What changed

B100296/2026

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

(2026/2772(RSP))

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine, notably that of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure,

A. whereas several incidents in recent years have involved military drones, drone debris or unidentified aerial systems entering the territory of Member States bordering Russia and Belarus, including Romania, Poland, the Baltic States and other countries in the region;

– having regard to the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law,

B. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian drone entered Romanian airspace and crashed into a residential building in Galați, injuring civilians and causing material damage, thereby constituting one of the most serious drone-related incidents recorded on the territory of an EU Member State in recent years;

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 24(3), 42(7) and 222 thereof,

C. whereas on 8 June 2026, Latvian authorities reported that a drone entering Latvian airspace from Russian territory had to be intercepted by a French aircraft on patrol;

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, in particular Articles 4 and 5 thereof,

D. whereas Poland and other Member States on the EU’s eastern flank have repeatedly reported airspace violations, incursions by military objects, electronic interference affecting satellite navigation systems, and other incidents creating risks to civilian aviation and public safety;

– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint white paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120) and to its resolution of 12 March 2025 thereon,

E. whereas several Member States located on the EU’s eastern flank have reported an increase in electronic interference, including GPS jamming and spoofing activities affecting civilian aviation, maritime navigation and border surveillance systems; whereas such activities create serious risks for public safety and regional stability;

– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025, entitled ‘Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),

F. whereas such incidents, regardless of intent, create security concerns, increase the risk of miscalculation and place additional burdens on national authorities responsible for airspace surveillance, civil protection and public safety;

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 March 2026 on the EU’s continued support for Ukraine,

G. whereas the proliferation of relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial systems has transformed the security environment and created new challenges for border monitoring, critical infrastructure protection and airspace management;

– having regard to the statements made by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 20 May 2026 regarding Russian threats against the Baltic states,

H. whereas the evolving security environment also requires increased attention to the EU’s southern flank, including the Mediterranean and North Africa, where the growing use of unmanned aerial systems by State and non-State actors, combined with regional instability and organised criminal networks, creates additional security challenges for several Member States;

– having regard to the statement made by Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas of 29 May 2026 condemning the reckless violation of the EU’s airspace by Russia,

I. whereas Member States retain primary responsibility for national security and territorial defence in accordance with Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union;

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

1. Condemns any violation by the Russian Federation, and by any other third country or hostile actor, of the sovereignty, territorial integrity or airspace of Member States, in particular, incursions by military drones, military-related objects or other unauthorised aerial systems;

A. whereas more than four years ago Russia launched its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, continuing its 2014 annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of the Donbas in flagrant violation of international law and Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty; whereas intrusions into EU and NATO airspace, caused by Russia, have been occurring since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but have recently increased in frequency and intensity;

2. Reiterates its solidarity with all Member States affected by drone incursions, airspace violations or other hybrid activities threatening their security; stresses that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every Member State must be fully respected;

B. whereas Russia’s military build-up along the EU’s eastern flank is ongoing and also includes the territory of Belarus, which is complicit in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and hybrid attacks against the EU, notably via its instrumentalisation of irregular migration, organised crime, disinformation and the launch of meteorological balloons, which pose serious security threats, including the constant disruption of civilian aviation, the terrorisation of countries bordering Belarus like Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and damage to local economies;

3. Expresses concern over the increasing number of incidents involving unmanned aerial systems, electronic interference and other hybrid activities affecting Member States on the EU’s eastern flank;

C. whereas Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania and other EU Member States have been targeted by Russia’s attempts at destabilisation, which take the form of drone incursions and airspace violations, propaganda and disinformation, electronic warfare, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) interference, cyberattacks and sabotage;

4. Notes the efforts undertaken by Member States, in cooperation with relevant partners, to increase the protection of their airspace against emerging aerial threats, including unauthorised drone incursions, airspace violations and electronic interference; commends the professionalism and vigilance shown by civilian and military personnel involved in air surveillance and air defence activities; stresses that all measures taken should contribute to the protection of Member States while remaining proportionate and avoiding unnecessary escalation;

D. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian drone crashed into a residential building in Galați, Romania, causing an explosion that injured two people; whereas this was the first such incident on the territory of an EU and NATO Member State to result in injuries requiring medical treatment; whereas more than 70 people had to be evacuated;

5. Calls on the Russian Federation to avoid any actions that may endanger the safety and security of Member States, and to prevent incidents that could increase tensions or create risks of misunderstanding and escalation;

E. whereas on 19 May 2026, an intruding drone flying in Estonian airspace was shot down by a Romanian fighter jet participating in the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission; whereas on 20 May 2026, the incursion of an unidentified drone into Lithuanian airspace forced authorities to issue an unprecedented air raid alert, compelling civilians to seek shelter; whereas on 8 June 2026, French NATO fighter jets, participating in a NATO mission, shot down drones flying over Latvia; whereas these drone incursions are a direct result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with the majority entering EU airspace as a result of Russian electronic warfare; whereas, in March 2026, due to the interference from Russian electronic warfare systems, at least three Ukrainian drones were diverted from their intended course and entered Finnish territory, where they crashed;

6. Underlines the importance of full transparency, timely investigations and factual public communication following any cross-border security incident involving drones or other military-related objects; emphasises that attribution should only be made on the basis of verified facts and completed investigations, as premature conclusions risk undermining the credibility of public authorities and may be exploited by disinformation and propaganda campaigns;

F. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Ukrainian naval drone exploded in the Romanian port of Constanța as a result of electronic warfare measures employed by the Russian Federation, causing damage to property but no human casualties;

7. Encourages Member States to continue strengthening national airspace surveillance, early warning systems and detection capabilities, particularly in border regions and around critical infrastructure;

G. whereas on 7 May 2026, two Ukrainian drones, jammed by Russian electronic warfare systems, struck a fuel storage depot in Rēzekne, Latvia; whereas the Latvian military’s five-hour delay in communicating its response, the lack of public warnings in Rēzekne and the failure of initial radar detection ignited an intense public backlash, causing a political crisis that led to the collapse of the Latvian Government;

8. Highlights that the growing proliferation of unmanned aerial systems is not limited to the EU’s eastern flank and may increasingly affect other regions of strategic importance to the EU, including the Mediterranean and the EU’s southern flank; notes that the rapid diffusion of low-cost drone technologies among state and non-state actors is likely to create new security challenges in the coming years, including risks to border management, maritime security, civilian aviation and critical infrastructure; calls on Member States to take a forward-looking approach to preparedness and resilience in order to address emerging threats across all European regions;

H. whereas the Baltic Sea region contains a high concentration of critical infrastructure, including subsea energy and telecommunications networks, transport links and other strategic assets, making it particularly vulnerable to hybrid attacks, sabotage and drone-related threats; whereas the protection of critical infrastructure requires both physical hardening and increased redundancy and decentralisation, as demonstrated by the lessons learned from Russia’s attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure;

9. Reaffirms that national authorities are responsible for protecting Member States’ territory, airspace and critical infrastructure;

I. whereas the decommissioning of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania presents significant regional security and environmental hazards due to the presence of large volumes of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste stored in temporary overground facilities, and whereas any accident or intentional provocation to this critical infrastructure could have severe consequences for the entire Baltic region and far beyond;

10. Highlights the growing importance of counter-unmanned aerial system technologies, including radar systems, passive sensors, electro-optical detection, radio-frequency monitoring and other defensive measures designed to identify, track and assess aerial threats;

J. whereas there have been other serious incidents of suspected Russian violations of EU Member States’ airspace;

11. Calls on Member States to exchange best practices in drone detection, identification and incident response procedures, while fully respecting national competences in the fields of defence and security;

K. whereas the security and protection of the EU Member States along its eastern flank are an immediate priority and a joint European responsibility, especially given that hybrid attacks are being carried out using modern drone warfare, an area in which the EU Member States’ capacity is far from complete;

12. Encourages closer cooperation between military authorities, civil aviation authorities, border services, law-enforcement bodies and emergency response services in order to improve preparedness for drone-related incidents;

L. whereas drone incidents on the EU’s eastern flank have exposed significant gaps in both military and civilian preparedness; whereas existing radar systems often prove unable to track low-altitude objects, methods chosen for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) interception are economically inefficient and reports on incidents revealed that some air-raid shelters were locked or inaccessible to the public; whereas these failures highlight urgent systemic vulnerabilities in alert and reaction procedures, and broader societal resilience;

13. Stresses the importance of ensuring that civilian airports, energy infrastructure, telecommunications networks, ports, transport hubs and other critical infrastructure are adequately protected against emerging drone-related risks;

M. whereas in its latest attacks against Ukraine, Russia set ablaze the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, a historic monastery of Eastern Christianity and a UNESCO World Heritage Site, among other invaluable cultural heritage sites;

14. Calls for the identification and promotion of affordable, rapidly deployable and operationally effective counter-drone solutions capable of addressing the growing challenge posed by unmanned aerial systems; stresses the importance of reducing strategic dependencies by supporting European industries and technologies by prioritising European solutions where possible;

N. whereas those recent drone incidents have demonstrated the urgent need for multilayered defence capabilities integrating kinetic and non-kinetic counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); whereas drones have become a defining feature of modern warfare and hybrid conflict, and their use in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped defence requirements and operational doctrines across the continent;

15. Welcomes the proactive measures taken by several Member States to strengthen their legal preparedness against drone-related threats; notes in particular the legislative reforms adopted in Romania and Lithuania following repeated airspace violations and drone incidents in the region; considers that clear legal frameworks are essential to enable swift decision-making, improve coordination between civilian and military authorities and increase the protection of the public, critical infrastructure and national airspace;

O. whereas the Arctic and the High North are becoming increasingly important for European security, while limited sensor coverage and a sparse permanent presence create vulnerabilities that hostile actors may seek to exploit through unmanned systems and hybrid operations, thereby increasing the risk of hostile drone incursions deep into EU territory;

16. Recognises the increasing challenge posed by electronic warfare activities, including interference with satellite navigation and positioning systems;

1. Strongly condemns Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into the EU Member States;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Government of the Russian Federation.

2. Reaffirms its full solidarity with Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, whose territory, airspace and critical infrastructure have been targeted by Russian hybrid provocations; reaffirms that the EU will not be intimidated by Russia’s campaign of destabilisation and that it stands united in its determination to defend the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all EU Member States and to continue to support Ukraine;

3. Recognises the particular vulnerability of, and expresses its full solidarity with, citizens in the EU border regions along the eastern flank, who are most exposed to serious threats and who also bear significant economic and social costs as a result; calls for targeted EU-level measures, including dedicated financial support, to strengthen the protection of affected communities and critical infrastructure, and ensure prevention, preparedness, resilience and emergency response and reconstruction in these particularly exposed regions;

4. Unequivocally condemns the Russian drone strike on a residential building in Galați, Romania, which caused direct civilian casualties, constituting a grave and serious escalation; considers that repeated drone incursions and airspace violations into EU countries are not isolated incidents but an integral part of Russia’s broader strategy of intimidation directed against the EU and its allies;

5. Declares that Russia bears full and unequivocal responsibility for these reckless escalatory attacks which endanger lives; reiterates that the acts of the Russian Federation constitute a deliberate, systematic and ongoing threat to the security, resilience and sovereignty of the EU and its Member States; reiterates its condemnation in the strongest possible terms of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as Belarus’s complicity in it; strongly denounces Russia’s decision to continue its war of aggression, including its latest targeted attacks on cultural heritage sites and the UNESCO World Heritage Site Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, while refusing any direct negotiations with Ukraine, as recently proposed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy;

6. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s deliberate jamming of GNSS signals in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions, and of Belarus’s deliberate launch of meteorological balloons, which pose serious safety risks for civilian aviation and maritime transport; condemns Belarus, furthermore, for its hybrid attacks against the EU;

7. Reiterates its call to urgently accelerate the production and delivery of priority military equipment to Ukraine, in particular air defence systems, ammunition, drones and missiles, at a critical moment when acute shortfalls in air defence capabilities leave Ukraine’s population and infrastructure increasingly exposed;

8. Highlights that these hostile acts are compounded by an aggressive disinformation campaign seeking to intimidate local populations, spread fear, damage local economies and lay the groundwork for possible retaliatory actions, as in the case of unfounded Russian allegations that the Baltic states allow Ukraine to use their territories and airspace for drone attacks against targets in Russia;

9. Reiterates its call for the urgent establishment of a genuine European Defence Union, including proposals for swift decision-making processes, going beyond existing frameworks, including the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 and the subsequent Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030; underlines that deeper integration, coordination and the pooling of resources are indispensable to an effective EU response to Russia’s escalating threats; calls for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base and its production capacity across the EU to be boosted through enhanced EU-level coordination, maximising the use of national initiatives and EU instruments;

10. Calls for the solidarity clause (Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised, including where a conventional or hybrid attack leads a Member State to invoke them;

11. Emphasises the need for the coherent strengthening of the EU and NATO’s eastern flank along its entire length from the Arctic to the Black Sea, including the land, maritime and air dimensions by building capabilities in frontline Member States to combat drones and meteorological balloons, and through the allocation of adequate resources for this purpose; calls for the EU and its Member States to urgently strengthen detection, jamming, interception and neutralisation capabilities along the EU’s eastern flank; further calls for regular joint exercises between the Member States, the EU institutions, Ukraine and NATO to test and improve the readiness of these rapid response mechanisms;

12. Recommends the integration of C-UASs into joint training exercises and EU-level civil protection planning, with an emphasis on critical infrastructure that enables police, airport authorities and energy sector operators to access EU-wide training and standardised C-UAS capabilities;

13. Highlights with concern that current European drone detection and defence systems are inadequate and stresses the urgent need to improve detection and defence; stresses, in this context, the need for a holistic approach that focuses on better equipping law enforcement and civilian authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones;

14. Encourages the Member States to prioritise integrating command and control systems with first responders, civil defence and UAS defence doctrines to ensure that civil preparedness, sheltering, early warning and technological integration are optimised to the fullest extent possible;

15. Stresses that Russia’s deliberate incursions into the eastern flank of the EU and NATO are intended not only to provoke and destabilise Member States, but also to test and exploit weaknesses in NATO’s detection and response capabilities; recognises that Russia continues its destabilising activities in the Black Sea region, both through conventional and hybrid actions, including through the use of drifting mines, jamming operations and threats to freedom of navigation, making the strengthening of security in this region a strategic priority that must be addressed urgently as a threat to European security;

16. Calls for the full implementation of the EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea, and calls for the acceleration of the creation of the Black Sea Maritime Security Hub;

17. Welcomes the recent approval of the 20th package of EU sanctions against Russia and the presentation of the 21st sanctions package; calls on the Commission, the EU Sanctions Envoy and the Member States to strictly implement new and existing sanctions, and to prioritise without delay the closing of loopholes in supply chains; calls on the Commission to develop additional sanctions without delay, including sanctions on alumina and other strategic raw materials and dual-use goods, and urges all Member States not to block such a listing on grounds of national economic interest; supports additional measures for the upcoming sanctions package targeting the Russian Federation’s energy and financial sectors, as well as a ban on entry into the EU for former Russian combatants who fought in Ukraine, and calls on Member States that continue to support the Russian Federation to cease such support;

18. Calls on Member States, in particular those issuing the majority of visas to Russian nationals, to strictly implement the Commission Implementing Decision of 6 November 2025 establishing adapted rules on the issuing of multiple-entry visas to Russian nationals residing in the Russian Federation and applying in the Russian Federation for short-stay visas, and fully apply the Commission’s 2022 guidance on heightened scrutiny, especially for tourist and other non-essential travel, while safeguarding access for anti-war political activists, independent journalists, human rights defenders, civil society representatives and humanitarian cases;

19. Calls for the establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework specifically designed for hybrid threats, which would exist alongside the hybrid sanctions regime for Russia, to underscore Russia’s active engagement in hybrid operations globally, while enabling faster and more systematic sanctioning of entities responsible for hybrid campaigns;

20. Calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure appropriate funding for the construction and renovation of civil air-raid shelters in eastern flank and other EU Member States, and to carry out EU-wide information campaigns and civilian exercises to make citizens aware of how to act in the event of an air raid or similar crisis situation; considers that protecting EU civilian populations from aerial threats must be treated as an integral component of European defence readiness, preparedness and resilience; stresses the urgent need for increased financing for security and defence programmes and projects, with a special focus on the eastern flank countries, in the next multiannual financial framework; calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt a comprehensive, whole-of-society approach, recognising that lasting security requires not only adequate military capabilities but also social cohesion, economic resilience, democratic stability and strong public services;

21. Underlines that Ukraine has developed unparalleled operational and industrial expertise in drone production and counter-drone systems; considers, therefore, that deepening EU-Ukraine defence industrial cooperation in this domain is a strategic imperative; calls for the EU and its Member States to fully integrate Ukrainian expertise and industrial capacity into the development of European capabilities to counter unconventional aerial threats;

22. Emphasises that in addressing the drone threats coming from Russia, cooperation with the Republic of Moldova – alongside Ukraine – is essential in terms of operational efficiency, situational awareness and the exchange of information; calls, therefore, on the Member States to increase funding for Moldova through the European Peace Facility, also in the light of repeated violations of Moldovan airspace by Russian drones and missiles; further calls on the Member States to include Moldova and Ukraine in joint acquisitions;

23. Calls on the Member States to urgently deliver the priority capabilities identified in the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, in particular air and missile defence as well as drones and counter-drone systems; calls on the Member States to rapidly establish joint, layered, cost-effective counter-drone defence systems, starting on the eastern flank, capable of detecting and intercepting airborne and seaborne threats from outside the EU, including through enhanced air and maritime surveillance, early-warning systems, rapid-response assets and improved military mobility infrastructure;

24. Calls for the establishment of a European Centre of Excellence for Drone Warfare, where Ukrainian instructors pass on their expertise to the EU Member States;

25. Calls for the full and speedy implementation of the European Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch; calls on the Member States to actively engage in and contribute to both initiatives in close coordination with NATO;

26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Russian authorities and the de facto authorities of the Lukashenka regime.