What changed

B100287/2026

B100285/2026

European Parliament resolution on the political repression and humanitarian situation in Cuba

(2026/2735(RSP))

– having regard to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, and the EU’s commitment to effective multilateralism,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in Cuba, in particular those of 19 September 2024 on the case of José Daniel Ferrer García in Cuba, of 29 February 2024 on the critical situation in Cuba, and of 12 July 2023 on the state of the EU-Cuba PDCA in the light of the recent visit of the High Representative to the island,

– having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other (PDCA),part, signed in December 2016, and which has provisionally applied since 1 November 2017, in particular to the suspension clause under Article 85(3)(b) thereof,

– having regard to successive annual resolutions of the UN General Assembly on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba, first approved in 1992, and again in 2025 for the 33rd consecutive time, with the full support of the European Union and a total of 165 votes in favour, 7 against and 12 abstentions,

– having regard to the consent given by Parliament to the PDCA on 5 July 2017, on the condition of Cuba improving the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country,

– having regard to the UN experts’ declarations of 26 May and 2 June 2026 condemning the United States’ threats, coercion and judicial weaponisation against Cuba and calling for an end to the unlawful energy blockade imposed on Cuba,

– having regard to the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act) of 7 December 2020,

– having regard to the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro and the 2024 UN General Assembly declaration adopting the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS (ABAS), recognising the particular vulnerabilities of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), including Cuba,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Cuba is a party,

– having regard to the statements by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and other international organisations concerning the situation in Cuba,

– having regard to the monthly report of the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Prisoners Defenders of 14 May 2026, which covers April 2026,

– having regard to the UN Charter and the principles of international humanitarian law,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 29 January 2026, the US administration under President Donald Trump escalated sanctions against Cuba by threatening retaliatory tariffs against countries supplying oil to the island; whereas on 1 May 2026, a new US executive order also introduced sanctions targeting foreign operators maintaining economic relations with Cuba, particularly in the energy, security and financial sectors; whereas on 4 June, the United States announced a new round of sanctions, including sanctions on President Miguel Díaz-Canel and some of his immediate family, alongside members of the Castro family; whereas the US administration also threatened foreign countries or entities with sanctions, leading to the immediate interruption of credit card payments in Cuba;

A. whereas the situation in Cuba is extremely dire, marked by poverty, repression and a huge number of political prisoners; whereas Cuba is under a one-party regime that has endured for more than 67 years; whereas the country faces an economic crisis, an energy emergency, with blackouts that can last up to 22 hours a day in many provinces, and the collapse of an economic and political model based on immobility, repression and resistance to change as its sole narrative, amid shortages of food, water and medicine and the despair of the population, with constant protests in the form of demonstrations and ‘pot-banging’ (cacerolazo), to which the regime responds with detentions and repression as a means of punishment, intimidation and threats;

B. whereas since then, Cuba has been experiencing its most severe socio-economic and humanitarian crisis in decades, marked by chronic shortages of food, medicines, fuel and essential goods, repeated nationwide power outages, high inflation, and a sustained decline in living standards; whereas UN experts, the OCHA and the WHO have warned that these measures are having serious humanitarian and human rights consequences, particularly for children, older persons, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups; whereas Cuba is especially vulnerable due to its status as a small island developing state;

B. whereas, according to the NGO Prisoners Defenders, Cuba held a record 1 260 political prisoners at the end of April 2026, including 14 minors, some of whom were being held in maximum-security prisons alongside adults, as well as 142 women and 449 detainees in seriously ill health; whereas this NGO has documented systematic torture, sexual violence and death threats against detainees;

C. whereas in March 2026 Cuba’s national electricity grid collapsed three times, leaving approximately 10 million people without power, following a succession of massive blackouts in the following months affecting millions of citizens, disrupting hospitals, schools, water supply systems, food preservation and economic activity; whereas in certain neighbourhoods blackouts can last more than 22 hours;

C. whereas, in their daily lives, ordinary Cubans face visits to hospitals without basic medicines, where patients are told to bring their own supplies, alongside chronic shortages of food and water and hours-long queues, while many essential goods are sold only in foreign-currency stores beyond the reach of those in receipt of ordinary state wages;

D. whereas, following a visit to Cuba in May 2026, Edem Wosornu of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Altaf Musani of the WHO warned that prolonged blackouts, fuel shortages and shortages of medicines and medical supplies were severely disrupting healthcare services and placing vulnerable populations at increased risk;

D. whereas cumulative inflation over the past four years exceeds 500 % and state salaries are equivalent to between USD 15 and 25 a month at the black-market rate, which is the only realistic rate on the island; whereas in October 2024 the national electricity system collapsed completely for several days, leaving 11 million people without power;

E. whereas the EU released an additional EUR 2 million in humanitarian aid in April 2026 to support access to food and safe drinking water for the Cuban population, building on humanitarian assistance already provided earlier in the year and reinforcing the EU’s commitment to addressing humanitarian needs in Cuba;

E. whereas Cuba today imports more than 70 % of the food it consumes, despite it being a tropical country with fertile soil that once was one of the world’s largest sugar producers; whereas this collapse is the direct result of decades of collectivised, state-controlled agriculture and an unproductive and inefficient economic system;

F. whereas the long-standing US embargo continues to have severely negative humanitarian and socio-economic consequences for the Cuban population, including through restrictions affecting financial transactions, access to credit, trade and imports of essential goods; whereas the United States’ designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism has further restricted access to international financial services and transactions;

F. whereas Cuba, the only constitutionally imposed one-party state, constitutes an anti-democratic anomaly in the Latin American region;

G. whereas the EU has consistently opposed the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba and has repeatedly rejected the extraterritorial application of unilateral restrictive measures, including Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act;

G. whereas EU-Cuba relations are governed by the PDCA with the objective of the Cuban regime progressively opening up through this mechanism and improving the political, economic and social situation of its citizens;

H. whereas Cuba has legally committed to upholding international human rights law and standards, including political and civil rights and freedoms; whereas independent observers from international organisations and human rights bodies, including UN bodies, have documented restrictions on freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, arbitrary detentions, harassment of activists and journalists, and the continued imprisonment of individuals detained in connection with peaceful protests, alongside restrictions on access to justice and judicial guarantees; whereas concerns persist regarding the situation of dissidents and vulnerable groups, including women, Afro-descendants and LGBTIQ+ persons; whereas Cuba has so far not undertaken meaningful democratic reforms to allow for political pluralism and the full exercise of fundamental freedoms;

H. whereas, almost nine years after Parliament gave its consent to the PDCA, the regime has taken no significant steps toward opening up whatsoever; whereas, on the contrary, it has intensified its repression, persecuted those who dissent and increased the number of political prisoners; whereas the economic situation has also deteriorated to unacceptable levels, leaving the situation on the island markedly worse with the regime more entrenched than ever, to the detriment of the Cuban people;

I. whereas despite a moratorium on executions since 2003, Cuba still retains the death penalty;

I. whereas rejection of the regime is widespread both on and off the island, as evidenced by recurrent protests and by the largest exodus in Cuba’s history, with hundreds of thousands of Cubans leaving in search of a better future abroad; whereas the regime’s only response to demands for change is to entrench itself and intensify its repression;

J. whereas the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an integral part of the EU’s external policies, and is reflected in the PDCA between the EU and Cuba signed in December 2016;

J. whereas the Cuban regime seeks to justify its own failure by invoking the US embargo; whereas, in reality, only a partial embargo exists, covering direct investment, tourism and the dollar banking system, while dozens of countries, including EU Member States, trade freely with Cuba, and the United States has for several years been among its principal suppliers of food;

K. whereas recent announcements by the Cuban authorities concerning the release of prisoners, following mediation efforts by the Holy See, have been welcomed as a positive step; whereas concerns remain regarding the transparency of implementation and the Cuban authorities have continued to restrict former political prisoners and have re-arrested prominent opposition leaders, activists and artists;

K. whereas the humanitarian emergency is not the product of any external embargo but the direct consequence of the regime’s own model, namely the militarisation and state monopolisation of the economy, the suppression of private enterprise, and the diversion of resources to the security apparatus rather than to the food, medicine and electricity its people need; whereas this model is embodied by the Business Administration Group (GAESA), a corrupt military conglomerate that is opaque in its operation and structure and controlled by the regime’s leaders, and which controls almost half of the island’s gross domestic product and does not account for its profits; whereas its portfolio comprises hotels, transport, fuel stations, construction, wholesale and retail trade, telecommunications, remittances, foreign trade and the Mariel port free-trade zone, among other sectors, as well as the accounts of diplomatic personnel, embassies and foreign corporations in the country and the earnings from medical missions; whereas these medical missions were until recently the regime’s principal source of hard currency, under which Cuban doctors are sent abroad, in conditions the UN has likened to forced labour, even as hospitals at home are without basic supplies;

L. whereas Cuba possesses significant reserves of critical raw materials, including nickel and cobalt, whose exploitation should contribute to the sustainable development and well-being of the Cuban people, while fully respecting Cuba’s sovereignty over its natural resources;

L. whereas talks have taken place in recent months between the Cuban regime and the US administration, the content of which has not been disclosed; whereas any process of normalisation with the regime must not come at the expense of human rights or relieve it of accountability;

M. whereas no external actor should seek to impose political change through coercion, humanitarian crisis, military intervention or actions undermining sovereignty and territorial integrity;

M. whereas the regime maintains close military cooperation with the Russian Federation, including the reported recruitment of over 1 000 Cuban nationals to fight in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which is incompatible with the spirit of the PDCA and contrary to the security interests of the EU;

1. Expresses its utmost and urgent concern over the dramatic deterioration of living conditions in Cuba and the growing humanitarian impact of the lack of access to fuel, medicines, food and other essential goods and public services, particularly affecting vulnerable groups; recalls that civilians should never be victims of geopolitical conflicts and unilateral political decisions;

N. whereas, on 2 March 2026, more than 50 Cuban opposition and civil society organisations, from the island and in exile, presented a roadmap towards democratic transition known as the ‘Liberation Agreement’, which sets out three phases, namely liberation, stabilisation and reconstruction, and democratisation, culminating in free, fair, multiparty elections supervised by the international community;

2. Recognises that the current crisis results from a combination of internal and external factors, including structural weaknesses in economic and democratic governance, delayed reforms and policy failures, as well as the increasingly negative impact of the US embargo, extraterritorial sanctions and energy blockade imposed in January 2026;

O. whereas any transition to democracy must be Cuban-led and inclusive of all Cubans, both on the island and in the diaspora;

3. Calls for full respect for the United Nations Charter, international humanitarian law and international human rights law on all sides;

P. whereas brutal and relentless repression is the only mechanism keeping the regime alive; whereas, in July 2021, thousands of Cubans spontaneously took to the streets in more than fifty localities chanting ‘Freedom!’; whereas this was the largest wave of protests since 1994, and was crushed by plain-clothes police, paramilitary shock groups and the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution; whereas hundreds of people were arbitrarily detained and more than 700 were tried in summary proceedings that Parliament condemned as a ‘judicial farce’, with sentences handed down of up to 25 years merely for protesting peacefully; whereas the message was deliberately exemplary: whoever protests risks their job, their freedom, their family or their life;

4. Reaffirms its commitment to Cuba’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity in accordance with the UN Charter and rejects any attempt to impose regime or policy change from outside through military intervention, coercive action or other measures incompatible with international law;

Q. whereas, on 20 May 2026, the United States Department of Justice, acting through the US Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, unsealed an indictment in Miami against Raúl Castro and five other Cuban military officers for the 1996 downing of two light aircraft belonging to the organisation Brothers to the Rescue, in which four people died; whereas those charges represent an escalation of pressure by the current US administration against the Cuban regime;

5. Strongly condemns the United States’ increasing economic coercion and judicial weaponisation against Cuba; deplores the threats and measures aimed at third-country operators, and rejects any attempt to impose regime change from outside through coercive measures incompatible with international law;

1. Condemns in the strongest terms the systematic repression carried out by the Cuban regime, in particular the torture, sexual violence and death threats inflicted on political prisoners and the imprisonment of children; expresses its full solidarity with the Cuban people and with all those persecuted for defending their fundamental rights;

6. Reiterates its full support for the UN General Assembly resolution on the need to end the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba;

2. Demands the immediate release of all imprisoned individuals, including minors, an end to torture and ill-treatment, and unimpeded access for the International Committee of the Red Cross, UN special rapporteurs and a European Parliament delegation to the island, covering all places of detention and prisoners in serious ill health;

7. Calls on the United States to immediately halt all illegitimate practices against Cuba, including the economic, commercial and financial embargo, unilateral coercive and extraterritorial measures, the designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and the energy blockade, which severely affect the humanitarian situation, development prospects and human rights of the Cuban population while also challenging the economic sovereignty of the EU and its Member States;

3. Considers that the only way out of the dire situation of hardship, poverty and isolation experienced by the Cuban people lies in profound economic and political changes leading without delay to a transition towards a full, multiparty democracy in which dissidents are not persecuted, imprisoned, tortured or murdered and in which basic human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, including the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, whose freedom it demands without precondition;

8. Calls on the Cuban authorities to protect human rights and to guarantee the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression without discrimination based on political views; strongly condemns all violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, including arbitrary detention, ill treatment, torture, restrictions on freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, harassment of independent journalists, human rights defenders and civil society actors, as well as the disproportionate use of criminal sanctions against peaceful protesters; calls for the official abolition of the death penalty;

4. Calls on the High Representative and the Member States to make clear that, unless clear, concrete and significant steps towards introducing such changes – including a clear proposal for a transition to a democratic system, the immediate and unconditional release of the close to 1 300 political prisoners, and authorisation for Cubans forced to take the painful path of exile to return without reprisals – are taken in the short term, the Union should proceed to suspend the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, which has been systematically breached by the Cuban regime, and establish sanctions against those responsible for human-rights violations;

9. Welcomes the mediation efforts of the Holy See that have led to Cuba’s announcement of the release of more than 2 000 prisoners; calls on the Cuban authorities to implement this decision transparently and to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and those detained for the exercise of their right of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; urges the Cuban authorities to ensure full due process guarantees, judicial independence and respect for international human rights standards, to honour their international commitments and grant unhindered access to independent human rights and humanitarian organisations, particularly the UN agencies, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

5. Calls for targeted measures under the EU Magnitsky Act against those responsible for repression, beginning with the regime’s most senior officials, and against the GAESA leadership, and for the freezing of any EU cooperation that benefits the repressive apparatus;

10. Calls on the Cuban authorities to engage in a genuine and inclusive national dialogue involving civil society, religious organisations, independent social actors and citizens, with a view to promoting democratic participation, greater civic space and respect for fundamental freedoms;

6. Condemns the recruitment of Cuban nationals to fight in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the regime’s deepening military cooperation with Moscow; insists that this be treated as a central element of the EU’s review of its relations with Cuba;

11. Recalls that both Cuba and the EU have committed, within the framework of the PDCA, to cooperate in supporting social, economic and institutional reforms;

7. Insists that independent civil society and the democratic opposition take part, without reprisals, in any dialogue under the PDCA, and that no EU funds benefit the regime or GAESA or other entities sustaining repression, and that the EU be in no way complicit in the human rights violations on the island, including the medical missions involving forced labour;

12. Calls for the EU to ensure the full implementation of the PDCA and to mobilise all appropriate diplomatic, political, economic and financial instruments to support the Cuban people; highlights the importance of deepening mutually respectful and beneficial relations between the EU and Cuba; stresses the need to accompany and encourage governance reforms that strengthen democratic participation, the rule of law, transparency, accountability and sustainable development;

8. Stands ready, together with the international community, to provide Cuba with substantial assistance as soon as it embarks on a credible democratic transition, so that the island may become prosperous and guarantee the well-being of its citizens;

13. Calls on the High Representative and the Council to ensure that the EU-Cuba Human Rights Dialogue is preceded and followed by an inclusive dialogue with EU and Cuban civil society organisations and includes measurable benchmarks on human rights and civic freedoms, including progress on the release of political prisoners, guarantees for freedom of expression and association, access for international human rights mechanisms, and reforms enabling greater civic participation;

9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the Cuban regime, and to the transition council to be established under the Liberation Agreement, uniting Cuban opposition members from inside and outside the island, namely its signatory coalitions, the Cuban Resistance Assembly (Asamblea de la Resistencia Cubana) and Pasos de Cambio.

14. Urges the EU to further engage with the United Nations system and other relevant international and regional organisations, including the Organization of American States, international financial institutions and humanitarian partners to develop an emergency humanitarian roadmap for Cuba aimed at:

(a) ensuring the rapid delivery of medicines, medical equipment and essential health supplies;

(b) supporting the rehabilitation of electricity generation and distribution infrastructure;

(c) improving access to water, sanitation and waste management services;

(d) strengthening food security, particularly for children, pregnant women and vulnerable households;

(e) supporting schools, hospitals and community services affected by prolonged shortages;

(f) ensuring transparent monitoring and needs-based distribution of humanitarian assistance in accordance with international humanitarian principles;

15. Calls for the EU to support the reform of international financial institutions and debt restructuring mechanisms, taking account of the particular vulnerabilities of SIDS;

16. Calls on the Commission to fully deploy and rigorously enforce all current EU instruments and protective measures to establish a credible deterrent framework capable of responding swiftly, effectively and proportionately to the extraterritorial application of US sanctions and other coercive measures targeting European operators, financial institutions, investors, and public or private entities engaged in lawful activities in Cuba, or otherwise adversely affecting the interests, sovereignty and economic autonomy of the EU and its Member States; calls on the Commission to modernise the EU blocking statute in order to ensure an effective response in that respect;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and National Assembly of Cuba, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Government of the United States of America, and the Holy See.