What changed

B100061/2026

Krzysztof Hetman, Pascal Canfin, Raphaël Glucksmann, Majdouline Sbai, Manon Aubry, Marta Wcisło, Benoit Cassart, Maria Noichl, Saskia Bricmont, Lynn Boylan, Céline Imart, Yvan Verougstraete, François Kalfon, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Danilo Della Valle, Hanna GronkiewiczWaltz, Hristo Petrov, JeanMarc Germain, Thomas Waitz, Anja Hazekamp, FrançoisXavier Bellamy, Ciaran Mullooly, Chloé Ridel, Ana Miranda Paz, Luke Ming Flanagan, Ewa Kopacz, Eric Sargiacomo, Cristina Guarda, Rudi Kennes, Christophe Gomart, Michael McNamara, Estelle Ceulemans, David Cormand, Kathleen Funchion, Kamila GasiukPihowicz, Grégory Allione, Marko Vešligaj, Marie Toussaint, Martin Schirdewan, Jacek Protas, Valérie Devaux, Elio Di Rupo, Diana Riba i Giner, Marina Mesure, Andrzej Buła, Michał Kobosko, Aurore Lalucq, Tilly Metz, Leila Chaibi, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Laurence Farreng, Claire Fita, Lena Schilling, Sebastian Everding, Adam Jarubas, Christine Singer, Nora Mebarek, Jaume Asens Llodrà, Arash Saeidi, Li Andersson, Rasmus Andresen, Giuseppe Antoci, Pascal Arimont, Bartosz Arłukowicz, Konstantinos Arvanitis, Pernando Barrena Arza, Michael Bloss, Gordan Bosanac, Marc Botenga, Gilles Boyer, Borys Budka, Mélissa Camara, Damien Carême, Laurent Castillo, Anna Cavazzini, Per Clausen, Christophe Clergeau, Jérémy Decerle, Özlem Demirel, Bas Eickhout, Nikolas Farantouris, Emma Fourreau, Daniel Freund, Mario Furore, Estrella Galán, Hanna Gedin, Giorgos Georgiou, Charles Goerens, Markéta Gregorová, Martin Günther, Rima Hassan, MirceaGheorghe Hava, Pär Holmgren, Dariusz Joński, Pierre Jouvet, Fabienne Keller, Elena Kountoura, Alice Kuhnke, Merja Kyllönen, Sergey Lagodinsky, Katrin Langensiepen, Murielle Laurent, Isabelle Le Callennec, Nathalie Loiseau, Isabella Lövin, Mimmo Lucano, Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, Jagna MarczułajtisWalczak, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Erik Marquardt, Catarina Martins, Sara Matthieu, Irene Montero, Carolina Morace, Nadine Morano, Ville Niinistö, Maria Ohisalo, João Oliveira, Younous Omarjee, Leoluca Orlando, Valentina Palmisano, Nikos Pappas, Gaetano Pedulla’, Thomas PellerinCarlin, Emma Rafowicz, Terry Reintke, Manuela Ripa, Ilaria Salis, Jussi Saramo, Mounir Satouri, Benedetta Scuderi, Isabel Serra Sánchez, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Jonas Sjöstedt, Anthony Smith, Nicolae Ștefănuță, Joachim Streit, Tineke Strik, Michał Szczerba, Dario Tamburrano, Pasquale Tridico, Catarina Vieira, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Stéphanie YonCourtin

B100060/2026

European Parliament resolution seeking an opinion from the Court of Justice on the compatibility with the Treaties of the proposed Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Common Market of the South, the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, of the other part, and the proposed Interim Agreement on Trade between the European Union, of the one part, and the Common Market of the South, the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, of the other part

– having regard to the proposed Interim Agreement on Trade between the European Union, of the one part, and the Common Market of the South, the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, of the other part,

– having regard to Article 218(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Common Market of the South, the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, of the other part (COM(2025)0357),

– having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Common Market of the South, the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, of the other part,

– having regard to the draft Council decision on the signing and provisional application of the Interim Agreement on Trade between the European Union, of the one part, and the Common Market of the South, the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, of the other part,

– having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Interim Agreement on Trade between the European Union, of the one part, and the Common Market of the South, the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, of the other part,

– having regard to ArticlesArticle 3(5), Article 4(3), 5(2),Article 10(3), Article 13(2) and Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

– having regard to Articles 11, 39, 168, 169, 191, 207, 217 and 218 TFEU,

– having regard to Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 thereof,

– having regard to Articles 11, 168, 169, 171 and 191 TFEU,

– having regard to Articles 35, 37 and 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

– having regard to the Council negotiating directives adopted on 17 Septemberof 1999 for the conclusion of an Association Agreementagreement between the European CommunityUnion and itsthe Memberfour States,founding members of theMercosur one– part,Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Mercosur,Uruguay of(hereinafter the other1999 part,negotiating directives),

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 8 May 2018,

– having regard to the agreement in principle between the European Union and the four founding members of Mercosur – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – as negotiated in 2019 and its new and revised chapters and the protocols and annexes thereto,

– having regard to the Commission decision of 3 September 2025 to propose two separate instruments, namely an EU-Mercosur Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) and an EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA), thereby dividing the initial association agreement into distinct legal instruments,

– having regard to Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019 concerning the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part (CETA) and CJEU Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017 concerning the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore,

– having regard to the relevant opinions of theFramework CourtAgreement ofon Justicerelations ofbetween the European Union, in particular Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017 on the EU–Singapore Free Trade Agreement,Parliament and Opinion 1/17 of 30the AprilEuropean 2019Commission, onin theparticular EU–Canadaparagraphs Comprehensive23-29 Economicthereof andregarding Tradeinternational Agreement,agreements,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 May 2018 on the negotiation and conclusion of EU trade agreements (hereinafter the 2018 Council conclusions), in particular paragraph 3 thereof,

– having regard to Rule 117(6) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas, under Article 218(11) TFEU, Parliament has the right to seek the opinion of the Court of Justice on the compatibility of an envisaged agreement with the Treaties before it is concluded;

A. whereas in 2019, the Commission published the agreement in principle summarising ‘the negotiating results of the trade part of the EU-Mercosur Association agreement’; whereas in December 2024, the Commission announced that it had finalised the negotiation of the EU-Mercosur agreement; whereas on 3 September 2025, the Commission presented the EU-Mercosur agreement as two parallel legal texts, namely the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA) and an Interim Trade Agreement (ITA), and put forward its proposals to the Council for the signature and conclusion of the EMPA; whereas the EMPA is a mixed framework agreement, which requires unanimous approval in the Council, the consent of Parliament and ratification by all 27 Member States before it can fully enter into force; whereas the ITA covers only those provisions falling under the exclusive competence of the EU and requires only a qualified majority in the Council and Parliament’s consent to enter into force;

B. whereas the EU–Mercosur Association Agreement, negotiated and initialled as a single and comprehensive text, was presented by the Commission and the Council as a mixed agreement, requiring ratification by both the EU and its Member States owing to the inclusion of provisions falling under shared or national competences, including the environment, health and non-direct investment;

B. whereas the 1995 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement, which forms the basis of the 1999 negotiating directives, was presented, in its preamble, as a ‘prelude to the negotiation of an Interregional Association Agreement’ and as being aimed at ‘prepar[ing] the conditions enabling an interregional association to be created’;

C. whereas the Council1999 negotiating directives ofauthorised 17the Septembernegotiation 1999of explicitlyan mandatedassociation agreement with the CommissionMercosur tocountries, negotiatethus arequiring balancedCouncil unanimity and comprehensiveratification agreementby constitutingnational aparliaments; singlewhereas undertakingneither coveringthe scope of the political,ITA cooperationnor its consequences on Member States’ veto power could have been anticipated at the time this mandate was issued and tradeagreed pillars;on; whereas the Council conclusionsconfirmed ofits 22position Mayin its 2018 reaffirmedCouncil thatconclusions theand EU-Mercosurstated negotiationsthat were‘[i]t conductedis onfor the basisCouncil ofto adecide singlewhether andto mixedopen Associationnegotiations Agreement,on inthis accordancebasis. withIt is equally for the 1999Council mandateto anddecide, on a case-by-case basis, on the distributionsplitting of competencestrade establishedagreements. byDepending theon Treaties;their whereas,content, reflectingassociation theagreements sharedshould competencesbe ofmixed. theThe Unionones andthat theare Membercurrently States,being thenegotiated, Councilsuch conclusionsas ofwith 8Mexico, MayMercosur 2018and reaffirmedChile, thatwill itremain ismixed foragreements’; thewhereas Councilthe toEU-Mercosur decideTrade whetherAgreement, toagreed openin negotiationsprinciple and,in onJuly a2019, case-by-casealso basis,refers to determinethe whetherEU-Mercosur anAssociation agreementAgreement; shouldwhereas bea divideddeviation intofrom separatethe instruments,1999 therebynegotiating confirmingdirectives thatand suchthe a2018 decisionCouncil doesconclusions notcould fallbe withinconsidered theto autonomousbe discretionincompatible ofwith theEU Commission;law;

D. whereas the Commission’s unilateral decision to divide the agreement into two distinct instruments – an Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) purportedly within EU exclusive competence and a Partnership Agreement (EMPA) covering political and cooperation matters – fundamentally alters the legal nature, scope and ratification procedure established under the Council’s initial negotiating directives;

D. whereas national parliaments in various Member States have already signalled their opposition to the ratification of the EU-Mercosur agreement by adopting resolutions to that effect; whereas separation of the EU-Mercosur agreement into two separate legal texts, namely the EMPA and the ITA, circumvents national parliaments’ right to ratify the ITA; whereas it is important to ensure effective consultation of citizens, the European Parliament, national and regional parliaments, civil society and other relevant stakeholders at every stage of the process to guarantee democratic accountability;

E. whereas, under Article 218(2) TFEU, the power to determine the nature, scope and composition of the envisaged agreement lies with the Council;

E. whereas Chapter 21 Article 21.4(b) and Chapter 1 Article 1.3(k) of the ITA introduce a newly designed ‘rebalancing mechanism or clause’ which allows a party to seek compensation if a ‘measure applied by the other party nullifies or substantially impairs any benefit accruing to it under the covered provisions in a manner adversely affecting trade between the parties, whether or not such measure conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, except if otherwise expressly provided’; whereas this mechanism aims to compensate for the economic impact of a trading partner’s legislation or practice, even when these do not violate the provisions of the Agreement; whereas, for example, in Chapter 21 of the ITA, Article 21.20 and Article 21.21 thereof provide that a countermeasure will only be suspended once the measure in question has been ‘withdrawn or amended so as to eliminate that nullification or substantial impairment’; whereas this mechanism could be used by Mercosur countries to pressure the EU to refrain from enacting or enforcing legislation and other measures related to climate and environmental protection, food safety or bans on certain pesticides;

F. whereas, under Article 218(5) TFEU, the power to adopt a decision authorising the signing of the agreement and, where appropriate, its provisional application before entry into force lies with the Council;

F. whereas the Brazilian Government’s interpretation of the temporal scope of the rebalancing clause differs from the Commission’s interpretation, with Brazil considering it to extend as far back as 2019;

G. whereas, under Article 218(5) TFEU, the negotiator’s proposal to the Council does not confer on the Commission any discretion to determine or modify the legal architecture of the envisaged agreement before its entry into force;

G. whereas this clause is more wide-reaching than existing ones in previous free trade agreements concluded by the EU and differs in scope and content to the clause set forth in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in Article 26(1) of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding; whereas the rebalancing clause contained in the GATT has never been invoked against sustainable development legislation, presumably because such legislation would be covered by the general exceptions clause of Article XX GATT;

H. whereas any unilateral alteration by the Commission of the structure or scope of the envisaged agreement, including its division into separate instruments, would thus go beyond the limits of the mandate conferred by the Council under Article 218 TFEU;

H. whereas the possibility of Mercosur countries gaining compensation for the trade effects of EU’s sustainability measures might incite the EU co-legislators to refrain from adopting such measures and put pressure on the Commission to withdraw, amend or halt the implementation of current legislation; whereas the mechanism could have an impact, in particular, on legislation that aims at preserving the rights protected by the Charter and the Treaty principles on which the EU’s legal order rests;

I. whereas such a division raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the principles of conferral of competences (Article 5 TEU) and sincere cooperation between the Union and the Member States (Article 4(3) TEU), as well as with the principle of institutional balance recognised by the case-law of the Court of Justice, insofar as it alters the distribution of powers established by the Treaties and the procedural balance established by Article 218 TFEU;

I. whereas there are significant regulatory differences between the EU and the Mercosur countries in relation to food production and sanitary and veterinary standards; whereas the EU-Mercosur agreement reduces auditing and control measures for agricultural imports from Mercosur; whereas Chapter 6 of the ITA, on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, encompasses several measures that weaken existing control mechanisms; whereas in accordance with Article 6.12(2) thereof, sanitary and phytosanitary measures are only acceptable if they are provisional and reviewed ‘in a reasonable period of time’; whereas under EU law, the application of the precautionary principle is not made conditional on such a requirement;

J. whereas under Article 218(10) TFEU, Parliament must be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure, and any circumvention of this obligation undermines the Parliament’s right of consent (Article 218(6) TFEU);

J. whereas Chapter 18 of the ITA, on trade and sustainable development, restricts the application of the precautionary principle, notably to situations of ‘risk of serious environmental degradation or to occupational health and safety’; whereas these restrictions may result in reducing the levels of health, consumer and environmental protection in the EU; whereas current EU measures allowed under the EU precautionary principle could be challenged in front of an arbitration panel and could justify compensations;

K. whereas, in Opinion 2/15, the Court distinguished between exclusive and shared competences within a single mixed agreement but did not envisage the restructuring or division of such an agreement after negotiation and initialling, or authorise the Commission to take such action;

1. Is concerned that the splitting of the EU Mercosur agreement into the EMPA and the ITA may be incompatible with Article 218(2) and (4) TFEU, as well as with the principle of conferral, the institutional balance principle and the sincere cooperation principle enshrined in Article 4(3) and Article 13(2) TEU; is concerned that the negotiation guidelines issued by the Council may not be respected and that this may affect the voting rules in the Council and prevent national parliaments from having their legitimate say on the agreement;

L. whereas the environmental, social and health dimensions of the agreement fall under shared competences and are subject to democratic scrutiny at national level; whereas the provisional application of the ITA would affect these shared competences without allowing for adequate democratic scrutiny and oversight by national parliaments;

2. Is concerned that the rebalancing mechanism provided for in the EU Mercosur agreement may, at least, be incompatible with Articles 11, 168, 169 and 191 TFEU and Articles 35, 37 and 38 of the Charter and may threaten the EU’s ability to maintain the autonomy of the EU legal order;

M. whereas several Member States have publicly expressed their opposition to the current ratification of the EU–Mercosur agreement, citing their incompatibility with the EU’s climate and agricultural objectives;

3. Is concerned that the EMPA and the ITA may compromise the application of the precautionary principle, which could result in incompatibility with, at least, Articles 168, 169 and 191 TFEU as well as Articles 35, 37 and 38 of the Charter; is also concerned that the precautionary principle might be adversely affected by the authority granted to an arbitration panel to assess the EU’s application of the precautionary principle;

N. whereas excessive liberalisation without adequate safeguard provisions could conflict with the objectives set out in Articles 39 and 207(1) TFEU, which require the common commercial policy to be conducted in accordance with the Union’s internal policies and objectives, including the protection of agricultural producers and rural communities;

4. Decides to seek an opinion from the Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 218(11) TFEU, on the compatibility with the Treaties of the proposed agreement and the EU’s proposed conclusion of the EMPA and the ITA, and the procedure followed in seeking to obtain that conclusion;

O. whereas the envisaged liberalisation of agri-food trade under the EU–Mercosur agreement may expose EU consumers to health and sanitary risks linked to the import of products that may not comply with EU standards on food safety and animal and plant health, and whereas the limited capacity for systematic border controls could undermine the high level of human, environmental and consumer protection required under Articles 35, 37 and 38 of the Charter and Article 168 TFEU;

5. Instructs its President to quickly take the necessary measures to obtain such an opinion from the Court of Justice and to forward this resolution, for information, to the Council and the Commission.

P. whereas the principle of sincere cooperation requires the Commission to act transparently and in close coordination with the Member States and with Parliament throughout the process of negotiating and concluding international agreements; whereas the Commission should therefore ensure full transparency and institutional balance when applying Article 218 TFEU, in order to safeguard Parliament’s prerogatives and the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s external action;

1. Takes the view that there is legal uncertainty as to whether the proposed agreements are compatible with the Treaties, in particular with Articles 4, 5 and 21 TEU and Articles 7, 11, 39, 191, 207 and 218 TFEU;

2. Decides to seek an opinion from the Court of Justice on the compatibility of the Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Common Market of the South, the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, of the other part, and the proposed Interim Agreement on Trade between the European Union, of the one part, and the Common Market of the South, the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, of the other part with the Treaties, and on whether;

(a) the decision of the Commission to divide an association agreement negotiated and initialled as a single mixed instrument is consistent with the principles of conferral of competences (Article 5 TEU), institutional balance (as recognised in the case-law of the Court of Justice) and sincere cooperation between the Union and the Member States (Article 4(3) TEU);

(b) such a division affects the allocation of competences between the Union and the Member States or alters the procedure of conclusion provided for in Article 218 TFEU;

(c) the envisaged agreements comply with the Union’s environmental objectives under Articles 11 and 191 TFEU and the precautionary principle recognised in the case-law of the Court of Justice;

(d) the common commercial policy, as pursued through these agreements, is coherent with the Union’s internal policies and objectives, in accordance with Article 207(1) TFEU and the general duty of consistency set out in Article 7 TFEU;

(e) taken together, the Commission’s actions respect the democratic legitimacy and procedural safeguards required under Article 218(10) and (6) TFEU concerning Parliament’s right to be informed and to give consent;

3. Instructs its President to take the necessary measures to obtain such an opinion from the Court of Justice and to forward this resolution, for information, to the Member States, the Council and the Commission.