What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

P10_TA(2026)0119

on the controlControl of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank Group –— annual report 2024

(2025/2237(INI))

Committee on Budgetary Control

PE784.237

European Parliament resolution of 28 April 2026 on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank Group – annual report 2024 (2025/2237(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024 of 13 June 2024,

– having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2025/504 of 11 March 2025 amending Protocol No 5 on the Statute of the European Investment Bank1,Bank,

– having regard to the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan, presented at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 12 April 2024,

– having regard to the report by the EIB Group of July 2025 entitled ‘EIB Group’s contribution to the European Union’s 2021 – 2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF): A synthesis of evaluative evidence’,

– having regard to the 2024 study by the Commission published entitled ‘Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs’2,SMEs’,

– having regard to ECA Opinion 01/2026 of 12 January 2026,

– having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, of 4 March 2025 on the defence package,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence3,defence,

– having regard to the EIB Group list of excluded activities, published on 17 July 2025,

Financial operations and performance

1. Notes the EIB Group’s stable financial performance in 2024 and its consolidated results in 2024, amounting to EUR 3.383,38 billion; stresses that preserving the EIB’s AAA credit rating must remain a primary objective of the EIB’s governance; stresses that the EIB’s AAA rating is a strategic asset that enables the EIB to ensure favourable financing conditions; stresses that success must continue to and increasingly be measured by demonstrable economic and policy outcomes, not by merely volumes signed; stresses, furthermore, that financial performance should also be measured against evidence of policy additionality, value for money and measurable outcomes; recalls that simplified procedures should be periodically submitted for independent review;

2. Notes with concern that the portion of payments overdue by more than 90 days tripled, totalling EUR 281.3281,3 million at the end of 2024 and representing 0.060,06 % of the total loan portfolio (compared with EUR 82.482,4 million or 0.020,02 % at the end of 2023) and, while acknowledging that they remain very low by banking standards, invites the EIB to explain the underlying causes and to report on corrective measures taken; stresses that any increase in non-performing exposures must be carefully monitored in order to safeguard the EIB’s financial stability and credit standing; highlights that these increases in non-performing exposures and overdue payments significantly exceed the 2 % growth in the overall loan portfolio;

InvestEU, the simplification of the multiannual financial framework, and the Recovery and Resilience Facility

3. Notes that in 2024 the EIB approved 38 operations under InvestEU, utilising EUR 1.71,7 billion of the EU guarantee; insists that reporting must complement input-based metrics with impact-based indicators demonstrating genuine economic outcomes and must include additionality assessment and ex post analysis of potential crowding out, including for operations implemented through financial intermediaries; calls for a performance-based budgeting approach where capital allocations and strategic priorities are evaluated based on proven efficiency, return on investment and genuine value for money, in addition to compliance with predetermined percentage targets;

4. Stresses that the InvestEU programme should also be assessed according to the quality of its interventions and their measurable impact and not only the quantity of funding deployed; recalls that, currently, there are no verifiable measurement frameworks in place for assessing outcomes of projects funded under InvestEU;

11. Welcomes the EIB’s continued and enhanced role in strengthening Europe’s security through targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure, in line with the EU’s broader goals of promoting innovation and enhancing the Union’s security; stresses that the EIB should keep investing in a safe and secure Europe, supporting the European defence technological and industrial base and the provision of products, services and technologies that bolster Europe’s defence capacities, research and development, and innovation; calls for the scope of eligible investments to be further adjusted to meet the ambitious goal of contributing to Europe’s defence and security;

12. Notes the strong increase in EIB security and defence financing from EUR 0.50,5 billion in 2023 to EUR 1.041,04 billion in 2024, and the further scale-up in 2025; points out that the EIB’s current EUR 8 billion Strategic European Security Initiative will be integrated into a permanent, cross-cutting public policy objective, complementing existing public policy goals, removing predefined ceilings for security financing and allowing for increased and flexible support in line with the Council’s priorities; calls for a dedicated annual reporting annex to be submitted to Parliament on security and defence operations, including additionality, implementation speed, procurement safeguards, integrity controls and risk-sharing arrangements;

13. Invites the EIB to further strengthen synergies with investments in defence financed by the EU budget and to align these investments more closely with EU-wide initiatives; emphasises to the EIB the need to ensure that its investments complement broader EU defence policy goals and contribute to achieving economies of scale in European defence capabilities;

26. Stresses that climate and sustainability reporting must be based on verifiable outputs and outcomes (including emissions reductions, resilience gains and leverage effects), supported by a coherent portfolio methodology and independent evaluation;

27. Notes the EIB Group’s record cohesion financing of EUR 38.338,3 billion in 2024, representing 48 % of total EU financing; calls on the EIB to publish region-by-region impact data to allow for effective scrutiny;

28. Calls on the EIB to increase transparency regarding its cross-cutting objectives by distinguishing clearly between targets mandated by EU regulations and those initiated by the EIB itself; requests a detailed breakdown of how different targets compete for resources; warns that the continuous accumulation of overlapping mainstreaming targets risks creating a mathematically impossible portfolio composition; calls on the EIB to report transparently on the trade-offs between competing policy goals; reiterates that mainstreaming objectives should be evaluated for their genuine impact; notes that, given the current geopolitical context and security challenges facing Europe, defence and security investments, including support for external border protection infrastructure, should be enhanced;

31. Welcomes the adoption, in 2024, of the Ukraine Facility, which follows the EIB’s EU for Ukraine initiative and establishes a support mechanism based on the EU’s budget resources; encourages the Member States to ensure that solid support continues to be provided to the country, in line with its needs; calls on the EIB to ensure the transparency and traceability of its projects in Ukraine; highlights the importance of strengthening the administrative and audit capacity of Ukrainian authorities entrusted with the implementation, monitoring and control of the funded actions;

32. Notes that the EIB has disbursed EUR 2.3 billion in emergency relief and project support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression; notes that the EIB’s disbursed exposure in Ukraine is predominantly covered by EU guarantees under the EU External Lending Mandate4;Mandate; highlights that EIB support for the private sector has allowed Ukrainian banks to continue lending to the real economy; notes that, by the end of 2024, the EIB had granted financial guarantees on exposures of EUR 500.5500,5 million, which were also fully covered by EU guarantees, to counterparties located in Ukraine; remarks that the EIB maintains a local presence in Ukraine and that the Kyiv office has been progressively restaffed; reiterates its call on the EIB to provide regular, detailed updates to the budgetary authority and relevant audit bodies regarding the disbursement and implementation of funds covered by EU guarantees;

33. Notes that, in 2024, the EIB Group was selected as one of the main implementing partners of the Ukraine Investment Framework, part of the Ukraine Facility under which EUR 50 billion will be allocated by the EU during the 2024-2027 period to finance the Ukrainian state budget, stimulate investment and provide technical support; notes that the framework is composed of guarantees and grants for European and other development finance institutions and that at least EUR 2 billion of the available support is set to sustain EIB lending to the public sector;

40. Recalls the findings of Contact Committee statement CC 1/2025, which formally identified critical gaps in the external public audit of the EIB; notes the paradox in which the EIB’s mandate and EU budget guarantees are expanded, yet audit powers remain restricted; calls on the EIB to actively involve national supreme audit institutions in this process to ensure accountability for operations not currently covered by the ECA and to guarantee robust accountability and oversight, including through regular information-sharing on risk areas and follow-up of audit recommendations; reiterates that a Treaty change is necessary to grant the ECA, in the exercise of its mandate, full and unrestricted access to all EIB operations to align democratic accountability with the EIB’s evolving financial exposure;

41. Expresses concern regarding the bankruptcy of Northvolt AB, the battery manufacturer that filed for bankruptcy in Sweden on 12 March 2025 after having benefited from a substantial EIB lending package of slightly over EUR 942.6942,6 million, signed in 2020 as part of the debt financing raised to expand a gigafactory site; notes that similar risks appear to exist with similar large-scale ventures such as Stegra (H2 Green Steel); calls for the disclosure of the EIB’s risk assessments and of the post-operation assessments, including the evaluation of financial exposure and the adequacy of early-warning indicators, as soon as the ongoing processes allow; demands a review of the lessons learned from the Northvolt case; calls on the Commission and the EIB Board of Directors to establish mechanisms for the early detection of systemic risks in flagship investments in order to prevent the recurrence of similar situations; calls on the EIB to disclose the risk assessment profiles for these and other similar engagements, including for governance, concentration and technology risks, in an appropriately aggregated and confidentiality-compliant manner; reiterates its call on the EIB to provide details of the evaluation and decision-making process that took place ahead of the investment in Northvolt AB, and to explain how such a crucial project failed despite the EIB’s claims that it carries out adequate and continuous monitoring of the beneficiaries of its financial support;

42. Calls on the EIB to establish enhanced stress-testing and risk concentration limits for large strategic projects, and to report to Parliament on aggregate exposure to high-risk single borrowers;

45. Notes with concern the existence of a leaked EIB internal audit flagging conflict of interest provisions as ‘needing significant improvement,’ including failure to cover apparent and potential conflicts; emphasises that declarations of interest by EIB and EIF governing and audit bodies are misaligned with other multilateral development banks and the European Central Bank and must be rectified without delay; underlines the lack of authority, independence and scope of EIB and EIF ethics compliance functions and the risks posed by complex reporting lines exposing sensitive personal data; urges the EIB to align its rules with the Ethics Network of Multilateral Organisations and report on the follow-up actions taken;

46. Is aware that Regulation (EC) No 1049/200151049/2001 does not formally apply to the EIB and that the EIB Transparency Policy, based on the ‘presumption of disclosure’, is intended to operate separately from, but aligned with, this regulation; calls on the EIB, in the context of its 2026 Transparency Policy review, to limit the exceptions to the ‘presumption of disclosure’ to strictly necessary and justified cases; calls on the EIB to publish more detailed minutes of its Board of Directors’ meetings, including voting records and project-specific justifications, while respecting legitimate confidentiality where necessary;

47. Notes the increasing number of cases handled by the EIB complaints mechanism (113 cases in 2024, 104 in 2023 and 97 in 2022); stresses that the complaints mechanism remains a self-referential dispute-solving process fully embedded in the EIB’s structure, at the cost of its independence, whose findings are subject to review and approval by the same management structures that it is supposed to scrutinise; notes that appointments are made internally without external oversight; regrets that it does not report individual cases to the Board of Directors but only aggregate summaries in twice-yearly reports; calls on the EIB to reform the complaints mechanism to ensure genuine independence and external accountability;

55. Notes that transparency and access to information have improved in recent years, such as efforts to improve documentation of decision-making, including the indication of required majorities where applicable; observes that project-level disclosures and traceability remain uneven, especially for operations involving financial intermediaries and complex guarantee structures; calls on the EIB to better align its internal indicators with EU-wide sustainability standards (for instance, by rectifying the discrepancy between the EIB’s Climate Action Ratio and EU Green Asset Ratio metrics); recalls that adequate reporting is a necessary precondition to transparency and regrets that reporting to Parliament relies on voluntary and occasional appearances by the EIB President, either in plenary or at a meeting with the committee with sectoral competences;

56. Notes the findings of the 2025 Development Finance Institutions Transparency Index, which indicate that the EIB scores below other multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and African Development Bank, on overall transparency metrics; recognises, however, the EIB’s significant strengths identified in the November 2025 ‘Behind the Billions’6Billions’ report, which labels the EIB’s disclosure as ‘good practice’ for providing nearly complete traceability of its climate finance; emphasises that the EIB should now leverage its demonstrated leadership in data coverage to provide the granular impact data and standardised methodologies required to verify the effectiveness and value for money of its investments;

57. Is aware that EIB loans are not subject to the same visibility obligations as grants; asks, however, the EIB to ensure that the applicable contractual and legal frameworks provide for transparency in all projects financed with support from the EIB and a clear indication that they are funded with the support of citizens of the Member States, so as to enhance public awareness of the tangible benefits delivered by EU investment and strengthen taxpayers’ confidence in the use of public resources;

58. Reiterates its observations on the importance of fully implementing a policy on tax fraud, evasion and avoidance; welcomes the testing of a new tax integrity risk rating tool in 2024 to assess tax risks in projects and looks forward to assessing the group-wide implementation in 2025; reiterates its call on the EIB to refrain from funding beneficiaries or financial intermediaries that have been found to be, or are at high risk of being, involved in tax malpractices and underlines that double taxation of cross-border investments, as well as complex tax environments, constrain investments;

59. Regrets the EIB’s delay in providing follow-up to Parliament’s annual report on the control of its financial activities for the year 20237,2023, which is traditionally provided in line with a practice established in many previous years; stresses that more structured and predictable cooperation would be beneficial to both parties; maintains that a memorandum of understanding or an interinstitutional agreement is essential for establishing such cooperation on information exchange, hearings and follow-up, which would formally put in place the practices mostly already established with the EIB; welcomes the EIB’s declared availability to engage in dialogue to ensure that cooperation is based on predictable institutional commitments rather than on informal arrangements; reiterates its call for this arrangement to be finalised quickly; calls for further ways to be explored to improve coordination between Parliament, the national parliaments and the supreme audit institutions and for an enhanced exchange with civil society and academia, which would foster greater transparency;

Follow-up on Parliament’s recommendations

60. Urges the EIB to follow up, in a timely manner, on the recommendations issued by Parliament and to report on the outcomes achieved and on the impact of the actions taken to implement its priorities and the EU’s policies, with special regard to: (a) the impact (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and the results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the EU; (b) actions adopted to enhance the prevention and countering of conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and other potential forms of misconduct; (c) new measures to strengthen transparency; (d) measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;

(a) the impact (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and the results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the EU;

(b) actions adopted to enhance the prevention and countering of conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and other potential forms of misconduct;

(c) new measures to strengthen transparency;

(d) measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;

°

61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and asks that the Council and the EIB Board of Directors hold a debate on Parliament’s positions presented herein.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

This report is anchored in the core mandate of the Committee on Budgetary Control: assessing value for money spent, holding the Bank accountable for results and ensuring that external scrutiny keeps pace with the Bank's expanding role. The EIB is entirely owned by the Member States, and a growing share of its operations is additionally backed by EU budget guarantees. The guiding principle throughout is that success must be measured by demonstrable economic outcomes, not merely by volumes signed or percentage targets met.

The report acknowledges the EIB Group's solid results in 2024 and its AAA credit rating; however, sound headline figures alone do not demonstrate that investments achieve their intended purpose, and the lack of adequate accountability structures may itself pose a risk to the Bank's credit standing. The Contact Committee of the Supreme Audit Institutions formally identified critical gaps in the external public audit of the Bank, confirming a paradox: the mandate and EU budget guarantees keep expanding while audit arrangements remain essentially unchanged. The report calls for the European Court of Auditors' full and unrestricted access to all EIB operations and for greater involvement of national supreme audit institutions. Conflict-of-interest prevention receives strengthened attention, prompted by internal audit findings flagging relevant provisions as needing significant improvement and by documented revolving-door cases.

The bankruptcy of Northvolt, after having benefited from a substantial EIB lending package, exposed serious questions regarding due diligence, risk monitoring and early-warning capacity. The report demands a thorough review of lessons learned and enhanced stress-testing for large projects considered strategic.

The report acknowledges the EIB's role in defence and security financing and recognises nuclear energy on equal terms under the principle of technological neutrality, and calls for ensuring that the Bank's reporting and evaluation frameworks are applied consistently. On additionality, it takes a firm position: the EIB must fund projects that the private sector alone would not finance and must guard against crowding out private capital. EIB lending outside the Union must be subject to robust safeguards on transparency, anti-fraud and sanctions compliance, taking into account cooperation on return agreements with partner countries.

The report recognizes that the EIB has become a major implementing partner of EU financial support to Ukraine. While recognising the extraordinary circumstances of the ongoing war, the report insists that continued EIB support must be accompanied by effective oversight, traceability of funds and cooperation with anti-corruption authorities. Taxpayer confidence in the sustained commitment to Ukraine depends on demonstrating that these resources are properly safeguarded.

The EIB is entrusted with resources that belong to European taxpayers. Its growing role in delivering EU policy objectives must be matched by a corresponding growth in accountability, transparency and independent scrutiny.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not include in his report input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.1

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted

24.3.2026

Result of final vote

+ : 17

- : 11

0 : 1

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

17

+

ECR

Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Serban Dimitrie Sturdza

PPE

Georgios Aftias, François-Xavier Bellamy, Caterina Chinnici, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Andreas Schwab, Marion Walsmann, Tomás Zdechovský

PfE

Virginie Joron, Ondrej Knotek, Pierre Pimpie

Renew

Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu

11

-

ESN

Arno Bausemer

S&D

Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Andi Cristea, Maria Guzenina, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Thomas Pellerin-Carlin

The Left

Rudi Kennes, Pasquale Tridico

Verts/ALE

Daniel Freund, Erik Marquardt

1

0

PfE

Tamás Deutsch

Key:

+ : in favour

- : against

0 : abstentions