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From · opinion parliamentary committee draft · 2022-03-16 CONT-PA-719717 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) 1094/2010, (EU) 1095/2010

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To · opinion parliamentary committee · 2022-05-17 BUDG-AD-719588 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) 1094/2010, (EU) 1095/2010

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SHORT JUSTIFICATION

As the Court of Auditors have recently found, EU-level action in the fight against ML/TF has significant weaknesses. There is institutional fragmentation and poor co-ordination at EU level when it comes to actions to prevent ML/TF and take action where risk is identified. The EU bodies that the Court audited have limited tools at present to ensure sufficient application of AML/CFT frameworks at national level. There is no single EU supervisor for ML/TF and the EU’s powers in relation to ML/TF is split between several bodies and co-ordination with Member States is carried out separately.

According to Europol, around 1% of the EU’s GDP is involved in suspect financial activity. Money laundering and use of laundered illicit proceeds to finance terrorism pose a serious threat to the EU’s economy, to the wider financial system and to the security of Union citizens. Effective measures at EU level to tackle money laundering and counter terrorism financing are therefore essential.

Furthermore, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has recently highlighted that competent authorities’ approaches to identifying and tackling ML/TF risks differed significantly across them, and varied beyond what would have been expected under a risk-based approach. According to the EBA, there is a risk that relevant risk exposures in Member States may have not been detected. Additionally, EBA also found that not all of the competent authorities took advantage of the existing cooperation channels to exchange information and improve the understanding of the risks to which their sector was exposed.

The Commission’s proposal to establish a new decentralised agency - the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) - stems from the May 2020 ‘Action Plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and terrorist financing’ and is part of a package of four legislative proposals presented in July 2021. Under the proposal, AMLA would be responsible for coordinating national supervisory authorities to ensure correct and consistent application of EU rules and for supporting Financial Intelligence Units to enhance their analytical capacity and ability to provide effective financial intelligence for use in law enforcement. It would also directly supervise some of the riskiest financial institutions operating in a number of Member States or requiring immediate action to address imminent risks.

Work in the CONT Committee has always focused on the consideration of fraud and irregularities in the implementation of the budget of the Union, measures aimed at preventing and prosecuting such cases, the strict protection of the Union’s financial interests and the relevant actions by the European Public Prosecutor in this field, and relations with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). Recent work of this Committee on the assessment of the impact of organised crime on own resources of the EU and on the misuse of EU funds with a particular focus on shared management from an auditing and control perspective has resulted in the identification of money laundering as a risk element, as well as a facilitator of organised crime. There is strong evidence that the fight against money laundering is crucial to prevent the misuse of funds by criminal organisations. In this sense, the recently launched Operation Sentinel will target fraud against COVID-19 EU recovery funds being offered under the framework of the NextGenerationEU initiative, and will target fraud, as well as tax evasion, excise fraud, corruption, embezzlement, misappropriation and money laundering.

Your Rapporteur welcomes the central aims of the proposal and is convinced that AMLA can help improve the detection of suspicious transactions and close loopholes currently being exploited by criminals and terrorists. Nevertheless, in line with his approach to decentralised agency files, he considers that the policy substance of the proposal should be dealt with by the lead committees.

That is why the establishment of the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism is welcomed, as it addresses some of the identified shortcomings. This opinion, based on the expertise of the CONT Committee in the area, focuses on several areas on which further options to deepen the effectiveness of the new Authority are possible.

As such, the draft opinion focuses on those areas where the Committee on Budgets can add value, therefore in particular on the financial provisions, governance rules and provisions relating to reporting and evaluation to ensure proper parliamentary scrutiny. Your Rapporteur assesses the proposal notably against the 2019 Schoepflin report, the Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on decentralised agencies of 19 July 2012 and the Common Approach and the Framework Financial Regulation governing decentralised agencies.

In this sense, this draft opinion focuses on suggestions to improve the transparency and governance of the Authority, including an enhanced role of Europol, OLAF and EPPO. It also includes suggestions to reinforce the role of financial intelligence units, including on the overall training and assistance provided by the Authority. Finally, there are also suggestions related to the role of ECA, as well as on the discharge procedure.

Budgetary impact and financial provisions

According to the Commission proposal, AMLA will need to be fully resourced by the end of 2025 to enable direct supervision to begin in early 2026. AMLA would then have estimated annual outgoings of EUR 45.6 million and a staff of 250. The agency would be partially self-financed through fees, as is the case with a handful of existing agencies, such as the European Medicines Agency. The Commission intends that 75% of the agency’s revenue would come from fees levied on entities subject to anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism rules (‘obliged entities’) and the remaining 25% from the EU budget. The EU budget contribution is to come from the margin under Heading 1, which is to be welcomed as the creation of AMLA should therefore have no direct impact on existing programmes or other expenditure lines.

Your Rapporteur introduces a set of targeted amendments: a) to emphasise the need for the agency to be resourced in a manner commensurate with its tasks and responsibilities and to have the necessary autonomy over contract agent recruitment, learning the lessons from the early staffing challenges of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, b) to ensure that fees are calculated in such a way as to provide a stable revenue stream and thus predictability for the EU budget and c) to enhance transparency regarding all AMLA revenue. It will be essential in discussions on the scope of AMLA’s mandate to bear in mind the budgetary impact of any changes and to consider where potential additional resources may be found.

Governance, parliamentary scrutiny and evaluation

Your Rapporteur introduces a number of more technical amendments to ensure that provisions in the AMLA regulation comply fully with the principles in the Common Approach. This includes removing the Commission’s veto right over administrative and budgetary decisions taken by the Executive Board where it in any case has a voting right in accordance with standard practice in agency governance. Autonomy in budgetary and administrative decision-making is important for the Authority’s effectiveness.

Other amendments seek to enhance parliamentary scrutiny and accountability with respect to multiannual programming and the appointment of the Chair of the Authority and to ensure that the performance of the agency is fully assessed on a five-yearly basis to ensure that EU funds are being spent effectively.

AMENDMENTS

The Committee on ~~Budgetary Control~~Budgets calls on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, as the ~~committees~~committee responsible, to take into account the following amendments:

Amendment 1

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 62

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6) Combining both direct and indirect supervisory competences over obliged entities, and also functioning as a support and cooperation mechanism for FIUs, is the most appropriate means of bringing about supervision and cooperation between FIUs at Union level. This should be achieved by creating an Authority which should combine independence and a high level of technical expertise and which should be established in line with the Joint Statement and Common Approach of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on decentralised agencies32 .

(2) Cross-border nature of crime and criminal proceeds endanger Union financial system efforts relating to prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism. Those efforts have to be tackled at Union level through the creation of an Authority responsible for contributing to the implementation of harmonised rules. In addition, the Authority should pursue a harmonised approach to strengthen the Union’s existing AML/CFT preventive framework, and specifically AML supervision and cooperation between FIUs. That approach should reduce divergences in national legislation and supervisory practices and introduce structures that benefit the smooth functioning of the internal market in a determined manner and should, consequently, be based on Article 114 TFEU.

(6) Combining both direct and indirect supervisory competences over obliged entities, and also functioning as a support and cooperation mechanism for FIUs, is the most appropriate means of bringing about supervision and cooperation between FIUs at Union level. This should be achieved by creating an Authority which should combine independence and a high level of technical expertise and which should be established and governed in accordance with the principles set out in the Joint Statement and Common Approach of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on decentralised agencies32 .

(2) The cross-border nature of crime and criminal proceeds endanger the Union financial system's efforts relating to the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism and organised crime. Those efforts have to be tackled at Union level through the creation of an Authority responsible for contributing to the implementation of harmonised rules. In addition, the Authority should pursue a harmonised approach to strengthen the Union’s existing AML/CFT preventive framework, and specifically AML supervision and cooperation between FIUs. That approach should reduce divergences in national legislation and supervisory practices and introduce structures that benefit the smooth functioning of the internal market in a determined manner and should, consequently, be based on Article 114 TFEU.

~~__________________~~

~~32 https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/default/files/docs/body/joint_statement_and_common_approach_2012_en.pdf.~~

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 2

Proposal for a regulation

~~Recital 42~~

Recital 5 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(42) The governing body of the Authority should be the Executive Board composed of the Chair of the Authority and of five full time members, appointed by the General Board based on the shortlist by the Commission. With the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision making process, the Executive Board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the Authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the General Board. In order to ensure objectivity and appropriate rapidity of the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities, the Executive Board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. In addition, together with a representative of the Commission the Executive Board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the Authority. The consent of the Commission should be required when the Executive Board is taking decisions related to the budget administration, procurement, recruitment, and audit of the Authority, given that a portion of funding of the Authority will be provided from Union budget.

(5a) In particular in the context of the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine and the decisions taken to impose financial sanctions, asset freezes and other restrictive measures against individuals and entities from the Russian Federation and in any possible future situations in which such measures may be taken against individuals and entities from a third country, the Authority should monitor and support the implementation of such measures across the internal market, with particular attention to transfers of crypto-assets given their importance in possible efforts to evade restrictive measures.

(42) The governing body of the Authority should be the Executive Board composed of the Chair of the Authority and of five full time members, appointed by the General Board based on the shortlist by the Commission. With the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision making process, the Executive Board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the Authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the General Board. In order to ensure that the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities is objective and swift, the Executive Board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. In addition, together with a representative of the Commission the Executive Board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the Authority.

~~Or. en~~

~~Justification~~

~~In line with the changes in the article, this removes the veto right for the Commission, which is not in line with standard practice in agency governance or the Common Approach.~~

Amendment 3

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 446

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(44) To ensure the independent functioning of the Authority the five Members of the Executive Board and the Chair of the Authority should act independently and in the interest of the Union as a whole. They should behave, both during and after their term of office, with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. In order to avoid a Member of the Executive Board potentially using their position as a Member of the Executive Board of the Authority to get a high-ranking appointment in the private sector after their term of office and to prevent any post-public employment conflicts of interests, a cooling-off period for the five Members of the Executive Board, including the Chair of the Authority, should be introduced, meaning that they will not be able to take up gainful employment in a selected obliged entity or any other role that might give rise to real or perceived conflicts of interest.

(6) Combining both direct and indirect supervisory competences over obliged entities, and also functioning as a support and cooperation mechanism for FIUs, is the most appropriate means of bringing about supervision and cooperation between FIUs at Union level. This should be achieved by creating an Authority which should combine independence and a high level of technical expertise. The Authority should be established and governed in accordance with the principles set out in the Joint Statement and Common Approach of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on decentralised agencies32.

~~Or. en~~

__________________

~~Justification~~

__________________

~~To clarify the nature of the cooling-off period for members of the Executive Board.~~

32 https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/default/files/docs/body/joint_statement_and_common_approach_2012_en.pdf.

Amendment 4

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 507

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(50) The rules on establishment and implementation of the budget of the Authority, as well as the presentation of annual accounts of the Authority, should follow the provisions of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/71536 as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations.

(7) A seat agreement should be established between the Authority and the host Member State, stipulating the conditions of establishment of the seat and advantages conferred by the Member State on the Authority and its staff.

(50) The rules on establishment and implementation of the budget of the Authority, as well as the presentation of annual accounts of the Authority, should follow the provisions of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/71536 including as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations.

(7) The arrangements concerning the Authority’s seat should be laid down in a headquarters agreement between the Authority and the host Member State. That agreement should stipulate the conditions of establishment of the seat and the facilities to be provided by the Member State to the Authority and its staff. In accordance with the Joint Statement and Common Approach of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on decentralised agencies, the decision on the seat of the Authority should take into account the desirability of geographical spread of decentralised agencies.

~~__________________~~

36 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 122, 10.5.2019, p. 1).

~~Or. en~~

~~Justification~~

~~Cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF are two of many provisions in the Delegated Financial Regulation, which applies in full.~~

Amendment 5

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 1 – paragraph 3 – point f a (new)~~

Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

~~(fa) providing adequate training and assistance to selected obliged entities, financial and non-financial supervisors, and FIUs.~~

(8) The powers of the Authority should allow it to improve AML/CFT supervision in the Union in various ways. With respect to selected obliged entities, the Authority should ensure group-wide compliance with the requirements laid down in the AML/CFT framework and any other legally binding Union acts that impose AML/CFT-related obligations on financial institutions. Furthermore, the Authority should carry out periodic reviews to ensure that all financial supervisors have adequate resources and powers necessary for the performance of their tasks. It should facilitate the functioning of the AML supervisory colleges and contribute to convergence of supervisory practices and promotion of high supervisory standards. With respect to non-financial supervisors, including self-regulatory bodies where appropriate, the Authority should coordinate peer reviews of supervisory standards and practices and request non-financial supervisors to investigate possible breaches of AML/CFT requirements. In addition, the Authority should coordinate the conduct of joint analyses by FIUs and make available to FIUs IT and artificial intelligence services and tools for secure information sharing, including through hosting of FIU.net.

~~Or. en~~

~~Justification~~

EBA has recently identified that competent authorities sometimes experience difficulties in understanding ultimate beneficiary owners' structures of institutions under their supervision, among other shortcomings. Adequate training and assistance provided by the Authority may be helpful.

Amendment 6

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)~~

Recital 37

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

~~(da) provide adequate training and assistance to selected obliged entities.~~

(37) The establishment of a solid governance structure within the Authority is essential for ensuring effective exercise of the tasks granted to the Authority, and for an efficient and objective decision-making process. Due to the complexity and variety of the tasks conferred on the Authority in both the supervision and FIU areas, the decisions cannot be taken by a single governing body, as is often the case in decentralised agencies. Whereas certain types of decisions, such as decisions on adoption of common instruments, need to be taken by representatives of appropriate authorities or FIUs, and respect voting rules of the TFEU, certain other decisions, such as the decisions towards individual selected obliged entities, or individual authorities, require a smaller decision-making body, whose members should be subject to appropriate accountability arrangements. Therefore, the Authority should comprise a General Board, and an Executive Board composed of five full-time independent members and of the Chair of the Authority.

~~Or. en~~

(37) The establishment of a solid governance structure within the Authority is essential for ensuring effective exercise of the tasks granted to the Authority, and for an efficient and objective decision-making process. Due to the complexity and variety of the tasks conferred on the Authority in both the supervision and FIU areas, the decisions cannot be taken by a single governing body, as is often the case in decentralised agencies. Whereas certain types of decisions, such as decisions on adoption of common instruments, need to be taken by representatives of appropriate authorities or FIUs, and respect voting rules of the TFEU, other decisions, such as the decisions addressed to individual selected obliged entities or individual authorities, should be taken by a smaller decision-making body, the members of which should be subject to appropriate accountability arrangements. Therefore, the Authority should comprise a General Board, and an Executive Board composed of five full-time independent members and of the Chair of the Authority.

Amendment 7

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 5 – paragraph 3 – point g a (new)~~

Recital 39

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

~~(ga) provide adequate training and assistance to financial supervisors.~~

(39) For a smooth decision making process, the tasks should be clearly divided: the General Board in FIU composition should decide on the relevant measures for FIUs, the General Board in supervisory composition should decide on delegated acts, guidelines and similar measures for obliged entities. The General Board in supervisory composition should also be able to provide its opinion and advice to the Executive Board on all draft decisions towards individual selected obliged entities proposed by the Joint Supervisory Teams. In absence of such opinion or advice, the decisions should be taken by the Executive Board. Whenever the Executive Board deviates from the advice provided by the General Board in supervisory composition in the final decision, it should explain the reasons thereof in writing.

~~Or. en~~

(39) For a smooth decision-making process, the tasks should be clearly divided: the General Board in FIU composition should decide on the relevant measures for FIUs, while the General Board in supervisory composition should decide on delegated acts, guidelines and similar measures for obliged entities. The General Board in supervisory composition should also be able to provide its opinion and advice to the Executive Board before it adopts decisions addressed to individual selected obliged entities proposed by the Joint Supervisory Teams. In absence of such opinion or advice, the decisions should be taken by the Executive Board. Whenever the Executive Board deviates from the advice provided by the General Board in supervisory composition in the final decision, it should explain the reasons therefor in writing.

Amendment 8

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 5 – paragraph 4 – point f a (new)~~

Recital 40

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

~~(fa) provide adequate training and assistance to non-financial supervisors.~~

(40) For the purposes of voting and taking decisions, each Member State should have one voting representative. Therefore, the heads of public authorities should appoint a permanent representative as the voting member of the General Board in supervisory composition. Alternatively, depending on the subject-matter of the decision or agenda of a given General board meeting, public authorities of a Member State may decide on an ad-hoc representative. The practical arrangements related to decision-making and voting by the General Board members in supervisory composition should be laid down in the Rules of Procedure of the General Board, to be developed by the Authority.

~~Or. en~~

(40) For the purposes of voting and taking decisions, each Member State should have one voting representative. Therefore, the heads of public authorities should either appoint a permanent representative as the voting member of the General Board in supervisory composition or decide on an ad-hoc representative depending on the subject-matter of the decision or agenda of a given General Board meeting. The practical arrangements related to decision-making and voting by the General Board members in supervisory composition should be laid down in the Rules of Procedure of the General Board, to be developed by the Authority.

Amendment 9

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 5 – paragraph 5 – point i a (new)~~

Recital 41

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

~~(ia) provide adequate training and assistance to FIUs.~~

(41) The Chair of the Authority should chair the General Board meetings and have a right to vote when decisions are taken by simple majority. The Commission should be a non-voting member on the General Board. To establish good cooperation with other relevant institutions, the General Board should also be able to admit other non-voting observers, such as a representative of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and of each of the three European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA) for the General Board in its Supervisory Composition and Europol, the EPPO and Eurojust for the General Board in its FIU composition, where matters that fall under their respective mandates are discussed or decided upon. To allow a smooth decision making process, decisions of the General Board should be taken by a simple majority, except for decisions concerning draft regulatory and implementing technical standards, guidelines and recommendations which should be taken by a qualified majority of Member State representatives in accordance with voting rules of the TFEU.

~~Or. en~~

(41) The Chair of the Authority should chair the General Board meetings and have a right to vote when decisions are taken by simple majority. The Commission should be a non-voting member on the General Board. To establish good cooperation with other relevant institutions, the General Board should also be able to admit other non-voting observers. In particular, the General Board should invite a representative of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and of each of the three European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA) in its Supervisory Composition and Europol, the EPPO and Eurojust for the General Board in its FIU composition, where matters that fall under their respective mandates are discussed or decided upon. To allow a smooth decision-making process, decisions of the General Board should be taken by a simple majority,except for decisions concerning draft regulatory and implementing technical standards, guidelines and recommendations which should be taken by a qualified majority of Member State representatives in accordance with voting rules of the TFEU.

Amendment 10

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 9 – paragraph 2~~

Recital 42

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. By the end of each year, the Chair of the Authority shall present to the General Board in supervisory composition as referred to in Article 46(2) a consolidated planning of the thematic reviews that supervisory authorities intend to undertake during the following year. The Chair may also issue an opinion on potential shortcomings or areas that are not sufficiently covered by the thematic reviews. The General Board in supervisory composition may issue recommendations of thematic reviews to the supervisory authorities for inclusion in future work programmes. In such cases, the supervisory authorities shall provide a written reply to the General Board in supervisory composition before 31 October of the following year.

(42) The governing body of the Authority should be the Executive Board composed of the Chair of the Authority and of five full-time members, appointed by the General Board based on a shortlist drawn up by the Commission. With the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision-making process, the Executive Board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the Authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the General Board. In order to ensure that the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities is objective and swift, the Executive Board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. In addition, together with a representative of the Commission, the Executive Board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the Authority.

~~Or. en~~

~~Justification~~

The authority should be empowered to issue opinions on potential areas of interest that are not covered by the national authorities, as it may be able to more effectively aggregate data and awareness across the EU.

Amendment 11

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 10 – paragraph 2 – introductory part~~

Recital 43

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

~~2. The Authority shall facilitate and encourage at least the following activities:~~

(43) To allow for swift decisions, all decisions of the Executive Board, including the decision where the Commission has a right to vote, should be taken by simple majority, with the Chair holding a casting vote in case of a tied vote. To ensure sound financial management of the Authority, the Commission’s consent should be required for decisions related to budget, administration and recruitment. The voting members of the Executive Board other than the Chair should be selected by the General Board, based on a short-list established by the Commission.

~~2. The Authority shall organise, facilitate and encourage at least the following activities:~~

(43) To allow for swift decisions, all decisions of the Executive Board, including the decisions where the Commission has a right to vote, should be taken by simple majority, with the Chair holding a casting vote in case of a tied vote.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 12

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 10 – paragraph 3~~

Recital 44

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. Each supervisory authority may submit a request for mutual assistance related to its supervisory tasks to the Authority, specifying the type of assistance that can be provided by the staff of the Authority, the staff of one or more supervisory authorities, or a combination thereof. If the request concerns activities that relate to the supervision of specific obliged entities, the requesting supervisory authority shall ensure that access to any information and data necessary for the provision of assistance may be granted. The Authority shall keep and regularly update the information on specific areas of expertise and on the capacities of supervisory authorities to provide mutual assistance.

(44) To ensure the independent functioning of the Authority the five Members of the Executive Board and the Chair of the Authority should act independently and in the interest of the Union as a whole. They should behave, both during and after their term of office, with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. In order to avoid a Member of the Executive Board potentially using his or her position to get a high-ranking appointment in the private sector after his term of office and to prevent any post-public employment conflicts of interests, a cooling-off period for the five Members of the Executive Board, including the Chair of the Authority, should be introduced such that they do not take up gainful employment in a selected obliged entity or perform any other role that may give rise to a conflict of interests or situation which may objectively be perceived as a conflict of interests. The arrangements for the prevention and management of conflicts of interests to be adopted by the General Board should ensure in particular that senior representatives of the Authority do not undermine its integrity during or after their term of office. When adopting those arrangements, the General Board should give due consideration to the recommendations of the European Ombudsman.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 13

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 11 – paragraph 4~~

Recital 46

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. Any supervisory authority or any non-AML authority may address to the Authority a reasoned request for information collected pursuant to paragraph 2 that is relevant for its supervisory activities. The Authority shall assess those requests and provide the information requested by the supervisory authorities or non-AML authorities on a need-to-know basis and confidential basis and in a timely manner. The Authority shall inform the authority that has initially provided the requested information, of the identity of the requesting supervisory or other authority, the identity of an obliged entity concerned, the reason for the information request as well as whether the information has been provided to the requesting authority.

(46) The Executive Director of the Authority should be appointed by the Executive Board based on a shortlist from the Commission. The Executive Director of the Authority should be a senior administrative official of the Authority, in charge of the day-to-day management of the Authority, and responsible for budget administration, procurement, and recruitment and staffing.

4. Any supervisory authority or any non-AML authority, including the EPPO, OLAF and Europol, may address to the Authority a reasoned request for information collected pursuant to paragraph 2 that is relevant for its supervisory activities. The Authority shall assess those requests and provide the information requested by the supervisory authorities or non-AML authorities on a need-to-know basis and confidential basis and in a timely manner. The Authority shall inform the authority that has initially provided the requested information, of the identity of the requesting supervisory or other authority, the identity of an obliged entity concerned, the reason for the information request as well as whether the information has been provided to the requesting authority.

(46) The Executive Director of the Authority should be appointed by the Executive Board based on a shortlist from the Commission, which respects the principle of gender balance. The Executive Director of the Authority should be in charge of the day-to-day management of the Authority, and responsible for budget administration, procurement, and recruitment and staffing.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 14

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 12 – paragraph 4 – point a~~

Recital 48

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

~~(a) with respect to customer-related risk: the share of non-resident customers, the presence and share of customers identified as Politically Exposed persons (‘PEPs’);~~

(48) To guarantee the proper functioning of the Authority, funding should be provided by a combination of fees levied on certain obliged entities and a contribution from the Union budget, depending on the tasks and functions. The budget of the Authority should be part of the Union budget, confirmed by the Budgetary Authority on the basis of a proposal from the Commission. The Authority should submit to the Commission a draft budget and an internal financial regulation for approval.

(a) with respect to customer-related risk: the share of non-resident customers, the presence and share of customers identified as Politically Exposed persons (‘PEPs’), and the share of beneficiaries of Union funds;

(48) It is necessary to provide the Authority with the requisite human and financial resources and equipment so that it can fulfil the objectives, tasks and responsibilities assigned to it under this Regulation. In order to ensure that the Authority can respond flexibly to human resource needs, it is in particular appropriate that it has autonomy regarding the recruitment of contract agents. To guarantee the proper functioning of the Authority, funding should be provided by a combination of fees levied on certain obliged entities and a contribution from the Union budget. The budget of the Authority should be part of the Union budget. The contribution from the Union budget is to be decided by the Budgetary Authority through the budgetary procedure. To that end, the Authority should submit to the Commission a statement of estimates. It should also adopt financial rules after consulting the Commission.

~~Or. en~~

~~Justification~~

~~The share of beneficiaries of EU funds may be a customer-related risk, in order to protect more effectively the use of EU funds.~~

Amendment 15

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 16 – paragraph 2~~

Recital 49

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. The persons referred to in paragraph 1 or their representatives and, in the case of legal persons or associations having no legal personality, the persons authorised to represent them by law or by their constitution, shall supply the information requested. Lawyers duly authorised to act may supply the information on behalf of their clients. The latter shall remain fully responsible if the information supplied is incomplete, incorrect or misleading.

(49) To ensure that the Authority can also fulfil its tasks as direct and indirect supervisor of obliged entities, an adequate mechanism for the determination and the collection of the fees should be introduced. As regards the fees levied on selected obliged entities and certain non-selected obliged entities, the methodology for their calculation and the process of collection of fees should be developed in a delegated act of the Commission. The methodology should be based on the risk of the directly and indirectly supervised entities as well as their turnover or revenue.

2. The persons referred to in paragraph 1 or their representatives and, in the case of legal persons or associations having no legal personality, the persons authorised to represent them by law or by their constitution, shall, without undue delay, cooperate with the Authority and supply the information requested. Lawyers duly authorised to act may supply the information on behalf of their clients. The latter shall remain fully responsible if the information supplied is incomplete, incorrect or misleading.

(49) To ensure that the Authority can also fulfil its tasks as direct and indirect supervisor of obliged entities, a transparent, adequate mechanism for the determination and the collection of the fees should be introduced. As regards the fees levied on selected obliged entities and certain non-selected obliged entities, the methodology for their calculation and the process of collection of fees should be developed in a delegated act of the Commission. The methodology should be based on the risk of the directly and indirectly supervised entities as well as their turnover or revenue. The methodology established should ensure sufficient and stable revenue for the Authority and therefore predictability of the contribution from the Union budget.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 16

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 17 – paragraph 1 – introductory part~~

Recital 50

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, the Authority may conduct all necessary investigations of any selected obliged entity or any natural or legal person employed by or belonging to a selected obliged entity and established or located in a Member State.

1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, the Authority may conduct all necessary investigations of any selected obliged entity, other entities of the same group as the selected obliged entity, or any natural or legal person employed by or belonging to a selected obliged entity, and established or located in a Member State.

(50) The rules on establishment and implementation of the budget of the Authority, as well as the presentation of annual accounts of the Authority, should follow the provisions of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/71536 including as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations.

~~Or. en~~

__________________

Amendment 17

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 28 – paragraph 1~~

Recital 51

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. The Authority shall perform periodic assessments of some or all of the activities of one, several, or all financial supervisors, including the assessment of their tools and resources to ensure high level supervisory standards and practices. The assessments shall include a review of the application of the AML/CFT supervisory methodology developed pursuant to Article 8 and shall cover all financial supervisors in a single assessment cycle. The length of each assessment cycle shall be determined by the Authority and shall not exceed seven years.

(51) In order to prevent and effectively combat internal fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity within the Authority, it should be subject to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations. The Authority should accede to Interinstitutional Agreement concerning internal investigations by OLAF, which should be able, to carry out on-the-spot checks within the area of its competence.

1. The Authority shall perform periodic assessments of some or all of the activities of one, several, or all financial supervisors, including the assessment of their tools and resources to ensure high level supervisory standards and practices. The assessments shall include a review of the application of the AML/CFT supervisory methodology developed pursuant to Article 8 and shall cover all financial supervisors in a single assessment cycle. A financial supervisor may be covered more than once in a single assessment cycle. The length of each assessment cycle shall be determined by the Authority and shall not exceed seven years.

(51) In order to prevent and effectively combat internal fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity within the Authority, it should be subject to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. The Authority should accede to Interinstitutional Agreement concerning internal investigations by OLAF, which should be able, to carry out on-the-spot checks within the area of its competence.

~~Or. en~~

~~Justification~~

~~On specially risky financial supervisors, it may be necessary to carry out more evaluations on the same assessment cycle~~

Amendment 18

Proposal for a regulation

~~Article 28 – paragraph 4~~

Recital 64 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

~~4. Financial supervisors shall make every effort to comply with the specific follow-up measures addressed to them as a result of the assessment.~~

(64a) At five-yearly intervals after the Authority is established, the Commission should assess the Authority’s performance in relation to its mandate, objectives, tasks and location(s). The evaluation should, inter alia, examine whether the Authority’s financial and human resources are adequate, factoring in the effect on organised crime and terrorist groups of depriving them of assets and liquidity. On the occasion of every second evaluation, the Commission should conduct a thorough review of the results achieved by the Authority. The review should take into account the effectiveness of the Union Anti-Money Laundering system as a whole and the Authority’s cooperation with other bodies and agencies.

4. Financial supervisors shall make every effort to comply with the specific follow-up measures addressed to them as a result of the assessment and shall report to the Authority on the implementation of the follow-up measures. The Authority shall provide a follow-up report two years after the date of publication of the assessment. The follow-up report shall include an assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of the actions undertaken by the financial supervisors that were subject to the assessment. The Authority shall publish the findings of the follow-up report on its website.

~~Or. en~~

~~Justification~~

The follow-up of the Authority of its measures is necessary to ensure an adequate supervision. Furthermore, enhanced transparency can contribute to ensure a coherent approach in the different Member States.

Amendment 19

Proposal for a regulation

Article 291 – paragraph 23 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the staff of the Authority shall have full participation rights in the AML supervisory colleges and shall be able to participate in their activities, including on-site inspections, carried out jointly by two or more financial supervisors.

(d) contributing to supervisory convergence in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism across the internal market;

(d) contributing to supervisory convergence in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and organised crime across the internal market;

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 20

Proposal for a regulation

Article 325 – paragraph 21 – ~~introductory~~point ~~part~~f

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Upon request from one or more supervisory authorities in the non-financial sector, the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, or on its own initiative, including when this is based on well-substantiated information from natural or legal persons, and after having informed the supervisory authority in the non-financial sector concerned, the Authority shall outline how it intends to proceed with the case and, where appropriate, investigate the alleged breach or non-application of Union law.

(f) monitor and support the implementation of asset freezes under the Union restrictive measures across the internal market;

(f) monitor and support the implementation of asset freezes under the Union restrictive measures across the internal market, with particular attention to transfers of crypto-assets;

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 21

Proposal for a regulation

Article 335 – paragraph 15 – point a a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Where, pursuant to Article 25 of [OP please insert the next number to the AMLD, COM(2021)423], a FIU of a Member State identifies a potential need to conduct a joint analysis with one or several FIUs in other Member States, it shall notify the Authority thereof. The Authority shall inform the FIUs in all the relevant Member States and invite them to take part in the joint analysis within five days of the initial notification. To this end, the Authority shall use secured channels of communication. The FIUs in all the relevant Member States shall consider taking part in the joint analysis. The Authority shall ensure that the joint analysis is launched within 20 days of the initial notification.

(aa) organise on-site visits in Member States, on a case-by-case basis, in close collaboration with the Member States concerned, to provide additional support and guidance to FIUs;

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 22

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3346 – paragraph 32 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. Upon explicit consent of the FIUs participating in the joint analysis, the staff of the Authority supporting the joint analysis shall be granted access to all the data pertaining to the subject-matter of the joint analysis and shall be able to process those data.

The heads of the supervisory authorities referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b) in each Member State shall share a single vote and shall agree on a single common representative for each meeting and voting procedure. That common representative shall be the ad-hoc voting member for the purposes of that meeting or voting procedure. The public authorities in a Member State may also agree on a single permanent common representative who shall be a permanent voting member. Where items to be discussed by the General Board in supervisory composition concern the competence of several public authorities, the ad-hoc or permanent voting member may be accompanied by a representative from up to two other public authorities, who shall be non-voting.

~~3. The staff of the Authority supporting the joint analysis shall be granted access to all the data pertaining to the subject-matter of the joint analysis and shall be able to process those data.~~

The heads of the supervisory authorities referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b) in each Member State shall share a single vote and shall appoint a single common representative, either a permanent voting representative or an ad-hoc voting representative for the purposes of a specific meeting or voting procedure. Where items to be discussed by the General Board in supervisory composition concern the competence of several public authorities, the single common representative may be accompanied by a representative from up to two other public authorities, who shall be non-voting.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 23

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3346 – paragraph 42 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. The Authority shall provide all the necessary tools and operational support required for the conduct of the particular joint analysis, in accordance with the developed methods and procedures. In particular, the Authority shall set up a dedicated, secured channel of communication for the performance of the joint analysis, and shall provide the appropriate technical coordination, including IT support, budgetary and logistical support.

Each public authority that has a voting member under ad-hoc or permanent agreement shall be responsible for nominating a high-level alternate from its authority, who may replace the voting member of the General Board referred to in the second sub-paragraph where that person is prevented from attending.

Each public authority that has a voting member under ad-hoc or permanent agreement shall be responsible for appointing an alternate from its authority, who may replace the voting member of the General Board referred to in the second sub-paragraph where that person is prevented from attending.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 24

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3452 – paragraph 34

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. On the basis of the feedback referred to in paragraph 2, or on its own initiative, the Authority may issue follow-up reports relating to the conduct of joint analyses, including specific suggestions on adjustments regarding the methods and procedures for the conduct of the joint analyses, and conclusions on the outcome of the joint analyses. The procedural and operational aspects of the follow-up report shall be shared with all FIUs, without disclosing confidential or restricted information on the case. The conclusions and recommendations relating to the conduct of the joint analyses shall be shared with the FIUs that participated in the relevant joint analyses, and with all the other FIUs insofar as these conclusions do not contain confidential or restricted information.

4. The term of office of the five members of the Executive Board shall be four years. In the course of the 12 months preceding the end of the four-year term of office of the Chair of the Authority and five members of the Executive Board, the General Board in both compositions or a smaller committee selected among General Board members including a Commission representative shall carry out an assessment of performance of the Executive Board. The assessment shall take into account an evaluation of the Executive Board members’ performance and the Authority’s future tasks and challenges. Based on the assessment, the General Board in both compositions may extend their term of office once.

3. On the basis of the feedback referred to in paragraph 2, or on its own initiative, the Authority shall issue follow-up reports relating to the conduct of joint analyses, including specific suggestions on adjustments regarding the methods and procedures for the conduct of the joint analyses, and conclusions on the outcome of the joint analyses. The procedural and operational aspects of the follow-up report shall be shared with all FIUs, without disclosing confidential or restricted information on the case. The conclusions and recommendations relating to the conduct of the joint analyses shall be shared with the FIUs that participated in the relevant joint analyses, and with all the other FIUs insofar as these conclusions do not contain confidential or restricted information.

4. The term of office of the five members of the Executive Board shall be four years. In the course of the 12 months preceding the end of the four-year term of office of the Chair of the Authority and five members of the Executive Board, the General Board in both compositions or a smaller committee selected among General Board members and including a Commission representative shall carry out an assessment of performance of the Executive Board. The assessment shall take into account the Executive Board members’ performance and the Authority’s future tasks and challenges. Based on the assessment, the General Board in both compositions may renew their term of office once.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 25

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3552 – paragraph 17 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

~~1. The FIU of each Member State may delegate one staff member to the Authority. The national FIU delegate shall have his or her regular place of work at the seat of the Authority.~~

7. During a period of one year after ceasing to hold office, the former members of the Executive Board, including the Chair of the Authority, are prohibited from engaging in a gainful occupational activity with

~~1. The FIU of each Member State shall delegate one staff member to the Authority. The national FIU delegate shall have his or her regular place of work at the seat of the Authority.~~

7. During a period of two years after ceasing to hold office, the former members of the Executive Board, including the Chair of the Authority, are prohibited from engaging in a gainful occupational activity with

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 26

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3653 – paragraph 14 – point ba

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

~~(b) personnel exchanges and secondment schemes, including secondment of FIU staff from a Member State to the Authority;~~

(a) adopt, by 30 November of each year, on the basis of a proposal by the Executive Director, the draft Single Programming Document, and shall transmit it for information to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission by 31 January the following year, as well as any other updated version of the document ;

~~(b) personnel exchanges and secondment schemes, including secondment of FIU staff from a Member State to the Authority and staff from the Authority to the national FIUs;~~

(a) adopt, by 30 November of each year, on the basis of a proposal by the Executive Director, the draft Single Programming Document in accordance with Article 54, and shall transmit it for information to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission by 31 January the following year, as well as any other updated version of the document;

~~Or. en~~

~~Justification~~

~~Secondments of staff of the Authority to the Member States may contribute to the development of common understandings and expertise in all the Member States~~

Amendment 27

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3654 – paragraph 21 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Any FIU may submit to the Authority a request for assistance related to the tasks of the FIU, specifying the type of assistance that can be provided by the staff of the Authority, the staff of one or more than one FIU, or a combination thereof. The FIU requesting assistance shall ensure the access to any information and data necessary for the provision of such assistance. The Authority shall keep and regularly update information on specific areas of expertise and capacity of FIUs to provide mutual assistance.

1. By 30 November each year the Executive Board shall adopt a Single Programming Document containing multiannual and annual programming, based on a draft put forward by the Executive Director, taking into account the opinion of the Commission and in relation to multiannual programming after consulting the European Parliament. If the Executive Board decides not to take into account elements of the opinion of the Commission, it shall provide a thorough justification therefor. The obligation to provide a thorough justification shall also apply to the elements raised by the European Parliament when it is consulted. The Executive Board shall forward the Single Programming Document to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 28

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4355 – paragraph ~~3 – subparagraph~~ 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Authority shall publish the fact that a supervisory authority does not comply or does not intend to comply with that guideline or recommendation. The Authority may also decide, on a case-by-case basis, to publish the reasons provided by the supervisory authority for not complying with that guideline or recommendation. The supervisory authority shall receive advanced notice of such publication.

2. A representative of the Commission shall have a right to vote whenever matters pertaining to Article 53(4) points (a) to (l) are discussed and decided upon. For the purposes of taking the decisions referred to in Article 53(4), points (f) and (g), the representative of the Commission shall have one vote. The decisions referred to in Article 53(4), points (b) to (e) and (h) to (l) may only be taken if the representative of the Commission casts a positive vote. For the purposes of taking the decisions referred to in Article 53(4), point (a), the consent of the representative of the Commission shall only be required on the elements of the decision not related to the annual and multi-annual working programme of the Authority.

The Authority shall publish the fact that a supervisory authority does not comply or does not intend to comply with that guideline or recommendation. The Authority shall publish the reasons provided by the supervisory authority for not complying with that guideline or recommendation. The supervisory authority shall receive advanced notice of such publication.

2. A representative of the Commission shall have a right to vote whenever matters pertaining to Article 53(4) points (a) to (l) are discussed and decided upon.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 29

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4356 – paragraph ~~3 – subparagraph 3~~1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

~~If required by that guideline or recommendation, obliged entities shall report, in a clear and detailed way, whether they comply with that guideline or recommendation.~~

~~Obliged entities shall report, in a clear and detailed way, whether they comply with that guideline or recommendation.~~

1. The Chair of the Authority shall be selected on the basis of merit, skills, knowledge, recognised standing and experience in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and other relevant qualification, following an open selection procedure which shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Chair of the Authority shall have no prior criminal conviction. The Commission shall draw up a shortlist of two qualified candidates for the position of the Chair of the Authority, taking due account of the principle of gender balance. The shortlisted candidates shall be invited to appear before the Council and the competent committees of the European Parliament. The Council shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair of the Authority after having obtained the consent of the European Parliament. Where the European Parliament considers that none of the shortlisted candidates sufficiently fulfils the requirements set out in this paragraph, the open selection procedure shall recommence.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 30

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4458 – paragraph 32

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. The Authority may, upon a request from the European Parliament, from the Council or from the Commission provide technical advice to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in the areas set out in the legislative acts referred to in Article 1(2).

2. The Executive Director shall perform his duties in the interests of the Union, and independently of any specific interests.

3. The Authority shall, upon a request from the European Parliament, from the Council or from the Commission provide technical advice to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in the areas set out in the legislative acts referred to in Article 1(2).

2. The Executive Director shall perform his or her duties in the interests of the Union, and independently of any specific interests.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 31

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4659 – paragraph 41 – point i

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. The General Board may decide to admit observers. In particular, the General Board in FIU composition shall admit as an observer a representative of OLAF, Europol, Eurojust and the EPPO to meetings when matters fall under their respective mandates. The General Board in supervisory composition shall admit a representative nominated by the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank and a representative of each of the European Supervisory Authorities, where matters within the scope of their respective mandates are discussed.

(i) preparing the Authority’s draft statement of estimates of revenue and expenditure and implementing its budget;

4. The General Board may decide to admit observers. In particular, the General Board in FIU composition shall admit observer representatives of OLAF, Europol, Eurojust and the EPPO to its meetings if they so request. The General Board in supervisory composition shall admit a representative nominated by the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank and a representative of each of the European Supervisory Authorities, where matters within the scope of their respective mandates are discussed.

(i) preparing the Authority’s draft statement of estimates of revenue and expenditure as part of the draft Single Programming Document pursuant to Article 66 and implementing its budget pursuant to Article 67;

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 32

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5259 – paragraph 71 – ~~introductory~~point ~~part~~l

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(l) drawing up a draft statement of estimates of the Authority’s revenue and expenditure as part of Authority’s Single Programming Document pursuant to Article 66 and shall implement the budget of the Authority pursuant to Article 67;

7. During a period of one year for the members of the Executive Board and three years for the Chair of the Authority after ceasing to hold office, the former members and Chair are prohibited from engaging in a gainful occupational activity with:

deleted

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 33

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6859 – paragraph 73

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

7. The Executive Director shall submit to the European Parliament, at the latter's request, any information required for the smooth application of the discharge procedure for the financial year N, in accordance with Article 261(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.

3. The Executive Director shall decide whether it is necessary to locate one or more staff in one or more Member States for the purpose of carrying out the Authority's tasks in an efficient and effective manner. Before deciding to establish a local office, the Executive Director shall obtain the prior consent of the Commission, the Executive Board and the Member State(s) concerned. The decision shall specify the scope of the activities to be carried out at the local office in a manner that avoids unnecessary costs and duplication of administrative functions of the Authority. A headquarters agreement with the Member State(s) concerned shall be concluded.

7. The Executive Director shall submit to the European Parliament, at the latter's request, any information required for the smooth application of the discharge procedure, in accordance with Article 261(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.

3. The Executive Director shall decide whether it is necessary to locate one or more staff in one or more Member States for the purpose of carrying out the Authority's tasks in an efficient and effective manner. Before deciding to establish a local office, the Executive Director shall obtain the prior consent of the Commission, the Executive Board and the Member State(s) concerned. The decision shall specify the scope of the activities to be carried out at the local office in a manner that avoids unnecessary costs and duplication of administrative functions of the Authority. An agreement with the Member State(s) concerned shall be concluded accordingly.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 34

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6864 – paragraph 83 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

8. On a recommendation from the Council acting by a qualified majority, the European Parliament shall, before 15 May of year N + 2, give a discharge to the Executive Director in respect of the implementation of the budget for year N.

The amount and origin of any revenue referred to in points (b) and (c) of the first sub-paragraph of this paragraph shall be included in the annual accounts of the Authority and clearly detailed in the annual report on the Authority’s budgetary and financial management referred to in Article 68(2).

8. On a recommendation from the Council acting by a qualified majority, the European Parliament shall, before 15 May of year N + 2, consider whether to give a discharge to the Executive Director in respect of the implementation of the budget for year N.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 35

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7565 – paragraph 31 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, the Authority shall be authorised, within the limits and under the conditions set out in the acts referred to in Article 1(2), to exchange information with national or Union authorities and bodies in the cases where these acts allow financial supervisors to disclose information to those entities or where Member States may provide for such disclosure under the relevant Union law.

1a. The fees to be levied shall be calculated in such a way as to ensure sufficient and stable revenue for the Authority.

~~Or. en~~

Amendment 36

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8088 – paragraph 13

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

1. The Authority may conclude working arrangements with Union institutions, Union decentralised agencies and other Union bodies, acting in the field of law enforcement and judicial cooperation. Those working arrangements may be of a strategic or technical nature, and shall in particular aim to facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information between the parties thereto. The working arrangements shall neither form the basis for allowing the exchange of personal data nor shall bind the Union or its Member States.

~~Or. en~~

~~Amendment 37~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 88 – paragraph 1 – introductory part~~

~~Text proposed by the Commission~~

~~Amendment~~

1. By 31 December 2029, and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall assess the Authority’s performance in relation to its objectives, mandate, tasks and location(s), in accordance with the Commission's guidelines. The evaluation shall, in particular, address:

1. By 31 December 2028, and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall assess the Authority’s performance in relation to its objectives, mandate, tasks and location(s), in accordance with the Commission's guidelines. The evaluation shall, in particular, address:

~~Or. en~~

~~Amendment 38~~

~~Proposal for a regulation~~

~~Article 88 – paragraph 2 – point c~~

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

~~(c) it is appropriate to confer additional tasks in the area of support and coordination of the work of FIUs;~~

3. On the occasion of every second evaluation, there shall be an assessment of the results achieved by the Authority having regard to its objectives, mandate and tasks, including an assessment of whether the continuation of the Authority is still justified with regard to these objectives, mandate and tasks.

(c) it is appropriate to confer additional tasks in the area of support and coordination of the work of FIUs, in particular whether it is appropriate for the EU FIUs’ Platform to become a Union-level FIU, replacing national FIUs, and competent for receiving reports of suspicious transactions directly from all obliged entities in the Union, in which case the opinion of the Authority shall be annexed to the evaluation;

3. On the occasion of every second evaluation, the Commission shall conduct a thorough review of the results achieved by the Authority having regard to its objectives, mandate and tasks, including an assessment of whether the continuation of the Authority is still justified with regard to these objectives, mandate, tasks and powers. The review shall have due regard for the effectiveness of the Union Anti-Money Laundering system as a whole and for the Authority’s cooperation with other bodies and agencies.

~~Or. en~~

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

~~Justification~~

Title

The European Banking Authority recently found (Report on Risk Assessment on Luanda Leaks, February 2022) that the competent authorities' approaches to identify and tackle ML/TF risks differed significantly and varied beyond what the EBA would have expected under a risk-based approach, and action was not taken in many cases. This suggest that there is a risk that relevant risk exposures may not have been detected. EBA findings also suggest that existing cooperation channels were not fully used. An EU-level FIU may be able to address these shortcomings more successfully.

Establishing the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) 1094/2010, (EU) 1095/2010

References

COM(2021)0421 – C9-0340/2021 – 2021/0240(COD)

Committees responsible

Date announced in plenary

ECON

4.10.2021

LIBE

4.10.2021

Opinion by

Date announced in plenary

BUDG

4.10.2021

Rapporteur for the opinion

Date appointed

Niclas Herbst

20.12.2021

Rule 58 – Joint committee procedure

Date announced in plenary

20.1.2022

Discussed in committee

28.2.2022

Date adopted

17.5.2022

Result of final vote

–:

Members present for the final vote

Rasmus Andresen, Robert Biedroń, Anna Bonfrisco, Olivier Chastel, Lefteris Christoforou, David Cormand, Andor Deli, José Manuel Fernandes, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Vlad Gheorghe, Valentino Grant, Francisco Guerreiro, Valérie Hayer, Eero Heinäluoma, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Moritz Körner, Joachim Kuhs, Zbigniew Kuźmiuk, Pierre Larrouturou, Camilla Laureti, Janusz Lewandowski, Margarida Marques, Silvia Modig, Siegfried Mureşan, Victor Negrescu, Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos, Andrey Novakov, Dimitrios Papadimoulis, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Nils Torvalds, Nils Ušakovs, Johan Van Overtveldt, Rainer Wieland, Angelika Winzig

Substitutes present for the final vote

Jan Olbrycht

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

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