State support dedicated to connectivity and other basic provisions of services for communities residing in isolated, remote or peripheral regions of the EU; calls on the Commission to investigate possibilities of further flexibility in providing funding to these regions;

18. Takes note of the recent Court of Justice of the European Union ruling which found that one of the Member States has failed to transpose the ECN+ Directive into national legislation; underlines the importance of transposing the ECN+ Directive fully; calls on all of the Member States to ensure a proper implementation of this Directive;

Merger and antitrust

19. Notes with concern the Court of Justice of the European Union’s interpretation of Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation in Case C-611/22 P (Illumina v Commission), rescinding the Commission’s approach of accepting referrals of non-notifiable deals; acknowledges that the EC Merger Regulation does not provide the Commission with sufficient tools for dealing with killer acquisitions; strongly believes that the impact of merger decisions on the internal market justifies the inclusion of an internal market legal base in the EC Merger Regulation, so as to fully involve co-legislators, in a manner similar to that of the Digital Markets Act (DMA); calls on the Commission to require Member States that have or can claim the relevant competence to examine potential killer acquisitions in the light of their national merger control laws, and to continue to refer those deals in accordance with Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of reviewing the EC Merger Regulation to be able to examine mergers that fall below EU or national thresholds, regardless of the sectors involved;

20. Notes that since the 2004 entry into force of the EC Merger Regulation, 0,7 % of notified mergers have been either blocked by the Commission or withdrawn following an investigation;

21. Notes that the turnover thresholds in the EC Merger Regulation alone might not be suitable for detecting all cases that should be reviewed by the competition authorities; highlights practices used by dominant firms to avoid formal investigations, such as the growing use of ‘partnerships’ in the AI sector, which further suggests that a review of the EU Merger Regulation is necessary;

22. Welcomes the Draghi report’s proposal for an ‘innovation defence’ in cases where a merger increases the ability and incentive to innovate, and invites the Commission to analyse and further develop this concept; furthermore calls for matters of public interest, such as the impact on workers, to be taken into account;

23. Asks the Commission to identify the national barriers that may prevent it from considering the EU market as the relevant one in its analyses of mergers; calls on the Commission to present a legislative proposal to remove these impediments; notes that the international environment needs to be carefully analysed when deciding on the definition of the relevant market in competition and merger control cases; calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking approach to consolidation in the EU where appropriate, as also proposed by the Draghi and Letta reports, taking into account the strategic importance and pro-competitive impact of scale and favourable investment conditions in certain sectors for driving innovation and long-term competition;

24. Calls for merger assessment frameworks to be updated to reflect the realities of the digital economy, where market power can be manifested in ways beyond traditional market share in clearly delineated markets; supports the development of advanced methodologies for analysing data-driven dominance and network effects, emphasising the critical role of consumer choice in selecting digital services and devices; encourages the Commission to enhance mechanisms enabling interoperability across services and devices, fostering innovation and competition in the digital ecosystem; urges the Commission to progress swiftly on the implementation of the existing interoperability obligations for messaging services under the DMA, the existing interoperability obligations for cloud providers under the Data Act and to start work on the review of the DMA for May 2026; urges the Commission to implement existing interoperability obligations under the DMA and look into extending interoperability obligations to online social networking services; supports the Commission in taking more account of the potential harm to competition when assessing mergers where expansion into adjacent markets would have the effect of further strengthening market dominance in the acquiring company’s core market;

25. Calls on the Commission to address excessively long antitrust investigations during which companies continue to benefit from their anticompetitive practices; calls on the Commission to set appropriate time limits for antitrust cases and ensure an effective follow-through of decisions taken; calls on the Commission to adopt further interim measures to stop any practice which would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

Sectoral policies

26. Welcomes the two September 2024 landmark judgments by the Court of Justice confirming the Commission’s assertion that the Irish tax deal with Apple constitutes illegal State aid and that Google abused its dominant position in contravention of the Treaties; acknowledges that the legal framework in Ireland has since changed; encourages the Commission to continue the clamp down on State aid abuses involving the selective granting of tax breaks to companies;

27. Notes the detrimental effect of international tax competition; recalls its support for the implementation of Pillar Two of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); deeply regrets the US presidential Executive Order of 20 January 2025 which asserts that the OECD global tax agreement has ‘no force or effect within the United States’; stresses the importance of multilateralism in ensuring that multinationals pay their fair share of taxation where value is created; takes the view that the EU should fully stand by the OECD’s Pillar Two Directive;

28. Emphasises the worrying market concentrations in various digital markets, such as social media, search engines, AI, cloud services, e-commerce, microchips and online advertising; underlines the actual and potential negative impact on EU competitiveness, the resilience of supply chains, media freedom, privacy and data protection, society and democracy; urges the Commission to address issues that are specific to the tech market, including infrastructural power in hardware and cloud computing layers, vertical concentration, algorithmic manipulation of the digital public sphere and market leveraging in digital markets, as demonstrated by the progress made under the DMA; additionally calls for the opening of new investigations into the cloud services sector to further ensure fair competition and innovation, taking into account the degree of market concentration in this sector and anticompetitive practices related to complex and non-transparent licensing terms or forced bundling; furthermore, urges the Commission to address the increasing vertical concentration of dominant players across the advertising value chain, which puts the EU online advertising sector at risk;

29. Notes the rapid development of AI services, which has the potential to result in market concentration; calls on the Commission to take an ecosystemic approach towards this sector, including by developing and applying new theories of harm to address the further entrenchment of the dominant players in this sector; highlights that the DMA contains several provisions that must be used to prevent gatekeepers from restricting emerging AI developers, and asks the Commission to act swiftly to address the risk of consumers being forced into using pre-determined AI services on their mobile devices, ensuring that AI systems remain user-selectable and transparent, thereby safeguarding competition and consumer choice; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of adding generative AI as a new core platform service under the DMA;

30. Notes that large digital players use their market power, power over consumers, financial resources and data concentration in one market to leverage their position in another; stresses that small players cannot compete with the aforementioned factors, which makes EU citizens even more dependent on the same small number of non-EU companies and endangers strategic autonomy; calls for increased scrutiny of the leveraging of position by dominant digital sector players into other sectors and the EU’s strategic autonomy, through a revision of the merger guidelines to ensure that market leveraging can be scrutinised more effectively;

31. Notes the importance of data and data analytics tools as one of the deterring factors for digital market concentrations and acquisitions in the digital sector; calls for an opinion of the European Data Protection Board in cases of concentrations involving one or more operators in digital sectors on the relevance of datasets for the intended concentration, the personal data the target acquisition processes and the potential impact on the rights to privacy and data protection the intended concentration has;

32. Expresses concern regarding the growing use of dynamic pricing mechanisms across the EU; calls on the Commission to explore regulatory measures against highly adaptive and opaque pricing methods;

33. Calls on the Commission to vigorously enforce all competition rules, including the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and the DMA, in order to address gatekeeper practices and foster contestable markets and fair competition; stresses that the Commission must have sufficient staff for enforcement, while noting that new tools, as well as scientists and economists stemming from divergent disciplines, can work to improve competition law enforcement; underlines in particular that the DMA should be applied rigorously and independently, without any undermining by external pressures; stresses that the DMA and potential fines must not be used as a bargaining chip in relation to discussions on tariffs, but as a cornerstone of the EU’s efforts to ensure fair and competitive digital markets; notes the six non-compliance procedures launched against some designated gatekeepers; is deeply concerned about potential delays in critical investigations and the capacity of the Commission to respect their ‘best effort’ obligations and to make a decision on non-compliance procedures without undue delay;

34. Notes with concern the fragmentation in numerous consumer markets, including financial services, telecoms and household energy, and calls for faster and greater market integration where there are benefits for consumers, and for recognition that this market integration can drive investment and innovation;

35. Expresses alarm at the high concentration in the retail, agricultural and automotive sectors in overseas territories whereby excessive prices set by dominant undertakings on essential products and services amplify inequalities, precariousness and territorial disparities; calls on the Commission to launch an investigation into potential abuses of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU;

36. Notes with concern the high degree of market concentration in the European financial sector, as well as its sustained over-reliance on a limited number of non-EU service providers; notes that the three largest credit rating agencies still hold a market share of over 90 %; expresses concern about the continued high concentration in the public interest entities (PIE) audit market, with four firms mainly holding the vast majority of EU revenues for PIE audits, limiting choice and risking supervisory capture; invites the Commission to present an impact assessment on options to address these concerns; urges the Commission to carefully assess public tenders for expertise from audit market participants so that potential conflicts of interest are avoided;

37. Expresses concern about the food price crisis and notes, in this regard, the high levels of market concentration in food supply chains; reiterates its call for the Commission to urgently conduct a thorough analysis of the extent and effect of buying alliances, thereby devoting special attention to guaranteeing fair competition and greater transparency in supermarket and hypermarket chains’ commercial practices, particularly where such practices affect brand value and product choice or limit innovation or price comparability; recalls, in this light, the market concentration in agri-commodity trading wherein four companies account for the vast majority of the global crop trade; regrets that the Commission nonetheless conditionally approved the 2024 Bunge-Viterra merger (M.11204) despite competition concerns; asks the Commission to address excessive power accumulation in the hands of a few large players in this market, in order to strengthen the bargaining position of farmers and consumers alike; highlights the implementation of the New Competition Tool in this context;

38. Notes the high-net profits of EU banks during this inflationary period, mostly driven by the delayed pass-through of the rapid monetary policy tightening to deposit rates;

39. Notes with particular concern the dominant position of two international card schemes in the EU payments market, and their engagement in practices that reinforce and extend their dominance of this market, potentially further increasing barriers to entry and hampering long-term innovation, as well as leading to higher costs for EU businesses and ultimately consumers; calls on the Commission to take decisive actions, emphasising the need for a review of the Interchange Fee Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/751) to tackle the significant increase in card scheme fees charged by international card schemes and to ensure a fair, competitive and transparent market environment;

Parliamentary involvement

40. Stresses that Parliament should be sufficiently involved in shaping competition policy; cautions against the over-reliance on soft-law instruments, such as guidance and temporary frameworks, in which Parliament’s involvement is limited; calls on the Commission to enter into negotiation for an interinstitutional agreement on competition policy to formalise its enforcement priorities to Parliament; calls on the European Council to adopt a decision under Article 48(7) TEU allowing for the adoption of legislative acts in the area of competition policy in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure; stresses that Parliament should be more involved in the activity of working parties and expert groups in the International Competition Network and the OECD as an observer, and also in the High-Level Group on the DMA;

41. Calls on the responsible Executive Vice-President, also Commissioner in charge of competition policy to maintain close contact with Parliament’s competent committee and its working group on competition issues;

°

° °

42. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.