What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

Follow-up to the European Parliament non-legislative resolution on Security of energy supply in the EU

on the security of energy supply in the EU

Rapporteur: Beata Szydło (ECR / PL)

(2025/XXXX(INI))

References: 2025/2055(INI) / A10-0121/2025 / P10_TA(2025)0146

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,

Date of adoption of the resolution: 8 July 2025

– having regard to Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products,

Competent Parliamentary Committee: Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)

– having regard to the Commission communication of 28 May 2014 entitled ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ (COM(2014)0330),

Brief analysis/ assessment of the resolution and requests made in it:

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010,

The European Parliament’s resolution calls for a comprehensive overhaul of the EU’s energy security framework in response notably to ongoing geopolitical tensions and climate challenges. It notably stresses the need for a resilient energy infrastructure and for a definitive phase out from Russian fossil fuels.

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU,

Key requests from the resolution include an EU-wide ban on Russian fossil fuel imports by 2027 at the latest and no return to Russian energy imports, streamlined and accelerated permitting for renewables projects and electricity installations and networks, stronger EU-wide action to protect critical energy infrastructure, and more cooperation between energy companies and ENISA on cybersecurity. The resolution also highlights the need for solidarity among Member States and a future-proof framework based on resilience, efficiency, and clean energy production. The Commission welcomes the European Parliament’s supportive stance.

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity,

Response to requests and overview of actions taken, or intended to be taken, by the Commission:

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC,

The Commission shares most of the European Parliament’s analysis in this report. It reiterates the importance of energy security for EU’s economic competitiveness and societal resilience. It shares the view of the European Parliament that the EU should move towards a more integrated and horizontal understanding of energy security, with a close attention to emerging risks such as climate change adaptation or hybrid threats. Concerning the specific requests expressed in the report, the Commission brings the below points to the attention of the European Parliament.

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘Powering a climate-neutral economy: An EU Strategy for Energy System Integration’ (COM(2020)0299),

On renewables and flexibility

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014,

In the context of the energy transition, accelerating the deployment of renewable energy sources and integrating them into the grid require enhanced flexibility solutions to ensure proper functioning of the balancing markets and maintain secure and stable grid operation. Flexibility is therefore recognised as a strategic priority that underpins both the resilience of the energy system and progress towards a cleaner energy mix. Greater flexibility enables the efficient use of renewable generation and existing infrastructure, while helping to minimise overall system costs. As such it is also key for the affordability of energy bills.

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2009, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 and Directives 2009/73/EC and (EU) 2019/944, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013,

The recent Electricity Market Design reform has introduced a framework to foster the development of non-fossil flexibility, with a particular focus on demand response and energy storage solutions. Under this reform, Member States now have the option to implement dedicated State aid schemes to support non-fossil flexibility. In June, the Commission published specific State aid guidelines for such schemes, the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework. Under the new electricity regulation, Member States must also carry out a national assessment of their flexibility needs by summer 2026 and then every two years, based on a common European methodology developed by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and the EU Distribution System Operators (DSO) Entity. Using these assessments, each Member State will define indicative targets to increase non-fossil flexibility.

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘EU external energy engagement in a changing world’ (JOIN(2022)0023),

The reform also allows for the development of a Demand Response Network Code that aims to tackle the remaining regulatory barriers to non-fossil flexibility and to establish a harmonised EU framework. The draft Network Code prepared by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) is currently under review by the Commission, and is expected to be adopted in 2026.

– having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU Plan’ (COM(2022)0230),

As part of the broader Clean Industrial Deal, the Commission presented an Affordable Energy Action Plan on 26 February 2025, which is structured around four key pillars. The development of flexibility solutions is part of the pillar focused on lowering energy costs, which emphasises the critical role of non-fossil flexibility. This pillar includes specific actions, such as Commission supporting Member States in removing barriers to market access for demand response and storage, and Commission bringing forward proposals to accelerate permitting for storage.

– having regard to the Commission communication of 18 October 2022 entitled ‘Digitalising the energy system – EU action plan’ (COM(2022)0552),

As storage has an increasing importance in EU energy security of supply, the Commission follows a technology neutral approach, emphasising that all storage technologies are needed, and different solutions play different role in addressing short- or longer-term needs arising from different generation and consumption patterns. Specifically, the Commission would like to underline the increasing importance of long/multi-day duration energy storage solutions in future energy systems, also in close relation with system integration.

– having regard to Special Report 09/2024 by the European Court of Auditors entitled ‘Security of the supply of gas in the EU’,

Innovative technologies and forms of renewable energy deployment complement the deployment of conventional renewable technologies and can contribute to reach out the EU’s energy and climate targets, including the indicative target for innovative renewable energy technology. The Commission has recently adopted a recommendation and a guidance on innovative technologies and forms of renewable energy deployment. They cover mainly those technologies and forms of deployment that have the highest technological readiness levels, like ocean energy or agrisolar, but also recognise that there are other relevant innovative renewable technologies and forms of deployment which can also benefit from the recommendations and guidance outlined. They focus primarily on permitting barriers specific to innovative renewable technologies and forms of deployment, but also address other significant barriers, including financial ones.

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

The Commission acknowledges the untapped potential of geothermal, not only in terms of volume, but also as an important component of an integrated energy system, that can be supported through the promotion of heat pumps, district heating and thermal storage. The Commission is aware of barriers that geothermal faces related in particular to planning and permitting, data availability and financing, and will dive into those in the preparatory work on the heating and cooling strategy for which the call for evidence and the public consultation was lunched in summer 2025. EU legislation adopted over the last years can provide solutions to many challenges faced by geothermal and clean heating in general. That’s why the timely transposition and implementation of existing legislation can go a long way towards addressing these issues. The Commission knows that Member States will require support to deliver, for instance to help local authorities with planning, or raise awareness of businesses on available solutions. Lastly, next to policy, many initiatives are ongoing to tackle these barriers and the development of a common Geological Service for Europe by the European association of Geological Surveys, funded by the EU. The first way to promote geothermal energy is therefore to raise awareness about what is being done – at local, national and European level – and identify replicable best practices.

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

On electrification and hydrogen

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0000/2025),

Hydrogen and direct electrification are complementary and will be part of the future energy system in line with an energy system integration approach. The Commission is conducting a study on industry decarbonisation looking at the respective roles of electrification and hydrogen, in particular in decarbonizing hard-to-abate sectors. The Clean Industrial Deal and the ongoing work on lead markets confirm once more the relevance of hydrogen for hard-to-abate sectors.

A. whereas energy security is a key building block of a resilient and competitive economy;

The Electrification Action Plan intends to set forward a granular analysis of the different demand sectors and sub-sectors, to identify in particular industrial processes for which direct electrification provides a cost-effective solution. Indirect electrification through hydrogen plays an important complementary role in those sub-sectors where electrification does not provide such a cost-effective solution.

B. whereas the EU has scarce energy resources and imports more than 60 % of its energy, leaving it vulnerable to energy supply disruptions;

Other Commission initiatives are meant to set conditions for the ramp up of hydrogen. A comprehensive regulatory framework has been put in place, covering market regulation, infrastructure development and certification of renewable hydrogen. We will closely monitor the ramp-up of the hydrogen industry, including through a dedicated study, until the legal review clause date in July 2028.

C. whereas the EU Member States agreed in the Versailles Declaration to reassess how to ensure the security of their energy supplies and to phase out their dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal imports ‘as soon as possible’; whereas the REPowerEU plan put forward a set of actions to stop importing Russian fossil fuels by 2027;

The Clean Industrial Deal also announced the creation of an Industrial Decarbonisation Bank to finance the green transition of industries, aiming for EUR 100 billion in funding based on funds in the Innovation Fund, additional revenues resulting from parts of the ETS as well as the revision of InvestEU. The new State aid framework accompanying the Clean Industrial Deal (CISAF) will also play a role in the ramp up of the hydrogen market.

D. whereas while Russian oil and coal imports have been sanctioned, Russian gas imports have remained outside of the EU’s sanctions regime amid concerns over security of supply;

On future military needs and the revision of the Oil Stocks Directive

E. whereas domestic energy production and energy efficiency measures decrease reliance on external energy sources and enhance the security of energy supply;

The Commission is aware that military capabilities for the long-term depend on a timely and sufficient supply of liquid fuels from the European market. The strategic nature of fuel and fuel infrastructure was already acknowledged and identified by the Action Plan Military Mobility 2.0. The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 of 13 March 2025 further proposed to identify immediate and future energy supply bottlenecks together with relevant partners, in particular NATO.

F. whereas the US has rolled back on climate policies, including withdrawing from the Paris Agreement;

In addition, the ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation has already set clear targets for Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) supply at EU airports and will be a key instrument in supporting availability and production of SAF in Europe. The Sustainable Transport Investment Plan expected later this year will set out an industrial strategy to further incentivise SAF production in Europe. Considering that a significant share of aviation fuels is transported by the Central European Pipeline System managed by NATO, cooperation is essential to enable the continued and uninterrupted access to aviation fuels.

New vision for energy security

As announced in the Affordable Energy Action Plan, the Commission intends to revise the EU energy security framework. The Commission services are currently assessing how the energy security framework and in particular the oil stocks directive, could be enhanced to better respond to new emerging threats. The Commission is working on a staged approach, with a first step in Q1 2026 focusing on gas and electricity, and with a second step focusing on oil.

1. Considers that a comprehensive approach to energy security should take into account the physical dimension, the affordability of supplies and sustainability, and should place emphasis on the geopolitical dimension;

On the role of interconnectors for energy security

2. Emphasises that the current geopolitical situation underscores the need to revise the understanding of energy security, recognising that the ‘peace dividend’ is over and that the resilience of energy systems, broadly understood, is now a strategic imperative;

The Commission acknowledges the importance of meeting the 15% electricity interconnection target set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and monitors progress on interconnection capacity as part of the National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs). In addition, the EU regulatory framework on Trans-European energy networks (TEN-E) provides tools to assess infrastructure needs, notably through the Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) package developed by ENTSOs. The Union list of Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMIs) supports projects that address system needs at the EU level, contributing to the internal energy market, enhancing energy security, and mitigating the impacts of climate change. In addition, the High-Level Groups support these projects to progress towards the current interconnection target.

3. Stresses that as the energy system continues to decarbonise, the share of renewables increases and electrification advances, the issues of the right market model, integration of flexibility sources and sufficient dispatchable capacity will be crucial;

Going forward, the Commission will present the European Grids Package, which is expected to be adopted by the end of this year. Among others, the Package will include measures to strengthen cross-border energy infrastructure planning.

4. Highlights that energy security cannot work without adequacy; draws attention to the volumes of fossil fuel-based electricity generation that are at risk of economic decommissioning and notes that ‘the scarcity issues tend to shift from the peripheral areas of Europe in 2025 to the central parts of the continent by 2033’; stresses the urgent need to integrate capacity mechanisms into the energy market design to promote investment in flexible generation and storage so as to ensure a stable and cost-effective energy supply in systems dominated by renewable energy sources;

On critical entities resilience

5. Stresses that decarbonisation must take into account the specificities of Member States, the needs of their industries and the vulnerability of their citizens in order to ensure a just transition that maintains energy security by balancing climate ambitions with economic and social realities;

The Commission is closely supporting Member States with the implementation of Directive (EU) 2022/2557. As part of these activities, the Commission is already developing non-binding guidelines, in close cooperation with Member States, to promote a coherent Union approach on the resilience of critical entities. Moreover, as stated in article 20, the Commission will develop best practices, guidance materials and methodologies, and cross-border training activities and exercises to test the resilience of critical entities. In the context of the revision of the energy security framework, the Commission will also look at exercises for increasing preparedness in the energy sector.

6. Notes the need for a broader approach to flexibility and storage that incorporates molecules and heat; highlights the potential of district heating systems that can use thermal storage to reduce the temperature of the loop and incorporate waste heat, solar and other alternatives;

To respond to the increase of acts of sabotage or likely acts of sabotage of critical maritime infrastructure, in the Baltic Sea in particular, the Commission and the High Representative presented in February of 2025 the Action Plan on Cable Security, which includes actions on prevention, detection, response and repair, and deterrence. Moreover, the EU has a revised Maritime Security Strategy and Action Plan which includes civil-military exercises and enhance dialogue and cooperation with third countries and international partners on maritime security issues of common interest. In both documents, it is recommended the full deployment of the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) to enhance the EU situational picture for the security of maritime infrastructures; at the same time deeper cooperation with NATO on maritime security is promoted. In this regard, the Commission has been actively participating in tabletop and joint exercises with NATO, such as Coherent Resilience 2023 – Baltic (CORE 23-B) and Integrated Resolve PACE 2024.

7. Stresses that the impact of climate change on generation assets, networks and consumption patterns should be better integrated into the modelling and preparedness of energy infrastructure;

The Commission is engaging with Ukrainian experts to learn from their experience following the invasion from Russia. Based on their experience, it seems that decentralized energy systems, like solar power and wind power systems, are more resilient, since the impact of an attack is reduced compared to an attack on a centralized system, and targeting decentralised power systems is resource intensive. Likewise, battery storage and interconnection strengthen the resilience of the energy system. These aspects are being weighed and the lessons learned from the Ukrainian experience will be reflected in the proposal for revision of the energy security framework.

8. Emphasises that technological neutrality plays a key role in enhancing the security of energy supply while fostering sustainability and economic efficiency;

On the supply of key clean technologies and critical raw materials

9. Commends the Draghi report which highlights the need to establish a long-term strategy for natural gas that should guide infrastructure development, international partnerships and legislation; notes, with concern, that inconsistent policies on natural gas have weakened the trading position of EU companies, leaving them exposed to global spot market prices and creating a gap between what the EU has contractually secured and what will be imported over time;

The Clean Industrial Deal sets out the Commission’s approach to strengthening EU industrial competitiveness while advancing decarbonisation. It underlines the importance of ensuring a secure supply of key clean technologies, components and critical raw materials. In this context, the ongoing implementation of the Net-Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act is essential.

10. Stresses that nuclear energy has an important role to play in an integrated energy system with increasing penetration of renewables; underlines the need to support the development of a new generation of nuclear technologies that will contribute to building a competitive technological supply chain in the EU so as to ensure open strategic autonomy;

The ongoing revision of the EU public procurement framework aims to enhance flexibility, streamline procedures, and foster innovation across sectors, while maintaining transparency and competition. The Commission is committed to ensure that the updated rules will support the Union’s climate and industrial objectives by facilitating faster, more agile, and innovation-friendly procurement processes that will address inter alia specific needs of strategic sectors and enhance Europe’s strategic autonomy.

11. Recognises that increasing domestic production, including in less developed sectors, such as geothermal, biomethane and marine energy, is crucial to strengthening energy security and should be pursued in a way that reflects regional diversity and the needs of local industries; notes the need to increase natural gas production in the EU and the European Economic Area;

On Russian fossil fuels phase-out

12. Notes that infrastructure bottlenecks impede the benefits of sector integration and aggravate the threats to energy security; underlines the importance of investing in new energy networks and optimising existing infrastructure;

To prevent any return of Russian gas to Europe, on 17 June 2025 the Commission adopted a legislative proposal to gradually phase out the import of Russian gas and oil by the end of 2027, which has been sent to the European Parliament and Council of the EU for the co-decision legislative process. The proposal aims to redefine our trade energy relationship with Russia, which has proven to be unreliable and conducts an unacceptable war against Ukraine that we cannot contribute to finance. It proposes: (i) a ban on Russian gas imports (both pipeline and LNG) in a step-wise approach: (a) new contracts with suppliers of Russian gas banned as of 1 January 2026 and full phase-out at the end of 2027; (b) transitional phase for existing contracts: for short-term supply contracts – ban as of 17 June 2026; for long-term supply contracts – ban as of 1 January 2028; (ii) ban on long term LNG terminal services to entities from or controlled by Russia as of 1 January 2026, in line with ban on gas imports a long-term terminal service contracts prohibition kicks in as of 1 January 2028.

13. Emphasises the need to invest in the protection of energy infrastructure against military and cyber attacks; notes, with concern, that small distributed energy resources connected to the internet, such as inverters, are not covered by cybersecurity legislation, and that if they are manufactured in non-EU countries, they could give those countries control over EU electricity grids;

The legislative proposal is accompanied by an assessment of impacts, which concludes that these proposals will have a limited impact, both from a security of supply and price perspective. The phase out of Russian imports would mitigate economic vulnerabilities and shield the Union from sudden supply disruptions and price spikes as experienced in the past.

14. Urges the Member States to address security risks associated with foreign investment in and acquisitions of energy infrastructure;

This proposal constitutes a sovereign act of the Union, without any discretion for Member States concerning its application. This should enable EU importers to invoke force majeure (i.e., an unforeseeable event preventing a party to fulfil its contractual obligations) in order to terminate their contracts. As stated in the proposed Regulation, ‘with a view to the recent practice of the Russian Federation to unilaterally change agreed court and arbitration procedures in a manner not compatible with international customary law or bilateral investment treaties entered between Member States and Russia, it follows from international law that affected companies and Member States cannot be held liable for any judgments, arbitral awards, including investor-State arbitral awards, or other judicial decisions adopted under procedures which are illegal under international customary law or under a bilateral investment treaty, and against which the person or Member State concerned does not have effective access to the remedies under the relevant jurisdiction. With respect to financial responsibilities concerning possible investor-to-state dispute settlement resolution cases, reference is made, to Regulation (EU) 912/2014, where applicable.’

15. Stresses that energy security should include the supply of key technologies and critical raw materials; calls for increased support for the EU’s grid manufacturing industry;

The Commission has, within the framework of RepowerEU, proposed a gradual phase out Russian Gas, including LNG. This includes among other actions the development of national plans to systematically reduce reliance on Russian gas, and a stepwise phasing out of gas, first under spot and subsequently under long-term contracts at the latest by 2027. Under the 18th sanctions package, the EU has expanded the shadow fleet list of vessels to reinforce the effectiveness of its sanction's regime. As part of this measure, several vessels were required to commit to ceasing LNG transport from the Yamal and Arctic LNG 2 projects. The 19th package introduces a ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) into the EU, starting from January 2027 for long-term contracts, and within six months following the entry into force for short-term contracts, and tightens the existing transaction ban on two major Russian state-owned oil producers (Rosneft and Gazprom Neft). When it comes to the Russian oil sector, the EU is listing a Tatarstani conglomerate active in the Russian oil sector and taking measures against important third country operators enabling Russia’s revenue streams. This involves sanctioning Chinese entities- two refineries and an oil trader - that are significant buyers of Russian crude oil. Furthermore, the EU is imposing additional sanctions across the shadow fleet value chain. Among others, additional 117 vessels part of Russia’s shadow fleet, have been made subject to a port access ban and a ban on the provision of a broad range of services related to maritime transport, bringing the total number of designated vessels to 557. This action reinforces the EU’s strategic objective of phasing out Russian gas and strengthened the sanctions framework. While AggregateEU supported the diversification on EU’s gas supplies in the energy crisis triggered by Russia, its legal basis and the legal basis for the new gas mechanism make the participation of companies voluntary.

16. Highlights that the EU should prioritise partnerships with like-minded energy suppliers, such as the European Economic Area;

Preparedness and risk assessments

Phase out of Russian energy supplies

Preparedness is inherently embedded in energy security policy. The revision of the energy security framework will strengthen the preparedness of the EU energy system in view of the current geopolitical context and increased electrification, while also paying close attention to emerging risks, such as climate change impacts, cyber and physical attacks to critical energy infrastructure. The Commission will propose specific measures for the energy sector.

17. Expresses concern that the EU is increasing its reliance on Russian gas as it imported 30 % more natural gas from Russia in May 2024 than in September 2022;

Under the Electricity Risk Preparedness Regulation (EU) 2019/941, every four-year ENTSO-E has to identify the most relevant crisis scenarios for each region in close coordination with the Electricity Coordination Group, on the basis of a methodology developed by ENTSO-E and approved by ACER. The methodology update and the crisis scenario identification were last carried out in 2024. The close collaboration with ENTSO-E on the risk assessments therefore already exists. Similarly, under the gas Security of Supply Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, ENTSOG, in collaboration with the Gas Coordination Group, identifies gas disruption scenarios and runs an EU-wide simulation of those scenarios that is the basis for further regional and national risk assessment by Member States. This exercise is performed every 4 years unless more frequent updates are deemed necessary.

18. Stresses that the roadmap for phasing out Russian energy imports must pave the way for their definitive end as soon as possible, including nuclear and related technologies;

However, the fact that the EU required additional measures to combat the energy crisis, points to the need for more robust risk assessments and scenario planning, taking better account of gas and electricity interactions, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, access to critical energy transition minerals and climate change impacts. The upcoming impact assessment will therefore explore ways to reinforce risk assessments.

19. Expresses concern that official data does not provide a complete picture of Russian energy imports, as relabelled Russian oil and gas continue to enter the EU market; notes with regret that this often happens with the tacit approval of EU Member States;

Energy solidarity and standardisation

20. Agrees that an adequate assessment of the level of Russian energy imports is a prerequisite for phasing out this dependence; welcomes the proposals for transparency and traceability mechanisms, as the effective implementation of sanctions depends on compatible control mechanisms in all Member States;

As underlined by the European Court of Justice in the “OPAL case”, energy solidarity is a key principle of the EU energy acquis: it is not only a guiding concept, but an unwritten requirement. While it is already enshrined in the current EU energy security legislations (both the Electricity Risk Preparedness Regulation and the Gas Security of Supply Regulation), the upcoming revision of the framework will aim at making this principle more operational in times of crises. Policy options in the supporting impact assessment will notably look at the expansion of solidarity rules beyond mere energy flows.

21. Calls on the Commission to develop a legislative mechanism to ensure the transparency and traceability of natural gas originating in Russia and exported to the EU as liquefied natural gas and by pipeline, and eventually to cover oil imports; considers that the mechanism would require cooperation between various services, including EU competition services and national customs authorities with enhanced criminal investigation powers; stresses the need for dissuasive penalties for sanctions evasion;

However, under Regulation (EU) 2012/1025, the responsibility to develop harmonised European standards lies on the European Standardisation Organisations (ESOs), such as the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN). The Commission shall adopt an annual Union work programme for European standardisation which shall identify strategic priorities and indicate standards that the Commission intends to request from the ESOs.

Revision of security of supply framework

22. Considers that the security of supply architecture should reflect the cross-sectoral integration of the energy system, the new geopolitical landscape and the profound changes in supply routes;

23. Calls on the Commission to include in the security of supply architecture a framework for diversification, requiring each Member State to prepare an exit plan for Russian energy sources, and to monitor the preparation of exit plans at the level of their national companies;

24. Condemns the calls for a return to Russian energy imports as part of the peace settlement in Ukraine; warns against the EU falling back into dependency on an unreliable supplier and calls on the Commission to develop safeguards against this, such as a countersignature by the Commission on any potential contracts with Russia or the mandatory use of the AggregateEU platform for this type of purchase;

25. Stresses the need for greater cooperation on the resilience of energy infrastructure to both climate impacts and human-caused threats; considers that new energy assets should be ‘resilient by design’, including to possible military threats;

26. Notes the need to accommodate the integration of renewable and low-carbon gases, such as biomethane and hydrogen;

27. Considers that the new security of supply framework could be broadened to reflect a new way of looking at the security of energy supply, based not only on energy sources, but also on the ability to produce different types of energy domestically;

28. Stresses the need to include affordability risks in national risk assessments;

29. Emphasises that energy security is increasingly becoming a shared responsibility of the Member States; notes the need for stronger coordination, including on the withdrawal of generation capacity from the system, as this affects the availability and affordability of energy in neighbouring countries; calls for transparency on the implementation of national risk-preparedness measures to increase trust between the Member States; notes the need for greater alignment on protected consumer categories to allow coordinated consumer load-shedding plans to be defined;

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30. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

In the Versailles Declaration, Member States agreed that the new situation requires a thorough reassessment of how the EU should ensure the security of energy supply. The update should reflect the technological changes that have taken place in recent years and the progress made in the cross-sectoral integration of the energy system. It should also reflect changes in the geopolitical situation. This is not limited to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the profound changes in supply routes and the EU’s increased dependence on Liquefied Natural Gas imports, but should also take into account broader geopolitical developments in the world. We need to analyse the new US administration’s decision to take a step back on climate policy, including withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, and see what the consequences are for our economy, for the existing competitiveness gap between the US and the EU, and whether this requires a reassessment of our policies, including in the field of energy and climate.

The reassessment would be incomplete without taking into account the lessons learned and acknowledging the shortcomings of existing policies. This applies to the EU’s unstable and ambivalent policy towards natural gas, which has undermined the trading position of EU companies, leaving them unable to conclude long-term contracts, partly due to the legal limitation of gas contracts to 2049, leaving Europe exposed to global spot market prices and creating a dangerous gap between what the bloc has contractually secured and what will be imported over time. The above also applies to the existing approach to nuclear energy, which has been treated as an elephant in the room of EU policy for years. This has gradually changed in recent years, with the result that Commissioner Dan Jorgensen has been given the task in his mission letter of facilitating the deployment of small and modular reactors in the EU. The role of nuclear power should be further reassessed as it has an important role to play in an integrated energy system with increasing penetration of renewables, providing flexible load following and frequency control, allowing very rapid changes in output and underpinning security of supply in Member States. EU energy policy should be firmly based on the principle of technological neutrality, which is crucial for security of supply as it allows for a diverse mix of energy sources and innovations - from renewables to nuclear and low-carbon fuels - to increase resilience, reduce dependence on specific suppliers and ensure a stable and adaptable energy system in the face of geopolitical and market uncertainties.

The Rapporteur expresses her concern that the short-sightedness and self-interest of some EU Member States in securing cheap energy imports for their economies, against the warnings of other countries, has taught the whole continent, at enormous cost, the dangers of dependence on an unreliable energy supplier such as Russia. The report stresses that the lessons of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine must be at the heart of future EU action. EU energy sanctions against Russia should be fully implemented and further strengthened. This is required not only by our obligations to Ukraine, which is the first line of defence of the European continent against an aggressive, revisionist and imperialist Russia. It is also required by the resilience of our energy systems, which must not fall back into the trap of energy dependence on Russia and its inevitable future blackmail. For this reason, the Rapporteur calls for the adoption of a phase-out plan that should pave the way for the definitive end of all energy imports from Russia, including in nuclear and related technologies. The text also emphasises the need to ensure transparency and traceability of Russian energy imports into the EU, as a clear picture of what and how much is actually being imported should be a prerequisite and a basis for future measures guiding the EU’s phasing out of Russian imports. The Rapporteur believes that the forthcoming revision of the security of supply architecture should be used as an opportunity to include in its framework an obligation for each Member State to prepare an exit plan for Russian energy sources and to monitor the preparation of exit plans at the level of national companies. This should be used in the future to prevent other dependencies, as we cannot have a situation where we move from dependence on one country to total dependence on another.

The Rapporteur condemns calls for a return to Russian energy imports as part of a peace settlement in Ukraine. This would undermine the commitments made in the Versailles Declaration and undermine all aspects of the Union’s security. Given that gas imports are not (yet) sanctioned by the EU, the Rapporteur calls on the Commission and Member States to put in place much needed safeguards against the import of gas volumes that threaten the security of the Union. These safeguards could take the form of a required countersignature by the Commission on any potential contract with Russia or the mandatory use of the AggregateEU platform for this type of purchase.

The Rapporteur emphasises that the geopolitical situation underscores the need to revise the understanding of energy security. This requires reconceptualising that the “peace dividend” is over and that resilience of energy systems, broadly understood, is now a strategic imperative. Member States urgently need to cooperate and invest in protecting their critical infrastructure against man-made threats, both cyber and military. We need to learn the lessons from a war in Ukraine and Russia’s deliberate attacks on its energy infrastructure assets and increase the preparedness of our energy systems.

Climate change poses significant risks to energy infrastructure, as rising temperatures, extreme weather events and changing rainfall patterns threaten the reliability and resilience of energy systems. Heat waves can reduce the efficiency of power plants and transmission lines, while droughts can limit hydropower generation and the availability of cooling water for thermal and nuclear power plants. More frequent storms, floods and wildfires can damage critical infrastructure, leading to power outages and costly repairs. These challenges require urgent adaptation measures, such as strengthening networks, decentralising energy production and integrating climate resilience into infrastructure planning. Strengthening the energy system against climate impacts is an essential element of a policy to ensure a stable, secure and sustainable energy supply in a rapidly changing environment. We must therefore ensure that all new energy infrastructure is “resilient by design” and provides a high level of protection against climate and man-made threats.

The Rapporteur would like to draw attention to the fact that the increasing complexity of the energy system, driven by the integration of variable renewable energy, decentralised production, digitalisation and the electrification of key sectors, requires greater policy coordination between Member States in order to ensure stability, efficiency and security of supply. As energy flows become increasingly interconnected across borders, unilateral action can often lead to inefficiencies, market distortions and supply risks. This should not be limited to network infrastructure and emergency response mechanisms, which are essential to prevent congestion, increase flexibility and optimise the use of resources across regions. As has been shown, national decisions to remove generation capacity from the system, such as the closure of nuclear power plants, can have a major impact on the availability and affordability of energy in neighbouring countries, to the extent that some of them are considering insulating their markets from EU energy system influence. Energy security is increasingly a shared responsibility of Member States and these decisions require closer coordination.

Securing a stable and diversified energy supply is essential for economic resilience, industrial competitiveness and social stability. Domestic energy production, improving energy efficiency and strengthening the infrastructure for alternative sources, such as hydrogen and biomethane, are essential to reduce dependence and increase resilience. Strong trade partnerships, especially with like-minded countries, are essential for energy security as they diversify sources of supply, reduce dependence on individual suppliers, increase market stability and facilitate access to critical energy resources and technologies needed for a resilient and sustainable energy system. A secure energy system not only protects economies from geopolitical shocks, but also supports long-term climate goals, enhancing both sustainability and strategic autonomy.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report:

Entity and/or person

SolarEdge

Trina Solar

Forum Energii

ACER

CEWEP - Confederation of European Waste-to-Energy Plants

Edison

EUTurbines

EUgine

Cefic - European Chemical Industry Council

ENTSO-G

ENTSO-E

Urenco

PKEE - Polish Electricity Association

PGE

COGEN Europe

Gas Infrastructure Europe

Offshore Norway

Fluxys

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.