What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/16245, Regulation (EU) 2024/16206 and Directive (EU) 2024/16407, all of the European Parliament and of the Council, all adopted on 31 May 2024 and all concerning the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, including through the establishment of the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism,

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law8 (the Whistleblower Directive) and to the Commission report of 3 July 2024 on its implementation and application (COM(2024)0269),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy8 (the Common Provisions Regulation),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/13712019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 523 JulyOctober 20172019 on the fightprotection againstof fraudpersons who report breaches of Union law9 (the Whistleblower Directive) and to the Union’sCommission financialreport interestsof by3 meansJuly of2024 criminalon law9its (theimplementation PIFand Directive),application (COM(2024)0269),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law10 (the PIF Directive),

– having regard to the Commission report of 16 September 2022 entitled ‘Second report on the implementation of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law’ (COM(2022)0466),

– having regard to the joint Europol-OLAF report of 6 June 2023 entitled ‘Assessing the Threats to the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) Fund’,

– having regard to the annual reports of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on the implementation of the Union budget and the activities financed by the 9th, 10th and 11th European Development Funds (EDFs) for the financial year 202410,202411,

– having regard to ECA special report 06/2023 of 13 March 2023 entitled ‘Conflict of interest in EU cohesion and agricultural spending – Framework in place but gaps in transparency and detection measures’11,measures’,

– having regard to ECA special report 03/2024 of 22 February 2024 entitled ‘The rule of law in the EU – An improved framework to protect the EU’s financial interests, but risks remain’12,remain’,

– having regard to ECA Review 02/2025 of 6 May2025 entitled ‘Performance-orientation, accountability and transparency – lessons to be learned from the weaknesses of the RRF’13,RRF’,

– having regard to ECA special report 08/2025 of 24 March 2025 entitled ‘Value Added Tax fraud on imports – The EU’s financial interests are insufficiently protected under simplified import customs procedures’14procedures’ and to the Commission report entitled ‘VAT gap in the EU – 2024 report’15,report’12,

– having regard to ECA special report 09/2025 of 10 March 2025 entitled ‘Systems for ensuring compliance of RRF spending with public procurement and state aid rules – Improving but still insufficient’ 16,insufficient’,

– having regard to ECA special report 13/202515/2025 of 18 June 2025 entitled ‘EU humanitarian aid under remote management – Can save lives, but there are weaknesses in the approach’17,approach’,

– having regard to the ECA special report 26/202522/2025 of 1520 DecemberNovember 2025 entitled ‘EU‘Financial bodiescorrections fightingin fraudcohesion policy – ClearA mandatescomplex butframework exchangeand ofonly informationone anddecision Commissionadopted oversightby remainthe insufficient’18,Commission so far’,

– having regard to Special Eurobarometer 548 entitled ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2024’19,

– having regard to ECA special report 26/2025 of 15 December 2025 entitled ‘EU bodies fighting fraud – Clear mandates but exchange of information and Commission oversight remain insufficient’,

– having regard to its resolution of 6 May 2025 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 202320,

– having regard to Special Eurobarometer 548 entitled ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2024’,

– having regard to its resolution of 6 May 2025 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 202313,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0080/2026),

A. whereas every year, the Commission submits a report, known as the PIF Report, to Parliament and the Council, drafted in cooperation with the Member States on the measures taken for the implementation of Article 325(5) TFEU;

B. whereas the sound management of the EU’s resources, both for expenditure and for revenue, and the protection of the EU’s financial interests, should form key components of any EU policy, so as to foster their efficienteffective implementation, ensure that taxpayers’ money is used properlyproperly, efficiently and effectivelytransparently, and increase citizens’ confidence in the EuropeanEU institutions;

C. whereas the annual PIF Report is mainly based on information provided by the Member States,States via the Irregularity Management System (IMS),(IMS) and by the Commission,Commission via its accounting system (ABAC), which includes data on irregularities and on fraud detection, which is analysed to identify areas deemed most exposed;

D. whereas the description and analysis in the PIF Report of the measures adopted to combat fraud and irregularities should make it possible to identify and implement more targeted actions at both EU and national level;

D. whereas on 6 May 2025, Parliament adopted its resolution on the protection of the EU’s financial interests for 2023, calling for the PIF Report to serve as a tool to strengthen the governance of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture (AFA) and to adopt a more holistic approach;

E. whereas the protection of the EU’s financial interests must be supported by an analysis based on reliable data;

E. whereas the description and analysis in the PIF Report of the measures adopted to combat fraud and irregularities should make it possible to identify and implement more targeted actions at both EU and national levels; whereas the detection of fraudulent irregularities continues to improve across the EU, but recovery actions remain uneven in some Member States; whereas effective protection of the EU’s financial interests would require both comprehensive detection and consistent judicial and administrative follow-up to prevent, correct, and deter the misuse of EU funds;

F. whereas, considering the disparities between the Member States, in particular as regards the detection and reporting of irregularities, the diversity of administrative systems in the Member States hinders the implementation of the objective of a common level of national management, control and reporting systems in the Union; whereas, if the diversity of administrative systems in the Member States is not addressed in a consistent manner by enhancing interoperability and digitalisation, it risks undermining the reliability, comparability and usefulness of data and reports; whereas, to this end, it seems necessary that genuine common guidelines worthy of the name and robust standard procedures be implemented effectively and more efficiently in order to achieve a more standardised and uniform management and treatment of European funds and the protection of the Union’s financial interests in the same way in all Member States;

F. whereas the protection of the EU’s financial interests must be supported by an analysis based on reliable data; whereas the potential of digital tools, including risk-scoring systems and interoperable databases to prevent and detect fraud should be promoted; whereas the deployment of advanced analytics and predictive tools remains limited; whereas fostering the development and adoption of such tools contributes to more efficient and effective management of EU funds and strengthens the protection of the EU’s financial interests;

G. whereas the EU and its Member States share responsibility for the protection of the Union’s financial interests, which covers the deployment of funds under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)21 and the implementation of the national recovery and resilience plans; whereas the role of national authorities in ensuring an adequate level of protection of the Union’s financial interests has significantly increased under NextGenerationEU (NGEU) and the proposal for the future multiannual financial framework (MFF);

G. whereas considering the disparities between the Member States, in particular as regards the detection and reporting of irregularities, the diversity of administrative systems in the Member States hinders the implementation of the objective of a common level of national management, control and reporting systems in the EU; whereas a limited number of Member States have adopted fully comprehensive anti-fraud strategies covering all relevant sectors; whereas strengthening governance structures, ensuring coordination among authorities, and establishing measurable objectives at national level are essential to protect the EU budget and improve the effectiveness of EU-wide anti-fraud measures; whereas, if the diversity of administrative systems in the Member States is not addressed in a consistent manner by enhancing interoperability and digitalisation, it risks undermining the reliability, comparability and usefulness of data and reports; whereas to this end, it seems necessary that genuine common guidelines worthy of the name and robust standard procedures be implemented effectively and more efficiently in order to achieve a more standardised and uniform management and treatment of EU funds and the same protection of the EU’s financial interests in all Member States;

H. whereas criminal organisations, attracted by the unprecedented volume of resources deployed under the MFF and NGEU programmes, are particularly active in intercepting EU funds and are able to exploit the heterogeneity of Member States’ administrative, control and sanctioning systems to penetrate their economic, financial, commercial, social and political fabric, thereby undermining the financial interests of the Union;

H. whereas the EU and its Member States share responsibility for the protection of the EU’s financial interests, which covers the deployment of funds under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)14 and the implementation of the national recovery and resilience plans; whereas the role of national authorities in ensuring an adequate level of protection of the EU’s financial interests has significantly increased under NextGenerationEU (NGEU) and the proposal for the future multiannual financial framework (MFF);

I. whereas the protection of the EU budget is based on an anti-fraud architecture22, involving multiple actors at EU and Member State level, and allowing for cooperation between authorities responsible for administrative and criminal investigations; whereas the actions of the EPPO, OLAF, Europol and Eurojust have contributed to the fight against crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, but their effectiveness depends on enhanced coordination between them and with the competent national authorities and international partners;

I. whereas the Commission is obliged to apply financial corrections to Member States in order to exclude from EU financing expenditure incurred in breach of the applicable law;

J. whereas value added tax (VAT) is an important source of revenue for national budgets and VAT-based own resources, which accounted for around 14 % of the EU’s total own resources in 2024 and around 10 % in 2023; whereas the emergence of cases of VAT carousel fraud has intensified in recent years and has seen the increasing involvement of organised criminal networks;

J. whereas criminal organisations, attracted by the unprecedented volume of resources deployed under the MFF and NGEU programmes, are particularly active in intercepting EU funds and are able to exploit the heterogeneity of Member States’ administrative, control and sanctioning systems to penetrate their economic, financial, commercial, social and political fabric, thereby undermining the EU’s financial interests;

K. whereas corruption is one of the most serious crimes with a cross-border dimension and affects all Member States to varying degrees; whereas it erodes citizens’ trust in the Union and undermines the Union’s financial interests and economy as a whole, as well as democracy and the rule of law in the Union;

K. whereas the concerning and worrying phenomenon of entryism has been highlighted in several Member States and the Commission is expected to exercise the utmost vigilance and to put in place the necessary checks to ensure that EU funds do not indirectly encourage or support such movements that run counter to the values upheld by the EU;

L. whereas conflicts of interest are not duly and fully reported in the current monitoring databases; whereas they deserve the highest consideration, as they represent a serious threat to the credibility of institutions and supporting authorities and a breach of taxpayers’ trust;

L. whereas the protection of the EU budget is based on an AFA, involving multiple actors15 at EU and Member State levels, and allowing for cooperation between authorities responsible for administrative and criminal investigations; whereas the actions of the EPPO, OLAF, Europol and Eurojust have contributed to the fight against crimes affecting the EU’s financial interests, but their effectiveness depends on enhanced coordination between them and with the competent national authorities and international partners;

M. whereas the protection of the Union’s financial interests must be fully integrated into all EU external action instruments, given that financial support to non-EU countries inherently entails an increased risk of fraud, misappropriation and misuse of funds compared to direct implementation, and must therefore be accompanied by robust safeguard measures ensuring the consistent use of Union funds, as well as mechanisms allowing for protective interventions at all times in order to prevent, detect and correct possible breaches;

M. whereas effective protection of the EU budget requires close cooperation between authorities conducting administrative investigations and those conducting criminal investigations at both EU and Member State levels and this cooperation should be encouraged; whereas not only cooperation but also systematic coordination is needed; whereas regular information sharing and joint risk analysis would avoid fragmented protection and ensure timely and coherent action against fraud and irregularities;

N. whereas value added tax (VAT) is an important source of revenue for national budgets and VAT-based own resources, which accounted for around 14 % of the EU’s total own resources in 2024 and around 10 % in 2023; whereas the emergence of cases of VAT carousel fraud has intensified in recent years and has seen the increasing involvement of organised criminal networks;

O. whereas corruption is one of the most serious crimes with a cross-border dimension and affects all Member States to varying degrees; whereas it erodes citizens’ trust in the EU and undermines the EU’s financial interests and economy as a whole, as well as democracy and the rule of law in the EU;

P. whereas conflicts of interest are not duly and fully reported in the current monitoring databases; whereas they deserve the highest consideration, as they represent a serious threat to the credibility of institutions and supporting authorities and a breach of taxpayers’ trust;

Q. whereas the protection of the EU’s financial interests must be fully integrated into all EU external action instruments, given that financial support to non-EU countries inherently entails an increased risk of fraud, misappropriation and misuse of funds compared to direct implementation, and must therefore be accompanied by robust safeguard measures ensuring the consistent use of EU funds, as well as mechanisms allowing for protective interventions at all times in order to prevent, detect and correct possible breaches; whereas transparency in the allocation of EU funds to non-governmental organisations is essential to ensure the sound management of public resources and to prevent undue influence on the EU’s decision-making processes;

General remarks on PIF reports and major issues

1. Takes note of the 2024 PIF report, endorses its four recommendations but considers them insufficiently ambitious, particularly regarding transparency and the means by which citizens and their elected representatives can monitor the use of funds, as annual reports alone offer only a partial and filtered view of the real problems;

1. Takes note of the 2024 PIF Report and endorses its four recommendations but considers that they are not sufficiently ambitious, in particular as regards transparency and accountability; stresses that citizens and their elected representatives must be able to effectively monitor how EU funds are used; stresses that enhanced transparency is essential and should allow for value for money to be demonstrated; notes that annual reporting alone provides only a partial overview of the real problems and does not provide the focused analysis required to tackle the issues reported; requests that the Commission keep improving the quality, consistency and analytical value of data used in the report, in order to support meaningful transparency and effective democratic scrutiny and to explore periodic reporting formats that would allow for effective parliamentary scrutiny beyond the annual PIF reporting cycle; encourages the Commission and the Member States to maximise transparency in the use of funds, including with regard to information about final beneficiaries; in this context, recalls that Parliament, as the discharge authority, has an important role to fulfil for EU citizens and considers that the Committee on Budgetary Control in particular should be able to play a more structured and continuous role in monitoring the protection of the EU’s financial interests; reiterates that communication about the use of EU funds is essential to address fraud and corruption;

2. Reiterates that the protection of the Union’sEU’s financial interests faces significant challenges in an increasingly complex and rapidly evolving context and that its effectiveness can only be achievedensured through joint and coordinated actions by judicial and administrative authorities, the EuropeanEU institutions and entities and the Member States; stresses that cooperation must include systematic information sharing, joint risk analysis and operational coordination; urges the Member States to adopt a proactive stance in safeguarding the EU’s financial interests and strengthening information exchange both among national authorities and with EU bodies and agencies, in order to detect and address emerging risks and fraud patterns promptly; recalls that all stakeholders and all the tools made available by the relevant financial regulations and EPPO operations must contribute to the protection of the EU’s financial interests;

3. Stresses that only enhanced digitalisation, including through national anti-fraud strategies, process digitalisation and the use of common digital tools, will enable knowledge sharing, accessibility and data processing, as well as the comprehensive reporting necessary for results-based governance in the protection of the Union’s financial interests; notes that only enhanced digitalisation can provide the foundation for genuine transparency to citizens and their elected representatives, which is essential when public money is at stake;

3. Underlines that the rule of law is a cornerstone of the EU and is essential for protecting EU financial interests in all Member States; stresses that the rule of law conditionality mechanism must be applied where breaches directly affect the EU budget; underlines that decisions to protect EU financial interests must be based on technical and legal findings; calls on the Commission to ensure consistent and proportionate use of the mechanism, while respecting Member States’ primary responsibility for upholding rule of law principles and ensuring coherence across EU instruments;

4. Notes that the number of irregularities reported by EU competent authorities and national authorities in 2024 was slightly lower than in 2023 (totalling 13 589 in 2024, 13 947 in 2023 and 12 455 in 2022), while the corresponding irregular amounts were reported to be relatively stable (EUR 1.84 billion in 2024 compared to EUR 1.90 billion in 2023, reaching EUR 1.77 billion in 2022); observes that fraud cases account for around 10 % of the total irregularities reported, the number having increased sharply to 1 364 (26 % more than in 2023); notes that the financial amounts related to these fraud cases also increased to EUR 548.8 million in 2024 (+ 138.7 % compared to 2023); points out that since checks are not systematic but are often carried out by sampling, these figures should be interpreted with caution;

4. Underlines that enhanced digitalisation could significantly simplify controls, reduce bureaucracy for beneficiaries and ensure that taxpayers’ money is used more efficiently;

5. Expresses its concern that the number of irregularities reported in 2024 was 3.6 % higher than the five-year average, while the financial amounts involved were 12 % higher, and that the number of frauds reported in 2024 was 19 % higher and the amounts involved were 56 % higher than the average over the five-year period;

5. Recalls that digitalisation must move from analytical reflection to operational deployment, while ensuring data protection, a high level of cybersecurity and appropriate human oversight; stresses that digitalisation will deliver added value only if accompanied by effective interoperability between national and EU systems, and sufficient analytical capacities to translate data into early detection, risk prioritisation and measurable corrective actions;

6. Notes that the results of OLAF investigations are stable, indicating that it closed 246 investigations (265 in 2023 and 256 in 2022) and issued 301 recommendations (309 in 2023 and 275 in 2022), with a total recommended recovery amount of EUR 871.5 million (EUR 1 043.8 million in 2023 compared to EUR 426.8 million in 2022);

6. Points out that enhanced digitalisation, including through national anti-fraud strategies, the digitalisation of processes and the use of common digital tools, is essential to enable effective knowledge sharing, data accessibility and processing and the comprehensive reporting necessary for results-based governance in the protection of the EU’s financial interests; underlines that digitalisation can provide the foundation for genuine transparency for citizens and their elected representatives, which is essential when public money is at stake;

7. Notes that the EPPO’s activities have steadily increased since June 2021, in terms of the number of investigations opened (in 2024, 1 504 investigations, compared to 1 371 in 2023 and 865 in 2022), the number of investigations currently ongoing (2 666 in 2024 compared to 1 927 in 2023 and 1 117 in 2022), the number of indictments (205 in 2024 compared to 139 in 2023 and 87 in 2022), the number of judicial convictions (102 criminal cases were closed in 2024 with one conviction compared to 48 cases in 2023 and 20 cases in 2022) and the number of freezing orders obtained (in 2024 for EUR 2.42 billion compared to EUR 1.5 billion in 2023, EUR 359.1 million in 2022);

7. Notes that the number of irregularities reported by EU competent authorities and national authorities in 2024 was slightly lower than in 2023 (totalling 13 589 in 2024, 13 947 in 2023 and 12 455 in 2022), while the corresponding irregular amounts were reported to be relatively stable (EUR 1.84 billion in 2024 compared to EUR 1.90 billion in 2023 and EUR 1.77 billion in 2022); observes that fraud cases account for around 10 % of the total irregularities reported, the number having increased sharply to 1 364 in 2024 (26 % more than in 2023); notes that the financial amounts related to these fraud cases also increased to EUR 548.8 million in 2024 (+ 138.7 % compared to 2023); recalls that the information reported in the IMS is primarily based on data transmitted by the Member States, which rely on a variety of detection sources and methods; recalls that since checks often rely on risk-based analysis, these figures should be interpreted in their proper methodological context, which does not allow for a precise assessment of the actual scale of fraud affecting the EU budget; calls on the Commission to address the analytical gap through strengthened risk analysis, more harmonised control practices and improved qualitative assessment of cases;

8. Notes that in 2024, the EPPO reported that Europol had provided support (information exchange, analytical support and expertise) in response to 83 requests and that by the end of 2024, 25 cases were ongoing with the support of Eurojust’s national offices; notes that in 2024, OLAF sent 74 cases to the EPPO for the opening of a criminal investigation, and that the EPPO opened 69 cases on the basis of OLAF’s contributions, and that in the same year OLAF closed 26 additional investigations and opened 17; expects that the revision of the anti-fraud architecture will provide opportunities to strengthen this cooperation and set ambitious targets aligned with EU priorities;

8. Expresses its concern that the number of irregularities reported in 2024 was 3.6 % higher than the five-year average, while the financial amounts involved were 12 % higher, and that the number of frauds reported in 2024 was 19 % higher and the amounts involved were 56 % higher than the average over the five-year period;

9. Stresses that the fight against fraud requires a comprehensive approach, involving a wide range of actors and interconnected processes that influence each other and cover the four main stages of the anti-fraud cycle, namely prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution, as well as recovery and sanctions;

9. Notes that the results of OLAF investigations are stable, indicating that, in 2024, it closed 246 investigations (compared to 265 in 2023 and 256 in 2022) and issued 301 recommendations (309 in 2023 and 275 in 2022), with a total recommended recovery amount of EUR 871.5 million (EUR 1 043.8 million in 2023 and EUR 426.8 million in 2022);

10. Notes that the EPPO’s activities have steadily increased since June 2021, in terms of the number of investigations opened (in 2024, 1 504 investigations, compared to 1 371 in 2023 and 865 in 2022), the number of investigations currently ongoing (2 666 in 2024 compared to 1 927 in 2023 and 1 117 in 2022), the number of indictments (205 in 2024 compared to 139 in 2023 and 87 in 2022), the number of judicial convictions (102 criminal cases were closed in 2024 with one conviction compared to 48 cases in 2023 and 20 cases in 2022) and the number of freezing orders obtained (in 2024 for EUR 2.42 billion compared to EUR 1.5 billion in 2023, EUR 359.1 million in 2022); stresses, however, that the sustained growth in the EPPO’s activities should be assessed not only in terms of the number of investigations and convictions, but also in terms of effective budgetary impact, including the recovery of funds and the deterrent effect; calls for this dimension to be systematically integrated into future PIF reports; calls for sufficient resources, commensurate with workload and case complexity, to be ensured by the Commission and the budgetary authority, and for those resources to be sufficient, in turn, to generate financial revenue;

11. Recognises the level of cooperation among some of the AFA authorities; notes that in 2024, the EPPO reported that Europol had provided support (information exchange, analytical support, including financial information, joint operations, operational meetings, action days and expertise) in response to 83 requests, a steep increase compared to 2023, and that by the end of 2024, 25 cases were ongoing with the support of Eurojust’s national offices; notes that in 2024, OLAF sent 74 cases to the EPPO for the opening of a criminal investigation, and that the EPPO opened 69 cases on the basis of OLAF’s input, and that in the same year OLAF closed 26 complementary investigations and opened 17 (in 2023, 22 complementary investigations were opened by OLAF and four supporting investigations were requested by the EPPO); maintains that the use of complementary investigations (ex Article 12(f) of the OLAF Regulation16) and investigations in support (ex Article 12(e) of the OLAF Regulation) is still suboptimal and reiterates its call on the Commission to address the legal and operational causes of this when reviewing the relevant regulations; expects that the revision of the AFA, as launched by the Commission to better safeguard the EU’s financial interests and to ensure more efficient cooperation between EU anti-fraud actors and Member States, will meaningfully strengthen operational cooperation, strategic coordination and data sharing between OLAF, the EPPO, Eurojust, Europol and national authorities and will set ambitious and results-oriented targets aligned with EU priorities; underlines that this review should prioritise interoperability, risk analysis and the use of modern technologies;

12. Notes that the ECA found that, in 40 cases, OLAF had independently concluded, without informing the EPPO, that no criminal conduct was suspected; points out that only the EPPO and national public prosecutors’ offices are competent to assess whether conduct is suspected of being criminal; notes that OLAF does not have access to reports closed by the EPPO, which, according to the ECA, hinders OLAF’s ability to take relevant administrative action; points out that the ECA has concluded that the procedures for exchanging reports between the EPPO and OLAF are not efficient enough and recommends that received reports of suspected fraud be centrally registered to ensure efficient procedures; stresses the need to close the information gaps between national authorities, OLAF and the EPPO; calls on the Commission to strengthen operational information-sharing channels and ensure timely, structured and secure exchanges of relevant information throughout the anti-fraud cycle; calls on the Commission to prioritise the improvement of the coordination process, in line with the ECA’s analysis;

13. Recalls that the operational protection of the EU’s financial interests from fraud, irregularities and other illicit activities is entrusted to national authorities, OLAF and the EPPO; stresses the added value that EU bodies bring to the protection of the EU’s financial interests and the fight against fraud, especially when it comes to cross-border crime, as shown by the operational results of the EPPO and OLAF; welcomes, in this vein, the integration of OLAF and EPPO findings into the 2024 PIF Report; underlines that a deeper analysis of the interaction between the AFA components is needed and encourages further engagement in holistic reporting to provide a clearer, more complete and more concrete picture of the overall state of play of the protection of the EU’s financial interests, encompassing the entirety of anti-fraud action at both national and EU levels; believes that the analysis to be run during the revision of the AFA will offer the opportunity to find ways to ensure that future reporting will be more complete than is currently the case; emphasises that the upcoming revision of the mandates of key EU entities, such as Europol and EPPO, planned for 2026, offers a unique opportunity to consolidate a well-functioning and effective cross-agency operational framework to counter, among others, PIF-related organised criminal organisations; considers that the coexistence of multiple actors within the EU’s AFA requires a structural evaluation based on efficiency to assess, in a transparent manner, whether the current allocation of functions allows for the maximisation of detection, investigation, recovery and deterrence, or whether more far-reaching adaptations of the model are necessary;

14. Stresses that the fight against fraud requires a comprehensive and coherent governance approach, involving a wide range of actors and interconnected processes covering all main stages of the anti-fraud cycle, namely prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, recovery and sanctions; stresses that weaknesses or fragmentation at any stage reduce the effectiveness of the entire system; insists that, without substantial progress at the stage of timely and effective recovery of funds and the application of appropriate sanctions, efforts in prevention and detection lose part of their deterrent effect; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with OLAF, the EPPO and the competent national authorities, to develop and apply harmonised indicators enabling the assessment of the real budgetary impact of anti-fraud policies, to guide decision-making and the allocation of resources;

Prevention and detection

10.15. Recalls that the fight against fraud must not be carried out only a posteriori, but must concernbe allintegrated from the Europeanoutset institutionsinto asthe soondesign asof funding schemes, instruments and programmes areand drawnfostered up;by all EU institutions; stresses, therefore, that better involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the anti-fraud architectureAFA and of Parliament at the stage of developing the arrangements, instruments and programmes would certainly lead to better protection of the Union’sEU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to takebetter noteinvolve ofall thisactors upstream and to betterintegrate involveanti-fraud allconsiderations actorsat upstream;an early stage of programme design, including in risk-based assessment and the clear assignment of responsibilities;

11.16. Stresses that, in addition to the necessary efforts to limit fraud through the design of public policies, a more determined proactive effort is also needed to detect and combat fraud; highlights the fact that artificial intelligence isand oneadvanced ofanalytics are among the tools tothat should be usedeffectively deployed, in a proportionate manner and subject to appropriate human oversight, to optimise thisfraud fight;detection;

12.17. Notes that infringement reports submitted to the EPPO, information on potential investigative interests transmitted to OLAF and the reporting of irregularities, as well as the periodic updates to them submitted to the Commission through the IMS, are the main source of data for assessing detection levels; notes that detection levels vary from one Member State to another and among the sources of information, and maintains that the level of detection in a geographical area or a budgetary or politicalpolicy sector does not necessarily correspond to the actual incidence of fraud or other misconduct in that area or sector; stresses, furthermore, that the results of detection efforts vary considerably across sectors and countries; calls on the Commission to develop a standardised risk and efficiency benchmark to identify underperforming, high-risk programmes and allow for the reallocation of funds to initiatives with lower risk and higher added value for EU citizens; emphasises the need for improved harmonisation of definitions and reporting standards to enable meaningful comparison of detection levels across Member States and sectors;

13. Notes that, in the common agricultural policy (CAP), cohesion policy and fisheries sectors, during the period 2020-2024, risk analysis still only marginally contributed to the detection of fraud, with no improvement compared to the previous period (2015-2019); notes that the detection of fraud based on alerts by whistleblowers remains low, as fraud has only been detected once as a result of information published in the media in the context of direct payments, while in the cohesion and fisheries sectors the role of information from civil society has increased, with around 18 % of irregularities detected on this basis; stresses that for irregularities affecting the CAP, the analysis of the detection concentration presented in the 2024 PIF Report shows a higher concentration for fraudulent irregularities than for non-fraudulent irregularities, suggesting that differentiated approaches to investigations and criminal prosecutions may have been a determining factor in these detection levels; notes, furthermore, that for the detection of non-fraudulent irregularities, neither risk analysis nor civil society information play a significant role and recalls that in 2023, a significant level of error persisted under the heading ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, reaching 9.3 %; reiterates its concerns about the excessive length of procedures needed to finalise cases where irregularities are detected, noting that in the period 2020-2024, it took on average more than four years in the CAP sector between the start of the irregularity and the suspicion of a fraudulent irregularity, and then about three more years to close the case after informing the Commission, while in the cohesion sector almost two years were needed to detect a suspicion of fraud and almost two and a half more years to finalise the case; understands that in both sectors the average duration is shorter for non-fraudulent irregularities, possibly due to higher obstacles to verification in cases of fraud and the need to mobilise specialised resources that are generally limited; stresses that the length of these procedures hampers the adoption of effective recovery or mitigation measures and deprives the actions taken of their deterrent effect; considers, lastly, that the modalities and timing of the initial handling of cases have a decisive influence on the subsequent conduct of proceedings and calls on the Commission to consider adopting appropriate measures to speed up these processes, in particular by intensifying its dialogue with the authorities of the Member States, which is in the interest of protecting the financial interests of the Union;

18. Reiterates the view that the IMS should have greater interoperability with other key tools used by the Commission to protect the EU’s financial interests, such as ARACHNE and the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES), and with digital tools in the Member States; understands that interoperability with the IMS will be part of the broader assessment of the interoperability among different Commission databases and ARACHNE+ in the context of the post-2027 MFF, and that the Commission is currently running a survey across the Member States on the IMS-EDES interface, in the framework of the extension of EDES to shared management; asks the Commission to promptly inform Parliament about the progress of the specific EDES-IMS-ARACHNE interface;

14. Notes that, in the area of direct management, during the period 2020-2024, OLAF was presumably the main source of detection of recovery elements related to fraudulent irregularities, accounting for 89.8 % of cases and 96.9 % of the total amounts recovered, while the Commission’s ex post controls detected an additional 6.0 % of these elements, corresponding to 1.9 % of the amounts recovered; notes furthermore that around 95.7 % of the recovery items classified as non-fraudulent irregularities were detected through Commission controls, both ex ante and ex post; notes, in this regard, the analysis of the 2024 PIF Report on the relationship between the source of detection and the amounts to be recovered, which shows that the Commission’s ex post controls and OLAF investigations led to the highest amounts recovered for non-fraudulent and fraudulent irregularities, respectively;

19. Observes that the 2024 recast of the Financial Regulation introduced a legal basis for ARACHNE+, a modernised data-mining and risk-scoring tool, to be available for the post-2027 MFF and to be used for all management modes with mandatory feeding of relevant data categories by EU institutions and bodies, Member States, and other entities implementing the EU budget; points out that, currently, the use of ARACHNE+ by the Member States is voluntary and that the Commission, the Council and Parliament have committed to examining and revisiting the discussion on the mandatory use of the corporate tool by Member States for the post-2027 MFF based on an assessment of the tool’s readiness by the end of 2027; stresses that, irrespective of the national digital systems in use by the Member States, ARACHNE is uniquely oriented towards cross-border fraud detection and is particularly effective in evaluating the risk of fraud, conflicts of interest, and irregularities affecting transnational operations and cooperation; believes that, to effectively improve prevention and detection through its profiling and pattern recognition, ARACHNE has to meet the specific needs and challenges within each national framework; notes that the Commission is expected to provide robust support mechanisms and to allow for the adaptations needed to maximise ARACHNE’s positive effects; points out that Member States have highlighted the need for comprehensive training and support in order to maximise the tool’s effectiveness;

15. Notes that in recent years, the increase in detection by Union bodies has been proportionately lower than that by private whistleblowers or national authorities (in 2024, reports of offences to the EPPO by private whistleblowers increased by 85 %, those by national authorities by 13 % and those by the EU’s institutions, bodies, office and agencies by 5 %, and in 2023, reports of offences from private whistleblowers, national authorities and IBOA increased by 30 %, 24 % and 5 % respectively compared to 2022); reiterates its call on the Commission and other EU authorities to promote detection by facilitating reporting processes and strengthening staff and management awareness initiatives and internal communication;

20. Regrets that risk analyses relating to the common agricultural policy (CAP), cohesion policy and the fisheries sector contributed only marginally to fraud detection in the 2020-2024 period, with no improvement compared to the previous period (2015-2019); calls on the Commission to analyse the causes of this and develop an action plan to improve the quality of risk analyses in cooperation with the authorities responsible in the Member States; notes that fraud detection based on whistleblower reports remains low, with only one instance of fraud being detected based on information published in the media, in the context of direct payments, while the role of civil society in the cohesion and fisheries sectors has increased, with approximately 18 % of irregularities detected in this way; stresses that, as regards irregularities related to the CAP, the analysis of detection rates in the 2024 PIF Report shows a higher concentration of fraudulent irregularities than of non-fraudulent ones, suggesting that differentiated approaches in investigations and criminal prosecutions may have been a decisive factor in these detection rates; notes, furthermore, that neither risk analysis nor information from civil society plays a significant role in the detection of non-fraudulent irregularities; stresses the need to reinforce risk analysis methodologies, to improve data-mining tools and use them more systematically, and to further promote secure and effective reporting channels for whistleblowers; recalls that, in 2023, there was still a significant error rate under the heading ‘Cohesion, Resilience and Values’, namely 9.3 %; reiterates its concern about the excessively long duration of the procedures required to close cases in which irregularities have been detected, noting that in the 2020-2024 period in the CAP sector, on average, it took more than four years between the occurrence of the irregularity and the suspicion of fraud, followed by a further three years to close the case after the Commission was notified, while in the cohesion sector, it took almost two years to detect a suspicion of fraud and almost two and a half years to close the case; understands that, in both sectors, the average duration is shorter for non-fraudulent irregularities, possibly due to the greater obstacles to verification in fraud cases and the need to deploy specialised resources, which are often limited; emphasises that the length of these procedures hinders the adoption of effective remedial or mitigating measures and deprives the measures taken of their deterrent effect; considers, finally, that the modalities and timing of the initial handling of cases have a decisive influence on the subsequent course of the procedures and calls on the Commission to take appropriate measures to accelerate these procedures, in particular by stepping up its dialogue with the Member States’ authorities, which is in the interest of protecting the EU’s financial interests;

16. Reminds the Commission that for fraud to be detected, checks are needed and that although this may cost money, it also makes it possible to bring in – sometimes significant – additional revenue and/or to avoid irregular expenditure; notes therefore that it is essential to provide resources to those involved in the anti-fraud architecture to enable them to carry out more frequent checks;

21. Notes that, according to the PIF Report 2024, in the area of direct management, during the period 2020-2024, OLAF was the main source of detection of recovery elements related to fraudulent irregularities, accounting for 89.8 % of cases and 96.9 % of the total amounts recovered, while the Commission’s ex post controls detected an additional 6.0 % of this type of recovery item, accounting for 1.9 % of the amounts recovered; notes furthermore that around 95.7 % of the recovery items classified as non-fraudulent irregularities were detected through Commission controls, both ex ante and ex post; notes, in this regard, the analysis of the 2024 PIF Report on the relationship between the source of detection and the amounts to be recovered, which shows that the Commission’s ex post controls and OLAF investigations led to the highest amounts recovered for non-fraudulent and fraudulent irregularities respectively;

22. Notes that in recent years, the increase in detection by EU bodies has been proportionately lower than that by private whistleblowers or national authorities (in 2024, reports of offences to the EPPO by private whistleblowers increased by 85 %, those by national authorities by 13 % and those by the EU’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies by 5 %, and in 2023, reports of offences from private whistleblowers, national authorities and the EU’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies increased by 30 %, 24 % and 5 % respectively compared to 2022); reiterates its call on the Commission and other EU authorities to promote detection by facilitating reporting processes and strengthening staff and management awareness initiatives and internal communication; is concerned that this low level of detection may raise concerns about the Commission’s ability to oversee EU funds;

23. Emphasises that public authorities have a crucial role in fostering a zero-tolerance culture against fraud, and stresses, in particular, the importance of fraud prevention to ensure that fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, and other types of misuse of funds do not occur in the first place;

24. Maintains that whistleblowers play a key role in boosting fraud detection; observes with concern the remarks presented in the 2024 Commission report on the implementation and application of the Whistleblower Directive on the protection of persons who report breaches of EU law, which suggests that the transposition process is still far from complete; regrets that, in March 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union fined five Member States (Germany, Luxembourg, Czechia, Estonia and Hungary) for failing to properly transpose the directive; welcomed the Commission’s launch, on 25 August 2025, of a public consultation on its forthcoming action plan on whistleblower protection, which is part of the Commission’s broader evaluation of the directive; calls on the Commission to take into the utmost consideration the feedback from relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, trade unions, research institutions and their staff, and individual whistleblowers, on the implementation of the directive, and to introduce measures to fill the identified gaps; points out, furthermore, that Parliament is expected to adapt its internal rules in line with the directive to safeguard its own whistleblowers, as stemming from the judgment of the General Court of 11 September 2024 in Case T-793/2217 according to which the current framework fails to provide balanced and effective protection against retaliation;

25. Emphasises that independent media and investigative journalism could play a role in the fight against fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, and other forms of misuse of public funds;

26. Reminds the Commission that for fraud to be detected, checks are needed and that, although this may cost money, it also makes it possible to bring in – sometimes significant – additional revenue and/or to avoid irregular expenditure; notes therefore that it is essential to provide resources to those involved in the AFA to enable them to carry out more frequent checks; calls for a strategic and targeted allocation of resources to high-risk sectors and cross-border investigations, combined with enhanced training and capacity building for national authorities, in order to ensure a results-driven approach, strengthen budgetary accountability and safeguard every euro of the EU budget;

27. Underlines the importance of protecting the EU’s financial interests by implementing and enforcing clear rules about taxation and transparency for businesses, particularly those operating on a transnational level, especially in the context of EU-backed investments;

Investigations and prosecutions

17.28. Considers that the excessive length of investigations and administrative procedures undermines the effectiveness of the protection of the Union’sEU’s financial interests, in particular as regards monitoring, recovery and prosecution;

18.29. Underlines the strategic role of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS) at all stages of the anti-fraud cycle and calls on the Commission to strengthen their activities; considers that persistent disparities among Member States in terms of administrative capacity, human resources and analytical tools weaken the protection of the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of defining common minimum anti-fraud capacity standards for the competent national authorities, in particular AFCOS, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity;

19. Stresses that information on the EPPO’s ongoing investigations should be forwarded to the Commission where the conditions laid down in Article 103 of the EPPO Regulation23 so permit; notes, however, that according to the 2024 PIF Report, from the start of the implementation of the RRF until 27 May 2025, the Commission received only 75 notifications from the EPPO, of which 64 concerned ongoing cases, while 279 investigations related to the RRF existed at the end of 2024, with an estimated total financial damage of EUR 2.7 billion; observes that this prevents a full understanding of the state of play of the implementation of the RRF;

30. Recalls that Member States manage the largest share of EU expenditure and are therefore the first line of defence for the protection of the EU’s financial interests; notes that, in 2024, all 27 Member States reported having some form of strategy in place to protect the EU’s financial interests; observes, however, that approaches differ significantly; regrets that the adoption of comprehensive national anti-fraud strategies remains uneven across Member States and stresses that such strategies are essential to ensure effective coordination, risk analysis and follow-up of fraud cases at national and EU levels; calls on the Member States to adopt and regularly update their NAFS in order to better identify and address emerging fraud risks, with the support of the Commission; regrets, furthermore, that information collected in 2024 shows limited progress in strengthening national anti-fraud governance compared to previous years, despite the Commission’s recommendations to establish or improve dedicated national anti-fraud networks; calls on the Commission to assess the quality, scope and effective implementation of national anti-fraud strategies and to provide guidance and support to ensure that such strategies are coherent, comprehensive and results-oriented; welcomes the fact that, following repeated calls by Parliament, the Commission has included national anti-fraud strategies among the key requirements for national management and control systems in its proposal for the 2028-2034 MFF; reiterates that Member States would benefit from regular evaluations or peer reviews of their anti-fraud frameworks, in order to improve consistency and ensure high standards across the EU;

31. Stresses that information on the EPPO’s ongoing investigations should be forwarded to the Commission where the conditions laid down in Article 103 of the EPPO Regulation18 so permit; notes, however, that according to the 2024 PIF Report, from the start of the implementation of the RRF until 27 May 2025, the Commission received only 75 notifications from the EPPO, of which 64 concerned ongoing cases, while 279 investigations related to the RRF existed at the end of 2024, with an estimated total financial damage of EUR 2.7 billion; observes that this prevents a full understanding of the state of play of the implementation of the RRF; calls for improved, timely and structured information sharing that fully respects the EPPO’s independence, in particular for high-risk programmes such as the RRF;

32. Acknowledges that EPPO investigations can only be launched if information has reached the prosecutors; expects the Member States to comply with their legal obligations and to report all relevant cases to the EPPO; notes with concern that some Member States have been declaring criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the EU as national cases instead of acknowledging the competences of the EPPO; expresses its concern that these conflicts of competence can have a possible negative impact on investigations, including the loss of evidence or the belated collection of evidence; observes that, in spite of the EPPO’s competences being clearly outlined in Article 22(1) and (2) and in Article 23 of the EPPO Regulation, questions of competence between the national authorities and the European Delegated Prosecutors come up frequently, including several in 2024; underlines that, as things stand, these cases should be handled in compliance with the EPPO Regulation, which states that they should be referred to the national judicial authority with the competence to decide cases of conflict of competences between national prosecutors, under the condition that its decision can be subject to a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice, as provided for by Article 25(6) of the EPPO Regulation, drawing on Article 267 TFEU, which provides that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provision on conflicts of competence between the EPPO and national authorities; reiterates that the current situation lacks legal clarity since, in many Member States, the national authority’s decision on the conflict of competence cannot be the subject of a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice; calls on the Commission to collect and assess information regarding cases of conflicts of competence, with a view to obtaining the relevant data and to addressing the matter during the revision of the EPPO Regulation;

Recoveries and reporting

20. Acknowledges that recovery is a complex process that requires cooperation within the Commission and with other actors and national authorities; reiterates its calls on the Commission to ensure effective follow-up of OLAF recommendations and of EPPO proceedings in order to reliably measure the actual impact of their actions and to provide further evidence in support of results-oriented policymaking;

33. Acknowledges that recovery is a powerful deterrent and an effective tool to tackle serious and organised crime and that it is a complex process that requires cooperation within the Commission and with other actors and national authorities as well; notes that the main obstacles to recovery stem from lengthy administrative and judicial proceedings, restrictive conditions for recovering funds under certain measures, and strict limitation periods in sector-specific legislation; calls on the Commission to develop a benchmarking system to measure recovery effectiveness, including indicators such as the ratio between amounts recommended for recovery and those established for recovery, the length of time between the end of the investigation and the recovery decision, and the relationship between the duration of recovery procedures and the results;

21. Expresses its disagreement with the Commission’s reply to its resolution of 6 May 2025, in which it stated that the information on recovery would be accurate and available; stresses that detailed data on effective recoveries following OLAF’s financial recommendations are published neither in the OLAF Annual Report nor in any other Commission official report; regrets that only aggregated data is made available; highlights the persistence of the significant gap between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered from the economic operators; reiterates its call on the Commission to provide data with an adequate level of granularity on recovery and to assess and publish the reasons explaining any such gap;

34. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to ensure effective follow-up of OLAF recommendations and of EPPO proceedings in order to reliably measure the actual impact of their actions and to provide further evidence in support of results-oriented policymaking; calls on the Commission to establish a structured feedback loop on recoveries and precautionary measures following EPPO cases; recalls the recent adoption of Directive (EU) 2024/1260 on asset recovery and confiscation19; highlights the fact that the upcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation could offer the opportunity to clarify the recovery process and to protect the EU’s financial interests after the confiscation has occurred;

35. Welcomes Eurojust’s offer, in the context of the yearly interinstitutional exchange of views in November 2025, to play a bigger role in the recovery process, specifically the contribution that Eurojust contact points could have in the identification and assessment of relevant property in the Member States; calls on the Commission to propose the creation of an EU asset recovery office at Europol, in the framework of the upcoming revision of Europol’s mandate, planned for 2026;

36. Expresses its disagreement with the Commission’s reply to Parliament’s resolution of 6 May 2025, in which it stated that the information on recovery would be accurate and available; stresses that detailed data on effective recoveries following OLAF’s financial recommendations are published neither in the OLAF Annual Report nor in any other Commission official report; regrets the fact that only aggregated data is made available; notes that, following repeated calls by Parliament, the PIF Report 2024 includes figures on recoveries following OLAF recommendations for the period 2022-2024, indicating recovered amounts of EUR 4.5 billion; notes, however, that this figure largely reflects the outcome of a single major case (C-213/1920), accounting for more than EUR 2.7 billion, which limits its value as a benchmark for assessing the overall impact of OLAF’s activities on the EU budget; points out that other Commission data indicate that, between 2015 and 2024, OLAF issued 982 financial recommendations on expenditure, amounting to EUR 3.3 billion; stresses that effective recovery rates remain limited and vary significantly depending on the budget implementation mode, with approximately 38 % under shared management, 14 % under indirect management and 7 % under direct management, resulting in total effective recoveries of EUR 974 million over the same period; expresses concern about the persistence of the significant gap between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered from the economic operators; reiterates its call on the Commission to provide data with an adequate level of granularity on recovery and to assess and publish the reasons explaining any such gap; calls on the Commission to publish an annual breakdown of the legal and administrative bottlenecks preventing recovery, with a comparative analysis of recovery rates across Member States, followed up with recommendations on best practice;

37. Notes the establishment in 2024 of the OLAF Monitoring Site, which should enable centralised and real-time communication within the Commission and its executive agencies, and should contribute to more accurate financial and administrative monitoring of the follow-up to OLAF cases; calls on the Commission to propose those amendments to the existing regulatory framework that are necessary to ensure effective, comprehensive, updated and constant reporting in the IMS; calls on OLAF to live up to its responsibility to support Member States by giving advice and guidance in establishing internal procedures and organisational arrangements, which should be built on the national experiences of the Member States in the relevant sector and which must be embedded into specific guidelines for reporting and monitoring, as well as for the implementation of national anti-fraud strategies (NAFS) and for the organisation of AFCOS;

38. Understands that, after the necessary corrective actions have been taken, the carrying out of further analysis would allow for lessons to be learnt from each case of fraud and for the improvement of the measures that could prevent similar cases from occurring in the future; asks the Commission to support the Member States in the analysis of the enabling factors behind fraud, because this analysis would allow appropriate assessment of the need to revise the national management and control systems accordingly;

39. Notes the findings of the ECA on financial corrections in cohesion policy21; regrets that it took more than 10 years for the Commission to adopt its first financial correction decision for the 2014-2020 period in September 2025, and that several proposed corrections were reduced or even withdrawn without proper justification; calls on the Commission to address the shortcomings identified by the ECA in the application of the financial corrections instrument; points out the need to clarify the legal framework for financial corrections and to work with a clearly defined time frame for procedures in the future to avoid unnecessary delays;

Main threats – organised crime

22.40. Notes that the EPPO reported 385 offences under investigation concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up until the end of 2024 (the EPPO’s 2023 annual report referred to 209 investigations concerned PIF-focused criminal organisations); is aware that the true overall involvement of organised crime and its impact on the deployment of EU resources is not precisely quantifiable; notes that, according to data and analysis provided by the EPPO, in the majority of cases, the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) focus their investigations on the underlying PIF offences (misappropriation, fraud, corruption) and not on the criminal organisation per se, as the EPPO Regulation limits the competence of the EPPO to organised criminal groups whose activity focuses on the commission of PIF offences (Article 22(2) of the EPPO Regulation); recalls that Eurojust can provide assistance in coordinating investigations into crimes against the Union’sEU’s financial interests linked to organised crime; underlines that the EPPO brings added value to the fight against fraud; recalls that Europol supports and strengthens action by the competent authorities of the Member States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime, including those against the EU’s financial interests; stresses that the reality of organised criminal activity on the ground is apparent from an assessment of the extent of the financial damages attributed to VAT fraud, excise duty fraud and customs fraud, where a strong component of organised crime is often present, and which always occurs when large financial volumes are involved; considers that the increasing involvement of organised crime in offences affecting the EU’s financial interests requires improved data analysis capacity at the EU level and the provision of adequate resources for the bodies responsible for combating fraud, as the work carried out by these bodies contributes to generating revenue for the EU budget;

Main threats – VAT fraud

23.41. Notes that there is an increasing number of reported cases of VAT fraud, that in 2023 it was present in around 20 % of the EPPO’s ongoing cases, with 873 cases, and that in 2024, there were a total of 1 287 VAT infringement cases, accounting for 20.29 % of all infringements, causing an estimated loss of EUR 13.5 billion, representing 53 % of the total estimated loss; observes that the current threshold of EUR 10 million, set in the PIF Directive, is not an effective criterion to establish the competence of the EPPO in VAT cases because of inconsistent approaches on interpretation, damage calculation methods and complexity of the cases, weakening the uniform and consistent handling of VAT fraud cases; reiterates its call on the Commission to review the threshold and to guarantee consistent interpretation of the total damage, providing clearer and explicit guidance to Member States;

24.42. Stresses the importance of moving towards digital reporting in order to reduce VAT fraud by up to EUR 11 billion per year and to reduce administrative and compliance costs for EU traders by more than EUR 4.4.1 billion per year over the next 10 years, to also ensure that, in the long term, existing national systems converge across the EU and to pave the way for Member States wishing to introduce national digital reporting systems for domestic trade; stresses the importance of strengthening cross-border cooperation and targeted data sharing between Member States, in compliance with the law, to prevent and combat AI-enabled fraud, notably in high-risk areas such as VAT, customs and EU financial aid; calls on the Commission to support Member States through the development of a coordinated exchange of information to monitor and respond to AI-driven fraudulent activity efficiently and in real time;

25. Stresses that OLAF’s limited and indirect access to certain customs and tax data is a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union; recalls that, in order to obtain certain essential information, especially in the field of VAT, OLAF must go through the competent national administrations, resulting in delays that are incompatible with the speed of fraud mechanisms; calls, therefore, for OLAF’s access to relevant data to be improved without delay, in line with the applicable legal framework;

43. Is aware of the increasing risk of AI-generated content used to compromise procurement procedures or financial operations and to mislead investigations or falsify contracts and for digital identity theft; deems it necessary to launch a dedicated EU-wide initiative to develop AI-driven fraud detection mechanisms by OLAF, the EPPO and Europol focused on financial crimes against the EU budget; calls on the Commission and the Member States to integrate AI and data analytics into fraud detection systems, ensuring interoperability between national and EU-level databases while maintaining strong data protection safeguards; reiterates its call for the establishment of a mandatory forensic verification process for all digital evidence submitted in financial fraud cases, ensuring the authenticity of documents and audio and video material used in investigations;

44. Stresses that OLAF’s limited and indirect access to certain customs and tax data is a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU; recalls that, in order to obtain certain essential information, especially in the field of VAT, OLAF must go through the competent national administrations, resulting in delays that are incompatible with the speed of fraud mechanisms; calls, therefore, for OLAF’s access to relevant data to be improved without delay, in line with the applicable legal framework; notes the early-warning and risk-analysis role of Eurofisc in detecting cross-border VAT carousel fraud;

45. Maintains that both OLAF and EPPO require direct and timely access to relevant VAT data in order to carry out effective and efficient investigations into intra-Community VAT fraud; considers, in fact, that limitations in access to tax and customs data do not affect OLAF alone but the AFA as a whole; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission proposal of 14 November 202522 to amend Regulation (EU) No 904/2010, which would improve access to VAT information at EU level for both bodies, strengthen cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO and significantly enhance the effectiveness of investigations; calls for the swift adoption and implementation of the proposed amended regulation;

Main threats – corruption

26.46. Is aware that corruption is a crime closely linked to many serious forms of misconduct; notes that corruption is intrinsically linked to money laundering and that money laundering is one of the main drivers of illegal activities of organised crime, as it allows criminals to transfer the proceeds of their crime into the legal economy; observes that corruption is also detected on a recurrent basis in cases of fraud affecting the financial interests of the UnionEU and notesnotes, in this regardregard, the analysis that explores the relationship between corruption and fraud presented in the 2024 PIF Report, targeting corruption cases reported since 2007 for the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 programming periods in the area of cohesion; underlines that the proposed anti-corruption directive (COM(2023)0234), currently under consideration by the co-legislators, recognises the link between corruption and money laundering and provides for a specific aggravating circumstance for entities engaging in corruption offences; recognises that heterogeneous national systems and fragmented application of the EU anti-money laundering framework have made it difficult to prevent, detect and combat money laundering;

27.47. Stresses that, with regard to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 191 offences investigated at the end of 2024 (compared to 131 at the end of 2023 and 87 in 2022); notes that the 2024 PIF reportReport revealed that 56 cases were reported to the Commission through the IMS by seven countries between 2020 and 2024; stresses that the comparison of data from different sources and an analysis based on data from 2007 to 2023 clearly indicate that Member States do not report sufficient fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS; underlines that organised criminal groups are increasingly exploiting corruption to infiltrate public administrations to distort procurement processes and secure illicit economic advantages; observes that the study on high-risk corruption areas of 4 November 202423 indicates that public procurement, construction and infrastructure, and healthcare are the areas most at risk of overlaps between fraud and corruption; notes that, when reported, corruption mainly concerns public procurement, with around 20 % of these corruption cases detected by a control having started following alerts by whistleblowers or information published in the media; notes that 25 % of irregularities were instead detected due to a control that started in the absence of specific allegations or suspicions, thus due to a similar chance or situation and not due to an appropriate risk analysis; concludes that reporting and detection are not optimal and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to strengthen thetargeted, userisk-based ofdetection specifictools analysis-basedand detectionproactive tools;investigation strategies, rather than relying on non-systematic controls; calls also for greater transparency for the general public through wider publication on– online and through other channels accessible to the internetgeneral public – of detailed information about the use of EuropeanEU funds, the full identity of final beneficiariesbeneficiaries, given that this concerns public money, the outcomes of subsidised programmes and projects, and the results of public procurement procedures; considers that the low level of reporting of fraudulent irregularities related to corruption in the IMS points to structural deficiencies in detection and reporting systems; calls on the Commission itself to lead by example and assess the quality and completeness of the data transmitted by Member States and to issue specific recommendations to address these deficiencies; acknowledges that anti-corruption strategies are in place in the Member States, but underlines that their evaluation and periodical revision are needed; encourages the Commission to monitor the progress of the actions launched in the Member States, provide periodic updates and report on the analyses carried out by the competent authorities of the Member States, and to lead by example itself;

28.48. Calls,Stresses that the protection of the EU’s financial interests must be fully integrated into enlargement policy; underlines that candidate countries must demonstrate their capacity to prevent, detect and address fraud and corruption affecting public funds, in line with EU rules and standards; calls on the Commission to implement stronger transparency rules with regard to EU funds being granted to non-EU countries, and calls, before any further enlargement of the EU, for a thorough examination of the effectiveness of control systems and safeguards for the protection of the EU’s financial interests and of the state of corruption in the candidate countries, including their anti-corruption frameworks, judicial independence and administrative capacity, especially if they become net beneficiaries of the budget after accession, in order to guard against any drift and any damage to the financial interests of the UnionEU by a future Member State; stresses that, in the event of the integration into the EU of a country presenting problems in these areas, effective controls and post-accession monitoring are essential;

Main threats – conflicts of interest

29.49. Maintains, as indicated in the ECA’s audit work, that the main source of information on conflicts of interest is the IMS and that the quantity and quality of data recorded in the IMS varies from one Member State to another; is aware that Member States have so far failed to report cases of conflict of interest that were part of a wider fraud case; notes thatthat, by the end of 2024, 418 cases related to conflicts of interest had been reported through the IMS (92 % concerned cohesion, 3 % agriculture and 3 % pre-accession), representing around EUR 159 million;

30.50. Notes thatthat, in 2024, Member States focused on preventing ‘conflicts of interest’ and that the adoption of 30 measures was reported by 16 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden); notes that these measures targeting conflicts of interest revolve around training and capacity building, management and deterrence, transparency and improved governance; notes that these measures place a strong focus on prevention and detection, suggesting a transition to comprehensive conflict of interest management systems that use both human oversight and technological innovation to reduce fraud risks;

31.51. Notes that the ECA has identified weaknesses in national control systems designed to ensure compliance with EU rules, in particular on public procurement and State aid, which increases the risk of undetected conflicts of interest; notes that these weaknesses concern the content, quality, timing and documentation of controls;

32. Recalls that the budgetary conditionality mechanism established by the Conditionality Regulation is a legally regulated tool to prevent risks to the Union budget; notes that its application can, however, be justified only where there is a direct, real and demonstrated link between the failures found and the harm to the financial interests of the Union; expresses its concern that any extension of its scope beyond this budgetary purpose would be contrary to the spirit of the Treaties and the principle of proportionality; recalls that the legitimacy of this mechanism is based on a strictly objective application, free from any political considerations, and respectful of equal treatment between Member States;

52. Welcomes the Commission’s ongoing revision of the handbook on reporting irregularities in shared management24, in cooperation with Member State experts, and expects reporting of conflict of interest cases in the IMS to be comprehensive, detailed and legally certain, allowing for clear and proportionate assessment; commends, furthermore, the dedicated focus group on conflict of interest prevention and detection held during the 2024 annual technical working meeting with national audit bodies for the RRF; calls for measures addressing conflicts of interests to be implemented in a way that ensures legal certainty, and for these measures to be based on a clear and proportionate assessment of the risks and allow for their practical application by the competent authorities;

53. Recalls that the budgetary conditionality mechanism established by the Conditionality Regulation is a legally regulated tool to prevent risks to the EU budget; notes that its application can, however, be justified only where there is a direct, real and demonstrated link between the failures found and the harm to the financial interests of the EU; expresses its concern that any extension of its scope beyond this budgetary purpose would be contrary to the spirit of the Treaties and the principle of proportionality; recalls that the legitimacy of this mechanism is based on a strictly objective application, free from any political considerations, and respectful of equal treatment between Member States; notes that its implementation has raised practical and operational challenges, as highlighted by ECA special report 03/2024 on the rule of law in the EU; calls on the Commission to apply the mechanism consistently and transparently on the basis of objective evidence;

54. Maintains that the integrity and reputation of the EU’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies is a core element of citizens’ trust; believes that accountability in the use of EU budget resources is crucial for democratic legitimacy, and that requirements related to transparency and the protection of the EU’s financial interests must apply equally to every beneficiary and without exception within each EU institution, including Parliament, in order to guarantee sound financial management and effective controls for public funds;

Revenue

33.55. Stresses that at a time when Europeanthe EU institutions are regularly debating introducing new own resources, priority should instead be given to enhancing fraud prevention and detection through strengthened controls, which would enablereduce revenue losses and ensure the recovery of funds legitimately owed to the EU and currently lost; considers that a rigorous analysis of the potential for recovering revenue currently lost due to fraud and evasion should therefore be carried out;

34. Stresses that VAT remains an essential resource for the EU budget24 and reiterates its concerns about the substantial financial damage caused by cross-border fraud, including VAT fraud, due to the increasing involvement of organised crime groups; stresses that at the end of 2024, the EPPO reported 767 active investigations with a cross-border dimension, of which 573 (74 %) related to revenue, including 416 related to VAT fraud, 86 to non-VAT fraud and 71 to combined fraud; notes that the estimated total financial damage amounted to EUR 13.6 billion, representing 87 % of the financial damage related to cross-border fraud, with a significant negative impact on national budgets, tax fairness and fair competition; considers, however, that the analysis and quantification of these phenomena should be based on homogeneous data and uniform reporting standards, taking into account the system of own resources of the Union;

56. Insists that stepping up protection of existing revenue represents a direct and sustainable means of strengthening the EU budget; recalls that every euro recovered through effective anti-fraud measures is a euro that does not need to be raised through additional taxation of EU citizens; considers that the protection of the EU’s revenue should become a strategic priority of the AFA, reflected both in the allocation of resources and in the operational planning of the competent actors at EU and national levels;

35. Notes that in 2024, the Commission estimated the 2022 VAT compliance gap at EUR 89.3 billion, representing 7.0 % of the total VAT liability; recalls that the VAT compliance gap measures the difference between the VAT revenue that would be collected in case of full compliance and the actual revenue collected and that it is not only the result of fraud, evasion or other misconduct, but also of insolvency, bankruptcy and administrative errors; maintains, however, that VAT fraud contributes significantly to VAT non-compliance and considers that digital tools and enhanced cooperation between national tax authorities and relevant EU investigative bodies are effective means to address this issue and should be encouraged and further developed; understands that, based on this data, the gap has been narrowing since 2018, when it was estimated at EUR 121.2 billion, representing 11.2 % of the total VAT due;

57. Stresses that VAT remains an essential resource for the EU budget25 and reiterates its concerns about the substantial financial damage caused by cross-border fraud, including VAT fraud; considers that the scale and sophistication of fraud affecting the EU's financial interests, particularly on the revenue side of the budget, point to the significant involvement of serious and organised crime groups; stresses that at the end of 2024, the EPPO reported 767 active investigations with a cross-border dimension, of which 573 (74 %) were related to revenue, including 416 related to VAT fraud, 86 to non-VAT fraud and 71 to combined fraud; notes that the estimated total financial damage amounted to EUR 13.6 billion, representing 87 % of the financial damage related to cross-border fraud, with a significant negative impact on national budgets, tax fairness and fair competition; considers, however, that the analysis and quantification of these phenomena should be based on homogeneous data and uniform reporting standards, taking into account the EU’s system of own resources, in particular when quantifying the financial impact of the EPPO’s activities and the recovery expectations;

36. Notes the need to strengthen operational cooperation between the EPPO, OLAF, the customs and tax authorities of the Member States and European law enforcement authorities; stresses that the massive customs and VAT fraud uncovered reveals persistent loopholes in the chain of control, from customs clearance to the distribution of goods within the internal market; considers that stricter surveillance of high-risk imports and better exchange of data in real time are essential conditions for preventing the recurrence of systemic fraud of this magnitude; notes, in particular, that many ports in Europe are vulnerable places jeopardising the protection of the Union’s financial interests and that a major plan should be launched to make these gateways safer and better controlled, bearing in mind that, while the means put in place to monitor them cost money, they also make it possible to bring in additional, sometimes significant, revenue;

58. Notes that in 2024, the Commission estimated the 2022 VAT compliance gap at EUR 89.3 billion, representing 7.0 % of the total VAT liability; recalls that the VAT compliance gap measures the difference between the VAT revenue that would be collected in case of full compliance and the actual revenue collected and that it is not only the result of fraud, evasion or other misconduct, but also of insolvency, bankruptcy and administrative errors; maintains, however, that VAT fraud contributes significantly to VAT non-compliance and considers that digital tools and enhanced cooperation between national tax authorities and relevant EU investigative bodies are effective means to address this issue and should be encouraged and further developed; understands that, based on this data, the gap has been narrowing since 2018, when it was estimated at EUR 121.2 billion, representing 11.2 % of the total VAT due;

59. Notes the need to strengthen operational cooperation between the EPPO, OLAF, the customs and tax authorities of the Member States and EU law enforcement authorities; stresses that the massive customs and VAT fraud uncovered reveals persistent loopholes in the chain of control, from customs clearance to the distribution of goods within the internal market; considers that stricter surveillance of high-risk imports and better exchange of data in real time are essential conditions for preventing the recurrence of systemic fraud of this magnitude; notes, in particular, that many ports in Europe are vulnerable places jeopardising the protection of the EU’s financial interests and that a major plan should be launched to make these gateways safer and better controlled, bearing in mind that, while the means put in place to monitor them cost money, they also make it possible to bring in additional, sometimes significant, revenue;

Expenditure

37.60. MaintainsUnderlines that, when assessing models for the implementation of EU spending, account should be taken of exposure to the risks of fraud and other misuse; regrets that the remarks repeatedly made by Parliament and the ECA and inspired by the design and implementation of the RRF have been neglectedignored in the proposed design of future EU funding instruments, notably in the post-2027 MFF; stresses that shortcomings have been identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud and double funding, lack of transparency, limited data accessibilityaccessibility, insufficient traceability of final recipients and opaque overall management,management and that theythese shouldshortcomings haveshould servedserve as a lesson for improving the design and governance of the future EU financial frameworks; recalls that the RRF is an exceptional and temporary instrument; reiterates its opposition to any replication of the RRF model in its current form and calls for any future performance-based funding to be provided with significantly stricter safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms in order to ensure the proper management of EU funds;funds, demonstrate clear added value for EU citizens and comply with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness;

38.61. Reiterates its concerns about the financial impact of irregularities detected and reported in the field of agriculture, recalling that, according to the ECA, the rural development area is exposed to a higher risk of error than direct payments to farmers; notes furthermore that in 2024, Member States reported the first fraudulent irregularities related to expenditure under their new CAP Strategic Plans, with around 25 % of fraudulent irregularities reported that year related to expenditure under those plans, almost all linked to climate and environment programmes;programmes, which suggests the need for strengthened controls to ensure sound use of the resources deployed to pursue the EU's objectives;

39.62. Notes that, as regards expenditure in direct management mode, in 2024, the Commission reported that it had registered 1 040 recovery posts classified as irregularities in ABAC, for a total amount of EUR 135.39 million, and that 63 of the posts were reported as fraudulent, for a total amount of EUR 62.44 million; notes that, on average, during the period 2020-2024, 43 recovery posts were classified as fraudulent irregularities per year and that the ratio between the financial amounts affected by these irregularities and the total expenditure under direct management was very low (0.05 %); notes that during the same period, 4 692 recovery posts were registered as non-fraudulent irregularities, for a total recovery amount of EUR 268.32 million, and that the ratio between the financial amounts involved in these irregularities and the total expenditure under direct management was around 0.15 %;

NextGenerationEU and the Recovery and Resilience Facility

40.63. Is deeply concerned about the ECA’s findings that the stock of EU loans increased by more than 30 % in 2024, as a direct result of the use of capital markets to finance large-scale programmes such as SURE and NGEU; notes that the total outstanding debt of the UnionEU could exceed EUR 900 billion by 2027, almost 10 times higher than the level observed in 2020 before the creation of NGEU; notes the absence of a clear, predictable and credible deleveraging strategy, even though the rapid and continuous growth of debt exposes the EU budget to increased sustainability risks, particularly in times of high interest rates; stresses that the dramatic increase in the Union’sEU’s indebtedness is automatically restricting the budgetary margins available in the current MFF; calls on the Commission to present without delay a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s debt sustainability, including medium- and long-term management scenarios, and to identify the measures necessary to ensure that debt developments do not jeopardise fiscal stability or the protection of the EU’s financial interests; urges the Commission to increase transparency on emissions, borrowing costs and associated risks, in line with the recommendations of the ECA; insists that, as a result of this unprecedented fiscal pressure, a rigorous cost-benefit analysis should be mandatory for all new EU spending programmes;

41.64. Notes that there are still inconsistencies in the reports, for example on NGEU and the RRF, thus demonstrating the limitations of the flexible instruments that the Commission intends to replicate,replicate; fornotes which,with concern, in fact, that in 2023, the EPPO reported having many ongoing investigations (233) into the recovery and resilience programmes whose estimated related financial losses werestood worryingat (EUREUR 1.86 billion);billion; notes thatthat, at the end of 2024, the EPPO was handling 311 NGEU-related active cases, including 307 from the RRF, corresponding to around 17 % of all active investigations into expenditure fraud; notes that, according to the EPPO, the estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of the Union amounts to EUR 2.8 billion, corresponding to 30 % of the total estimated damage for expenditure fraud (compared to 25 % last year); stresses, however, that in the 2023 PIF report, EPPO cases were not included in the analysis of fraud and irregularities affecting expenditure, unlike in other expenditure items, and that in the 2024 PIF Report different data is reported on EPPO investigations related to the RRF (279 investigations instead of 307, for an estimated total damage of EUR 2.7 billion instead of EUR 2.8 billion); calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the EPPO, to ensure consistent and clearly explained reporting of RRF and NGEU case figures across Commission and EPPO publications, including transparent reconciliation of methodological differences, to avoid weakening oversight and public trust;

42.65. Points out that the annual payments of grants under the RRF financed by NGEU reached only half of the amount anticipated by the Commission in June 2023 (EUR 96 billion); notes that by December 2024, 15 Member States had submitted payment requests for a total amount of EUR 58.5 billion;

43.66. Notes that RRF grants paid to Member States in 2024 amounted to EUR 55 896 million, which is more than the remainder of expenditure under direct management (EUR 50 172 million) and that, overall, 23 Member States received grants under the RRF, as well as loans, which in 2024 amounted to EUR 29 446 million; observes that Germany received the largest amount (EUR 13 514 million), followed by Spain and France (EUR 10 926 million and EUR 7 483 million, respectively) and that only a few countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Luxembourg and Sweden) received no grants;

44.67. Underlines that thein CommissionABAC, recordedat 1the 040end recoveryof items2024, inamong ABACthe thatrecovery wereitems classifiedrecorded asby operatingthe irregularitiesCommission under the Commission’s direct management, amounting to EURmanagement 135.39implementation millionmode and(1 reported040 as fraudulent in 63 cases,irregularities totallingand EURthe 62.4463 million,as butfraudulent), underlinesthere thatare no RRF-related irregularities were reported in ABAC at the end of 2024;irregularities; asks the Commission to report on the results of the implementation of Annex IV of the RRP Guidelines25Guidelines26 on the RRF reduction and recovery framework; points out that, according to data published in the EPPO’s 2024 annual report, 311 NGEU-related cases were ongoing at the end of 2024, all but four of which concerned the RRF, accounting for around 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations; notes that the estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of the Union amounts to EUR 2.8 billion, representing 30 % of the total financial damage related to expenditure fraud in the EU-27, compared to 25 % in 2023;

45.68. Stresses the need for greater transparency in the implementation of the RRF and recalls that the ‘final beneficiary’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, so that information on the ‘final beneficiary’ must be made available; regrets that Member States are only required to publish information on the 100 final beneficiaries receiving the highest amounts, which constitutes an arbitrary limit preventing any visibility onof the actual majority of beneficiaries and onof the potential risksrisks; considers that publishing information beyond the 100 final beneficiaries is necessary and would support the effective identification of risks related to fraud, mismanagement or conflicts of interest; points out that the examination of national practices reveals significant discrepancies in disclosure methods because some Member States report the amounts actually disbursed, others the amounts simply allocated, while others are limited to partial data or combined with national funding, which undermines the comparability, readability and reliability of the information published; calls for the publication of the full list of final recipients and beneficial owners for RRF-funded measures in a harmonised, machine-readable format across the Member States; stresses the need for a single audit trail in the future MFF allowing for budget contributions to be traced to the projects funded and the final beneficiaries, defined as the economic operators, not the receiving administrative entities; calls on the Commission to introduce mandatory fraud and irregularity reporting via the IMS for all RRF-related cases;

46.69. Reiterates its call on the Commission to strengthen its controls on the risk of double funding resulting from the financing, by both the EU budget and the RRF, of similar measures in similar areas, such as transport and energy infrastructure, which is enabled by the standard complementarity between the RRF and other EU instruments; recalls that the RRF is not linked to the reimbursement of costs actually incurred, but rather rewards the achievement of milestones and targets that could have been fully financed by funds other than the RRF, without this being noted due to the absence of a link in the RRF with the reimbursement of costs actually incurred; considers that limited data exchanges and insufficient use of data miningdata-mining tools such as ARACHNE, together with a lack of direct access to the full list of RRF final beneficiaries, increase the level of risk; welcomes the precautions taken by some Member States to avoid combining the RRF with other UnionEU instruments in order to mitigate the risk of double funding; reiterates its calls on the Commission to maintain adequate ex post audit procedures and to pay close attention to the risk of reversal after payment for the achievement of targets previously audited and assessed as satisfactorily fulfilled; calls on the Commission to accelerate work aimed at maximising the use of data-mining tools (including ARACHNE) to prevent double funding and detect cross-border patterns;

External dimension of the protection of the financial interests of the Union

70. Underlines that at the current expectedly advanced implementing stage of the RRF, the scarce information on results and the lack of information on actual costs is concerning; observes that the Commission mainly relies on Member States to detect and correct serious irregularities affecting the RRF and to ensure compliance with EU and national rules, but that national controls systems have weaknesses for which remedies could not be found at the implementation stage; stresses that this results in a substantial lack of sufficient assurance that control systems adequately protect the EU’s financial interests, in the context of an error-prone facility, weakened by ambiguities in the legal framework, with often vaguely defined milestones and targets and where the fraud risk is high; reiterates its call on the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

47. Appreciates the Union’s efforts, on the recommendation of the ECA, to ensure that anti-corruption measures are integrated into the EU’s external action instruments; maintains its recommendation to suspend budget support and withdraw funds from non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities clearly do not take any concrete action against widespread corruption, without compromising support to citizens;

External dimension of the protection of the EU’s financial interests

48. Takes note of the conclusions of ECA special report 15/2025 on EU humanitarian aid under remote management, recognising that this management approach provides a useful framework for providing life-saving assistance in hard-to-reach areas, but that there are weaknesses in its design and implementation; observes that the Commission recognises that remote management is inherently more risky than direct implementation and that fraud and aid diversion are among the main risks, as the inability of humanitarian organisations and donors to monitor action on the ground increases the level of risk; notes that the Commission has a dedicated team, as do all donors, to deal with suspected cases of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses, however, that its risk register does not take into account the impact that remote management may have on the likelihood and impact of non-critical risks identified, such as the risk of reputational damage in the event of fraud, misuse of aid or non-compliance with ethical standards; stresses, in particular, that the insufficient integration of the risks inherent in remote management into its risk management, control and audit strategy may limit its ability to prevent, detect and adequately manage those risks, which entails a risk of damage to its reputation in the event of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses that the control strategy does not provide for any specific checks to address the inherent risks of remote management and that it does not take into account the impact of remote management on control tasks related to the fight against fraud or audits on the ground; underlines that, in fact, in the Commission’s 2021-2027 audit strategy, actions managed remotely do not automatically receive a higher risk rating in the risk-based selection of actions to be audited, despite the specific difficulties these actions face; agrees with the ECA’s recommendations, fully accepted by the Commission, on the need to improve the approach and guidance on remote management, to strengthen the certification process for non-governmental organisation partners, to verify the information provided by partners and to report on remote management to stakeholders; urges the Commission to act accordingly and to implement the ECA’s recommendation, which is fully accepted;

71. Appreciates the EU’s efforts, on the recommendation of the ECA, to ensure that anti-corruption measures are integrated into the EU’s external action instruments; maintains its recommendation to suspend budget support and withdraw funds from non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities fail to take effective action against widespread corruption, while ensuring support for citizens;

72. Takes note of the conclusions of ECA special report 15/2025 on EU humanitarian aid under remote management, recognising that this management approach provides a useful framework for providing life-saving assistance in hard-to-reach areas, but that there are weaknesses in its design and implementation; observes that the Commission recognises that remote management is inherently more risky than direct implementation and that fraud and aid diversion are among the main risks, as the inability of humanitarian organisations and donors to monitor action on the ground increases the level of risk; notes that the Commission has a dedicated team, as do all donors, to deal with suspected cases of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses, however, that its risk register does not take into account the impact that remote management may have on the likelihood and impact of non-critical risks identified, such as the risk of reputational damage in the event of fraud, misuse of aid or non-compliance with ethical standards; stresses, in particular, that the insufficient integration of the risks inherent in remote management into its risk management, control and audit strategy may limit its ability to prevent, detect and adequately manage those risks, which entails a risk of damage to its reputation in the event of fraud and misuse of aid; stresses that the control strategy does not provide for any specific checks to address the inherent risks of remote management and that it does not take into account the impact of remote management on control tasks related to the fight against fraud or audits on the ground; underlines that, in fact, in the Commission’s 2021-2027 audit strategy, actions managed remotely do not automatically receive a higher risk rating in the risk-based selection of actions to be audited, despite the specific difficulties these actions face; agrees with the ECA’s recommendations, fully accepted by the Commission, on the need to improve the approach and guidance on remote management, to strengthen the certification process for non-governmental organisation partners, to verify the information provided by partners and to report on remote management to stakeholders; urges the Commission to exercise particular vigilance in order to act accordingly, including by ensuring, in high-risk environments, that remote management systematically results in a higher risk rating for audit selection and in more robust verification of partner-reported information and strengthened fraud-prevention and whistleblowing channels; urges the Commission, furthermore, to implement the ECA’s recommendation, which was fully accepted;

73. Stresses that Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction needs are considerable and must be urgently addressed to achieve a lasting peace;

74. Expresses concern about recent reports of corruption cases, including allegations involving high-level officials in Ukraine; encourages Ukraine to continue its reforms, including efforts to address the influence of oligarchs, and calls on the Commission to further strengthen its oversight of EU-funded activities in the country;

75. Stresses that EU support for Ukraine, as for any non-EU country, must be accompanied by robust measures to protect the EU’s financial interests, including effective prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities, in order to ensure that EU funds are properly monitored and reach their intended beneficiaries;

76. Recalls that the Ukraine Facility, established by Regulation (EU) 2024/79227, is the EU’s main instrument to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and reforms, providing up to EUR 50 billion for the period 2024-2027; underlines the conditionality linked to the implementation of agreed reforms and respect for EU values; notes the role of the Framework Agreement between the EU and Ukraine28 in setting out safeguards to prevent and address fraud and corruption affecting the EU’s financial interests, including cooperation with OLAF; takes note of the designation of the State Audit Service of Ukraine as the national anti-fraud coordination point;

77. Appreciates the work of OLAF and the EPPO in protecting EU funds deployed in Ukraine, including recent investigations into serious irregularities in EU-funded procurement and recalls that EPPO competences extend to EU funds even when used in non-EU countries; underlines the role of the Member States, OLAF and the EPPO in preventing the circumvention of sanctions and in protecting the EU’s financial interests; calls for the Commission to further strengthen controls on EU support to Ukraine, including where fraud risks involve economic operators located outside Ukraine; encourages continued cooperation between EU bodies and the Ukrainian authorities;

°

° °

49.78. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The INI Report identifies the main threats and weaknesses of the current framework at Union’s and Member States’ levels, including organised crime, corruption, under-reported conflict of interests and VAT fraud. The analysis highlights shortcomings in the implementation of performance-based instruments and external actions and it recommends to devote additional efforts and adequate resources to the key components of the anti-fraud cycle: not only investigations and prosecution, but in particular detection and prevention are crucial stages, too often underrated in the setting of national and European strategies. Persistent legislative fragmentation and the underfunding of national anti-fraud authorities, combined with the growing complexity of transnational fraudulent schemes and international financial flows, represent challenges that call for enhanced cooperation among the anti-fraud authorities. Greater day-to-day transparency beyond the annual reporting obligation and improved reporting practices are required, including on recovery. The development of new technologies should be further pursued, making use of strengthened IT tools, the digitalisation of processes, databases interoperability and the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) in the main controlling processes. The INI Report calls for more tangible and result-oriented efforts to ensure that the Union’s resources are correctly deployed and the financial interests are safeguarded for the benefit of all European citizens.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not include in his report input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

5.3.2026

MINORITY POSITION

pursuant to Rule 56(4) of the Rules of Procedure

Gilles BOYER

Renew Europe voted against the report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests. While the report contains useful elements on the evolution of fraud risks and the functioning of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, we were unable to support the text in its current form.

In our view, the report does not sufficiently insist on the fundamental link between the protection of the Union’s financial interests and respect for the rule of law in the Member States. Sound financial management of the EU budget cannot be ensured where systemic rule of law deficiencies undermine public authorities, judicial independence or the effective investigation and prosecution of fraud. We also regret that the report gives insufficient attention to the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation as a key instrument for safeguarding the EU budget. Furthermore, we believe the role of civil society organisations, independent media and investigative journalism in detecting and exposing the misuse of public funds deserves stronger recognition.

Our vote should not be interpreted as a lack of commitment to protecting the EU budget. On the contrary, we remain committed to strengthening transparency, accountability and the protection of the Union’s financial interests.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted

5.3.2026

Result of final vote

+ : 15

- : 12

0 : 1

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

15

+

ECR

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Beatrice Timgren

NI

Thomas Geisel

PPE

Georgios Aftias, Raúl de la Hoz Quintano, Dirk Gotink, Niclas Herbst, Jacek Protas, Andreas Schwab, Tomás Zdechovský

PfE

Angéline Furet, Virginie Joron, Ondrej Knotek, Julien Sanchez

12

-

Renew

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy

S&D

José Cepeda, Maria Grapini, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Thomas Pellerin-Carlin

The Left

Rudi Kennes, Jonas Sjöstedt

Verts/ALE

Daniel Freund, Rasmus Nordqvist

1

0

PPE

Kinga Kollár

Key:

+ : in favour

- : against

0 : abstentions