What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

(2025/2049(INI))

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948,

– having regard to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966,

– having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(5), 21, 23, 29 and 31(2) thereof,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 and Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses,

– having regard to Council Implementing Regulations (EU) 2021/371 of 2 March 20212021, and(EU) 2021/478 of 22 March 2021 and (EU) 2025/1111 of 28 May 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses,

– having regard to the Council decisions amending Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999, including Council Decisions (CFSP) 2021/372 of 2 March 2021, (CFSP) 2021/481 of 22 March 2021, (CFSP) 2021/2197 of 13 December 2021, (CFSP) 2023/1504 of 20 July 2023, (CFSP) 2023/1716 of 8 September 2023, (CFSP) 2024/1025 of 4 April 2024, (CFSP) 2024/1074 of 4 April 2024, (CFSP) 2024/1175 of 19 April 2024, 2024/1967 of 15 July 2024, (CFSP) 2024/3004 of 2 December 2024, (CFSP) 2025/346 of 18 February 2025 and (CFSP) 2025/1110 of 27 May 2025,

– having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act) and its resolution of 2 April 2025 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 November 2020 on the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, which has been renewed until 2027,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2721 of 4 December 2023,2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses, which extended the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act) for three years, until 8 December 2026,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A100000/2025),(A10-0266/2025),

A. whereas Article 21 TEU stipulates that the actions of the Union ‘shall be guided by … democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law’;

B. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act, adopted in December 2020, enables the EU to impose restrictive measures on individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights violations worldwide; whereas certain EU Member States have adopted their own national Magnitsky-style legislation and these are important tools to complement EU sanctions; whereas the United States, Canada andCanada, the United KingdomKingdom, Australia and other like-minded countries have adopted similar sanctions regimes; whereas cooperation and coordination among like-minded countries on sanctions increases their effectiveness;

C. whereas in its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act, Parliament welcomed the adoption of the sanctions regime as an essential addition to the EU’s human rights and foreign policy toolbox;

C. whereas the European Court of Human Rights, in a unanimous ruling of seven judges in the case Magnitsky and Others v Russia (application nos 32631/09 and 53799/12) on 27 August 2019, held that Russia was responsible for Sergei Magnitsky’s death in prison and that he had been subjected to intentional acts of violence amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment; whereas, despite investigations into his detention, torture, unlawful posthumous prosecution and death, no one has been held criminally accountable;

D. whereas thein EUGHRSRits –resolution EUof Magnitsky8 ActJuly applies2021 toon athe broadEUGHRSR range– ofEU humanMagnitsky rightsAct, violationsParliament andwelcomed the personsadoption andof entitiesthe listedsanctions canregime includeas perpetrators,an enablersessential andaddition thirdto partiesthe supplyingEU’s materialhuman orrights expertiseand forforeign repression;policy toolbox;

E. whereas numerous Parliament resolutions have called for sanctions instruments to be used more often in cases of core international crimes or serious human rights violations;

E. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act applies to a broad range of human rights violations and the persons and entities listed can include perpetrators, enablers and third parties supplying material or technical assistance for repression;

F. whereas as at 28 May 2025, 156 listings had been made under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act (120 individuals and 36 entities);

F. whereas the EUGHRSR targets individual perpetrators and entities, instead of broad economic sectors, which reduces collateral damage to the general population and avoids harming access to food, medicine or public services;

G. whereas despite progress, substantial gaps remain in the geographical and thematic coverage of listings and in the establishment of benchmarks aligned with the sanctions’ objectives;

G. whereas the EUGHRSR also covers widespread violations or abuses and systematic or serious concerns as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU, such as torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, slavery, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, enforced disappearance of persons, arbitrary arrests or detentions, human trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, violations or abuses of freedom of opinion and expression, and violations or abuses of freedom of religion or belief;

H. whereas listings have primarily focused on violations of physical integrity and civil-political rights, particularly those targeting male political opponents and activists in authoritarian regimes, rather than on core international crimes and systemic violations of socio-economic rights;

H. whereas the EUGHRSR listings are a form of international recognition for victims of human rights abuses;

I. whereas listings have largely been geographically concentrated, leaving other areas and contexts under-addressed;

I. whereas transnational repression has not yet been included in the list of serious human rights violations that trigger sanctions under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;

J. whereas confidentiality around potential listing or de-listing is key to ensuring the effectiveness of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act; whereas Parliament has no role or say in this process;

J. whereas numerous Parliament resolutions have called for sanctions instruments to be used in a more flexible way and more often in cases of core international crimes or serious human rights violations;

K. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act currently provides only for asset freezes and visa bans;

K. whereas as at 4 November 2025, 168 listings had been made under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act (131 individuals and 37 entities); whereas the list of designations under this regime has grown, and not much is known about its impact and effectiveness;

L. whereas guidance from the Commission remains insufficient to clarify the scope of the prohibitions on delivering technical and material support to sanctioned persons and entities;

L. whereas despite progress, substantial gaps remain in the geographical and thematic coverage of transnational listings and in the establishment of benchmarks aligned with the sanctions’ objectives; whereas, despite several calls by Parliament, corruption is still not considered a crime within the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;

M. whereas some implementation loopholes, such as derogation clauses allowing contracts that were concluded before an individual or entity was listed, create opportunities for sanction circumvention;

M. whereas listings have primarily focused on violations of physical integrity and civil-political rights, particularly those targeting political opponents and activists, predominantly males, in authoritarian regimes, rather than on core international crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, and systemic violations of socio-economic rights;

N. whereas existing EU geographical sanctions regimes include broader restrictions that could complement the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act through cross-listing;

N. whereas listings, in line with the EU’s strategic relationships and geopolitical interests, have largely been geographically concentrated, leaving other areas and contexts under-addressed;

O. whereas civil society actors continue to engage informally with EU institutions in proposing names for listing, in the absence of a structured mechanism for their input;

O. whereas confidentiality around potential listing or de-listing is key to ensuring the effectiveness of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act; whereas Parliament should have a role in this process;

P. whereas improved transparency, coordination with accountability mechanisms, coordination with international actors and like-minded countries and the uptake of listings at United Nations level would strengthen the sanctions regime’s effectiveness;

P. whereas parliamentary scrutiny of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act is necessary in order to strengthen its legitimacy; whereas Parliament’s resolutions containing recommendations for additional listings continue to be insufficiently considered by the Council;

Q. whereas some Member States have failed to comply with EU sanctions by allowing sanctioned individuals to enter the territory of the EU; whereas such failure to comply with the sanctions considerably harms the EU’s credibility and undermines the effectiveness of EU sanction regimes;

Q. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act currently provides only for asset freezes and visa bans;

R. whereas Parliament has called, in numerous resolutions, for the introduction of qualified majority voting for the adoption of sanctions under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;

R. whereas the current regime of asset freezes and visa bans could be complemented by additional measures, such as restrictions on financial services, public procurement and participation in EU-funded projects, and its scope should be extended to cover the immediate family members of human rights violators;

S. whereas the extension of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act until December 2026 provides an opportunity to review the regime;

S. whereas guidance from the Commission remains insufficient to clarify the scope of the prohibitions on delivering any kind of support, including technical and material support to sanctioned persons and entities;

1. Reiterates its support for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act as a significant tool to strengthen the EU’s human rights toolbox, particularly given its capacity to contribute to changing the behaviour of the targeted persons and entities and to efforts to hold accountable the direct perpetrators, enablers and indirect supporters of serious human rights violations;

T. whereas some implementation loopholes, such as derogation clauses allowing contracts that were concluded before an individual or entity was listed, create opportunities for sanction circumvention and diminish the effectiveness of sanctions;

2. Reaffirms its unwavering commitment to combating impunity for serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide through the effective use of existing EU sanctions instruments and tools, including the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;

U. whereas existing EU geographical sanctions regimes include broader restrictions that could complement the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act through cross-listing;

A. Policy coherence and strategic effectiveness

V. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act has largely focused on lower-level officials and functionaries, while those holding real political and military power have often remained beyond the scope of its designations;

3. Calls for a comprehensive impact assessment of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act and its links with the EU country-specific sanctions and the other EU horizontal restrictive measures in order to evaluate its effectiveness, including in changing the behaviour of those listed, to identify operational gaps and to ensure consistent and strategic application worldwide, and calls for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed in accordance with the findings of this impact assessment;

W. whereas listings under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to date have not targeted any actors responsible for committing some of the core international crimes recognised in the Rome Statute;

4. Considers that more information on the de-listing criteria should be made available in order to enhance legal clarity, due process and accountability;

X. whereas civil society actors continue to engage informally with EU institutions in proposing names for listing, in the absence of a structured mechanism for their input; whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS) lacks the resources to assess, investigate and respond to the information it receives;

5. Reiterates that it is important for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be consistent with and complement the EU’s country-specific and horizontal restrictive measures, sectoral measures and arms embargos, as well as existing international sanctions frameworks;

Y. whereas improved transparency, coordination with accountability mechanisms, coordination with international actors and like-minded countries and the uptake of listings at United Nations level would strengthen the sanctions regime’s effectiveness;

6. Encourages the Council to seek to align EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act listings with the sanctions lists of like-minded partners and the UN Security Council, where politically and legally feasible, in order to enhance global legitimacy and effectiveness;

Z. whereas some Member States have failed to comply with EU sanctions by allowing sanctioned individuals to enter the territory of the EU; whereas such failure to comply with the sanctions considerably harms the EU’s credibility and undermines the effectiveness of EU sanctions regimes;

7. Underlines that it is important for EU candidate countries and potential candidate countries to align with the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act, in line with their broader alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

AA. whereas implementation is largely carried out at national level and each Member State is responsible for enforcing the sanctions on its territory; whereas this creates a risk of weak links where individuals or companies may try to circumvent the sanctions by moving money or activities to Member States with slower or less strict implementation; whereas the EU institutions have repeatedly stressed the need for more uniform and coordinated application to make sanctions truly effective;

8. Fully supportsAB. thewhereas possibilityParliament ofhas imposingcalled, targetedin anti-corruptionnumerous sanctionsresolutions, withinfor the EUintroduction framework,of whichqualified hasmajority beenvoting afor long-standingthe priorityadoption of Parliament, whether through its inclusionsanctions inunder the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act or under a different regime;Act;

9. Urges the Member States to refrain from bilateral political or diplomatic actions that undermine or contradict the EU’s unified stance on sanctions;

AC. whereas the extension of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act until December 2026 provides an opportunity to review the regime;

10. Condemns the fact that some EU Member States have failed to comply with EU sanctions by allowing sanctioned individuals to enter EU territory, thereby harming the credibility and effectiveness of sanctions; urges all EU Member States to fully and unconditionally comply with EU sanctions; calls for the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to ensure that EU Member States comply with the sanctions and to rigorously address any instances of non-compliance by Member States;

1. Reiterates its support for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act as an indispensable foreign policy tool for enhancing human rights worldwide and for strengthening the EU’s human rights toolbox, particularly given its capacity to contribute to changing the behaviour of targeted persons and entities and to efforts to hold accountable the direct perpetrators, enablers, instigators and indirect supporters of serious human rights violations, as well as those who directly or indirectly benefit from such violations, including their immediate family members; highlights that the instrument is designed so as to not affect the enjoyment of human rights by the population;

B. Strengthening the fight against impunity

2. Reaffirms its unwavering commitment to combating impunity for serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide through the effective use of existing EU sanctions instruments and tools, including the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act; reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the international justice system, which is facing unprecedented challenges, including baseless sanctions against judges and staff of the International Criminal Court, some of whom are EU nationals; urges the EU, in that regard, to activate its Blocking Statute to contain the impact of those sanctions;

11. Calls for the EU sanctions regime to be consistent with and complement international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and EU policies related to the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, with the aim of strengthening the fight against impunity worldwide;

Policy coherence and strategic effectiveness

12. Urges the EU to strategically align EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act listings with national and international criminal justice efforts, including by listing individuals indicted by international courts and perpetrators of core international crimes;

3. Calls for a comprehensive impact assessment of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act and its interactions with the EU country-specific sanctions and the other EU horizontal restrictive measures in order to evaluate its coherence, proportionality and effectiveness, including in changing the behaviour of those listed, to identify operational gaps and to ensure consistent and strategic application worldwide, and calls for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed in accordance with the findings of this impact assessment;

13. Urges the Council to correct current geographical and thematic imbalances in listings under the EUGHRSR - EU Magnitsky Act by extending listings beyond the current geographical concentration;

4. Calls for the listings drawn up under the EU’s EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed continuously and systematically, at least once every 12 months, so as to ensure their consistency, proportionality and conformity with the latest information and judicial decisions;

C. Transparency, accountability and the role of civil society

5. Considers that more information on the de-listing criteria should be made available in order to enhance legal clarity, due process, transparency and accountability;

14. Recommends enhanced transparency in the sanctions process, while upholding the rights of listed individuals to effective judicial review;

6. Reiterates that it is important for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be consistent with and complement the EU’s country-specific and horizontal restrictive measures, sectoral measures and arms embargos, as well as existing international sanctions frameworks;

15. Recommends that behavioural change by listed individuals and entities, such as cooperation with international justice mechanisms, be formally recognised as a de-listing criterion to incentivise accountability and compliance;

7. Encourages the Council to seek to align EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act listings with the sanctions lists of like-minded partners, in particular those in the G7, and the UN Security Council, where politically and legally feasible, in order to enhance global legitimacy and effectiveness;

16. Proposes a structured consultation mechanism for civil society engagement in the sanctions process, including the establishment of a dedicated contact point;

8. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance synergies between the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act and international accountability mechanisms, such as the UN, the International Criminal Court and regional human rights courts, to improve the effectiveness of EU actions against serious human rights violations;

17. Calls9. forUnderlines thethat Councilit andis theimportant Vice-Presidentfor ofEU thecandidate Commissioncountries /and Highpotential Representativecandidate ofcountries theto Unionalign forwith Foreignthe AffairsEUGHRSR and– SecurityEU PolicyMagnitsky toAct, providein Parliamentline with timely information about decisionstheir onbroader sanctionsalignment underwith the EUGHRSREU’s –common EUforeign Magnitskyand Act;security policy;

D. Preventing circumvention and strengthening enforcement tools

10. Fully supports the imposition of targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act or under a different regime; recommends extending the regime’s scope to cover large-scale corruption cases and abuse of state procurement contracts that directly sustain authoritarian regimes, thereby linking human rights abuses with kleptocratic practices; stresses, furthermore, that anti-corruption sanctions should take into account the broader systemic context and be closely linked with comprehensive strategies towards the respective actors; welcomes the fact that the Commission put forward a proposal for an anti-corruption sanctions regime; finds it regrettable that the file has been blocked at the Council by some Member States;

18. Calls for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed to prevent sanction circumvention by issuing explicit guidance on the prohibition on providing economic resources and technical and material support to listed individuals and entities;

11. Stresses that the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act should also address human rights violations enabled through digital surveillance, spyware exports and other technologies used for repression, and deliberate acts of environmental destruction with a clear intent to harm the civilian population; calls for explicit listings of individuals involved in such abuses;

19. Encourages the cross-listing of entities under both the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act and geographical sanctions regimes where appropriate;

12. Welcomes the recent use of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act against actors responsible for the transnational repression of dissidents and human rights defenders, and calls for more listings to reflect this growing global trend and to systematically assess acts of transnational repression, including digital surveillance, harassment of exiles, and cross-border intimidation, disinformation and legal abuse; calls on the Council to adopt a working definition of transnational repression to ensure consistent sanctioning, including of non-state proxies such as private security companies and diaspora organisations; calls for the EU to step up the application of sanctions against individuals and entities credibly documented as responsible for acts of transnational repression against human rights defenders, including harassment of relatives, digital attacks and intimidation abroad;

20. Calls on the Council to review derogation clauses to ensure that contracts concluded before a person is listed do not benefit their family members or associates, or any entities controlled by the sanctioned person;

13. Urges the Member States to refrain from bilateral political or diplomatic actions that undermine their commitment to international criminal justice mechanisms, including the Rome Statute, and the defence of human rights, or that contradict the EU’s unified stance on sanctions; instructs the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, if this recommendation is not taken into account, to call on the Member States concerned to align their actions and maintain EU unity; invites the Member States to enhance coordination and make use of their own instruments, such as universal jurisdiction and national sanctions, provided that these are applied in a coordinated manner in support of the common EU objectives, so as to bring about significant change and help achieve the objectives of EU sanctions;

14. Condemns the fact that some EU Member States have failed to comply with EU sanctions by allowing sanctioned individuals to enter EU territory, thereby harming the credibility and effectiveness of sanctions; urges all EU Member States to fully and unconditionally comply with EU sanctions; calls on the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to ensure that EU Member States comply with the sanctions and to rigorously and without discrimination address any instances of non-compliance by Member States;

15. Stresses that EU restrictive measures can only be fully effective if they are interpreted, enforced and implemented consistently, swiftly and uniformly by all Member States; notes the differences between Member States in terms of legal frameworks, administrative structures and operational resources for the implementation of sanctions; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to take the necessary steps to ensure a more harmonised and coordinated application, including by strengthening the capacity for asset freezes, improving the exchange of information and developing common EU-level monitoring and enforcement mechanisms;

16. Urges the EEAS to define legal pathways for mobilising the interest accrued from the frozen assets of individuals sanctioned under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act so that it can be used to benefit the victims of the serious human rights violations for which the sanctioned individuals are responsible; encourages the EU, furthermore, to explore the possibility of establishing a specific procedure regarding ill-gotten gains;

17. Strongly welcomes the Council’s adoption of thematic sanctions packages under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act; urges the Council to systematically and proactively adopt similar targeted measures to address other specific and grave human rights violations, including torture, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and the repression of civil society and human rights defenders;

18. Reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the common foreign and security policy that do not have military or defence implications, such as sanctions;

Strengthening the fight against impunity

19. Calls for the EU sanctions regime to be consistent with and complement international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and EU policies related to the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, with the aim of strengthening the fight against impunity worldwide;

20. Urges the EU to strategically align EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act listings with national and international criminal justice efforts, including by listing individuals indicted by international courts, such as the International Criminal Court, and perpetrators of core international crimes and other actors who frustrate such accountability processes;

21. Underlines that sanctions should also serve the purpose of ensuring that perpetrators of serious human rights violations and corruption do not remain anonymous, thereby exposing those responsible;

22. Urges the Council to ensure that all regions of the world are treated with equal scrutiny and commitment, and to correct current geographical and thematic imbalances in listings under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act by extending listings beyond the current geographical concentration to all persons and entities responsible for serious human rights violations, irrespective of their country of origin;

23. Encourages the Council to pay particular attention to violations such as sexual and gender-based violence, discriminatory policies, and the persecution of women leaders, journalists and activists, so that these categories are adequately reflected in future listings;

24. Notes that, so far, a significant proportion of individuals sanctioned under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act were involved in the state’s repressive apparatus, but did not make decisions, while only a minority of those listed hold political or military leadership positions; urges the Council to extend designations beyond low-level designations to include political and military leaders, sanctioning those responsible for making decisions that led to grave human rights violations;

25. Calls for greater and more effective communication on imposed sanctions to reiterate the EU’s global stand on human rights and the fight against impunity, as in some cases sanctioned individuals are being portrayed as heroes by national propaganda and are even rewarded by repressive regimes; notes that the deterrent element of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act works most effectively against individuals and entities with property in, or means to travel to, the EU;

26. Condemns any countersanctions imposed on the EU or its institutions, Member States, bodies or citizens solely for promoting and upholding human rights, democracy and the rule of law through the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;

Transparency, accountability and the role of civil society

27. Recommends enhanced transparency and clear guidelines in the sanctions process, while upholding the rights of listed individuals to effective judicial review;

28. Recommends that sustained, demonstrable, real and lasting behavioural change by listed individuals and entities, such as ongoing cooperation with international justice mechanisms, be formally recognised as a de-listing criterion to incentivise accountability and compliance;

29. Proposes the establishment of a structured and transparent consultation mechanism for civil society reporting and engagement in the sanctions process, with protective measures for whistleblowers, including the establishment of a dedicated EEAS contact point; recommends the introduction of a budgetary window to strengthen the EEAS’s capacity to systematically assess, investigate, react to and process information and proposals from civil society;

30. Calls on the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to envision a complementary role for Parliament in collecting and proposing cases of serious human rights violations to be considered under the sanctions regime, and to provide Parliament with annual reports about decisions on sanctions under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act, including in the circumvention of sanctions; calls for the listings recommendations contained in Parliament’s resolutions to be thoroughly considered by the Council;

Preventing circumvention and strengthening enforcement tools

31. Calls for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed to prevent sanction circumvention by issuing explicit and updated guidance on the prohibition on providing economic resources and technical and material support to listed individuals and entities, clarifying that the prohibition on providing technical and material support includes non-financial assistance such as ICT infrastructure, software, legal facilitation and cyber tools used for repression; emphasises the need to strengthen the EU’s sanctions regime by broadening and diversifying the use of secondary sanctions with a view to targeting government officials, entities, businesses and individuals involved in facilitating breaches or the circumvention of sanctions, which would enable authoritarian regimes to continue their grave human rights violations;

32. Calls on the Commission to enhance cooperation with the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the Anti-Money Laundering Authority and national financial intelligence units in order to systematically identify whether opaque financial products, crypto-assets and offshore structures are being used to evade sanctions;

33. Encourages the cross-listing of entities under both the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act and geographical sanctions regimes where appropriate;

34. Calls on the Council to review derogation clauses to ensure that contracts concluded before a person is listed do not benefit their family members or associates, or any entities controlled by the sanctioned person;

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21.35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Adopted in December 2020, the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act enables the EU to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights abuses worldwide. Despite its significance as a foreign policy tool, the regime still faces several operational, geographical, and legal challenges that hinder its full potential.

As of May 2025, 154 listings (118 individuals and 36 entities) have been made under the regime. However, with the report concerns are expressed over the narrow focus of the listings – both geographically and thematically – as they tend to centercentre on certain geographical areas, and specific political and civil rights violations in authoritarian contexts, while under-addressing core international crimes and systemic socio-economic rights abuses. The gender perspective of the application of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act is also under analysis.

The report underlines the need for a more coherent and strategic use of the sanctions regime, aligned with broader EU foreign policy objectives and other restrictive measures. It calls for an impact assessment of the regime’s effectiveness, greater alignment with international partners, improved enforcement by Member States, and enhanced transparency and accountability.

Additionally, the text proposes to identify avenues for improving the sanctions instruments, and measures to close implementation loopholes and prevent sanctionssanction circumvention. The report also aims to identify ways for the European Parliament and other relevant actors such as civil society organisations to contribute to the process of suggestions for listing criteria. It also reiterates its long-standing support for including anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework.

Importantly, the draft report stresses that a review of the regime – following its prolongation until December 2026 – would provide a critical opportunity to address current shortcomings and reinforce the EU’s commitment to human rights, the rule of law, and the fight against impunity globally.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

Sergey Ross, lawyer and human rights defender

Tinatin Tsertsvadze, Advocacy Advisor, Open Society Foundations

Natalia Kubesch, Legal officer, Redress UK

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted

2.12.2025

Result of final vote

+:

–:

0:

44

15

4

Members present for the final vote

Mika Aaltola, Mieke Andriese, Lucia Annunziata, Petras Auštrevičius, Jordan Bardella, Wouter Beke, Adam Bielan, Helmut Brandstätter, Grzegorz Braun, Petr Bystron, Tobias Cremer, Danilo Della Valle, Elio Di Rupo, Loucas Fourlas, Michael Gahler, Giorgos Georgiou, Christophe Gomart, Bernard Guetta, Hana Jalloul Muro, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Sergey Lagodinsky, Antonio López-Istúriz White, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Hannah Neumann, Leoluca Orlando, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, António Tânger Corrêa, Marta Temido, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Roberto Vannacci

Substitutes present for the final vote

Pernando Barrena Arza, Jaroslav Bžoch, Viktória Ferenc, Tomasz Froelich, Giorgio Gori, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Miriam Lexmann, Matjaž Nemec, Matthieu Valet, Isabel Wiseler-Lima

Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

Sérgio Humberto, Nikos Papandreou, Carla Tavares, Catarina Vieira

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

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