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P10_TA(2026)0246
AMENDMENTS
Recommendation on the changing geopolitical situation in East Asia and the need for closer cooperation with like-minded partners in the region
The Committee on International Trade submits the following to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as the committee responsible:
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Amendment 1
PE776.904
Motion for a resolution
European Parliament recommendation of 7 July 2026 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the changing geopolitical situation in East Asia and the need for closer cooperation with like-minded partners in the region (2025/2169(INI))
Citation 7 a (new)
– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union,
Motion for a resolution
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),
Amendment
– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence approved by the Council on 21 March 2022, which underscores the role of partnerships for the Union’s security and resilience, including in the Indo-Pacific,
– having regard to the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement1a,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),
1a OJ L 330, 27.12.2018, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2018/1907/oj.
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’,
Amendment 2
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘European Democracy Shield: Empowering Strong and Resilient Democracies’ (JOIN(2025)0791),
Motion for a resolution
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),
Citation 7 b (new)
– having regard to the Security and Defence Partnership between the European Union and Japan of 1 November 2024,
Motion for a resolution
– having regard to the Security and Defence Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Korea of 4 November 2024,
Amendment
– having regard to the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Japan, of the other part,
– having regard to the Free TradeFramework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, ofon the one part, and the Republic of Korea, ofon the other part1a,part,
1a OJ L 127, 14.5.2011, p. 6, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2011/265/oj.
– having regard to the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement,
Amendment 3
– having regard to the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part,
Motion for a resolution
– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
Citation 16 a (new)
– having regard to the joint statement adopted at the 30th EU-Japan summit held on 23 July 2025 in Tokyo,
Motion for a resolution
– having regard to the 42nd EU-Japan inter-parliamentary meeting held on 28 and 29 May 2025 in Tokyo,
Amendment
– having regard to the 3rd EU-Japan Strategic Dialogue on 26 March 2026 in Vaux-de-Cernay,
– having regard to the 9th EU-Japan Digital Policy Dialogue on 25 March 2026 in Tokyo,
– having regard to the Letter of Intent signed on 13 March 2025 by the EU and Japan on ‘Strengthening Cooperation in Quantum Science and Technology’ to deepen joint research, exchanges and ecosystem development,
– having regard to the commitment to enhance cooperation on critical raw materials given by the EU, Japan and the United States at the Critical Minerals Ministerial meeting on 4 February 2026,
Amendment 4
– having regard to the EU-Japan Green Alliance of 27 May 2021,
Motion for a resolution
– having regard to the joint statement adopted at the 11th EU-Republic of Korea summit held on 10 June 2026 in Brussels,
Citation 16 b (new)
– having regard to the 23rd EU-Republic of Korea inter-parliamentary meeting held on 18 November 2025 in Brussels,
Motion for a resolution
– having regard to the second EU-ROK Strategic Dialogue on 22 January 2026 in Brussels,
Amendment
– having regard to the EU-Republic of Korea Green Partnership of 22 May 2023,
– having regard to the Green Alliance between the EU and Japan and the4th GreenEUIndoPacific Partnershipministerial betweenforum theheld EUin andBrussels theon Republic20-21 ofNovember Korea,2025,
Amendment 5
– having regard to the statement following the recent visit by a delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to the Republic of Korea and Japan from 31 March to 2 April 2026,
Motion for a resolution
– having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific,
Recital A
– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Japan relations,
Motion for a resolution
– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025,
Amendment
– having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2024 on reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia,
A. whereas East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific are pivotal to global prosperity and security, hosting vital sea lanes, advanced technology ecosystems, major trade routes, over half the world’s population, and critical supply chains essential to EU economic resilience and geopolitical influence;
– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan,
A. whereas East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific are pivotal to global prosperity and security, hosting vital sea lanes, advanced technology ecosystems, major trade routes, over half the world’s population, and critical supply chains essential to EU economic competitiveness, export performance and long-term industrial resilience, including in strategic sectors such as semiconductor production, digital technology and advanced manufacturing; whereas it is also a region accounting for a substantial and growing share of EU external trade and investment flows;
– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations,
Amendment 6
– having regard to its positions and recommendations on Indo-Pacific cooperation, including calls to work with like-minded partners to uphold freedom of navigation and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas,
Motion for a resolution
– having regard to Rule 121 of its Rules of Procedure,
Recital A a (new)
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0189/2026),
Motion for a resolution
A. whereas the ongoing geopolitical shifts and the growing strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific are reshaping the global order; whereas East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region are pivotal to global prosperity and security, energy security and democratic resilience, hosting vital sea lanes, advanced technology ecosystems, major trade routes, over half the world’s population, and critical supply chains essential to the EU’s economic competitiveness and long-term industrial resilience in strategic sectors, as well as its geopolitical influence;
Amendment
B. whereas economic security, including resilient and diversified supply chains for critical raw materials, semiconductors and clean technologies, is an integral part of trade, foreign and security policy; whereas reducing strategic dependencies and making supply chains more resilient and more diversified in critical sectors are essential for the EU’s economic security and competitiveness, in line with the its derisking strategy, while avoiding unnecessary economic decoupling;
Aa. whereas economic security, including resilient and diversified supply chains for critical raw materials, semiconductors and clean technologies, is an integral part of trade, foreign and security policy;
C. whereas East Asia’s geopolitical landscape has become increasingly volatile in recent years, with regional power dynamics being increasingly shaped by systemic rivalry, maritime disputes, military build-ups, and the expanding influence of authoritarian governance models that deploy economic coercion, including discriminatory market access, hybrid threats including foreign information manipulation and interference, and commercial and political espionage that challenge peace, stability and the rules-based international order and require coordinated responses with partners that share democratic values and high regulatory standards;
Amendment 7
D. whereas the security of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan remains largely dependent on the United States; whereas these partners are increasingly affected by US unpredictability and economic coercion, which is at times extended even to its closest allies; whereas these democratic partners therefore need to reinforce and diversify their partnerships with other actors, notably the EU, in order to strengthen resilience and shared security interests;
Motion for a resolution
E. whereas the EU’s strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is built on the conviction that the security and prosperity of the EU and the Indo-Pacific are inextricably linked; whereas the strategy underscores the importance of strengthening the EU’s engagement in the region through deeper political dialogue, enhanced economic cooperation and expanded security partnerships; whereas the unravelling of the rules-based order and traditional alliances, and the emergence of aggressive actors guided by imperialistic ambitions, warrant stronger ties between the EU and like-minded partners in the region in order to increase mutual security and prosperity;
Recital A b (new)
F. whereas the freedoms of navigation and overflight are fundamental principles of international law, as enshrined, in particular, in the UNCLOS, and are of key importance for the Union’s economic security;
Motion for a resolution
G. whereas the increasingly complex security challenges have a profound impact on both Europe’s and the Indo-Pacific’s stability and prosperity, with the two regions’ stability more interlinked than ever; whereas both are directly affected by Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the support of third countries such as China and North Korea that are enabling Russian aggression; whereas a robust EU-Japan and EU-Republic of Korea (RoK) defence-industrial cooperation is indispensable; whereas Japan and the RoK stand out for their substantial financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine; whereas Japan has provided and pledged over USD 20 billion to Ukraine in financial and military assistance since 2022; whereas instability in the Middle East has significant repercussions for Europe and East Asia with regard to energy security and supply-chain disruptions;
Amendment
H. whereas the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence’ states that certain actors, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), continue to endanger regional and international peace and security; whereas the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes constitute grave threats to the rules-based international order, as well as the country’s possible nuclear or ballistic missile-related technology and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) transfer from Russia in return for arms and military personnel; whereas the DPRK has repeatedly violated United Nations Security Council resolutions through ongoing missile launches, including tests conducted over Japan;
Ab. whereas reducing strategic dependencies, notably on China, and making supply chains more resilient and more diversified in critical sectors are essential for the EU’s economic security and competitiveness, in line with the EU’s derisking strategy, while avoiding unnecessary economic decoupling;
I. whereas the growing importance of the digital space for the functioning of our societies and our economies has increased the number and scale of cyberattacks; whereas the joint communication on the EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade states that fighting those threats and vulnerabilities requires cooperating with partners that are attached to the rule of law, fundamental freedom, democracy and human rights;
Amendment 8
J. whereas the EU’s interests and global security are best protected by deepening practical cooperation with like-minded partners in the region – notably Japan, the RoK and Taiwan while pursuing principled and constructive engagement with regional actors, and by engaging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a central convening actor; whereas these partnerships should serve to bolster the EU’s strategic autonomy by consolidating a robust industrial and technology base for European defence, without leaving the EU too heavily reliant on external powers; whereas the EU should avoid bloc-based confrontation dynamics and instead promote cooperative multilateralism and dialogue based on international law;
Motion for a resolution
K. whereas the strategic partnership between the EU and Japan serves as a model for effective bilateral cooperation that strengthens policy-shaping in multilateral forums; whereas the entry into force of the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) on 1 January 2025, allows for deeper collaboration, including in areas such as security and defence, hybrid threats, maritime security, cybersecurity, space and non-proliferation, alongside tangible joint efforts under the Competitiveness Alliance, the Green Alliance and the Digital Partnership and Energy Dialogue;
Recital A c (new)
L. whereas Japan is the EU’s closest strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas global challenges and, in particular, growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region require an ever closer partnership between the EU and Japan; whereas a free and open Indo-Pacific is a core interest pursued both by Japan and the EU, in particular by promoting a rules-based international order in which all countries adhere to international law and the principle of the peaceful settlement of conflicts; whereas Japan is an important actor in several forums in the Indo-Pacific such as the East Asia Summit; whereas the EU and Japan seek common approaches at bilateral level and in multilateral forums such as the G7, G20, the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as alignment as like-minded donors;
Motion for a resolution
M. whereas the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force in 2019 and was amended to include provisions on the free flow of data in 2024; whereas Japan ranks as the EU’s seventh-largest trading partner;
Amendment
N. whereas in May 2026 the fourth EU-Japan Digital Partnership Council expanded cooperation on artificial intelligence (AI), 5G/6G, semiconductors, cybersecurity and data governance and welcomed the progress on the ‘6G MIRAI-HARMONY’ joint research project;
Ac. whereas raw materials resources in the region and the EU are limited; whereas the countries of both regions have obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the principle of most favoured nation in the trade of critical raw materials, when relevant;
O. whereas the EU-Japan Energy Dialogue in 2025 underscored joint work on clean energy supply chains, LNG security and hydrogen cooperation to support climate neutrality;
Amendment 9
P. whereas the strategic partnership between the EU and the RoK, a key Indo-Pacific ally, spans political dialogue, trade and security cooperation; whereas the EU-RoK Free Trade Agreement has contributed to substantial growth in bilateral trade since its entry into force; whereas the EU-RoK Framework Agreement strengthens political, economic and institutional ties, including security; whereas the Framework Participation Agreement strengthens the EU-RoK political and security relationship and underscores shared values and interests; whereas at the 2023 EU-RoK Summit, leaders agreed to establish a security partnership and strategic dialogue at foreign ministerial level to enhance cooperation on global peace and security; whereas the EU-RoK Security and Defence Partnership provides a structured framework for engagement across all security domains; whereas the EU-RoK Digital Trade Agreement sets out mutually beneficial rules around data and digital technologies; whereas the RoK plays a pivotal role in regional stability;
Motion for a resolution
Q. whereas the EU-RoK Free Trade Agreement marked the first of a new generation of EU trade agreements; whereas full implementation of the Trade and Sustainable Development chapter of the EU-RoK Free Trade Agreement, including continued progress on labour rights and ratification of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No 105), remains important; whereas the RoK is the EU’s eighth-largest trading partner;
Recital A d (new)
R. whereas the EU has already established strategic partnerships with Japan and the RoK as like-minded partners in the region; whereas Japan and the RoK are directing substantial resources towards accelerating their energy transition, including in light of their ratification of the 2015 Paris Agreement and their considerable investments in solar and offshore wind energy; whereas the EU aims to go further in its strategic partnerships and strengthen its cooperation with Japan and the RoK in the field of renewable energies to reach carbon neutrality by 2050;
Motion for a resolution
S. whereas the RoK and Japan are leading technological actors, whose development of AI, including in the field of defence, is shaping responses to cyber and military threats, particularly in light of the constant threats posed by the DPRK;
Amendment
T. whereas Australia, Japan and the RoK are deepening trilateral cooperation to enhance security and stability in the Indo-Pacific, including through joint military exercises and closer cooperation on defence technology and supply-chain resilience; whereas this growing trilateral coordination builds on the momentum generated by Australia’s Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the RoK and its Special Strategic Partnership with Japan;
Ad. whereas the principles traditionally underpinning trade, such as openness, market access, trade liberalisation and economic growth, need to be connected with broader societal values such as resilience, sustainable development and democracy, in both the EU and its international partners;
U. whereas on 1 January 2025 the RoK became the first Asian country to join the Horizon Europe programme, followed by the completion of negotiations with Japan on 22 December 2025; whereas the accession of both countries to the programme demonstrates their strong commitment to research and innovation cooperation with the EU;
Amendment 10
V. whereas Taiwan is a reliable key democratic partner for the EU in the East Asia region; whereas the EU and Taiwan share common values, such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and are both committed to upholding multilateralism and the rules-based international order; whereas the White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 (JOIN(2025)0120) expresses concern over China’s coercion of Taiwan through the intensification of political, economic, military and cyber measures; whereas peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea are of vital strategic interest for the EU and are essential to global security and prosperity, including for international trade flows, investment certainty and the functioning of global supply chains;
Motion for a resolution
W. whereas Taiwan is the EU’s 13th-largest trading partner and a key economic partner, ranking among the EU’s most important trade and investment partners in Asia, and plays a central role in global value chains, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing, public health, democratic resilience and disaster preparedness;
Recital B
X. whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from China, Japan, the RoK and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas Taiwan leads the semiconductor manufacturing market, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan and advocates stabilising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait;
Motion for a resolution
Y. whereas cooperation between the EU, Japan, the RoK and Taiwan contributes to the promotion of stability, open markets and the rules-based international order; whereas these partners share common interests in addressing global challenges, including economic security and technological development; whereas enhanced coordination between the EU, Japan, and the RoK can contribute to greater policy coherence in addressing regional and global challenges;
Amendment
Z. whereas trilateral cooperation between the EU, Japan, the RoK and Taiwan can support the development of international norms and standards, particularly in the areas of digital governance and supply chains; whereas the EU, Japan and the RoK are like-minded partners which share same objectives; whereas their strategic partnership in AI is a mechanism to promote exchanges in digital trade and to address the changes in the global context;
B. whereas East Asia’s geopolitical landscape has become increasingly volatile in recent years, with regional power dynamics being increasingly shaped by systemic rivalry, maritime disputes, coercive economic practices and military build-ups that challenge the rules-based international order;
AA. whereas the EU-Japan Green Alliance and the EU-Republic of Korea Green Partnership provide concrete frameworks for cooperation on climate action, clean energy, industrial decarbonisation, the circular economy and other elements of the green transition; whereas deeper structured cooperation with Taiwan on clean technology and supply-chain resilience is also in the EU’s interest;
B. whereas East Asia’s geopolitical landscape has become increasingly volatile in recent years, with regional power dynamics being increasingly shaped by systemic rivalry, maritime disputes, military build-ups and the expanding influence of authoritarian governance models that deploy coercive economic practices including discriminatory market access, selective customs enforcement, trade distortions, export restrictions and economic coercion measures targeting strategic sectors;
AB. whereas peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea are of strategic importance for regional and global security; whereas some EU Member States have a naval presence in the Indo-Pacific and the EU as a whole has a direct interest in the preservation of the status quo;
Amendment 11
AC. whereas in November 2025 the EU and the Philippines established a Security and Defence Dialogue to address the growing complexity of security threats and to foster exchanges and cooperation on issues such as maritime security, regional stability and connectivity; whereas in January 2026 the EU and Viet Nam upgraded their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership to deepen cooperation across a wide range of areas, including on maritime security, resilience of supply chains and strengthening connectivity between Europe and South-East Asia;
Motion for a resolution
AD. whereas the human rights situation in the DPRK continues to be characterised by systematic, widespread and gross violations, including restrictions on freedom of expression, movement and access to information, the existence of political prison camps and documented cases of forced labour and torture, and an absence of the minimum legal standards within the criminal procedure; whereas these violations have been consistently reported by international institutions and require sustained attention and action from the international community;
Recital B a (new)
AE. whereas the EU’s presence in, and cooperation with, the East Asia region is of the utmost importance for fostering peace and stability in the region, for safeguarding economic security and for strengthening the rules-based international order as the security challenges in the region have direct implications for global peace and EU interests; whereas partners in East Asia, including Japan, the RoK, Taiwan and members of ASEAN, maintain complex and multifaceted relations with China, characterised by significant economic interdependence;
Motion for a resolution
AF. whereas the overseas countries and territories (OCTs) are the only territory belonging to the Member States in the Pacific Ocean and Indo‑Pacific; whereas the OCTs serve as unique focal points of strategic interest, providing the EU with a presence, influence and partnerships in the regions concerned, not least in the areas of defence, trade, digital technology, space and cultural cooperation;
Amendment
AG. whereas the EU is the largest source of foreign direct investment stock in Japan, the RoK and Taiwan;
Ba. whereas the WTO plays a crucial role in promoting a fair, open and rules-based global trading system, which is essential for ensuring stability and predictability in global economic relations; whereas the EU has a strategic interest in reinforcing a rules-based, open and fair multilateral trading system, with the reformed WTO at its core, and in working with Indo-Pacific partners to modernise and enforce global trade rules;
AH. whereas the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) has emerged as a major rules-based trade framework in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas Japan is a member of the CPTPP, and the RoK and Taiwan have applied for membership; whereas the EU launched a Trade and Investment Dialogue with CPTPP countries in November 2025;
Amendment 12
1. Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:
Motion for a resolution
(a) intensify the EU’s strategic focus, presence and visibility in and dialogue and cooperation with East Asia, including through diplomatic engagement, security cooperation, people-to-people contacts and economic partnerships, with the aim of avoiding bloc-based confrontation dynamics and contributing to peace, regional stability, security, prosperity and sustainable development, underpinned by the promotion of democracy, multilateralism, the rule of law, human rights, a rules-based trading system, territorial integrity and international law; in this context, cooperate with Japan on its updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept; enhance cooperation, coordination and dialogue with East Asian like-minded partners, making full use of their regional knowledge and experience in order to ensure a more effective, coherent and context-sensitive approach to peace, security and stability in East Asia;
Recital C
(b) strengthen strategic foresight and contingency planning between the EU and its East Asian partners to develop a shared assessment of regional security risks and coordinate deterrence measures to safeguard and contribute to peace and stability in the region and proactively discourage unilateral attempts to alter the regional status quo by force or coercion;
Motion for a resolution
(c) welcome the significant diplomatic progress made by the Governments of Japan and the Republic of Korea in forging a forward-looking, resilient partnership as such enhanced cooperation between Japan and the RoK is vital for maintaining a rules-based international order and ensuring stability across the Indo-Pacific region;
Amendment
(d) strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and economic security through trade and investment diversification, secure and predictable supply chains, open markets and trade flows, and closer cooperation with like-minded partners in East Asia, while ensuring mutual benefits and local value creation, and upholding the EU’s commitment to fair and sustainable trade;
C. whereas the increasingly complex security challenges have a profound impact on both Europe’s and Indo-Pacific’s stability and prosperity, with the two regions’ stability more interlinked than ever; whereas both are directly affected by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the support of third countries that are enabling Russian aggression;
(e) deepen cooperation with like-minded partners in the region, particularly Japan, the RoK and Taiwan, as well as ASEAN countries, to address common challenges in areas such as economic coercion, arbitrary export control measures, including export restrictions on dual-use items targeting Japan, non-market policies and practices, democratic resilience, ecological transition, cybersecurity, hybrid threats including foreign information manipulation and interference, protection of critical infrastructures, including submarine cables and port and logistics hubs, maritime and space security, non-proliferation, and emerging defence technologies, including advanced drone technology, while strengthening synergies with key partners and regional organisations in full respect for the UN Charter; explore and implement joint initiatives to strengthen the parties’ respective strategic autonomies and reduce dependency on China; highlight the importance of Japan’s, the RoK’s and Taiwan’s robust institutions and vibrant democracies within the broader regional context, providing a crucial counterbalance in the region;
C. whereas the increasingly complex security challenges have a profound impact on both Europe’s and Indo-Pacific’s stability and prosperity, with the two regions’ stability more interlinked than ever; whereas both are directly affected by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the support of third countries that are enabling Russian aggression and disruptions in oil and gas supplies from the Strait of Hormuz;
(f) maintain, in coordination with like-minded partners, open channels of dialogue and principled engagement with other global actors in East Asia in order to address shared global challenges;
Amendment 13
(g) reaffirm the importance of upholding international law to promote peace and prosperity in the free and open Indo-Pacific; actively promote respect for and universal application of the UNCLOS as the universal legal framework that governs maritime activities, including the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Ruling, and object to unilateral actions or claims that do not comply with international law;
Motion for a resolution
(h) facilitate structured military-industrial cooperation with like-minded partners and establish respective security partnerships that focus on interoperability, joint development and procurement of defence technology, security of supply chains, and shared R&D in aviation and drones, with regard also to the contribution of AI-driven systems;
Recital E a (new)
(i) continue to engage pragmatically with China on global challenges while enhancing coordination with like-minded partners on security issues in the light of China’s increasingly critical role in global peace and stability, particularly in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and ongoing instability in the Middle East;
Motion for a resolution
(j) step up cooperation on secure, sustainable and diversified supply chains for semiconductors, batteries and critical raw materials, including through traceability, recycling, circularity and high environmental and labour standards, and in coordination with like-minded partners in relevant multilateral initiatives;
Amendment
(k) further the EU-Japan SPA and the parties’ Security and Defence Partnership; encourage deeper collaboration on defence-industrial matters, including mutual involvement in defence initiatives, progress on a security of information agreement, and further development of the EU-Japan Defence Industry Dialogue to reinforce supply-chain resilience, interoperability and innovation; intensify concrete joint activities under the Competitiveness Alliance, the Green Alliance, the Digital Partnership and the Energy Dialogues and continue to expand the EU-Japan High-Level Economic Dialogue and strengthen the strategic economic cooperation between both parties; accelerate the implementation of the EU-Japan Competitiveness Alliance;
Ea. whereas the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) entered into force in 2019 and was amended to include provisions on the free flow of data in 2024; whereas Japan ranks as the EU’s seventh-largest trading partner;
(l) highlight that the EU-Japan partnership is one among exceptionally like-minded partners, built on shared values, democracy, free trade and mutually compatible interests; emphasise the importance of further deepening and broadening this partnership both bilaterally and in multilateral contexts; point out that the EU and Japan together account for almost 25 % of global gross domestic product (GDP) and that this partnership can and should play a key role in shaping a peaceful, rules-based, inclusive, just, sustainable and prosperous international order; welcome Japan’s financial, technical, humanitarian and security assistance to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022;
Amendment 14
(m) advance the implementation of the EU-RoK Security and Defence Partnership, fostering practical cooperation in maritime security, non-proliferation, cybersecurity, counterterrorism and crisis management, building on existing joint operations and exploring further engagement under the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presences tool; launch a joint EU-RoK defence industry dialogue, and strengthen coordination in multilateral forums to uphold peace, deter provocations and promote denuclearisation; further build on the successful and mutually beneficial defence product cooperation between the RoK and several EU Member States; intensify cooperation between the EU and the RoK to reinforce military and financial support to Ukraine;
Motion for a resolution
(n) welcome the RoK’s cooperation with the EU on shared economic security concerns; stress that the RoK remains a key partner in any de-risking and friendshoring efforts, in particular within the trade realm; urge the Specialised Committee on Emerging Trade and Economic Issues, newly created under the EU-RoK Free Trade Agreement, to speed up cooperation, particularly on topics with relevance for economic security, such as critical supply chains and overcapacity;
Recital F a (new)
(o) advance the joint efforts with like-minded partners in East Asia to address Russia’s growing involvement with the DPRK, including its support in enhancing the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic capabilities and China’s unwillingness to prevent it, as well as addressing the link between the nuclear programmes of the DPRK and Iran, underlining that this involvement exacerbates the tense geopolitical environment on the Korean Peninsula; advance cooperation with the RoK on addressing disinformation campaigns in election processes and on safeguarding electoral infrastructure from cyberattacks;
Motion for a resolution
(p) commend the RoK’s efforts to resume dialogue with the DPRK through proactive de-escalation and trust-building measures; call on the DPRK to immediately cease all its military actions and provocations, and its development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities; strongly condemn and effectively address the DPRK’s malicious cyber activities, including cryptocurrency theft and other forms of cybercrime; urge the DPRK to allow access to humanitarian aid organisations, to respect human rights and in particular to immediately resolve the abductions issue; urge Russia and the DPRK to fully comply with the UN Charter and the UN Security Council resolutions, including regarding the complete denuclearisation of the DPRK; condemn the DPRK’s contribution to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, including its engagement through the dispatch of military personnel and equipment; develop the EU policy on North Korea taking due account of the expertise, security needs and legitimate concerns of like-minded partners in the region, in particular those in close geographical proximity to the DPRK, notably the RoK and Japan;
Amendment
(q) establish a structured and comprehensive EU-Taiwan cooperation framework, building on existing mechanisms such as the Trade and Investment Dialogue, with a strong economic and trade component, focused on critical technologies such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence, supply-chain resilience, cybersecurity, disinformation countermeasures, maritime security, public health, civil protection and secure connectivity, as well as democratic, social and energy resilience and disaster preparedness; continue to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international bodies and technical forums, such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; intensify regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues, economic security, supply-chain agility, democratic and elections integrity, protection of critical infrastructure and cooperation on clean technologies; urge the Chinese authorities to closely coordinate with other regional actors, including Taiwan, when faced with major global health challenges; emphasise that any attempt by authoritarian regimes to influence EU-Taiwan relations is not acceptable;
Fa. whereas the EU-RoK Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which has provisionally applied since 2011, marked the first of a new generation of EU trade agreements; whereas the EU initiated the dispute settlement mechanism under the Trade and Sustainable Development chapter of the FTA, including the establishment of a panel of experts, which, despite being a challenging process, contributed to the RoK taking legislative and institutional steps towards better implementation of its labour commitments, including the ratification of the fundamental conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO); whereas the RoK is the EU’s eighth-largest trading partner; whereas the EU has concluded negotiations on a digital trade agreement with the RoK;
(r) underscore that Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific region; further deepen the EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue with a view to addressing market access barriers and enhancing legal certainty for EU investors; explore the launch of negotiations on an EU-Taiwan bilateral investment agreement or other trade-related frameworks; recognise the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector, and urge the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan in order to further boost economic, trade and investment ties; recognise Taiwan’s experience in managing economic exposure to China and its strengths in democratic governance, transparent regulatory standards and resilient digital and technological ecosystems;
Amendment 15
(s) reaffirm the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait by rejecting any coercive unilateral change of the status quo; ensure, through clear and coordinated messaging together with the Member States and like-minded partners, that such actions would incur significant political and economic costs; emphasise that any differences must be resolved peacefully through dialogue, in accordance with international law and respecting the will of the Taiwanese people; strongly recall that freedom of navigation and overflight, as guaranteed by international law, must be respected in the Indo-Pacific, including in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait; actively engage in diplomatic efforts to prevent further escalation in the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas; develop, as a matter of urgency, contingency planning and mitigation measures based on plausible escalation scenarios, including a naval blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China;
Motion for a resolution
(t) highlight the importance of the EU’s economic security instruments to address coercive economic practices and safeguard fair competition, including the Anti-Coercion Instrument, effective mechanisms for foreign direct investment screening, and export control regimes, where appropriate and in line with EU law; pool the EU’s geoeconomic leverage, including through coordinated export controls, joint risk assessments and collective responses to economic coercion, thereby transforming bilateral dependencies into effective deterrence and strengthening both the EU’s economic security and that of its partners;
Recital G
(u) accelerate cooperation by negotiating trilateral or quadrilateral agreements and initiatives on issues of common interest and which contribute to upholding the multilateral, rules-based international order; advance existing EU-Japan and EU-RoK Digital Partnerships with shared commitments on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, next-generation connectivity, quantum computing, data governance, cybersecurity, battery technologies, submarine cables, digital identity and supply-chain resilience; enhance cooperation frameworks for the development of defence technology;
Motion for a resolution
(v) implement the trade agreements with Japan and the RoK fully and effectively, including in the areas of market access, non-tariff barriers, sustainable development and regulatory cooperation, and, with regard to the RoK, ensure implementation of the fundamental ILO conventions; foster closer cooperation between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the EU and those in its partner countries in East Asia, to promote mutual business opportunities, enhance market access and strengthen innovation networks;
Amendment
(w) ensure that any future economic or sector-specific agreements with like-minded partners in the region are mutually beneficial partnerships that go beyond economic and security objectives, and also include strong commitments on labour rights, environmental protection and the development of clean and sustainable value chains, in line with the EU’s Trade and Sustainable Development framework; promote a comprehensive information campaign in East Asia on the European Union’s policies regarding the steel sector and the proposed industrial accelerator act, with a view to enhancing transparency and understanding of the EU’s goals among international partners; stress the importance of proactively engaging with East Asian partners to address their concerns, foster dialogue, and prevent potential misunderstandings in trade and industrial relations;
G. whereas Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the East Asia region; whereas the White Paper for European Defence: Readiness 2030 expresses concern over China’s coercion of Taiwan through the intensification of political, economic, military and cyber measures; whereas peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are essential to global security and prosperity;
(x) follow up on the reported sanctions circumvention by Russia through jurisdictions in East Asia, including rerouting trade to acquire sanctioned dual-use goods, microchips and industrial machinery, via intermediaries in the region;
G. whereas Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the East Asia region; whereas the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 expresses concern over China’s coercion of Taiwan through the intensification of political, economic, military and cyber measures; whereas Taiwan has launched a RISK Management Initiative on International Undersea Cables in order to promote global cooperation on improving the security of undersea cables that carry over 95 % of intercontinental data traffic, including financial transactions, supply chain coordination and digital trade flows critical to EU economic security; whereas peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are essential to global security and prosperity, including for international trade flows, investment certainty and the functioning of global supply chains;
(y) increase the EU’s political, economic and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific region as a whole, through enhanced partnerships with all like-minded actors and through initiatives such as the Global Gateway strategy, promoting human rights dialogues, sustainable development and connectivity, equality and high labour standards; recognise the growing convergence of strategic interests between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, with Japan and the RoK serving as NATO partners under the IP4 framework, also illustrated by the recent establishment of Japan’s Mission to NATO; affirm that this cooperation enhances mutual situational awareness of security developments across both regions; support the NATO IP4 framework as an essential contribution to strengthening European security and deepening inter-regional collaboration in a complementary and mutually reinforcing manner; strengthen EU engagement and coordination with key regional security initiatives across the Indo-Pacific, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the United States, Australia, India and Japan; devise a comprehensive, coherent and flexible new Indo-Pacific strategy firmly rooted in European values and interests as well as in the realities, needs and priorities of the region;
Amendment 16
(z) build on the strategic position of the OCTs in the Indo-Pacific, so they can serve as advanced platforms for cooperation with regional partners, including in the areas of trade, digital connectivity, critical infrastructure and space activities;
Motion for a resolution
(aa) highlight ASEAN’s consequential role in guaranteeing stability and fostering societal and economic integration; welcome Japan’s and the RoK’s growing engagement with ASEAN, including through regular bilateral and multilateral summits; underscore ASEAN’s crucial importance in ensuring a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific; intensify structured engagement with ASEAN to build inclusive regional security architectures, coordinate multilateral policy responses, and further anchor the EU’s presence in the region by deepening cooperation with ASEAN and its member states, including through strengthened security and defence dialogues with Viet Nam and the Philippines; encourage the strengthening of the Union’s role and visibility in regional formats, in particular in cooperation frameworks with ASEAN while identifying maritime safety and security, cybersecurity and crisis management as priority areas for expanded cooperation, drawing on initiatives such as ESIWA+, CRIMARIO II and the Global Ports Safety projects;
Recital G a (new)
(ab) expand joint action on non-traditional security such as search and rescue, disaster response and environmental incidents; launch a structured initiative to strengthen the protection and resilience of critical maritime infrastructure, including undersea cables, pipelines and ports; enhance maritime domain awareness through targeted capacity-building, training, sensors and data-sharing in cooperation with ASEAN coast guards and regional fusion centres;
Motion for a resolution
(ac) support the strengthening of people-to-people links through targeted mobility schemes for researchers, engineers and cybersecurity professionals, as well as through structured twinning initiatives between European and East Asian innovation hubs; enhance mutual understanding of shared values among students from both regions by deepening, expanding and reinforcing education programmes, such as Erasmus+, with like-minded partners in the region; strengthen exchanges among parliaments, civil servants, local authorities and civil society; increase support for language learning, cultural exchanges and youth-led initiatives to build long-term societal resilience and trust between the two regions;
Amendment
(ad) expand cooperation in the framework of Horizon Europe to enhance mutually beneficial cooperation in science and technology, taking positive note of the facts that RoK became the first Asian country to associate to Pillar II of Horizon Europe in July 2025 and that the EU successfully concluded the negotiations with Japan on its association to Horizon Europe in December 2025; consider starting negotiations in the framework of Horizon Europe with Taiwan; underpin the EU’s visibility across the region through meaningful cultural and public diplomacy efforts;
Ga. whereas Taiwan is the EU’s 13th-largest trading partner and a key economic partner, ranking among the EU’s most important trade and investment partners in Asia, and plays a central role in global value chains, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing;
2. Looks forward to deepening parliamentary diplomacy and the interparliamentary exchange on items of mutual interest with the Diet of Japan, the National Assembly of the RoK, and members of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan; strongly believes that the strengthening of the strategic partnerships with both Japan and the RoK over the past years should be mirrored by reinforcing ties at an interparliamentary level; considers that the comprehensive agenda of cooperation with the two countries would benefit from regular and structured exchanges between parliamentarians; believes, furthermore, that the establishment of an EU-Japan joint parliamentary committee and of an EU-RoK joint parliamentary committee should be explored;
Amendment 17
3. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the governments and parliaments of Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, and the secretariat and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
Ha. whereas the EU is the largest source of foreign direct investment stock in Japan, the RoK and Taiwan;
Amendment 18
Motion for a resolution
Recital H b (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
Hb. whereas the EU’s cooperation with Japan and the RoK on sustainable development has been important in addressing multilateral environmental challenges, which has enabled closer cooperation on clean technology and the decarbonisation of the economy, as highlighted by the institutional cooperation in the EU-Japan Green Alliance and EU-RoK Green Partnership;
Amendment 19
Motion for a resolution
Recital H c (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
Hc. whereas Japan is a member of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and the RoK and Taiwan have applied for membership; whereas the EU launched a Trade and Investment Dialogue with CPTPP countries in November 2025;
Amendment 20
Motion for a resolution
Recital H d (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
Hd. whereas the CPTPP has emerged as a major rules-based trade framework in the Indo-Pacific region, setting high standards in areas such as market access and digital trade; whereas enhanced EU engagement with CPTPP members would make supply chains more resilient, promote regulatory cooperation and support the EU’s strategic autonomy;
Amendment 21
Motion for a resolution
Recital H e (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
He. whereas in the current trade landscape, amid mounting threats to the international rules-based order and global supply chains, more cooperation with like-minded partners is needed;
Amendment 22
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(a) intensify the EU’s strategic focus, presence, visibility and actions in East Asia with the aim of contributing to joint stability, security, prosperity and sustainable development, underpinned by the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and international law;
(a) intensify the EU’s strategic focus, presence, visibility and actions in East Asia with the aim of contributing to joint stability, security, prosperity, sustainable development, underpinned by the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the international rules-based trading system;
Amendment 23
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(aa) strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and economic security through trade and investment diversification, secure and predictable supply chains, open markets and trade flows, and closer cooperation with like-minded partners in East Asia, while ensuring mutual benefits and local value creation, and upholding the EU’s commitment to fair and sustainable trade;
Amendment 24
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(ab) reinforce the commitment of the EU, Japan and the RoK to the international rules-based trading order with the WTO at its core, and increase cooperation on the long-needed reform of the WTO, to preserve a fair, predictable and rules-based global trading system; make progress on plurilateral initiatives, including on e-commerce, digital trade, and investment facilitation for development;
Amendment 25
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(b) deepen cooperation with like-minded partners in the region, particularly Japan, the RoK and Taiwan, to address common challenges in areas such as cybersecurity, hybrid threats including foreign information manipulation and interference, maritime and space security, non-proliferation, and emerging defence technologies, including advancing drone technology, while strengthening synergies with key partners and regional organisations in full respect of the UN Charter;
(b) deepen cooperation with like-minded partners in the region, particularly Japan, the RoK and Taiwan, to address common challenges in areas such as cybersecurity, hybrid threats including foreign information manipulation and interference, maritime and space security, non-proliferation, and emerging defence technologies such as advances in drone technology, via, for example, support for semiconductor and strategic technology resilience in Taiwan, Japan and the RoK, in order to diversify the EU’s military industrial supply chain, while strengthening synergies with key partners and regional organisations in full respect of the UN Charter;
Amendment 26
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(ca) implement the trade agreements with Japan and the RoK fully and effectively, including in the areas of market access, non-tariff barriers, sustainable development, regulatory cooperation and, with regard to the RoK, ensure implementation of the fundamental ILO conventions; ask for an assessment of the qualitative and quantitative impact of the trade agreements on the trade flows between the EU and Japan, and the EU and the RoK;
Amendment 27
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c b (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(cb) foster closer cooperation between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the EU and those in its partner countries in East Asia, to promote mutual business opportunities, enhance market access and strengthen innovation networks, with particular emphasis on ensuring that SMEs in the EU benefit from expanded access to markets in East Asia, while their interests and competitiveness are safeguarded through effective protection mechanisms;
Amendment 28
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c c (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(cc) continue to support the EU and Japanese SME contact points, which were established to maximise the benefit of the EPA for SMEs;
Amendment 29
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c d (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(cd) continue to expand the EU-Japan High-Level Economic Dialogue and strengthen the strategic economic cooperation between both parties, particularly in key areas such as economic security, trade and industrial policy; accelerate the implementation of the EU-Japan Competitiveness Alliance;
Amendment 30
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c e (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(ce) urge the Specialised Committee on Emerging Trade and Economic Issues, newly created under the EU-RoK FTA, to speed up cooperation, particularly on topics with relevance for economic security, such as critical supply chains and overcapacity;
Amendment 31
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(g) establish a dedicated EU–Taiwan cooperation framework focused on semiconductors, cyber resilience, disinformation countermeasures, public health, civil protection and secure connectivity; continue to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international bodies and technical fora, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; intensify regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues;
(g) establish a structured and comprehensive EU–Taiwan cooperation framework, building on existing mechanisms such as the Trade and Investment Dialogue, with a strong economic and trade component, focused on critical technologies and supply chain resilience, cybersecurity, disinformation countermeasures, public health, civil protection and secure connectivity; continue to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international bodies and technical fora, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; intensify regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues, economic security, supply chain agility and the protection of critical infrastructure;
Amendment 32
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(ga) further deepen the EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue with a view to addressing market access barriers and enhancing legal certainty for EU investors; promote closer cooperation with Taiwan on critical supply chains, in particular in the field of semiconductor production and advanced manufacturing, by encouraging joint research, development and industrial cooperation projects, as well as closer cooperation on talent development, skills mobility and academic exchanges, including Erasmus+; explore the launch of negotiations on an EU-Taiwan bilateral investment agreement or other trade-related frameworks; recognise Taiwan’s experience in managing economic exposure to China and its strengths in democratic governance, transparent regulatory standards and resilient digital and technological ecosystems;
Amendment 33
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(ha) highlight the importance of the EU’s economic security instruments to address coercive economic practices and safeguard fair competition, including the Anti-Coercion Instrument, effective mechanisms for foreign direct investment screening, and export control regimes, where appropriate and in line with EU law; pool the EU’s geoeconomic leverage, including through coordinated export controls, joint risk assessments and collective responses to economic coercion, thereby transforming bilateral dependencies into effective deterrence and strengthening both the EU’s economic security and that of its partners;
Amendment 34
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h b (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(hb) emphasise the importance of strengthening cooperation with like-minded partners in East Asia to enhance the resilience and security of critical infrastructure and connectivity, including digital networks, undersea cables and key supply chains;
Amendment 35
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(i) accelerate cooperation by negotiating trilateral or quadrilateral agreements and initiatives on issues of common interest; advance existing EU-Japan and EU-RoK Digital Partnerships with shared commitments on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, next-generation connectivity, quantum computing, data governance, cybersecurity, submarine cables, digital identity and supply-chain resilience;
(i) accelerate cooperation by negotiating trilateral or quadrilateral agreements and initiatives on issues of common interest; advance existing EU-Japan and EU-RoK Digital Partnerships with shared commitments on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, next-generation connectivity, quantum computing, data governance, cybersecurity, submarine cables, digital identity and supply-chain resilience, while putting in place adequate safeguards for data privacy and data protection;
Amendment 36
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(ia) ensure that any future economic or sector-specific agreements with like-minded partners in the region are mutually beneficial partnerships that go beyond economic and security objectives, and also include strong commitments on labour rights, environmental protection and the development of clean and sustainable value chains, in line with the EU’s Trade and Sustainable Development framework;
Amendment 37
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(ja) make progress on high-standard rules on digital trade, including cross-border data flows, the prohibition of unjustified data localisation and the protection of intellectual property, in cooperation with like-minded partners;
Amendment 38
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j b (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
(jb) explore closer cooperation with the CPTPP;
Amendment 39
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
2. Looks forward to deepening parliamentary diplomacy and inter-parliamentary exchange on items of mutual interest with the Diet of Japan, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan;
2. Looks forward to deepening parliamentary diplomacy and inter-parliamentary exchange on items of mutual interest with the Diet of Japan, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan; calls for enhanced parliamentary oversight of economic security instruments and trade-related agreements linked to EU-East Asia cooperation;
ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT
The rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not include in his opinion input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.
INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION
Date adopted
6.5.2026
Result of final vote
+:
–:
0:
33
2
1
FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION
Key to symbols: