What changed

PR_INI_ImplReport

Follow-up to the European Parliament non-legislative resolution on the implementation of the Treaty provisions on national Parliaments

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT - SUMMARY OF FACTS AND FINDINGS

Rapporteur: Paulo RANGEL (EPP / PT)

Introduction

Reference number: 2023/2084 (INI) / A9-0429/2023 / P9_TA(2024)0023

14 years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) considered necessary to draw up an own-initiative implementation report assessing “The implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning national parliaments”.

Date of adoption of the resolution: 17 January 2024

The goal of the report is to assess the use of current mechanisms for national parliaments’ participation in the European political process and future perspectives of its development. Based on that assessment, the report then looks into possible improvements to those mechanisms, in order to bring national parliaments closer to the overall integration process. It takes into account debates and recommendations that took place since the approval of the previous implementation report, such as the Conference on the Future of Europe and the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and “Doing Less More Efficiently”.

Competent Parliamentary Committee: Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO)

I. The primary function of national parliaments: scrutinizing European politics by mandating their own governments, represented in the Council and in the European Council

Brief analysis/ assessment of the resolution and requests made in it:

The Treaty of Lisbon became known as the Treaty of the Parliaments, precisely because it has considerably increased the powers of the European Parliament, while recognising national parliaments their own constitutional role within the European framework. These came to have an essential role in securing the democratic legitimacy of the Union, in promoting its pluralism and diversity and in granting its constitutional functioning.

The resolution encourages national Parliaments to fully exercise their European functions in order to directly influence and scrutinise the content of European policies, in particular via the monitoring of their national governments acting as members of the European Council, and, in cooperation with the European Parliament shape a stronger parliamentary dimension of the EU.

National parliaments are seen - by political actors at the various levels of governance and researchers alike - as important players contributing to strengthening the democratic basis of the EU project. In particular, national parliaments’ active participation in EU affairs and enhanced scrutiny of national governments by national parliaments are instrumental in ensuring democratic accountability and legitimacy of the EU institutional system. However, despite the inclusion of national parliaments in the text of the Treaties, their ability to act in EU affairs could yet be improved. National parliaments are willing to play a more active role in EU affairs by being more closely involved in the substance of EU policies and legislation, rather than on matters of subsidiarity alone. Discussions are intensifying on the possibility to give national parliaments the opportunity to intervene throughout the decision-making process.

As far as the Commission is concerned, it contains the following suggestions:

The democratic functioning of the institutions implies the ability to hold decision-makers accountable. In this respect, the European institutional system has a particularity: the Council of the Union belongs to both the legislative branch, legislator, and the executive branch, as an institution composed of national executives. This hybrid nature complicates the political control that can be exercised over it, as the prerogatives of the European Parliament are limited. In this context, national parliaments play an essential role in ensuring the democratic functioning of the Union, thanks to the control they exercise over the European policy of their national governments, as stipulated in the Treaty.

strengthen the role of national Parliaments by ensuring transparency of the Council’s work, i.e. regarding the action and voting record of Member States, and by strengthened political dialogue between the European institutions and national Parliaments in a manner whereby also minority views from the national Parliaments can be expressed;

However, this control is made difficult by the lack of transparency of the Council’s work, which despite some improvements remains the practice. The access to information, which is a prerequisite for exercising political control over the national government, is naturally and above all a matter for national rules and practices, which vary greatly from one Member State to another. However, common minimum rules could be promoted to ensure greater transparency of the work of the Council vis-à-vis the national parliaments. In particular, this transparency should apply to national votes in the Council, which should be public, and preferably to the meetings of the Council, which should be public in the future. Indeed, monitoring the action and voting record of Member States in the Council would be the most effective way for national parliaments to exercise proper scrutiny over their governments’ European policy.

strengthen interaction with national Parliaments by empowering European political parties with a recast of the Regulation on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations;

II. The specific constitutional contribution of national parliaments to the European level: the creation of an European political sphere

reform national Parliaments’ subsidiarity scrutiny of draft EU laws. For this purpose, agree on ‘a common understanding of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality originally attached to the Amsterdam Treaty, the relevant case-law of the European Court of Justice and the Commission’s own practice’;

If the Treaty of Lisbon calls on a more intimate relation between national parliaments and the European institutions, it is naturally because it expects their specific contribution further from that which its executives convey through their voice and vote in the Council and in the European Council. There is a true constitutional differentia specifica between the participation of national parliaments in the European life and the participation of national governments in the aforementioned Council and European Council. While governments represent a single political stance, reflected in the indivisibility of their vote, the national parliaments are precisely the expression of the plurality and internal diversity (without prejudice to the strict compliance with the will of the majority expressed within). The specific contribution that the national parliaments can bring to the European level is precisely this diversity of national visions (proportionately represented). However, little has been done to draw attention to the irreplaceable constitutional function of national parliaments within the European life. The latter strongly contributes to the establishment of a true European political space and a true authentic public sphere. In fact, minority positions in a national parliament might match a majority position in another, and the interaction between them reflects the emergence of European political arena. Amongst others, the report aims to bridge this gap. Firstly, strongly encouraging the representation of internal plurality by the delegations of national parliaments, in all of its joint events, and in accordance with the political groupings’ proportions. Secondly, allowing minority groupings that stand for a minority position to add their dissenting opinions to the reasoned opinions, without undermining the commitment of the adopted opinions to the will of the majority.

consider extending the eight-week period for the subsidiarity scrutiny in the framework of a future Treaty revision to a twelve-week period;

III. Aiming at a full interinstitutional cooperation: developing the European political sphere

establish a ‘green card’ procedure, ‘whereby at least one third of national Parliaments can submit constructive proposals to the Commission or the European Parliament, once the latter has been granted a general direct right of initiative, with the aim of positively influencing the European debate’;

The creation of the European political arena is obviously strengthened by the reinforcement of all kinds of initiatives already in place. In fact, the ongoing cooperation between the EU institutions and national parliaments has improved considerably in the past decade.

extend the right to be informed also to regional Parliaments with legislative powers;

While this cooperation is closely linked to the dialogue between national legislative branches themselves, there is still room for improvement. First and foremost, efforts should be made to simplify the current framework of relations between the EU and national parliaments, including the Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments, the COSAC, the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the EU, the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol, the interparliamentary committee meetings and the joint parliamentary meetings, just to name a few. The development of a committee-based approach would be extremely beneficial in this regard.

establish a ‘European Week’ – an event, which may take place simultaneously in all national Parliaments, with involvement of Parliaments from candidate countries, and which should be attended by Commissioners, MEPs and Council presidency to discuss and explain the European agenda.

Better coordination and organisation of interparliamentary cooperation in respect of time and content is needed to prevent interparliamentary cooperation fatigue. Furthermore, better cooperation among national parliaments/chambers themselves is needed so that they could explore the existing mechanisms for influencing EU affairs. A committee-based approach to interparliamentary cooperation seems to be preferred.

Response to requests and overview of actions taken, or intended to be taken, by the Commission:

A “European Week”, which may take place simultaneously in the 27 national parliaments and which should be attended by Commissioners, Members of the European Parliament and ministers of the sitting Council presidency, debating European affairs with national and, where appropriate, regional parliamentarians, should be organised. The “European Week” would entail, once more without jeopardizing each parliament’s sovereign prerogative, a reform of the “rules of procedure” of national parliaments and of the European Parliament.

In general

IV. The role of national parliaments with respect to the control of subsidiarity

The Commission acknowledges the important contribution that national Parliaments can make to creating a European public sphere, as highlighted in the European Parliament’s resolution. For the Commission, the exchange with national Parliaments in building coalitions for positive change is very important, as President von der Leyen underlined in her contribution at the plenary meeting of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), in Prague in 2022.

Aware that this is one of its most important constitutional powers, national parliaments are unanimous in their evaluation of certain throttling in the functioning of the Early Warning System (EWS), which may trigger the ‘yellow card’ or the ‘orange card’ procedures.

Paragraph 5

Reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments do not seem to slow down or halt the EU legislative processes, mainly because these opinions should be submitted within eight weeks from the moment the Commission has submitted its legislative proposal. However, this deadline is a limiting factor discouraging national parliaments from submitting reasoned opinions and is thus considered insufficient by all key players in the process, namely due to the delays in transmitting individual elements of complex legislative packages to the national parliaments and common holiday periods when most national parliaments are in recess. It cannot, however, be altered without Treaty change. The previous implementation report proposed the implementation of a technical notification period, which would de facto increase the eight-week period. Consequently, as a mitigation measure, from 2019, the Commission started excluding the end-of-year festive period when setting the eight-week period for national parliaments to send reasoned opinions. Nevertheless, in the framework of the discussions on possible Treaty changes, an extension of the deadline, as requested by national parliaments, must be considered.

The Commission very much appreciates the active engagement of national Parliaments in the framework of the political dialogue with the Commission. It encourages national Parliaments to engage earlier in the process by participation in the Commissions consultations, providing forward-looking political input and using ‘own-initiative opinions’ to let the Commission know their views about future initiatives that they deem necessary.

National parliaments and the European institutions seem to interpret the subsidiarity principle differently, which can have a certain impact on implementing the EWS, as it reduces its effectiveness. This reality is also seized in the recommendations of the Conference on the Future of Europe’s (CoFoE), which proposed different ideas. Therefore, the development of a common understanding of the subsidiarity principle, capturing the criteria contained in the Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality originally attached to the Amsterdam Treaty, the relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, as well as the Commission’s own practice, would help to increase clarity on the applicability and assessment of the principle. This common understanding could also attempt to address the distinction between subsidiarity stricto sensu and lato sensu, the latter also comprising conferral and proportionality, by eschewing an overtly restrictive vision of the subsidiarity principle.

Paragraph 10

A ‘green card’ procedure, addressed in the 2018 report, was likewise discussed in the CoFoE, which suggested in measure 40(2) that national parliaments (and regional parliaments with legislative powers) are ‘to be granted the possibility to suggest a legislative initiative to the European level’. This CoFoE measure would require a Treaty revision. While recognizing their role within the European Union, it should be stressed that national parliaments do not form a “third chamber” in the institutional framework of the Union and, therefore, should not be given a direct right of initiative. As clarified in the previous implementation report, such an innovation would necessarily have three limits: it cannot be a true legislative initiative, as this is a right exclusively reserved to the Commission (neither Parliament nor Council may, for the time being, initiate legislation, although any future Treaty revision should accord the European Parliament the right of legislative initiative); it cannot be used in relation to the repeal of existing EU law as it would otherwise act as a reverse red card and, finally, it should not incorporate any right to amendment European legislation (that would usurp powers assigned to the EP and Council by the Treaties). The idea is, therefore, most commendable, as it reflects the right understanding of subsidiarity, to the extent that it means that national parliaments recognize that some matters are of exclusive competence of the Union. At full deployment, it would be a right of proposal or suggestion that, similar to parallel mechanisms, having crossed a threshold of national parliaments’ support, could originate the obligation for a reasoned reply from the Commission in the event of refusal. It should first, furthermore, have to secure the support of the European Parliament.

The Commission has always defended that European political parties should play an important role in contributing to the debate on European public policy issues and in forming European political awareness, as set out in Article 10(4) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). A successful and timely revision of Regulation 1141/2014 would have been essential for European political parties to be able to fully play their role in the upcoming electoral campaign for the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, while also strengthening the transparency and legal certainty for all actors. The Commission deeply regrets that, despite the efforts deployed by all parties in the negotiation, the co-legislators could not overcome their diverging positions on fundamental aspects of the recast proposal to find an agreement ahead of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament.

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

Paragraph 11

on the implementation of the Treaty provisions on national parliaments

The Commission currently participates regularly in various interparliamentary events, such as the 2024 European Parliamentary week, whose agenda featured several Commission members as speakers. The Commission is ready to continue this engagement and consider how it could adapt to new formats of interparliamentary events.

(2023/2084(INI))

Paragraph 14

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Article 5 on the conferral of competences and subsidiarity, Article 10(1) on representative democracy, Article 10(2) on the representation of EU citizens, Article 10(3) on the right of EU citizens to participate in the democratic life of the Union, Article 11 on participatory democracy, Article 12 on the role of national parliaments, Article 48(3) on the ordinary revision procedure and Article 48(7) (passerelle clause) thereof,

The Commission is committed to promoting a common understanding of subsidiarity and proportionality and appreciates the European Parliament’s encouragement to refer to the criteria originally attached to the Amsterdam Treaty as a basis for that common understanding.

– having regard to Protocol No 1 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam and to Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiary and proportionality annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon,

Since 2015, the Commission’s better regulation policy includes already the assessment of subsidiarity and proportionality in policy making. The Commission explicitly sets out in the Explanatory Memoranda of its legislative proposals how its proposals conform to the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. Moreover, the Commission included in 2021 in its revised better regulation toolbox (see tool #5) a subsidiarity and proportionality assessment grid. This was a follow-up to the proposal by the 2018 report of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing less more efficiently’ to set up such a common assessment tool (a ‘grid’) to foster a common understanding and create a more effective application of these principles by all bodies and institutions in preparing new legislation. The subsidiarity grid is included, as a linked staff working document, with each legislative initiative accompanied by an impact assessment. The Commission would like to encourage the co-legislators and national Parliaments to use the subsidiarity grid for their assessment of a legislative proposal’s compliance with subsidiarity and proportionality and thus foster a common understanding of these principles.

– having regard to Article 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

In the Commission’s view, the usefulness of the subsidiarity scrutiny mechanism as described in Protocol No 2 to the Treaties cannot be deducted from the number of reasoned opinions, triggering a ‘yellow or an ‘orange’ card. The mere existence of the mechanism is an additional incentive for the Commission to perform a rigorous subsidiarity assessment early in the law-making process and to seek constant improvement in this regard. The Commission takes every single reasoned opinion seriously as an important source of information about the perception of its legislative proposals in the Member States and it replies in detail to all reasoned opinions.

– having regard to its resolutions of 7 May 2009 on the development of the relations between the European Parliament and national parliaments under the Treaty of Lisbon, of 16 April 2014 on relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments and of 19 April 2018 on the implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning national parliaments,

Paragraph 15

– having regard to the Commission’s annual report on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on relations with national parliaments for 2018 of 11 July 2019 (COM(2019)0333), for 2019 of 30 June 2020 (COM(2020)0272), for 2020 of 23 July 2021 (COM(2021)0417) and for 2021 of 1 August 2022 (COM(2022)0366),

To facilitate national Parliaments’ subsidiarity scrutiny, the Commission applies summer (the entire month of August) and winter (20 December - 10 January) exclusions from the calculation of the 8-weeks-deadline available for national Parliaments to express subsidiarity concerns.

– having regard to the annual reports of the European Parliament’s Directorate for Relations with National Parliaments, in particular the 2022 report on relations between the European Parliament and EU national parliaments,

Paragraph 17

– having regard to its resolutions of 20 January 2021 on monitoring the application of EU law 2017, 2018 and 2019 and of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report,

The Commission would like to stress that already within the framework set by the Treaties and through the political dialogue with the Commission, national Parliaments have several possibilities to let the Commission know their views and provide forward-looking political input. National Parliaments can annually send their views about the content of the Commission’s annual work programme, and their own related priorities. They also have the possibility of sending their input through the ‘Have your say’ portal on legislative proposals and policies under preparation, as well as sending their suggestions to the ‘Fit for Future’ platform to simplify EU legislation and reduce related unnecessary costs. National Parliaments can also use ‘own-initiative opinions’ to tell the Commission about future initiatives that they deem necessary. In practice, the Commission sees more and more national Parliaments using these possibilities.

– having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on European Union regulatory fitness and subsidiarity and proportionality – report on Better Law Making covering the years 2017, 2018 and 2019,

Paragraph 18

– having regard to the report of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less More Efficiently’ of 10 July 2018 entitled ‘Active subsidiarity – a new way of working’,

The Commission, in its contacts with regional Parliaments with legislative powers, does not pursue activities that would go beyond the Treaty setup or interfere in the constitutional relationship between the national and regional Parliaments in those Member States where regional Parliaments with legislative powers exist. However, the Commission continues to encourage regional Parliaments' early and proactive involvement in discussions on EU policy proposals and initiatives which have a particular relevance for the local and regional level, and it replies in substance to the contributions it receives from regional Parliaments in this context. This is fully in line with the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty. For example, in 2023 the Commission received 32 resolutions from regional Parliaments, concerning issues as various as the circular economy, human rights and the Conference on the Future of Europe. Some regional Parliaments also participate regularly in the Commission’s public consultations.

– having regard to its resolutions of 15 January 2020 on the European Parliament’s position on the Conference on the Future of Europe and of 4 May 2022 on the follow-up to the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe,

Paragraph 21

– having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties,

The Commission believes that the political dialogue with national Parliaments still bears great potential for addressing current and future challenges, and it stands ready to strengthen this dialogue through the established channels of communication and cooperation to facilitate national Parliaments’ input to and feedback on the Commission’s political and legislative initiatives.

– having regard to Article 13 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), which enshrines the organisation of inter-parliamentary conferences for the purposes of discussing budgetary policies and other issues covered by the Treaty,

– having regard to its resolution of 15 March 2023 on the European Semester for economic policy coordination 2023,

– having regard to the conclusions of the Presidency following the Conference of Speakers of the European Union Parliaments held in Prague on 24 and 25 April 2023,

– having regard to the conclusions of the Plenary Meeting of the LXIX Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs (COSAC) held in Stockholm on 14-16 May 2023,

– having regard to the Declaration of Léon on parliamentarism adopted at the Conference to Commemorate the International Day of Parliamentarism – Strengthening Parliaments to Enhance Democracy, held in Léon on 30 June and 1 July 2023,

– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as to Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0000/2023),

A. whereas national parliaments’ active participation in European affairs and enhanced scrutiny of national governments by national parliaments are instrumental in ensuring the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the EU institutional system;

B. whereas the parliamentary accountability of national governments within the framework of European affairs, which depends on individual national practices, is the cornerstone of the role of national parliaments in the current European Treaty framework;

C. whereas this accountability can be facilitated by increased transparency in the Council, especially with regard to the voting record of Member States;

D whereas a lack of transparency in the EU legislative and decision-making processes risks undermining both the prerogatives of national parliaments under the Treaties and relevant Protocols and, in particular, their role in scrutinising their national governments as represented in the Council;

E. whereas the pluralism of national parliaments is remarkably beneficial to the Union and the underrepresentation of parliamentary minorities in European affairs should be counterbalanced while fully respecting the majorities in each national parliament and in accordance with their proportions;

F. whereas Protocol No 2 (Article 6) acknowledges that national parliaments may consult regional parliaments with legislative powers, yet the role of regional parliaments is dependent on the national arrangements and very often remains advisory;

G whereas national parliaments and their role within the EU institutional framework were addressed by a number of proposals contained in the report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE);

H. whereas national parliaments play a role in any revision of the European Treaties; whereas the European Parliament in its resolution of 9 June 2022 called for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties;

I. whereas a European public sphere could be fostered by a series of forums on the European agenda and such forums could be endorsed through a common ‘European Week’, in which members of national parliamentary chambers would simultaneously discuss European affairs with Commissioners, Members of the European Parliament and ministers from the sitting Council presidency;

J. whereas national parliaments show interest in being involved more closely on the substance of EU policies and legislation rather than only in the framework of the early warning system (EWS), which exclusively concerns subsidiarity;

K. whereas the implementation of the right of national parliaments to scrutinise compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, on the basis of the EWS, has gradually improved relations between the EU institutions and national parliaments;

L. whereas the eight-week period laid down in Article 4 of Protocol No 1 has proven to be inadequate for the timely monitoring of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and must be considered in the framework of a future Treaty revision;

M. whereas the 2018 implementation report recommended that national parliaments be given the possibility to submit constructive proposals for the Commission’s consideration and with due regard to the Commission’s right of initiative;

N. whereas the CoFoE recommended that national parliaments and regional parliaments with legislative powers ‘be granted the possibility to suggest a legislative initiative to the European level’, an instrument which would afford them the opportunity to suggest constructive proposals for the Commission’s consideration and with due regard for the Commission’s right of initiative, having first secured Parliament’s support;

O. whereas in its resolution of 9 June 2022, Parliament called for the establishment of a general direct right of legislative initiative for the European Parliament; whereas, following the granting of this right, ‘green card’ procedures should be directed at Parliament;

P. whereas the implementation of a ‘red card’ procedure is not conceivable at this stage of the European integration process;

Q. whereas the IPEX, a platform for continuous exchange of information among national parliaments and between national parliaments and the European institutions, should be further developed in accordance with its digital strategy; whereas the European Parliament plays a major supporting role in this;

R. whereas national parliaments have relevant competencies in the areas of freedom, security and justice pursuant to Articles 70, 85 and 88 TFEU and should therefore play an important role in the future of the Union’s security and defence policy;

Scrutinising governmental activity in European affairs

1. Considers that the implementation of the rights and obligations of national parliaments deriving from the Treaty of Lisbon has enhanced their role within the European constitutional framework, thus providing for more pluralism, democratic legitimacy and the better functioning of the Union;

2. Takes the view that the accountability of national governments to national parliaments as acknowledged by Article 10(2) TEU is the keystone of the role of national parliamentary chambers in the European Union; encourages national parliaments to fully exercise their European functions in order to directly influence and scrutinise the content of European policies, in particular via the monitoring of their national governments acting as members of the European Council and the Council;

3. Calls on the Member States to ensure that national parliaments are granted enough time, the capacity and the necessary access to information in order to fulfil their constitutional role of scrutinising and thus legitimating the activity of national governments when these governments act at European level;

4. Considers that transparency of the working methods and decision-making processes of the EU institutions represents a precondition for enabling national parliaments to effectively fulfil their institutional role deriving from the Treaties; calls, therefore, for the voting records of Member States in the Council to be made public; calls, furthermore, for national parliaments to make full use of their respective competences, inter alia by adapting their internal organisation, timetables and rules of procedures to enable them to do so;

5. Recalls, while encouraging strengthened political dialogue with national parliaments, that decisions must be taken in accordance with constitutional competences and by taking into account the clear delineation between the respective decision-making competences of the national and European bodies;

6. States that the alignment of the European Semester with the agendas of national parliaments could further contribute to the coordination of economic policies, while underlining that such alignment should not disregard the powers of self-governance and the specific rules of procedure of each parliamentary chamber;

7. Calls for the implementation of a national period for budgetary dialogue, during which national parliaments would be able to deliberate upon and contribute to the European Semester by providing their governments with a mandate in their relations with the Commission and the Council;

Developing a European public sphere

8. Stresses the relevance of the principle of proportional representation of members from different political parties in this regard; recommends, therefore, that national parliamentary delegations acting before the European institutions should reflect political diversity;

9. Notes the fact that the binding will of parliamentary majorities could be expressed in the opinions issued by national parliaments, within or outside the framework of the EWS; endorses the idea, however, of national parliamentary political minorities being given the possibility to express dissenting points of view, which could then be incorporated into the annexes to such opinions;

10. Believes that the establishment of an annual European Week would allow Members of the European Parliament, Commissioners and ministers of sitting Council presidencies to stand before all national and, where appropriate, regional parliamentary assemblies in order to discuss and explain the European agenda alongside national and regional parliamentarians; believes, further, that meetings between national and European political groups in the framework of EU interparliamentary cooperation could bring added value in the form of authentic European political debate;

Backing reform of the Early Warning System

11. Underlines that the most substantial prerogative for national parliaments brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon was their ability to scrutinise compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in the early stages of EU legislative procedures;

12. Notes that procedures such as the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange’ cards have not been used extensively; believes, however, that the procedural shortcomings of the EWS should not be regarded as conclusive proof of failure to respect subsidiarity; suggests that all EU institutions and Member States agree on a common culture regarding the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality based on the criteria contained in the Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality originally attached to the Amsterdam Treaty, the relevant case law of the European Court of Justice and the Commission’s own practice; considers that the development of this common culture should allow for a broader understanding encompassing all the elements of subsidiarity;

13. Acknowledges the request by national parliaments to extend the eight-week period during which they can issue reasoned opinions under Article 3 of Protocol No 1; underlines, however, that the current Treaty framework does not provide for such an extension; notes that, as a mitigation measure, from 2019, the Commission began excluding the end-of-year festive period when setting the eight-week period for national parliaments to send reasoned opinions; considers, therefore, that the eight-week period must be reconsidered in the framework of a future Treaty revision;

14. Reiterates its suggestion of setting up a system, sometimes called a ‘green card’ procedure, whereby at least one third of national parliaments can submit constructive proposals to the Commission with the aim of positively influencing the European debate and the Commission’s power of initiative, having first secured Parliament’s support; suggests, in this regard, that the Commission could enjoy the discretion either to take on board such proposals or to issue a formal response underlining its reasons for not doing so; points out that such a procedure cannot consist of a right of initiative or the right to withdraw or amend legislation as this would subvert ‘the Union method’ and the distribution of competences between national and European level, thus violating the Treaties;

15. Considers that the ‘green card’ procedure should be directed at Parliament once the latter is granted a general direct right of legislative initiative, as the direct representative of EU citizens;

Implementing the right to information

16. Reaffirms that Article 12 TEU and Protocol No 1 give national parliaments the right to receive information directly from the European institutions; suggests that the right to be informed be extended also to regional parliaments with legislative powers;

17. Recommends that national parliaments use the IPEX platform in a timely fashion to ensure an early start to the national scrutiny mechanism; recommends using IPEX as a channel for the systematic sharing of information and the early flagging of subsidiarity concerns; welcomes the updated version of the IPEX Guidelines, approved at the Secretaries-General meeting in February 2023, which reflects the new version of the IPEX platform and the opportunities and tools offered by this new version;

Envisaging better interinstitutional cooperation

18. Takes note of the current cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments in the COSAC, in the Interparliamentary Conference on Common Foreign and Security Policy and within the framework of Article 13 TSCG; takes note, further, of more recent forms of interparliamentary cooperation such as the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol and the Interparliamentary Committee Meeting on the Evaluation of Eurojust; stresses that such cooperation should be developed on the basis of the principles of consensus, information-sharing and consultation in order for national parliaments to exercise scrutiny over their respective governments and administrations;

19. Reiterates that the current framework of relations between the Union and national parliaments could be simplified and harmonised in order to make it more efficient and effective; calls, in this context, for a review of the engagement between the Union and its national parliaments across existing platforms and forums, with the aim of strengthening these relations and adapting them to current needs;

20. Points out that strengthening political and technical dialogue between parliamentary committees, both at national and at European level, would be a highly productive step towards full interparliamentary cooperation; is considering the possibility of allocating additional resources to achieve this aim, and of the use of videoconferences, where possible;

21. Acknowledges the relevance of the Interparliamentary Committee Meetings (ICM) established in Articles 9 and 10 of Protocol No 1 and the sectorial success of a ‘committee method’ in interparliamentary cooperation; believes that better interinstitutional cooperation could be attained if the ICM were accorded more relevance by the Members of the European Parliament and the national parliaments and if they were prepared for closer cooperation;

22. Recommends that national parliaments be fully involved in the continuing development of the common security and defence policy; believes that such involvement should be promoted in close cooperation with the European Parliament and with full respect for the provisions of national constitutions regarding security and defence policies; invites national parliaments to reflect in more detail on defence capability prioritisation at EU level, including through joint interparliamentary meetings between representatives from national parliaments and Members of the European Parliament and via political dialogue;

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23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.