What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act)1,

– having regard to the Commission report of 28 April 2026 on the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), in accordance with Article 53 thereof (COM(2026)0178),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)2,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation)3,

– having regard to the Guidelinesguidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings4,

– having regard to the Guidelinesguidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings5,

– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

– having regard to its resolution of 10 September 2025 on facilitating the financing of investments and reforms to boost European competitiveness and creating a Capital Markets Union (Draghi Report)6,

– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 1017 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a Marketmarket – Speed, Security,security, Solidarity:solidarity: Empowering the Singlesingle Marketmarket to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’citizens’ (Letta report),

– having regard to the report of 19 January 2026 by Jörg Kukies and Christian Noyer entitled ‘Financing Innovativeinnovative Venturesventures Inin Europe’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 21 January 2026 for a regulationRegulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on digital networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, Directive 2002/58/EC and Decision No 676/2002/EC and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1971, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 and Decision No 243/2012/EU (Digital Networks Act) (COM(2026)0016),

– having regard to the factualreport of 29 October 2025 entitled ‘Factual summary of the contributions received in the context of the public consultation on the review of the horizontal and the non-horizontal Merger Guidelines, published on 29 Octobermerger 2025,guidelines’,

– having regard to the Commission staff working document of 13 October 2025 entitled ‘Evaluation of the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 on the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees’ (SWD(2025)0330),

– having regard to the Commission staff working document of 13 October 2025 entitled ‘Executive summary of the evaluation of the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees (SWD(2025)0331),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market8 (Foreign Subsidies Regulation),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 9 January 2026 entitled 'Guidelines‘Guidelines on the application of certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market' (C(2026)0042),market’9,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 4 July 2025 entitled ‘Framework for State Aid measures to support the Clean Industrial Deal (Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework)’ (C(2025)7600),Framework)’10,

– having regard to the Commission staff working document of 4 November 2025 accompanying the Commission communication on a Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (SWD(2025)0850),

– having regard to Commission Decision (EU) 2025/2630 of 16 December 2025 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest and repealing Decision 2012/21/EU92012/21/EU11 (SGEI Decision), and the Annexannex thereto,

– having regard to the Commission report of 5 May 2026 entitled ‘Report on Competition Policy 2025’ (COM(2026)0180),

– having regard to the report of 18 December 2025 by the European Securities and Markets Authority entitled ‘CRA Market Share Report: 2025 edition’,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0000/2026),(A10-0171/2026),

A. whereas EU competition policy must be forward-looking, foster EU solutions and innovation, and protect consumers;

A. whereas fair and open competition is an essential element for the proper functioning of the single market, job creation, consumer protection and the development of businesses, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); whereas competition policy should primarily aim at ensuring effective competition and consumer welfare, while remaining consistent with other EU policies;

B. whereas safeguarding the single market requires uncompromising competition rules, and resistance to external influence, particularly from the United States;

B. whereas EU competition policy must be forward-looking, foster EU solutions and innovation, and protect consumers;

C. whereas SMEs form the backbone of the European economy, and competition policy must take into account their specific needs, ensuring that compliance obligations and enforcement procedures do not place disproportionate burdens on them;

D. whereas safeguarding the single market requires strong, robust, predictable and non-discriminatory competition rules that are applied equally to all market actors, who must be insulated from undue political interference of any kind;

E. whereas increasing market concentration has an impact on income distribution, while competitive markets help ensure that productivity gains are more broadly shared across the economy and support sustainable competitiveness by strengthening purchasing power, internal demand and human capital formation;

F. whereas the institutional and operational independence of national competition authorities (NCAs) and EU enforcement are prerequisites for the credibility and effectiveness of competition policy; whereas safeguarding their decision-making processes from political interference or private-sector pressure is essential to ensure legal certainty, uphold the rule of law and maintain a level playing field across the single market;

G. whereas the Draghi report identifies three main areas for action: first, closing the innovation gap, second, establishing a joint plan to ensure both decarbonisation and competitiveness, reflecting the EU’s strong industrial and innovation base and its comparative advantage in green technologies, and, finally, increasing security and reducing dependencies;

H. whereas in this context the fragmented energy market drives up prices and weakens competition, while current geopolitical tensions may further increase vulnerabilities; whereas deeper integration of the internal energy market, stronger interconnections and effective enforcement of competition law can increase efficiency, resilience and cross-border participation, reduce dependencies on non-EU suppliers and reduce costs to consumers;

I. whereas in parallel, the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI), including generative AI systems, is significantly reshaping competitive dynamics, market structures, value chains and user access to digital services across the EU, with potential implications for competition within digital markets;

Reclaiming the EU’s strategic autonomy through competition policy, innovation and digital sovereignty

1. Recalls the EU’s strong competition framework and its due enforcement as a tool to step up competitiveness across all industries; underlines that EU policies should not be pursued in isolation and that competitiveness concerns cannot be interpreted as shortcomings in competition policy; recalls that EU competition rules must be consistent with the principles enshrined in the Treaties and should support the implementation of EU policies, such asincluding those covering industry, trade, consumersconsumers, financial services and financialdefence, services;while ensuring a stable framework that fosters investments, growth and the ability to scale under fair conditions; underlines that competition policy should contribute to the integration and deepening of the European capital markets and support the objectives of the savings and investments union;

2. Firmly believes that the Draghi and Letta reports should be used as a base for setting priorities in the competition field, and calls for these reports to be followed up on;

2. Highlights that well-functioning competition is a key driver of productivity growth and long-term competitiveness in the EU; notes that stronger competition policy enforcement is associated with higher total factor productivity and a more efficient allocation of labour and capital; stresses therefore that effective competition policy and enforcement contribute to fair employment conditions;

3. Emphasises the key role competition plays in creating digital market alternatives and reducing dependence on non-EU providers; encourages key infrastructures to be built to boost Europe’s autonomy and innovation, including cloud services, AI infrastructures (data centres and connectivity), and financial market infrastructure to support the EU’s digital sovereignty;

3. Firmly believes that the Draghi and Letta reports should contribute to shaping priorities in the competition field, and calls for these reports to be followed up on as a matter of urgency; takes note of Mario Draghi’s estimate that, in order to protect our EU competitiveness, an additional EUR 800 billion per year is needed; emphasises that consumer interests should remain central, while taking into account the need for competition policy to contribute to key objectives, such as competitiveness, resilience, security, strategic autonomy and sustainability; welcomes the Draghi report’s proposal for a flexible market investigation tool (the ‘new competition tool’) to address market failures which cannot be tackled effectively under the current Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; notes that similar tools have already been successfully implemented at Member State level and suggests that an EU-level new competition tool could help address structural competition issues across the EU; calls on the Commission to introduce such a tool to complement the existing framework;

4. Calls for a European preference in strategic sectors;

4. Recognises the need to strengthen the European defence industrial base; stresses that competition policy must ensure fair access for SMEs and prevent excessive concentration in defence supply chains that could reduce resilience and increase dependency;

5. Underlines the importance of important projects of common European interest for financing large strategic EU projects; calls on the Commission to shorten or fast-track notifications as they are burdensome for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

5. Reiterates the fundamental role of SMEs in strengthening European competitiveness, promoting innovation and creating jobs; calls on the Commission to ensure that the enforcement of competition rules and digital policies takes into account their impact on SMEs;

6. Welcomes the enforcement of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) in order to address distortions caused by foreign investments; welcomes the FSR Guidelines; suggests addressing trade distortions via the FSR and the screening of foreign direct investment alongside traditional trade defence instruments;

6. Underlines the importance of reducing energy costs to safeguard EU competitiveness, promoting net-zero energy sources in line with the Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act12 and the Taxonomy Complementary Climate Delegated Act13, while ensuring that an open, competitive and sustainable single market is balanced with supply security and increased EU energy autonomy; stresses that fair, well-functioning, competitive, integrated and interconnected electricity markets are essential for strengthening the EU’s industrial competitiveness and supporting more stable and affordable energy prices; underlines the importance of the effective enforcement of competition rules in energy infrastructure and network access in order to safeguard the proper functioning of the single market and to ensure fair pricing and better protect consumers;

An independent European competition authority

7. Notes the strategic role of critical raw materials for the energy transition and the objectives of the Critical Raw Materials Act14 in reducing geopolitical dependencies and strengthening supply chain resilience, and calls for competition policy to support competitive markets across the value chain and pan-European investments;

7. Calls for a real independent European competition authority under democratic oversight, which is separate from the executive branch to ensure no political interference, and integrates antitrust, merger control, State aid, consumer policy and digital enforcement; stresses the need for adequate staffing, expertise and powers;

8. Emphasises the key role competition plays in creating digital market alternatives and reducing dependence on and dominance of non-EU providers; encourages key infrastructure to be built to boost Europe’s autonomy and innovation, including cloud services, AI infrastructure (data centres and connectivity), financial market infrastructure and resilient, interoperable and competitive European payment systems, in order to ensure open and contestable markets and reduce strategic dependencies; observes evolving business practices and market structures, and potential new forms of harmful conduct like tacit collusion and algorithmic collusion on prices, and emphasises the need to align enforcement priorities with this evolving landscape, supported by data-driven analysis and evidence;

Enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) amid global challenges

9. Calls for a level playing field in strategic sectors and for the EU to use all available tools, including the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), public procurement rules and a robust merger review framework, to ensure that EU companies can compete on merit and that non-EU market participants are not advantaged by foreign state subsidies; stresses the importance of strengthening the resilience, diversification and security of European supply chains in strategic sectors promoting European capabilities and solutions, where appropriate, without compromising open markets;

8. Urges the Commission to fully enforce the EU competition rulebook to safeguard Europe’s regulatory autonomy against political pressures, particularly from the United States;

10. Underlines that competition authorities need improved data accessibility to ensure effective competition enforcement; stresses the importance of improving data collection, facilitating access to procurement data for national competition authorities, and strengthening fraud detection mechanisms in their enforcement of competition policy; calls, furthermore, on competition authorities to promote simplified procedures, enhance transparency and improve market access for emerging SMEs;

9. Underlines that effective enforcement can only be achieved if rules to address abuse of dominance (Article 102 TFEU) and the DMA work together, combining ex ante and ex post approaches; calls on the Commission to streamline and better articulate the competition rulebook;

11. Underlines the importance of Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) for financing large strategic EU projects; calls on the Commission to streamline and simplify IPCEI notification procedures as they are burdensome, in particular for SMEs, and to ensure proportionality, provide clear and predictable criteria for admissibility, and enhance transparency and legal certainty throughout the assessment process;

10. Supports enforcement under the DMA; welcomes the Commission’s recent market investigations into cloud service providers, such as Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure and its two proceedings against Google on Android interoperability and fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory access to anonymised Google Search data;

12. Welcomes the enforcement of the FSR as a necessary tool to create a level playing field and address market distortions caused by foreign subsidies; welcomes the FSR guidelines; maintains that State aid that is not allowed under the EU Treaties should also not be allowed from non-EU countries; calls for rigorous assessment of competition distortions via the FSR and the appropriate screening of foreign direct investment alongside traditional trade defence instruments; calls on the Commission to strengthen the enforcement of the FSR with regard to online platforms and marketplaces established in non-EU countries; calls on the Commission to ensure that SMEs and smaller transactions are not disproportionately burdened by FSR compliance obligations;

11. Recalls that enforcement of the DMA is still suboptimal; suggests stable funding through a ‘DMA fee’, similar to the DSA;

13. Underlines that, according to the latest Eurobarometer survey and the Eurobarometer post-electoral survey in 2024, respondents expect the EU to prioritise addressing inflation, rising prices and the cost of living; stresses that ensuring fair and effective competition is an important element in tackling these challenges and should therefore remain a priority within competition policy;

12. Calls for the DMA review process, expected to take place in May 2026, to be transparent, thorough and ambitious;

14. Underlines that strict and consistent competition policy enforcement contributes to strengthening economic, social and territorial cohesion across the EU and its outermost regions; notes that there are persistent economic and infrastructural gaps between internal, rural, peripheral, outermost and island regions, and calls on the Commission to take into account the territorial impact of competition decisions, in order to promote appropriate cohesion policies accompanying the development of the single market, while ensuring the uniform application of competition rules;

13. Urges the Commission to consider AI and cloud services as core platform services within the DMA; requests the Commission to include SMEs in the DMA review consultations;

15. Welcomes the signing of the EU-UK Competition Cooperation Agreement15, a key step in strengthening coordination between the respective competition authorities;

14. Stresses that DMA enforcement applies to all market participants regardless of nationality; notes Booking’s gatekeeper status and recalls that the French and Spanish authorities penalised the company over its parity clauses; urges the Commission to take decisive action accordingly;

More independent and more effective EU competition enforcement

16. Calls on the Commission to explore avenues towards strengthening the independence of EU competition enforcement;

17. Stresses that strengthening the existing enforcement capacity is essential in the short term; calls on the Commission to ensure as a matter of urgency that its Directorate-General for Competition is sufficiently staffed with the necessary resources and technical expertise to effectively enforce antitrust law, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and merger rules;

18. Underlines the importance of competition enforcement being conducted in an impartial, politically independent manner; calls on the Commission to present an impact assessment on the merits of establishing a dedicated European competition authority, examining subsidiarity, the proper delineation between competition and regulatory functions, democratic accountability to Parliament, and the potential implications for the European Competition Network (ECN); stresses the need for adequate staffing, expertise and powers;

Competition in the digital age and enforcement of the DMA amid global challenges

19. Urges the Commission to fully enforce the EU competition rulebook, including the DMA, in a consistent, impartial and legally robust manner, to safeguard Europe’s regulatory autonomy against political pressures; notes with concern external pressure surrounding the DMA and warns against foreign interference;

20. Underlines that effective enforcement can only be achieved if rules to address the abuse of dominance (Article 102 TFEU) and the DMA work together, combining ex ante and ex post approaches; calls on the Commission to streamline and better articulate the competition and digital rulebook;

21. Welcomes the publication of the Commission’s report on 28 April 2026 on the review of the DMA; notes the Commission’s conclusion, in this first review of the DMA, that the DMA is fit for purpose and does not need to be amended at this stage, although it identifies particular areas of focus going forward, namely AI and cloud computing services, while highlighting that the DMA should not be seen in isolation when it comes to regulatory tools aiming to capture the AI or cloud value chain;

22. Calls for the process of the DMA review, which is expected to take place every three years, to be transparent, evidence-based, proportionate, targeted and ambitious, while ensuring regulatory stability and avoiding unnecessary expansion of obligations for market participants; insists that the periodic review of the DMA, every three years, should assess systematically the effectiveness and practical impact of existing obligations, legal certainty for market participants, the DMA’s interaction with sector-specific regulation, and the need for any adjustments to gatekeeper designation thresholds in the light of market developments; calls on the Commission to systematically include SMEs in the DMA review consultations;

23. Stresses that increasing concentration in cloud services may undermine competition, innovation and the EU’s strategic autonomy; highlights that practices such as bundling, cloud marketplaces and contractual mechanisms, including credits and spend commitments, can reinforce vendor lock-in and limit switching or multi-cloud strategies; stresses that cloud obligations must be updated; notes that, in its first review of the DMA, the Commission reports that it opened three market investigations into cloud computing services in November 2025, two to assess whether Microsoft Azure and Amazon Web Services should be designated as gatekeepers for cloud computing services, and a third to assess whether the DMA can effectively address practices that may limit competitiveness and fairness in cloud computing services16; calls on the Commission to use the cloud services market investigation to adjust DMA obligations and ensure that they effectively address the barriers that prevent users from switching providers;

24. Recalls that enforcement of the DMA is still suboptimal; supports stronger enforcement of the DMA in relation to all market participants falling under the scope of its regulation regardless of nationality and encourages the Commission to conclude open investigations within the time frames provided for under the DMA; notes that effective DMA enforcement requires adequate and sustainable resources; calls on the Commission and the budgetary authorities to ensure that adequate and stable resources are allocated to DMA enforcement through the EU budget; calls therefore for sustainable finance solutions to be explored, while respecting institutional balance, notably for introduction of a ‘DMA fee’, similar to the fee under the DSA, to be explored;

25. Calls on the Commission to make full and proactive use of all enforcement instruments provided for under the DMA, including further market investigations, non-compliance proceedings, inspections, interim measures, fines and periodic penalty payments, in order to prevent circumvention and ensure effective compliance;

26. Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; is aware that EU competition rules stipulate that structural remedies should only be used as a last resort if behavioural remedies have proven ineffective, but nonetheless regrets the Commission’s reluctance to address market dominance through structural remedies;

27. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition, in its first review of the DMA, that the future-proofing tools incorporated by the co-legislators are crucial in enabling the framework to respond to developments in markets and technologies; calls therefore on the Commission to enforce the DMA, in a consistent and future-proof manner, in relation to technological developments, by addressing AI-driven services and cloud-based infrastructure in a timely manner, in order to prevent new forms of lock-in, foreclosure or gatekeeping practices, including where gatekeepers leverage control over data, computing resources or integrated services to the detriment of emerging AI developers and innovative market entrants;

28. Welcomes the fact that the Commission is already monitoring the deployment of AI tools within designated core platform services under the DMA; notes that, in its first review of the DMA, the Commission reports that, with respect to AI services, it has started addressing various fairness and contestability issues that featured prominently in the public consultation, for instance, through its regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers on ensuring that default settings can be changed easily and that AI services have equal access to operating systems; notes that two specification proceedings were opened in January 2026 in relation to Alphabet that also have an AI dimension relating to interoperability and access to search data; calls on the Commission to develop and apply new theories of harm to address the further entrenchment of the incumbents and assess, within the upcoming DMA review, whether the current list of core platform services adequately reflects market realities, including in areas such as AI models, AI chatbots and cloud services, main virtual assistant services and connected TV operating systems; calls on the Commission to include SMEs, start-ups, industry associations, academic experts and consumer organisations across all Member States in the DMA review consultations;

29. Stresses that DMA enforcement applies to all designated gatekeepers regardless of nationality or origin, and calls on the Commission to apply DMA obligations consistently; welcomes the coordination between the Commission and NCAs on DMA-related conduct; urges the Commission to take decisive action accordingly;

30. Calls on the Commission to examine, in the context of the implementation of the Digital Single Market Directive17, potential abuses by gatekeepers under the DMA in their negotiations with press publishers, and in particular to examine whether such negotiations comply with the FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) obligations, ensuring equitable remuneration, transparent terms and non-discriminatory access to online audiences;

31. Calls on the Commission to make full use of Article 13 DMA to address any circumvention by gatekeepers of their obligations under Articles 5 and 6 DMA;

Antitrust

15.32. Urges the Commission to make appropriate use of interim measures to stop any practices that harm competition, especially in fast-evolving digital markets; calls on the Commission to modernise Regulation (EC) 1/20031/200318 and ImplementingCommission Regulation (EC) 773/2004773/200419 into itsimprove upcomingthe review,efficiency, especiallylegal regardingcertainty theand useproportionality of EU antitrust enforcement; supports a clarified framework for interim measures;measures in cases of serious and irreparable harm to competition, with appropriate due process safeguards;

16. Reaffirms the need for strong cooperation between the Commission and national competition authorities within the European Competition Network;

33. Calls on the Commission to address excessively long antitrust investigations; calls for binding procedural time limits on antitrust investigations to prevent undue delays that harm legal certainty and the rights of defence;

17. Notes current investigations of US-based companies, including the Commission’s preliminary investigation into Visa and Mastercard fees; calls on the Commission to continue this investigation and act to preserve European competition; emphasises the need to review the Interchange Fee Regulation to address rising card scheme fees and ensure a competitive and transparent market for Europeans;

34. Urges the Commission to conduct a comprehensive study on the deterrent effect of its fines; insists that sanctions must be sufficiently high to surpass the illicit economic benefit derived from the infringement;

35. Stresses the importance of effective actions for damages as a complement to public antitrust enforcement, ensuring that victims of infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can obtain full compensation; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the effective implementation of the Antitrust Damages Directive20 and to remove remaining barriers to private enforcement;

36. Reaffirms the need for strong and effective cooperation between the Commission and NCAs within the ECN as well as with relevant private and public stakeholders and consumer organisations; underlines that NCAs must remain politically independent and adequately resourced, and that the ECN+ Directive21 should be fully and consistently transposed and implemented across all Member States; calls for enhanced convergence of enforcement standards, timely information-sharing, and clear allocation of competences to avoid duplicated proceedings; stresses that the ECN needs to move towards a fully integrated form of cooperation, with a view to enhancing cost efficiency and improving the handling of cross-border aspects, including by enabling joint investigations and joint decision-making; calls for the ECN to further guide companies, especially SMEs, in applying the competition rulebook;

37. Calls on the Commission and NCAs to establish easily accessible and SME-friendly complaint mechanisms for anti-competitive practices, ensuring the swift and effective handling of cases;

38. Notes current investigations of non-EU companies, including the Commission’s preliminary investigation into Visa and Mastercard fees; calls on the Commission to ensure that the payments market remains competitive, transparent and accessible for consumers and businesses; emphasises the need to review the Interchange Fee Regulation22 to assess its effectiveness in addressing rising fees; calls on the Commission to conclude ongoing investigations in the payments sector without undue delay; emphasises that the digital euro is a crucial opportunity to reduce the over-reliance on non-EU card schemes, and to strengthen competition and the EU’s strategic autonomy in the payments sector, including by helping to ensure more competitive pricing conditions for businesses, in particular SMEs;

39. Underlines the importance of competition in the banking sector and completion of the banking union; calls on the Commission to use all available instruments to ensure fair competition and monitor trends in the banking sector during high inflation periods; stresses the importance and urgency of the Commission’s upcoming report on the competitiveness of the EU banking sector and expects the Commission to adopt the report by July 2026; welcomes, furthermore, the upcoming assessment of the functioning of Directive 2002/87/EC23 and the Solvency II Directive24 on aspects relating to the level playing field among insurance and banking market participants;

40. Notes the existence of oligopolies in the provision of certain services that are critical for EU financial market participants, such as market aggregators and connectivity providers that are characterised by limited numbers of providers, significant difficulty switching from one provider to another, or asymmetrical pricing power to the benefit of the provider, which ultimately inflates costs for investors; further notes that the three largest credit rating agencies and the four biggest companies in the audit market still hold market shares of over 90 %; urges the Commission to investigate existing oligopolies and take the appropriate measures to the benefit of EU competition;

41. Recalls that the European Central Bank has noted that food prices remain high, affecting vulnerable consumers in particular; expresses concern about the high market concentration at certain levels of the agricultural and food supply chain; urges the Commission to assess the scale and impact of buying alliances, and further analyse their effects not only on prices but also on farmers’ and agri-food producers’ ability to supply healthy, safe and sustainable products to consumers; invites the Commission to assess whether additional guidelines are needed on the application of Article 102 TFEU on exploitative abuses, including excessive or unfair prices, in order to improve legal certainty and make enforcement more effective in highly concentrated consumer markets;

Merger control

18. Stresses that Europe lacks large-scale companies; considers scale as a strategic EU imperative, as highlighted by the Letta report, for competing effectively on global markets;

42. Stresses that Europe lacks large-scale companies capable of competing globally in numerous key strategic areas; considers scaling up within the single market as a strategic EU imperative to mobilise investments, drive competitiveness, invest in innovation and enable EU companies to compete effectively on global markets, as highlighted by the Letta report; stresses that the completion of the single market and the removal of internal barriers remain key priorities in this regard; notes that structural barriers to scaling up within the EU may result in innovative EU companies being acquired by non-EU players, with potential negative effects on long-term competition and innovation capacity in the EU; considers therefore that merger control should take full account of the ability of EU companies to invest in innovation;

19. Calls on the Commission to apply competition policies dynamically, adapt them to new market realities, and analyse the effects of concentrations;

43. Considers that competition policy should not create unnecessary obstacles for companies that need to scale up in order to compete globally, while noting that not all EU companies are in need of scaling up; underlines that the EU thrives on the vital link between big and small enterprises; considers that competitive scale should primarily result from fair competition, robust antitrust enforcement and the deepening of the single market, which are the foundation of the EU social market economy and remain the true driver of innovation;

20. Calls for an ambitious revision of the EU merger guidelines so they are better aligned with the EU’s industrial and sectoral policy objectives while continuing to safeguard a high level of consumer welfare; insists that while safeguarding fair competition, merger control should not obstruct pan-European mergers creating ‘EU champions’ in key sectors such as telecoms, banking, payments and energy;

44. Calls on the Commission to apply merger policy dynamically, based on an economic and legal assessment, analysing fully the concept of consumer welfare in the assessment of competition, and to consider the broader economic effects of mergers, adapt the policy to new market realities including digital ecosystems, AI, energy and defence, and analyse the effects of concentrations in the long term, taking a forward-looking approach; encourages the Commission to continue to monitor the evolution of market power in Europe, including the impact of mergers on sustainability, innovation and long-term resilience;

21. Calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking approach to mergers, taking efficiency gains into account, allowing companies to form alliances when they contribute to innovation, climate, resilience and security, and reflects sector-specific realities beyond prices and market shares;

45. Calls for an ambitious and evidence-based revision of the EU merger guidelines so they are better aligned with new market realities and the EU’s priorities in fostering a more resilient and competitive Europe while continuing to safeguard a high level of consumer welfare; insists that, while remaining grounded in competition analysis and safeguarding effective competition on national markets and within the single market, merger control should assess pan-European mergers in a forward-looking manner and ensure that any consolidation creating ‘EU champions’ enhances consumer welfare, market contestability and long-term resilience, particularly in key sectors such as telecoms, banking, payments, defence and energy; calls for the new merger control guidelines to ensure legal certainty for businesses in creating pan-European players fostering pro-competitive scaling up, while ensuring that national intervention powers, including veto powers, are used only in duly justified and proportionate cases;

22. Recalls that competition safeguards consumer choice; notes Netflix’s and Paramount’s interest in acquiring Warner Bros and calls for a thorough review of future audiovisual mergers;

46. Calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking and dynamic approach to mergers, taking into account efficiency gains, including, for example, economies of scale and sustainability gains, as early as possible in the procedure, while ensuring transparency and predictability and allowing companies to form alliances when they contribute to innovation, climate resilience and security, and reflecting an approach to the assessment of market power and sector-specific realities that extends beyond prices and market shares and also includes effects on wages and employment conditions;

23. Calls on the Commission to detect and prevent ‘killer acquisitions’ (i.e. when a company acquires control of an innovative company to eliminate them as a possible source of future competition), particularly in AI and other strategic sectors; urges the Member States to give national competition authorities ‘call in’ powers so they can review mergers and acquisitions, if this is not already the case;

47. Recalls that competition safeguards consumer choice, market diversity and affordable prices; notes the decision by Warner Bros. Discovery stockholders on 23 April 2026 approving the merger agreement with Paramount Skydance; calls on the Commission to apply rigorous merger control in the audiovisual and media sector, monitoring the impact of market consolidation in the single market and enabling EU players to scale up;

48. Notes that online platforms under the scope of the DMA have acquired nearly 700 smaller companies since 2000, while the Commission was only notified about 19 of these transactions, as most fell below the turnover-based notification thresholds; calls on the Commission to detect ‘killer acquisitions’ (i.e. when a company acquires control of an innovative company to eliminate them as a possible source of future competition) and to adapt regulation in order to prevent such acquisitions, particularly in digital, AI, pharma and other strategic sectors; maintains that a single market legal base should be added to the EC Merger Regulation if it is reviewed, so as to fully involve the co-legislators, in a manner similar to that of the DMA; urges the Member States to give national competition authorities ‘call-in’ powers so they can review mergers and acquisitions, if this is not already the case, while ensuring legal certainty and avoiding undue burden on SMEs and start-ups;

49. Acknowledges the increasing trend of foreign investment and multi-club ownership in European sports, as well as the rise of dynamic ticket pricing, and calls on the Commission to take into account the implications of this development when supporting efforts to safeguard the financial integrity and competitive balance of European sport; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider all regulatory options, including the prohibition of dynamic pricing at live sports and cultural events in the Digital Fairness Act, with a view to protecting consumers and upholding the social and public value of sport and culture;

State aid

24. Welcomes the Clean Industrial State Aid Framework (CISAF); calls for CISAF to be implemented in a way that ensures minimum burden on Member States and prevents them from engaging in subsidy races;

50. Underlines the need for a thorough analysis of State aid rules, particularly for companies operating in strategic sectors such as energy, technology and innovation; stresses the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of State aid in agriculture, logistics and transport; notes the divergent fiscal capacities of Member States, warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field and calls on the Commission to monitor these effects; considers that any State aid granted should be consistent with EU law and principles, including EU environmental and social policy objectives;

25. Expects the review of the General Block Exemption Regulation to modernise and simplify State aid rules in order to reduce red tape and boost the EU’s competitiveness;

51. Welcomes the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF); calls for the CISAF to be implemented in a targeted and proportionate way, ensure minimum burden on Member States, prevent subsidy races and preserve the integrity of the internal market, while including strong safeguards on transparency, proportionality and environmental effectiveness;

26. Welcomes the adoption of a revised SGEI Decision to enable Member States to support affordable housing projects;

52. Recalls that temporary, targeted State aid can be appropriate in times of crisis; reiterates the importance of the CISAF in supporting vulnerable sectors, in the context of rapidly increasing fuel prices due to the current geopolitical situation; notes nevertheless the European Court of Auditors’ findings (Special Report 21/2024) identifying shortcomings in the Commission’s monitoring of State aid in times of crisis and calls for stricter State aid notification monitoring by the Commission and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency in line with the European Court of Auditors’ recommendations;

53. Notes that more than three quarters of State aid is concentrated in only two Member States, highlighting risks of fragmentation and an uneven level playing field in the internal market;

54. Highlights the role of State aid as a tool to reduce economic disparities between the most developed EU regions and islands, inland areas, outermost regions, economically disadvantaged zones, and all parts of the EU affected by natural constraints; calls for greater flexibility and fewer restrictions on State aid for the EU’s islands and more vulnerable regions;

55. Expects the review of the General Block Exemption Regulation25 to solve the current issues regarding the definition of ‘undertaking in difficulty’ and to modernise and simplify State aid rules in order to reduce red tape and boost the EU’s competitiveness; welcomes the opening of the public consultation to collect input on the scope and content of the review;

56. Welcomes the adoption of the revised SGEI Decision, to enable Member States to support the provision of decent, sustainable, energy-efficient, socially inclusive and affordable housing projects, also for middle-income households; calls on the Commission to monitor the implementation of the revised SGEI Decision and to assess whether the thresholds and conditions are sufficiently flexible to meet Member States’ needs; calls for simplified notification procedures for SGEI-related State aid measures that do not present significant competition risks;

57. Invites the Commission to assess the impact of market concentrations in the real-estate sector and related markets, such as construction and property management, to ensure that effective competition helps contain prices and improve access to housing;

58. Notes the distortionary effects of aggressive tax planning and of tax systems, including preferential tax agreements, on fair competition, as they may stifle innovation and jeopardise the contestability of markets, especially for SMEs; welcomes the Commission recommendation of 14 July 202026 to not grant financial support to companies with links to tax havens, while protecting honest taxpayers; calls for companies established in countries listed on the EU’s list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, as adopted by the Council, to be excluded from receiving State aid and invites the Commission to assess whether the current framework contributes to broader efforts to combat aggressive tax planning and tax haven practices;

Parliamentary involvement

27.59. Deplores the lack of information it receives on the revision and implementation of competition rules;rules insistsand itstresses receivesthat allParliament theshould informationbe itsufficiently requiresinvolved in ashaping timelycompetition mannerpolicy; andfurther isemphasises fullythe involvedneed into thebe revisiontransparent andwith implementationParliament ofon competitionall rules;discussions with non-EU countries that may affect DMA enforcement;

28. Emphasises the need for transparency with Parliament about all discussions with non-EU countries that may affect DMA enforcement;

60. Calls, in that context, for a structured and regular dialogue between the Commission and Parliament on competition policy, including on the review and implementation of competition rules; calls on the Commission to provide Parliament’s competent committee with timely and comprehensive information on significant enforcement decisions, legislative proposals and significant major soft-law instruments; calls for the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement to formalise Parliament’s role in competition policy oversight, including consultation on priority-setting for guidelines and frameworks;

29. Promotes the exchange of best practice in international forums, such as the International Competition Network and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Competition Committee; deplores missed opportunities as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States;

61. Cautions against the over-reliance on soft-law instruments such as guidance and temporary frameworks in which Parliament’s involvement is limited; invites the European Council to adopt a decision under Article 48(7)(2) of the Treaty on European Union providing for the adoption of legislative acts in the area of competition policy in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure;

62. Promotes the exchange of best practice in international forums, such as the International Competition Network and the Competition Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; calls on the Commission to strive for continued dialogue and cooperation at international level, including via second-generation cooperation agreements that allow for more effective information exchange between competition authorities, while regretting that this has not been sufficiently pursued in the past; calls on the Commission to develop a strategy for the EU to take a leading role at international level in promoting effective competition;

°

° °

30.63. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

According to Rule 56(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the explanatory statement is still subject to change and can be amended closer to the vote.

In an increasingly fragmented global economy marked by geopolitical pressure and growing market concentration, EU competition policy must not only ensure effective competition in the Single Market but also defend Europe’s strategic autonomy and regulatory sovereignty. Our rules must be applied without compromise, ensuring that economic success is driven by innovation, efficiency, and consumer choice rather than by the abuse of dominance. Competition policy must evolve and become forward-looking, supporting European innovation while firmly resisting external political influence. Europe will not outsource its sovereignty: our competition rules are non-negotiable and they are enforceable on all market actors.

In an increasingly fragmented global economy marked by geopolitical pressure and growing market concentration, EU competition policy must not only ensure effective competition in the Single Market but also defend Europe’s strategic autonomy and regulatory sovereignty. Our rules must be applied without compromise, ensuring that economic success is driven by innovation, efficiency, and consumer choice rather than by the abuse of dominance. Recent external pressures, particularly from the United States, repeatedly challenged our frameworks, including the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and such interference cannot be tolerated. Competition policy must evolve and become forward-looking, supporting European innovation while firmly resisting external political influence. Europe will not outsource its sovereignty: our competition rules are non-negotiable and they are enforceable on all market actors.

Against this backdrop, our competition rulebook is a central pillar of Europe’s strategic autonomy. The EU competition acquis has long supported broader Union objectives by enabling firms to grow and innovate under fair conditions. Building on the recommendations of the Draghi and Letta reports, competition policy must be adapted to new market realities while emphasising that consumer interests should remain central, while taking into account the need for competition policy to contribute to key objectives, such as competitiveness, resilience, security, strategic autonomy and sustainability. This includes actively promoting technology-friendly market conditions, based on open standards and interoperable infrastructures as well as the introduction of a New Competition Tool at EU level to address structural market failures that cannot be effectively tackled under the current competition framework. As digital markets continue to evolve rapidly, the Commission should assess whether the current list of core platform services adequately reflects market realities, including in areas such as artificial intelligence and cloud services. Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) must be delivered faster, through simplified or fast-track notification procedures, particularly for SMEs. At the same time, the enforcement of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) is an important and necessary tool to address competition distortions caused by foreign state-backed investments. Europe must defend its markets and technological edge.

Against this backdrop, our competition rulebook is a central pillar of Europe’s strategic autonomy. The EU competition acquis has long supported broader Union objectives by enabling firms to grow and innovate under fair conditions. Building on the recommendations of the Draghi and Letta reports, competition policy must be adapted to new market realities. This includes actively promoting technology-friendly market conditions, based on open standards and interoperable infrastructures. In this context, cloud services should be recognised as strategic European infrastructure, critical for digital sovereignty. Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) must be delivered faster, through simplified or fast-track notification procedures, particularly for SMEs. At the same time, the enforcement of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) is an important and necessary tool to address distortions caused by foreign state-backed investments. Europe must defend its markets and technological edge.

To deliver on this objectives, effective enforcement is essential to the credibility of the EU competition rulebook. Competition enforcement must remain politically independent and be protected from undue external influence. At the same time, the Commission must urgently ensure that DG Competition is equipped with sufficient staffing, technical expertise and financial resources to effectively enforce antitrust rules, merger control and the Digital Markets Act. Looking ahead the Union should, explore, through an impact assessment, the merits of establishing a strong and independent European Competition Authority under democratic oversight by the European Parliament. Such an assessment should examine ways to shield competition enforcement from political interference. This needs to be looked at in relation to the European Competition Network (ECN) which plays a central role in the effective enforcement European competition rules. This would ensure consistent, impartial, and credible enforcement of EU competition.

To deliver on this objectives, effective enforcement is essential to the credibility of the EU competition rulebook. The Union should move towards a strong and independent European Competition Authority under democratic oversight by the European Parliament. Such an authority must be separated from the executive branch to shield it from any political interference, in line with the model of national competition authorities. This would ensure consistent, impartial, and credible enforcement of EU competition. It should be empowered to enforce antitrust, merger control, state aid, digital, and consumer policy rules, and be equipped with adequate human and financial resources.

Europe should also strengthen its international cooperation. European and global partners should make full use of international fora, such as the International Competition Network (ICN) and the OECD Competition Committee, to promote cooperation and convergence in competition enforcement.

When it comes to the DMA, enforcement must be strict, independent, and non-negotiable. The DMA is indispensable to restoring competition in digital markets dominated by powerful gatekeepers.markets. It must apply equally to all marketdesignated participantsgatekeepers and safeguard Europe’s regulatory autonomy from external political influence. The robustness of the EU competition rulebook depends on the DMA and abuse-of-dominance rules working together, combining ex-ante and ex-post enforcement. Nonetheless, recent investigations into major cloud service providers illustrate both the scale and the complexity of DMA enforcement. We observe that the DMA enforcement remains uneven and requires a transparent and thorough review, including of cloud services and AI interfaces with a view to designate them as core platform services. EnforcementThe effective enforcement of the Digital Markets Act shouldrequires beadequate supportedand bystable aresources. dedicatedThe supervisoryCommission fee,should similarexplore tosustainable thefinancing supervisorysolutions, feeincluding introducedthe underpossible theintroduction Digitalof Servicesa Act.dedicated DMA fee.

In parallel, traditional antitrust enforcement remains the backbone of competition policy and must be modernised to address algorithmic, data-driven market power, and artificial intelligence. Regulation 1/2003 and its implementing rules require updating. In that regard, full cooperation within the European Competition Network (ECN),ECN, between the Commission and national competition authorities, as well as with relevant private and public stakeholders and consumer organisations, is more than necessary. When it comes to Commission enforcement, its use of interim measures remains insufficient and should be normalisedapplied more systematically to stop anti-competitive practices in fast-changing markets, such as the digital market.

In addition, merger control must also evolve to remain effective in changing market conditions. Merger guidelines should be revised toso they are better reflectaligned innovation,with investment,new market realities and long-termthe competitiveness,EU’s priorities in fostering a more resilient and competitive Europe, while safeguarding high consumer welfare and preventing killer acquisitions, notably in AIdigital, AI, pharma and other strategic sectors. A forward-looking approach is particularly needed in telecomstelecoms, banking, payments, defence and audiovisualenergy markets. At the same time, Europe’s lack of scale in strategic sectors undermines its competitiveness and resilience and calls for a framework that doesassesses notpan-European hampermergers paneuropeanin mergersa andforward thuslooking enablesmanner theand emergenceensure ofthat Europeanany championsconsolidation increating key‘EU sectorschampions’ likeenhances telecoms,consumer payment,welfare, bankingmarket contestability and energy,long toterm ableresilience, toparticularly competein globallykey andsectors securesuch Europe’sas strategictelecoms, autonomy.banking, payments, defence and energy State aid policy must also support the green and digital transitions without fragmenting the Single Market, through the Clean Industrial State Aid Framework, a simplified GBER, and effective IPCEIs.

Finally, competition policy must be subject to strong democratic oversight. The European Parliament must be fully and timely involved in the revision,review, implementation, and external dimension of competition policy, including all discussions with third countries that may affect DMA enforcement. This is why an interinstitutional agreement should be concluded to formalise the European Parliament's role in competition policy oversight. Transparency and accountability are essential to maintain legitimacy, trust, and public support for a strong and credible EU competition framework. Europe’s rules are our rules: external actors have no veto over how we enforce competition. Our regulatory autonomy is a cornerstone of ourthe EU’s strategic sovereignty and has to be defended at all costs.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Forward Global

Apple

Orange

European Magazine Media Association (EMMA) and European Newspaper Publishers’ Association (ENPA)

Société générale

Browser Choice Alliance (BCA)

Booking

France Télévisions

2. Representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted

3.6.2026

Result of final vote

+ : 41

- : 2

0 : 12

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

41

+

ECR

Giovanni Crosetto, Denis Nesci, Ruggero Razza, Mariateresa Vivaldini

PPE

Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Stefan Berger, Gheorghe Falca, Marco Falcone, Markus Ferber, Dirk Gotink, Michalis Hadjipantela, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Ludek Niedermayer, Giusi Princi, Paulius Saudargas, Andreas Schwab, Flavio Tosi

Renew

Engin Eroglu, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Billy Kelleher, Ludovít Ódor, Anouk Van Brug, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

S&D

Matthias Ecke, Jonás Fernández, Eero Heinäluoma, Marina Kaljurand, Aurore Lalucq, César Luena, Ana Catarina Mendes, Nikos Papandreou, Evelyn Regner, Irene Tinagli

The Left

Gaetano Pedulla', Jussi Saramo

Verts/ALE

Damian Boeselager, Vladimir Prebilic, Marie Toussaint

2

-

ESN

Siegbert Frank Droese, Volker Schnurrbusch

12

0

ECR

Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Guillaume Peltier, Bogdan Rzonca

NI

Fabio De Masi, Katerina Konecná

PfE

Paolo Borchia, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Jaroslav Knot, Tomás Kubín, Jaroslava Pokorná Jermanová, Antonín Stanek, Annamária Vicsek

Key:

+ : in favour

- : against

0 : abstentions