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PR_NLE-CN_LegAct_am

P9_TA(2024)0313

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Requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States – amending Directive

* Consultation procedure

Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

*** Consent procedure

PE757.278

***I Ordinary legislative procedure (first reading)

European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 April 2024 on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States (15396/2023 – C9-0006/2024 – 2023/0136(NLE))

***II Ordinary legislative procedure (second reading)

***III Ordinary legislative procedure (third reading)

(The type of procedure depends on the legal basis proposed by the draft act.)

Amendments to a draft act

Amendments by Parliament set out in two columns

Deletions are indicated in bold italics in the left-hand column. Replacements are indicated in bold italics in both columns. New text is indicated in bold italics in the right-hand column.

The first and second lines of the header of each amendment identify the relevant part of the draft act under consideration. If an amendment pertains to an existing act that the draft act is seeking to amend, the amendment heading includes a third line identifying the existing act and a fourth line identifying the provision in that act that Parliament wishes to amend.

Amendments by Parliament in the form of a consolidated text

New text is highlighted in bold italics. Deletions are indicated using either the ▌symbol or strikeout. Replacements are indicated by highlighting the new text in bold italics and by deleting or striking out the text that has been replaced.

By way of exception, purely technical changes made by the drafting departments in preparing the final text are not highlighted.

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States

(COM(2023)0242 – C90171/2023 – 2023/0136(NLE))

(Consultation)

– having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2023)0242),draft (15396/2023),

– having regard to Article 126(14), third subparagraph, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C90171/2023),(C90006/2024),

– having regard to Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0440/2023),

1. Approves the CommissionCouncil proposaldraft as amended;

2. Calls on the Commission to alter its proposal accordingly, in accordance with Article 293(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

2. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

3. Calls onAsks the Council to notifyconsult Parliament again if it intends to depart from the textsubstantially approvedamend byits Parliament;draft;

4. Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the Commission proposal;

4. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and the Commission.

5. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and the Commission.

Amendment 2

Amendment 1

AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT*

to the CommissionCouncil proposaldraft

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2023/0136 (NLE)

COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

(2) Building upon the experience gained with the economic and monetary union since Directive 2011/85/EU came into force, it is necessary to amend its requirements regarding the rules and procedures forming the budgetary frameworks of the Member States.

(3) In 2019, the European Court of Auditors published a report examining the Union requirements on national budgetary frameworks and recommending the Commission to review those requirements, taking into account international standards and best practice.practices. The European Court of Auditors proposed specific actions to improve the scope and effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks, particularly as regards medium-term budgetary frameworks and independent fiscal institutions.

(4) Commission Communication of 5 February 2020 pointed to substantial but uneven progress in the development of national budgetary frameworks considering that Union law only sets minimum requirements and that implementation and compliance with national provisions had been very diverse. That Communication also considered the extent to which the framework would support economic, environmental and social policy needs related to the transition towards a climate-neutral, resource-efficient and digital European economy, complementing the key role of the regulatory environment and structural reforms.

(5) Commission Communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal calledDealcalled for a greater use of green budgeting tools to redirect public investment, consumption and taxation to green priorities and away from harmful subsidies. The European Climate Law sets a Union-wide climate neutrality objective by 2050 and requires Union institutions and Member States to progress in enhancing adaptive capacity. The Commission committed to working with the Member States to screen and benchmark green budgeting practices. Commission Communication of 24 February 2021 on the new EU strategy on adaptation to climate change pointed to the macro-fiscal relevance of climate change and highlighted the need to increase the Union’s resilience to the impacts of climate change. The European Semester provides an additional framework to support such efforts and the Technical Support Instrument offers practical assistance for their implementation.

(6) Commission Communication of 9 November 2022 on orientations for a reform of the EU economic governance framework highlighted the need to strengthen debt sustainability and reduce high public debt ratios while promoting sustainable and inclusive growth and resilience in all Member States. The key objectives of the orientations are to improve national ownership, simplify the framework and move towards a greater medium-term focus, combined with stronger and more coherent enforcement.

(7) In order to enhance compliance with the provisions of the TFEU, and to avoidprevent in particular the procedureoccurrence forof excessive government deficitdeficits laidin downthe insense of Article 126 TFEU, there should be specific provisions in the law of the Member States to strengthen national ownership, in accordance with the Commission Communication of 9 November 2022 on orientations for a reform of the EU economic governance framework, beyond those currently required by Directive 2011/85/EU. Building on the evidence of implementation of that Directive, amendments should also cover provisions on transparency and statistics, forecasts and medium-term budgeting to address weaknesses identified during implementation.

(8) This Directive is part of a package together with Regulation (EU) [XXX] of the Parliament and of the Council replacing Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact) and Council Regulation [XXX] amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact). Together, they establish a reformed Union economic governance framework that incorporates into Union law the substance of Title III ‘Fiscal Compact’ of the inter-governmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union, in accordance with Article 16 thereof. Title III is binding on the Member States whose currency is the euro and, on a voluntary basis, on Bulgaria, Denmark and Romania. By building on the experience with the implementation of the TSCG by the Member States, the package retains the Fiscal Compact’s medium-term orientation as a tool to achieve budgetary discipline and growth promotion. The package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by means of apreserving strongerthe role for independent fiscal institutions, which draws on the Fiscal Compact’s common principles proposed by the Commission in accordance with Article 3(2) of the TSCG. The analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures for the overall assessment of compliance required by the Fiscal Compact is set out in Regulation [XXX] replacing Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. As in the Fiscal Compact, temporary deviations from the medium-term plan are allowed only in exceptional circumstances in Regulation [XXX]replacing Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. Similarly, in case of significant deviations from the medium-term plan, measures should be implemented to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. The package strengthens fiscal surveillance and enforcement procedures to deliver on the commitment of promoting sound and sustainable public finances and sustainable and inclusive growth. The economic governance framework reform, thus, retains the fundamental objectives of budgetary discipline and debt sustainability set out in the TSCG.

▌

(9) Complete and reliable public accounting practices for all subsectors of general government are a precondition for the production of high-quality statistics that are comparable across Member States. The availability and quality of the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA) based statistics is crucial to ensure the proper functioning of the Union’s fiscal surveillance framework. ESA 2010 relies on information provided on an accrual basis. It is therefore desirable to improve the collection of accrual data and information needed to generate accrual-based statistics in a way that is comprehensive and consistent across all subsectors of general government.

(10) The availability of high frequency data can reveal patterns warranting closer surveillance and improve the quality of budgetary forecasts. Member States and the Commission (Eurostat) should publish cash-based data, quarterly deficit and debt data applying the definitions set out in Article 2 of the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU. Publication of budgetary data with higher frequency that are tailored to national budgetary definitions should be determined on the basis of national transparency requirements and user needs, to improve national ownership.

(11) Biased and unrealistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for the annual and multiannual budget legislations can considerably hamper the effectiveness of fiscal planning and consequently impair commitment to budgetary discipline. To improve baseline assumptions and provide unbiased assessments of the fiscal impactassumptions, ofMember variousStates policyshould measures,compare thetheir macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts ofwith the Member States should be produced,most supportedupdated or,ones whereof applicablethe accordingCommission toand, nationalif rules,appropriate, endorsedthose byof another independent fiscal institution.bodies.

(12) Macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for annual and multiannual fiscal planning for the general government should be subject to regular, objective and comprehensive ex post evaluations performed by an independent body or other bodies with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member States different from the one producing the forecast in order to enhance their quality. Those evaluations should include scrutiny of the economic assumptions, comparison with forecasts prepared by other institutions, and evaluation of past forecast performance.

(13) Independent bodies charged with monitoring public finances in the Member States can beare aan supporteffective tobuilding developblock effectiveof budgetary frameworks. Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council requires Member States whose currency is the euro to have independent fiscal institutions tasked with the production, support,endorsement or where applicable according to national rules, endorsementproduction of macroeconomic forecasts and establishes specific safeguards regarding their independence and technical capacity. Given the positiveWithout contributionprejudice to public finance of independent bodies, thosethe requirements should be extended to all Member States. In order to improveunder fiscalRegulation sustainability(EU) andNo strengthen473/2013, the credibilitytask of fiscal policy, such bodiesthe shouldindependent alsofiscal contributeinstitutions to budgetary planning by either producing,produce, supporting,assess or where applicableendorse tomacroeconomic nationalforecasts, rules,in endorsingaccordance thewith forecastsArticle and8(4), debtshould analysestake usedinto byaccount the government,established national procedures and bypractices carryingin outMember independentStates, assessmentsincluding ofthose fiscalconcerning policiesat andwhich monitoringpoint compliancein withtime the fiscaltask framework.is undertaken.

(14) In order to achieve strengthened responsibility in fiscal policy, independent fiscal institutions should have a high degree of operational independence, the necessary resources to perform their tasks, including adequate staff and funding,tasks and extensive and timely access to necessary information. Member States shouldmay ensureestablish more than one independent fiscal institution and each of them may discharge one or several of the tasks laid down in this directive, as long as there is a diversityclear allocation of viewsresponsibility and backgroundsthere inis theno compositionremit overlap between them. Excessive institutional fragmentation of monitoring tasks should be avoided. The design of those institutions.monitoring bodies should take into account the existing institutional setting and the administrative structure of the Member State concerned.

(15) To improve budgetary planning, due attention should be paidpaid, to the macrofiscal risks from climate changeextent andpossible, to the implications of climate-relatedmacrofiscal policiesrisks onfrom publicclimate financechange, overincluding theits mediumenvironmental and longdistributional term.impacts. Understanding the potential channels through which climate-related shocks affect the economy and public finance is key to national strategies to limit and manage the fiscal riskrisks stemming from climate change and from related disasters.

(16) AAlthough the approval of annual budget legislation is a key step in the budget process for democratic accountability, a single-year perspective for budgetary planning provides a limited basis for sound fiscal policies, as most measures have implications that go well beyond the annual budgetary cycle. As such, effective multiannualmedium-term fiscal planning strengthens the credibility of fiscal policy while taking into account debt sustainability. Effective medium-termIt planningshould restsrest on a clear and consistent definition of national budgetary objectives over the medium term,term for the general government, which are presented in national medium-term plans. In order to enhance a multiannual budgetary perspective, planning of annual budget legislation should be consistent with thenational multiannualbudgetary objectives establishedover the medium term referred to in medium-termArticle budgetary2, frameworks.point (e).

(17) To be effective in promoting budgetary discipline and the sustainability of public finance,finances, budgetary frameworks should comprehensively cover public finances. For that reason, particular attention should be given to operations of those general government bodies and funds which do not form part of the regular budgets atbut subsectorare levelpart of the general government, including subsectors, and that have an immediate or medium-term impact on Member States’ budgetary positions. TheMember States shall also publish values ofcorresponding to the combined impact on general government balances and debts of those operations should be presented in the framework of the annual budgetary processesbodies and in the medium-term budgetaryfunds. plans,Detailed capturinginformation impactson stemmingthe fromimpact futureof operationstax andexpenditures outstandingon andrevenues expectedshould newbe liabilities.published.

(18) Similarly, transparency regarding the type and size of tax expenditures and resulting revenue losses is necessary to provide a more profound understanding of the extent to which fiscal policy and budgetary planning are aligned with government priorities.

(19) Green budgeting tools can help redirect public revenue and expenditure to green priorities. In that respect, regular reporting of relevant information improves budget deliberations. Member States could publish the information on how the relevant elements of their budgets contribute to achieving climate and environmental national and international commitments and the methodology used. Member States should publish data and descriptive information separately for expenditure, tax expenditure and revenue items. Member States could publish information on the distributional impact of budgetary policies and take into account employment, social and distributional aspects in the development of green budgeting.

(19) Green budgeting tools can help redirect public revenue and expenditure to green priorities. In that respect, reliable and regular reporting of comprehensive, useful, and accessible information improves budget deliberations. This means reporting data on how revenues reflect the need to ensure that the “polluter-pays” principle is reflected, and in turn on how expenditure reflects both favourably and unfavourably green priorities. Member States should publish the information on how the relevant elements of their budgets contribute to achieving climate and environmental national and international commitments and the methodology used. Member States should publish data and descriptive information separately for expenditure, tax expenditure and revenue items. Member States are invited to publish information on the distributional impact of budgetary policies and take into account employment, social and distributional aspects in the development of green budgeting.

(20) Due attention should be paid to the existence of contingent liabilities. More specifically, contingent liabilities encompass possible obligations depending on the occurrence of an uncertain future event, or present obligations where payment is not probable or the amount of the probable payment cannot be measured reliably. They comprise, for instance, government guarantees, non-performing loans, liabilities stemming from the operation of public corporations, and, to the extent possible, disaster- and climate-related contingent liabilities.

(20) Due attention should be paid to the existence of contingent liabilities. More specifically, contingent liabilities encompass possible obligations depending on the occurrence of an uncertain future event, or present obligations where payment is not probable or the amount of the probable payment cannot be measured reliably. They comprise, for instance, government guarantees, non-performing loans, liabilities stemming from the operation of public corporations, and potential expenses and obligations arising from court cases and disaster-related contingent liabilities.

(21) Natural disasters and extreme weather events have affected most Member States and climate change is expected to amplify the frequency and intensity of such events. Governments invest in climate adaptation measures and step in to cover disaster costs for emergency relief, recovery and reconstruction and to act as insurer of last resort in some cases. Considering the existing and future challenges for the sustainability of public finances, particular attention should be paid to government obligations and risks to government finances stemming from natural disasters and climate-related shocks, starting with collecting and publishing information on the fiscal cost of past events to the extent possible.

(21) Natural disasters and extreme weather events have affected most Member States and climate change is expected to amplify the frequency and intensity of such events. Governments invest in climate adaptation measures and step in to cover disaster costs for emergency relief, recovery and reconstruction and to act as insurer of last resort in some cases. Considering the existing and future challenges for the sustainability of public finances, particular attention should be paid to government obligations and risks to government finances stemming from natural disasters and climate-related events, starting with collecting and publishing information on the economic losses and fiscal cost of past events as well as information on the budgetary arrangements and financial instruments used for that matter.

(21a) Reporting on macrofiscal risks from climate change, climate-related contingent liabilities and fiscal costs of disasters is improving but still remains at an incipient stage, with methodologies and indicators for such reporting still being developed. The adaptation to this reporting will require significant efforts from public administrations. Taking into account these challenges, and to the extent possible, reporting in these areas should be carried out and evolve in parallel to such methodological advances.

(22) The Commission should continue to regularly monitor the implementation of Directive 2011/85/EU. Best practices concerning the implementation of the provisions of that Directive should be identified and shared.

___________

*OJ L 174, 26.6.2013, p.1.’p. 1.’

(b) the second paragraph is amended as follows:

(i) point (a) is replaced by the following:

‘(a) systems of public sector accounting and statistical reporting;’reporting by the general government;’

(ii) point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) country-specific numerical fiscal rules that contribute to the consistency of Member States’ conduct of fiscal policy with their respective obligations under the TFEU, and that are expressed in terms of a summaryan indicator of budgetary performance, such as the government budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a major component thereof;’

(iii) point (e) is replaced by the following:

(iv) the following point (h) is added:

‘(h) independent fiscal institutions as bodies structurally independent or bodies endowed with functional autonomy as regards the budgetary authorities of the Member States established by national legal provisions in accordance with Article 8.’

(2) Article 3 is replaced by the following:

‘1. As concerns national systems of public accounting, Member States shall have, by 2030,have integrated,in comprehensiveplace andpublic nationallyaccounting harmonisedsystems ▌comprehensively accountingand systemsconsistently covering all subsectors of general government and containing the ▌informationinformation needed to preparegenerate accrual data with a view to preparing data based on ESAthe 2010.European ThoseSystem publicof sectorNational financialand Regional Accounts. Those public accounting systems by the general government shall be subject to internal control and independent audits.

2. Member States shall ensure timely and regular public availability of fiscal data for all subsectors of general government as set out by Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council*. In particular, Member States shall publish quarterly debt and deficit data separately for central government, state government, local government and social security funds, quarterly debt and, unless they have in place integrated, comprehensive and nationally harmonised accrual financial accounting systems, deficit data separately, before the end of the following quarter or after publication of the relevant data by the Commission (Eurostat).

3. The Commission (Eurostat) shall publish the quarterly government finance statistics data in accordance with tables 25, 27 and 28 of Annex B to Regulation (EU) No 549/2013, every 3 months.

(3) Article 4 is amended as follows:

(b)(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1. Member States shall ensure that annual and multiannual fiscal planning is based on realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts using the most up-to-date information. Budgetary planning shall be based on the most likely macrofiscal scenario or on a more prudent scenario. The macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall be either produced, supported or, where applicable according to national rules, endorsed by independent fiscal institutions established in accordancecompared with Articlethe 8.most Theyupdated shallforecasts beof comparedthe withCommission theand, mostif updatedappropriate, forecaststhose of theother Commission.independent bodies. Significant differences between the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts of the Member State and the Commission’s forecasts shall be explained, including where the level or growth of variables in external assumptions departs significantly from the values contained in the Commission’s forecasts.’

(c)(b) paragraph 4 is deleted.

(d)(c) paragraphs 5 and 6 are replaced by the following:

‘5. Member States shall specify which institution is responsible for producing macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts.forecasts and shall make public the official macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts prepared for fiscal planning. At least annually, the Member States and the Commission shall engage in a technical dialogue concerning the assumptions underpinning the preparation of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts.

6. The macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for annual and multiannual fiscal planning produced by the national institutions shall be subject to regular, objective and comprehensive ex post evaluation by an independent body,body includingor exother postbodies evaluation.with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member States different from the one producing the forecast. The result of that evaluation shall be made public and taken into account appropriately in future macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts. If the evaluation detects a significant bias affecting macroeconomic forecasts over a period of at least 4 consecutive years, the Member State concerned shall take the necessary action and make it public.’

(e)(d) paragraph 7 is deleted.

(4) Article 5 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 5

Each Member State shall establish its specific numerical fiscal rules to effectively promote compliance with its obligations deriving from the TFEU in the area of fiscalbudgetary planningpolicy over a multiannual period for the general government as a whole. Such rules shall promote in particular:

(a)

(a) compliance with the reference values and provisions on deficit and debt set in accordance with the TFEU;

compliance with the reference values and provisions on deficit and debt set in accordance with the TFEU;

(b) the adoption of a medium-term fiscal planning horizon, consistent with the provisions of Regulation [XXX preventive arm of the SGP].*

(b)

_________________

the adoption of a multiannual fiscal planning period, consistent with the provisions of Regulation [XXX preventive arm of the SGP].*

__________________

* Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council of [insert date] [insert full title] (OJ L ..).’

(a) in paragraph 1, point (b) is replaced by the following:

‘(b) The effective and timely monitoring of compliance with the rules, based on reliable and independent analysis carried out by independent fiscal institutions established in accordance with Article 8.’;8 or other bodies with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member States;’

(b) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘If numerical fiscal rules contain escape clauses, such clauses shall set out a limited number of specific circumstances, consistent with the Member States’ obligations deriving from the TFEU and Regulation [XXX preventive arm of the SGP], and stringent procedures in which temporary non-compliance with the rules is permitted. Escape clauses shall have clear time limits.’SGP].’

(6) Article 7 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 7

The annual budget legislation of the Member States shall be consistent with the countryspecificcountry-specific numerical fiscal rules in force.’

(7) In Chapter V, the title is replaced by ‘INDEPENDENT FISCAL INSTITUTIONS’

‘Article 8

1.‘1. Member States shall ensure that independent fiscal institutions, such as structurally independent bodies or bodies endowed with functional autonomy as regards the budgetary authorities of the Member States, are established by national laws, regulations or binding administrative provisions, and adequately staffed and funded.provisions.

2. The institutions referred to in paragraph 1 shall be composed of members nominated and appointed on the basis of their experience and competence in public finances, macroeconomics or budgetary management, and by means of transparent procedures. The Member States shall ensure a diversity of views and backgrounds in the compositions of those institutions.

1a. Member States may establish more than one independent fiscal institution.

2. The institutions referred to in paragraph 1 shall be composed of members nominated and appointed on the basis of their experience and competence in public finances, macroeconomics or budgetary management, and by means of transparent procedures.

3. The institutions referred to in paragraph 1 shall:

(b) have the capacity to communicate publicly about their assessments and opinions in a timely manner;

(ba) allow for the disclosure of minority and divergent positions in such assessments and opinions;

(c) have adequate and stable resources to carry out their tasks in an effective manner, including any type of analysis within their tasks;

(c) have adequate and stable own resources to carry out their mandate in an effective manner, including any type of analysis within their mandate;

(d) have adequate and timely access to the information needed to fulfil their tasks;

(d) have adequate and timely access to the information needed to fulfil their mandate;

(e) be subject to regular external evaluations by independent evaluators.

(e) be subject to regular external evaluations by independent evaluators;

4. Without prejudice to the tasks and functions attributed in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 for Member States whose currency is the euro, all Member States shall ensure that the following tasks are undertaken by one of the institutions referred to in paragraph 1:

(ea) regularly exchange best practices among each other coordinated by the European Fiscal Board (EFB);

(a) producing, assessing or endorsing annual and multiannual macroeconomic forecasts;

(eb) regularly consult relevant stakeholders.

(d) monitoring compliance with country-specific numerical fiscal rules unless performed by other bodies in accordance with Article 6;

4. Member States shall ensure that the institutions referred to in paragraph 1 have the following tasks:

(e) undertaking tasks in accordance with relevant articles of the Regulation [XXX preventive arm of the SGP] and of Regulation [XXX corrective arm of the SGP]*;

(a) producing the annual and multiannual macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts underlying the government’s medium-term planning or supporting or, where applicable according to national rules, endorsing the planning by the budgetary authorities;

(f) assessing the consistency, coherence and effectiveness of the national budgetary framework;

(b) producing debt sustainability assessments underlying the government’s medium-term planning by the budgetary authorities or supporting or, where applicable according to national rules, endorsing the assessment;

(g) upon invitation, participate in regular hearings and discussions at the national Parliament.

(c) producing assessments on the impacts of policies, including reform and investment commitments under the national medium term fiscal-structural plans, on fiscal sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth by the budgetary authorities or supporting or, where applicable according to national rules, endorsing;

5. The institutions shall issue assessments in the context of the tasks referred to in paragraph 4 (a), (d), (e) and (f) without prejudice to the tasks and functions attributed in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 473/2013. Member States shall comply with these assessments, or alternatively explain why they are not following them. The explanation shall be public and be presented two months from the issuance of such assessments.

(d) monitoring compliance with country-specific numerical fiscal rules in accordance with Article 6;

(e) monitoring compliance with the Union fiscal framework in accordance with Regulations [XXX preventive arm of the SGP] and [XXX corrective arm of the SGP] *;

(f) conducting, on a regular basis, reviews of the national budgetary framework, in order to assess, among others, the consistency, coherence and effectiveness of the framework, including mechanisms and rules that regulate fiscal relationships between public authorities across sub-sectors of general government;

(g) participate in regular hearings and discussions at the national Parliament and be available to provide technical analysis and advice to the national Parliament upon request.

5. Member States shall ensure that the budgetary authorities of the Member State concerned comply with the assessments or opinions issued by the institutions in the context of the tasks referred to in paragraph 4. Where such budgetary authorities do not comply with those assessments or opinions, they shall publicly justify the decision not to comply within a month from the issuance of such assessments or opinions.

_________________

* Regulation (EU) of the Council of [insert date] [insert full title] (OJ L ..)...).’

(9) Article 9 is amended as follows:

a)(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1. Member States shall establish a credible, effective national medium-term budgetary framework providing for the adoption of a fiscal planning periodhorizon of at least 43 years to ensure that national fiscal planning follows a multiannual fiscal planning perspective.’

b)(b) paragraph 2 is amended as follows:

(i) pointthe (a)introductory phrase is replaced by the following:

‘(a) comprehensive and transparent multiannual budgetary objectives as referred to in Article 2, point (e) in terms of the general government deficit, debt and any other summary fiscal indicator such as expenditure, ensuring that they are consistent with any country-specific numerical fiscal rules as provided for in Chapter IV of this Directive and the relevant provisions of Regulation [XXX preventive arm of the SGP].’;

‘2. National medium-term budgetary frameworks shall include procedures for establishing the following items:’

(ii) point (c)(a) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) a description of medium-term policies, including investment and reforms, and if applicable, specifying the investments and reforms in the common priorities of the Union referred to in Article 12, point (ba), of the Regulation [on the preventive arm], envisaged with an impact on general government finances, resilience and sustainable and inclusive growth, broken down by major revenue and expenditure item, showing how the adjustment towards the national budgetary objectives over the medium term as referred to in Article 2, point (e), is achieved compared to projections under unchanged policies.’;

‘(a) comprehensive and transparent multiannual budgetary objectives as referred to in Article 2, point (e) in terms of the general government deficit, debt and any other fiscal indicator such as expenditure, ensuring that they are consistent with any country-specific numerical fiscal rules as provided for in Chapter IV of this Directive and the relevant provisions of Regulation [XXX preventive arm of the SGP].’;

(iii) point (d)(c) is replaced by the following:

‘(d) an assessment‘(c) asa todescription howof inmedium-term thepolicies, lightincluding ofinvestment theirand directreforms, medium-termenvisaged andwith long-terman impact on general government finances, the policies envisaged are likely to affect the medium-term and long-term sustainability of the public finances and sustainable and inclusive growth. The assessment shallgrowth, specify,broken todown theby extentmajor possiblerevenue and based on a transparent andexpenditure replicableitem, scientificshowing methodology,how the macrofiscal risks fromadjustment climatetowards changethe andnational theirbudgetary environmentalobjectives andover distributionalthe impacts,medium andterm theas implicationsreferred onto publicin financeArticle of2, climate-relatedpoint mitigation(e), andis adaptationachieved policiescompared overto theprojections medium-termunder andunchanged long-term.’;policies.’

c) paragraph 3 is deleted;

(iv) point (d) is replaced by the following:

‘(d) an assessment as to how in the light of their direct medium-term and long-term impact on general government finances, the policies envisaged are likely to affect the medium-term and long-term sustainability of the public finances and sustainable and inclusive growth. To the extent possible, the assessment shall take into account the macrofiscal risks from climate change and its environmental and distributional impacts. ’

(c) paragraph 3 is deleted;

(10) Articles 10 and 11 are replaced by the following:

Article 11

This Directive shallshall, notin no way, prevent a Member State’s new government from updating its medium-term budgetary framework plan to reflect its new policy priorities, nevertheless this is not to be encouraged, as it would imply lost momentum, particularly on the implementation of the reform agenda.priorities. In such case, the new government shall indicate the differences between the previous and the new medium-term budgetary plan. The ambition of the reforms and investments in the revised plan shall not be lower than the original plan.’;

(11) in Chapter VI, the title is replaced by the following: ‘TRANSPARENCY OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES’

‘Article 12

Member States shall ensure that any measures taken in compliance with Chapters II, III and IV are consistent across,across all subsectors of general government and cover comprehensively those subsectors. To that effect MembersMember States shall, in particular, require consistent public sector accounting rules and procedures,procedures by the general government, and the integrity of their underlying data collection and processing systems.’;

(13) Article 14 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 14

1. Within the framework of the annual and multiannual budgetary legislation processes, Member States shall publish information on bodies and funds which do not form part of the regular budgets but are part of the general government, including subsectors of general government. Member States shall also publish valuesamounts corresponding to the combined impact on general government balances and debts of those bodies and funds whereby the impact on the balances shall include past and expected future operations and the impact on debts shall include outstanding and expected new liabilities.funds.

2. Member States shall publish detailed information on the impact of tax expenditures on revenues for the national budgetary objectives as referred to in Article 2, point (e), based on a transparent methodology.revenues.

3. For all subsectors of general government, Member States shall publish relevant information on contingent liabilities with potentially large impact on public budgets, including government guarantees, non-performing loans, and liabilities stemming from the operation of public corporations, ▌ including the extent thereof. Member States shall also publish information on disaster and climate-related contingent liabilities to the extent possible. Member States shall publishPublished information on past calls on one-off guarantees and expenditure recordedshall, forto standardisedthe guarantees.extent Publishedpossible, informationtake shallinto includeaccount information on economicfiscal lossescosts incurred due to disasters and climate-related shocks, including the fiscal costs borne by the public sector and the instruments used to mitigate or cover them.shocks. Member States shall publish information on the participation of general government in the capital of private and public corporations in respect of economically significant amounts.’amounts.

(14) Article 14a.15 is addedreplaced asby followsthe following:

‘Article 14a.

1. By 14 December 20XX the Commission shall publish a review of the effectiveness of this Directive.

2. By 31 December 2025, the Commission shall report on the state of play and future direction of public sector financial accounting in the Union, taking into account the progress made since its 2013 assessment of the suitability of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards for the Member States.’

(15) Article 15 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 15

1. Member States shall bring into force the provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 31 December 202X.2025. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions. The Council encourages Member States to draw up, for themselves and in the interests of the Union, their own correlation tables which will, as far as possible, illustrate the correlation between this Directive and the transposition measures, and to make them public.

2. When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made.

3. The Commission shall prepare an interim progress report on the implementation of the main provisions of this Directive on the basis of relevant information from Member States, which shall be submitted to the European Parliament and to the Council by 1430 DecemberJune 20XX.2025.

4. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.’Directive.

(16)(15) Article 16 is deleted.

(16) Article 16a is added as follows:

‘Article 16a

1. By 31 December 2025 and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall report on the state of play of:

(a) Public accounting by the general government in the Union, taking into account the progress made since its 2013 assessment of the suitability of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards for the Member States;

(b) Capacity and tasks of EU independent fiscal institutions, taking into account the progress made since the entry into force of this Directive, building on the findings of the Commission’s Fiscal Governance Database and consultations with relevant stakeholders, with a view to explore minimum standards;

2. By 31 December 2030, and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall publish a review of the effectiveness of this Directive.’

Done at Brussels,

For the Council The President

The President

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEURS HAVE RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur Esther de Lange and the rapporteur Margarida Marques declare that they have received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, until the adoption thereof in committee:

Table 1. Input received by Esther de Lange

Entity and/or person

European Trade Union Confederation

European Environmental Bureau

Finance Watch

Social Platform

Business Europe

Sustainable Finance Lab

European Commission

European Central Bank

Dutch Ministry of Finance / Permanent Representation to the EU

German Ministry of Finance / Permanent Representation to the EU

Spanish Ministry of Finance / Permanent Representation to the EU

Portuguese Ministry of Finance / Permanent Representation to the EU

Danish Ministry of Finance / Permanent Representation to the EU

French Ministry of Finance / Permanent Representation to the EU

European Fiscal Board

Slovakian Ministry of Finance / Permanent Representation to the EU

Representation of Flanders to the EU

European Economic and Social Committee

Belgian Ministry of Finance / Permanent Representation to the EU

Table 2. Input received by Margarida Marques

Entity and/or person

EU PRES SPAIN

EU PRES BELGIUM

European Commission

Council of the European Union

PERM REP ES / Finance Ministry

PERM REP BE / Finance Ministry

PERM REP FR / Finance Ministry

PERM REP SK /Finance Ministry

PERM REP PT / Finance Ministry

PERM REP NL / Finance Ministry

PERM REP DE / Finance Ministry

Bruegel

Dezernat Zukunft

European Fiscal Board

Conselho de Finanças Publicas (PT Independent Financial Institution)

Foundation for European Progressive Studies

CEPS Think Tank

European Trade Union Confederation

Solidar

Finance Watch

Climate Action Network

German Council on Foreign Relations

Friedrich-Ebert Foundation

The lists above are drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteurs.

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Title

Amending Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States

References

COM(2023)0242 – C9-0171/2023 – 2023/0136(NLE)

Date of consultation or request for consent

12.5.2023

Committee responsible

Date announced in plenary

ECON

12.6.2023

Committees asked for opinions

Date announced in plenary

EMPL

12.6.2023

Not delivering opinions

Date of decision

EMPL

29.6.2023

Rapporteurs

Date appointed

Esther de Lange

30.5.2023

Margarida Marques

30.5.2023

Discussed in committee

7.11.2023

Date adopted

11.12.2023

Result of final vote

+:

–:

0:

47

12

0

Members present for the final vote

Rasmus Andresen, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Manon Aubry, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Stefan Berger, Gilles Boyer, Engin Eroglu, Markus Ferber, Jonás Fernández, Giuseppe Ferrandino, Frances Fitzgerald, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, José Gusmão, Eero Heinäluoma, Michiel Hoogeveen, Danuta Maria Hübner, Billy Kelleher, Georgios Kyrtsos, Aurore Lalucq, Philippe Lamberts, Aušra Maldeikienė, Pedro Marques, Csaba Molnár, Siegfried Mureşan, Caroline Nagtegaal, Denis Nesci, Luděk Niedermayer, Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos, Piernicola Pedicini, Kira Marie Peter-Hansen, Sirpa Pietikäinen, Eva Maria Poptcheva, Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Dorien Rookmaker, Joachim Schuster, Ralf Seekatz, Marco Zanni

Substitutes present for the final vote

Fabio Massimo Castaldo, Esther de Lange, Valérie Hayer, Eugen Jurzyca, Chris MacManus, Margarida Marques, Erik Poulsen, Bogdan Rzońca, Eleni Stavrou

Substitutes under Rule 209(7) present for the final vote

João Albuquerque, François Alfonsi, Theresa Bielowski, Sara Cerdas, Marie Dauchy, Andor Deli, Daniel Freund, Łukasz Kohut, Jeroen Lenaers, Lydie Massard, Maria Veronica Rossi, Vera Tax, Carlos Zorrinho

Date tabled

15.12.2023

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Key to symbols: