Sittings · Compare

What changed

From · opinion parliamentary committee · 2022-03-08 DEVE-AD-700592 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council

→

To · Adopted text · 2026-04-28 TA-10-2026-0114 Generalised scheme of tariff preferences

+18 added · −442 removed · 1 modified paragraphs hide unchanged text

~~PA_Legam~~

P10_TA(2026)0114

~~SHORT JUSTIFICATION~~

Generalised scheme of tariff preferences

~~The GSP is one of the EU’s key trade instruments for supporting developing countries in their efforts to promote sustainable development, reduce poverty and ensure respect for human rights.~~

Committee on International Trade

The rapporteur points out that GSP is primarily a development tool, and that any proposals to extend the Positive Conditionality, currently applied exclusively to GSP+ beneficiaries as part of the special incentive arrangements, would be counterproductive to this fundamental principle.

PE703.100

~~Plans of Action~~

European Parliament legislative resolution of 28 April 2026 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021– 2021/0297(COD))

The new GSP provides for GSP+ beneficiaries to submit an accompanying Plan of Action as part of their binding undertakings to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure their effective implementation.

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The Plans of Action will help to ensure timely and effective implementation of the relevant conventions, a process that can be aided by the input of third-party stakeholders. This will only be possible if the concluded Plans of Action are publicly available.

The European Parliament,

It is therefore necessary to include a specific requirement for the publication of finalised Plans of Actions. This will aid their enforcement, and can contribute to the wider aims of improving transparency surrounding the monitoring and evaluation procedures associated with the special incentive arrangements provided to GSP+ beneficiaries.

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0579),

~~Rapid Response Mechanism~~

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 207(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0364/2021),

~~The new GSP provides for a Rapid Response Mechanism that can be activated in cases of exceptionally grave violations, for which a reaction is deemed urgent.~~

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

~~The introduction of this mechanism takes note of the fact that all previous withdrawal of preferences under GSP have taken up to two years to conclude.~~

– having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 75(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 19 December 2025 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Given the exceptional circumstances and degree of urgency under which this mechanism is intended to be used, the current seven- month timeframe is insufficiently rapid and should therefore be further reduced.

– having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

~~AMENDMENTS~~

– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Development,

~~The~~– ~~Committee~~having onregard ~~Development~~to ~~calls~~the onreport of the Committee on International ~~Trade, as the committee responsible, to take into account the following~~Trade ~~amendments:~~(A9-0147/2022),

~~Amendment 1~~

1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

~~Recital 1~~

P10_TC1-COD(2021)0297

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 28 April 2026 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2026/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012

~~Amendment~~

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2026/1395.)

~~(1) Since 1971, the Community has granted trade preferences to developing countries under its Generalised Scheme of Preferences (‘GSP’).~~

~~(1) Since 1971, the Community has granted trade preferences to developing countries under its Generalised Scheme of Preferences (‘GSP’), which is one of the Union’s key trade instruments.~~

~~Amendment 2~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Recital 6~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”16 (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact, reinforcing their capacity building and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation17. The continued and sustained progress towards ratifying and implementing the core international conventions should be closely monitored, and Union development finance programming should be designed to duly take that objective into consideration. Such support should, as a priority, target countries benefiting from the special arrangements, given their economic vulnerability. In addition, NDICI-Global Europe should assist countries of the GSP scheme in raising their human rights and environmental standards in line with the obligations enshrined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

~~_________________~~

~~16 COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021~~

17 Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.

~~Amendment 3~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Recital 9~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.

(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development and which have committed to signing and ratifying the international conventions referred to in Annex VI. Countries should have a transitional period of five years from the date of entry into force of that decision to comply with ratifications. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.

~~Amendment 4~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Recital 11~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 203018 . In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified and started implementing core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to pursuing the effective implementation thereof, including through a public, ambitious and time-bound plan of action, adopted in accordance with this Regulation. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 203018 . In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGT) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) and its principles on Free Prior and Informed Consent.

~~_________________~~

18 United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld

~~Amendment 5~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Recital 15 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(15a) The application of the special incentive arrangement should comprise a public plan of action detailing priority-oriented list of measures to be taken which are considered necessary to effectively implement the international conventions. That plan of action should also include deadlines and identify the relevant bodies of the beneficiary country responsible for its implementation. Progress made in the implementation of the plan of action should feed into the monitoring process and failure to effectively implement the plan of action should be taken into consideration in the assessment of temporary withdrawals under the scheme;

~~Amendment 6~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Recital 16 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(16a) Civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders should be consulted at all stages of the monitoring cycle, and the information they submit should be duly taken into account. For that purpose, an advisory body composed of representatives of such organisations and stakeholders should be set up, to assist the Commission in reviewing, monitoring and assessing the progress made by the beneficiary countries.

~~Amendment 7~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Recital 17~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(17) For the purposes of monitoring of implementation and, where applicable, withdrawal of tariff preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. However, such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the Commission, including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes, and through other sources of information, provided they are accurate and reliable. This could include information from the European Parliament and the Council, governments, international organisations, civil society, social partners, or complaints received through the SEP provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. Shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the Commission’s future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner.

(17) For the purposes of monitoring of implementation and, where applicable, withdrawal of tariff preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. However, such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the Commission, including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes, and through other sources of information, provided they are accurate and reliable. This could include information from the European Parliament and the Council, governments, international organisations, civil society, human rights organisations, social partners, or complaints received through the SEP provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. Shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the Commission’s future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner.

~~Amendment 8~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Recital 18~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(18) In July 2020, the Commission appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point (‘SEP’), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. Such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this Regulation.

~~Amendment 9~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Recital 29~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(29) In order to achieve a balance between the need for better targeting, greater coherence and transparency on the one hand, and better promoting sustainable development and good governance through a unilateral trade preference scheme on the other hand, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amendments to the Annexes to this Regulation and temporary withdrawals of tariff preferences due to serious and systematic violations of the principles set out in the relevant conventions with respect to human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance and other relevant grounds set out in this Regulation, as well as procedural rules regarding the submission of applications for the tariff preferences granted under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the conduct of a temporary withdrawal and safeguard investigations in order to establish uniform and detailed technical arrangements. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making21 . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. In order to provide a stable framework for economic operators, the power to adopt an act in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of repealing a decision on temporary withdrawal under the urgent procedure before that decision to temporarily withdraw tariff preferences becomes applicable, where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply. The Commission should also be empowered to adopt delegated acts to postpone the date of application of an act imposing the temporary withdrawal, or to modify its scope, for reasons related to a global sanitary emergency or other exceptional circumstances.

(29) In order to achieve a balance between the need for better targeting, greater coherence and transparency on the one hand, and better promoting sustainable development and good governance through a unilateral trade preference scheme on the other hand, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amendments to the Annexes to this Regulation and temporary withdrawals of tariff preferences due to violations of the principles set out in the relevant conventions with respect to human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance and other relevant grounds set out in this Regulation, as well as procedural rules regarding the submission of applications for the tariff preferences granted under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the conduct of a temporary withdrawal and safeguard investigations in order to establish uniform and detailed technical arrangements. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making21 . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. In order to provide a stable framework for economic operators, the power to adopt an act in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of repealing a decision on temporary withdrawal under the urgent procedure before that decision to temporarily withdraw tariff preferences becomes applicable, where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply. The Commission should also be empowered to adopt delegated acts to postpone the date of application of an act imposing the temporary withdrawal, or to modify its scope, for reasons related to a global sanitary emergency or other exceptional circumstances.

~~_________________~~

~~21 OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1.~~

~~Amendment 10~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(10a) ‘plan of action’ means a priority-oriented list of measures, including legislative measures, to be adopted and actions to be taken by a beneficiary country which are considered necessary to effectively implement the core international conventions referred to in Annex VI;

~~Amendment 11~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 b (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

~~(10b) ‘enhanced engagement’ means a dialogue aiming to facilitate and incentivise countries benefitting from the arrangements referred to Article 1(2) to effectively implement the conventions;~~

~~Amendment 12~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 c (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(10c) ‘list of issues’ means a list of objectives to effectively implement the core international conventions relevant to the GSP+ arrangement, as identified by the monitoring bodies and any information submitted by third parties, including civil society, human rights defenders and trade unions;

~~Amendment 13~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 12~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

~~(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the Commission through the Single Entry Point.~~

(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the Commission through the Single Entry Point by third parties, including stakeholders or civil society organisations established in the Union or in the beneficiary countries covered by the schemes referred to Article 1(2) and relating to conditions and reasons referred to Articles 9 and 19;

~~Justification~~

~~The reliance on the Single-Entry Point complaint mechanism should be opened to third country stakeholders, including human rights defenders, which is currently not the case.~~

~~Amendment 14~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

~~(ba) there is sufficient ground to consider that shortcomings and violations of the conditions set out in Article 19(1) points (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) exist.~~

~~Justification~~

~~Harnessing conditionalities linked to the GSP standard regime is necessary to promote effectively social and environmental standards through trade.~~

~~Amendment 15~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b b (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

~~(bb) it has not signed or ratified the conventions listed in Annex VI within five years of the application of the preferences,~~

~~Amendment 16~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

1a. Union development finance programming shall support countries benefitting from the standard arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article aiming to ratify and implement the conventions listed in Annex VI.

~~Justification~~

~~Amendment 17~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 4 – paragraph 1 b (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

~~1b. The Commission shall regularly consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a during the monitoring process.~~

~~Amendment 18~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;

(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, including information provided by civil society organisations, human rights defenders and trade unions, a failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;

~~Justification~~

~~The monitoring process linked to the effective implementation of Conventions should be harnessed through a better involvement of the civil society, human right defenders and trade unions.~~

~~Amendment 19~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(b) it has ratified, and is implementing, all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;

~~Amendment 20~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(ba) it has adopted a National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights;

~~Amendment 21~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions;

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action, for each listed objective, the plan of action with a timeframe, benchmarks and shall identify the relevant institution or structure responsible for its implementation and oversight;

~~Amendment 22~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

~~1a. The plan of action referred to in point (d) shall be made publicly available after having been jointly agreed between the Union and the GSP beneficiary;~~

~~Amendment 23~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 9 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

~~Article 9a~~

Union development finance programming shall prioritise support to countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in Article 9 aiming towards the ratification and the effective implementation of the conventions listed in Annex VI.

~~Justification~~

Enhanced social and environmental conditionality to benefit from preferential trade preferences should be embedded into the technical and financial assistance projects under the NDICI-Global Europe instrument. Given their vulnerability and lack of economic diversification, EU development finance should prioritise support to countries benefiting from the special arrangements.

~~Amendment 24~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 10 – paragraph 2~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, pointes (d), (e), and (f).

2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification and the implementation of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, pointes (d), (e), and (f).

~~Amendment 25~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

2a. The plans of action and the recommendations of the Commission and European External Action Service on priority implementation actions shall be taken into account in the Union development finance programming in order to support GSP+ beneficiary countries in attaining their commitments.

~~Amendment 26~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 13a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

~~Article 13a~~

~~Advisory Body~~

The Commission shall be assisted in reviewing, monitoring and assessing the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f) by an advisory body composed of CSOs and stakeholders’ representatives from the Union and the GSP+ beneficiary countries throughout the monitoring cycle.

~~Justification~~

To harness the monitoring process, a permanent advisory body composed of CSOs and stakeholders representatives from the EU and GSP+ beneficiary countries should assist the Commission in its monitoring role.

~~Amendment 27~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 14 – paragraph 1~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

1. By 1 January 2027, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.

1. By 1 January 2026, and every two years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.

~~Amendment 28~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

~~The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate.~~

~~The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate, in particular in cooperation with civil society organisations.~~

~~Amendment 29~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 14 – paragraph 3~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners.

~~Amendment 30~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 15 – paragraph 3~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), including with regards to the implementation of its plan of action or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

In its assessment of whether the GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings referred to in Article 9(d), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty mechanisms and supervisory mechanisms have signalled potentially failure to effectively implement the relevant conventions of Annex VI, based on a set of identified indicators to report on progress.

~~Amendment 31~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 15 – paragraph 3 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

3a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a about the complaints received. The Commission shall inform the complainant, the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a where it decides that the complaint does not provide sufficient evidence in relation to the indicators referred to in this Article.

~~Amendment 32~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 15 – paragraph 6~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information.

~~Amendment 33~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 15 – paragraph 9~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

9. Where the Commission considers, based on the outcome of the cooperation and engagement and the findings referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Article, and after consulting the advisory body referred to in Article 13a, that temporary withdrawal is justified for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). The Commission shall clearly and publicly state the grounds for withdrawing preferences and set clear benchmarks that the beneficiary country should meet for the preferences to be reinstated. In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the human rights and socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country, including with regard to impacts on women’s employment and empowerment and accordingly, consider a partial withdrawal, with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the GSP+ beneficiary country's population while maximising the leverage on its government.

~~Amendment 34~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 15 – paragraph 10 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

10a. During the application of a temporary withdrawal, the Commission shall continue the dialogue with the beneficiary country, including in the framework referred to in Article 18a, aiming at remedying the reasons for the withdrawal referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article. The Commission shall regularly assess the effects of the withdrawal on remedying the violations, including in the report referred to in Article 14. The Commission shall regularly consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a.

~~Amendment 35~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

1a. The Commission and, where applicable, the European External Action Service, shall make sure that countries that benefit from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall ratify the conventions listed in Annex VI and plan their effective implementation.

Union development finance programming shall prioritise support to countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article aiming towards the ratification and the effective implementation of the conventions listed in Annex VI.

~~Justification~~

Enhanced social and environmental conditionality to benefit from preferential trade preferences should be embedded into the technical and financial assistance projects under the NDICI-Global Europe instrument. Given their status of Least Developed Countries, EU development finance should prioritise support to countries benefiting from the special arrangements.

~~Amendment 36~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Chapter V – title~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

~~Temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements~~

~~Enhanced engagement and temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements~~

~~Amendment 37~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 19 – paragraph -1 (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

-1. In the framework of a Cooperation, Partnership or Association Agreement the Union has concluded with a beneficiary country, a general review of the status of the country in the framework of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) shall be conducted yearly and in consultation with the European Parliament. To that end, the Commission, the European External Action Service where relevant, and the beneficiary country shall review the issues pertaining to the conditions referred to in Article 19(1), including in relation to any complaints received by the Commission. The Commission, the European External Action Service where relevant, and the beneficiary country shall also review the status of the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article 4(1)(c) and progress towards ratification and effective implementation of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article 17(1a).

~~Justification~~

Preferential trade arrangements shall all be linked to the effective implementation of the social, environmental and good governance standards set in the Conventions listed in Annex VI. To this effect, a formal monitoring mechanism shall apply to the whole GSP Scheme.

~~Amendment 38~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, fully or partly, in respect of all or of certain products originating in, or of all or some economic sectors of a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

~~Justification~~

Considering that the withdrawal of trade preferences can impact negatively upon the most vulnerable, targeted sanctions should be considered, in line with the broader EU sanction regime targeting individuals and specific entities or the yellow card procedure.

~~Amendment 39~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

~~(a) serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI;~~

~~(a) violation of and failure to implement effectively the principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI;~~

~~Justification~~

To avoid a double standard policy in terms of human rights, environment and good governance, and with the view to creating a level playing field between the three GSP regimes, preferential trade arrangements shall all be linked to the effective implementation of the social, environmental and good governance standards set in the Conventions listed in Annex VI.

~~Amendment 40~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country’s own nationals or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

~~Amendment 41~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

(ea) For the purpose of applying point 1(a), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty mechanisms and supervisory mechanisms have signalled potentially violations of the principles of the relevant conventions of Annex VI, based on a set of identified indicators.

~~Amendment 42~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 19 – paragraph 2 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

2a. When the violations of principles of the international conventions listed in Annex VI so require, based on available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and the conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, or based on duly substantiated concerns expressed by the European Parliament, the Council, international organisations, and civil society organisations including trade unions and human rights defenders, or acting upon a complaint, the Commission shall notify the beneficiary country.

For a period of one year starting from the date of the notification, the beneficiary country and the Commission shall enter into an enhanced engagement, where the country commits to adopt time-bound roadmaps providing for concrete actions and sustainable solutions to the violations as identified. Once adopted, the roadmap should be made public.

~~The Commission shall regularly consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a during the enhanced engagement process.~~

~~Amendment 43~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 19 – paragraph 3~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) because the beneficiary country has failed to deliver in the framework of the enhanced engagement or on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

~~Amendment 44~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

3a. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) because the beneficiary country has failed to deliver in the framework of the enhanced engagement or on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

~~Amendment 45~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 19 – paragraph 10~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect, including with regard to impacts on women’s employment and empowerment, of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country and accordingly, consider a partial withdrawal, with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the GSP+ beneficiary country's population while maximising the leverage on its government.

~~Amendment 46~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 19 – paragraph 12 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

12a. During the application of a temporary withdrawal, the Commission shall continue the dialogue with the beneficiary country, including in the framework referred to in Article 18a, aiming at remedying the reasons for the withdrawal referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission shall regularly assess the effects of the withdrawal on remedying the violations, and shall consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a.

~~Amendment 47~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 19 – paragraph 16~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months.

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal under the rapid response mechanism in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 1 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 3 months.

~~Amendment 48~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 24 – paragraph 2~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

2. An investigation shall be initiated upon request by a Member State, by any legal person or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of Union producers, or on the Commission's own initiative if it is apparent to the Commission that there is sufficient prima facie evidence, as determined on the basis of factors referred to in Article 23, to justify such initiation. The request to initiate an investigation shall contain evidence that the conditions for imposing the safeguard measure set out in Article 22(1) are met. The request shall be submitted to the Commission. The Commission shall, as far as possible, examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the request, to determine whether there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.

2. An investigation shall be initiated upon request by a Member State, by the European Parliament, by any legal person or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of Union producers, or on the Commission's own initiative if it is apparent to the Commission that there is sufficient prima facie evidence, as determined on the basis of factors referred to in Article 23, to justify such initiation. The request to initiate an investigation shall contain evidence that the conditions for imposing the safeguard measure set out in Article 22(1) are met. The request shall be submitted to the Commission. The Commission shall, as far as possible, examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the request, to determine whether there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.

~~Amendment 49~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Annex VI – subheading 1 a (new)~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

~~UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and its principles on Free Prior and Informed Consent (UNDRIP) (2007)~~

~~Amendment 50~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Annex VI – paragraph 1 b (new)~~

~~Amendment~~

~~Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)~~

~~Amendment 51~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Annex VI – paragraph 1 c (new)~~

~~Amendment~~

~~VGGT - Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (2012).~~

~~PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION~~

~~Title~~

~~Applying a generalized scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council~~

~~References~~

~~COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD)~~

~~Committee responsible~~

~~Date announced in plenary~~

~~INTA~~

~~4.10.2021~~

~~Opinion by~~

~~Date announced in plenary~~

~~DEVE~~

~~4.10.2021~~

~~Rapporteur for the opinion~~

~~Date appointed~~

~~Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou~~

~~22.9.2021~~

~~Date adopted~~

~~28.2.2022~~

~~Result of final vote~~

–:

~~PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION~~

~~Title~~

~~Applying a generalized scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council~~

~~References~~

~~COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD)~~

~~Committee responsible~~

~~Date announced in plenary~~

~~INTA~~

~~4.10.2021~~

~~Opinion by~~

~~Date announced in plenary~~

~~DEVE~~

~~4.10.2021~~

~~Rapporteur for the opinion~~

~~Date appointed~~

~~Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou~~

~~22.9.2021~~

~~Date adopted~~

~~28.2.2022~~

~~Result of final vote~~

–:

~~Members present for the final vote~~

Barry Andrews, Eric Andrieu, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Hildegard Bentele, Dominique Bilde, Udo Bullmann, Catherine Chabaud, Antoni Comín i Oliveres, Ryszard Czarnecki, Gianna Gancia, Charles Goerens, Mónica Silvana González, Pierrette Herzberger-Fofana, György Hölvényi, Rasa Juknevičienė, Beata Kempa, Karsten Lucke, Pierfrancesco Majorino, Erik Marquardt, Janina Ochojska, Christian Sagartz, Tomas Tobé, Miguel Urbán Crespo, Bernhard Zimniok

~~Substitutes present for the final vote~~

~~María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos, Caroline Roose~~

~~FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION~~

~~Key to symbols:~~