What changed

Committee on International Trade Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

10.12.2025

Symbols for procedures

PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT RESULTING FROM INTERINSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

* Consultation procedure

Subject: Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

*** Consent procedure

***I Ordinary legislative procedure (first reading)

***II Ordinary legislative procedure (second reading)

***III Ordinary legislative procedure (third reading)

(The type of procedure depends on the legal basis proposed by the draft act.)

Amendments to a draft act

Amendments by Parliament set out in two columns

Deletions are indicated in bold italics in the left-hand column. Replacements are indicated in bold italics in both columns. New text is indicated in bold italics in the right-hand column.

The first and second lines of the header of each amendment identify the relevant part of the draft act under consideration. If an amendment pertains to an existing act that the draft act is seeking to amend, the amendment heading includes a third line identifying the existing act and a fourth line identifying the provision in that act that Parliament wishes to amend.

Amendments by Parliament in the form of a consolidated text

New text is highlighted in bold italics. Deletions are indicated using either the ▌symbol or strikeout. Replacements are indicated by highlighting the new text in bold italics and by deleting or striking out the text that has been replaced.

By way of exception, purely technical changes made by the drafting departments in preparing the final text are not highlighted.

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

(COM(2025)0828 – C100123/2025 – 2025/0180(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The interinstitutional negotiations on the aforementioned proposal for a regulation have led to a compromise. In accordance with Rule 75(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the provisional agreement reproduced below is submitted to the Committee on International Trade Committee on Industry, Research and Energy for decision by way of a single vote.

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0828),

ANNEX I

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 194(2) and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C100123/2025),

2025/0180(COD))

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

REGULATION (EU) …/… OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,

of

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions,

on phasing out Russian natural gas imports and preparing the phase out of oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

– having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0195/2025),

1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Amendment 1

AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT*

to the Commission proposal

---------------------------------------------------------

2025/0180 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on phasing out Russian natural gas and oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Whereas:

(1) The unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 revealed the dramatic consequences of the existing dependencies on Russian natural gas onfor markets and security. In their Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022, Heads of StatesState or Government therefore agreed to gradually decrease and eventually fully remove the dependency on Russian energy. The REPowerEU Communication of 8 March 2022 ▌ and the REPowerEU Plan of 18 May 2022 ▌ proposed concrete measures to allow for the full diversification away from Russian energy imports in a safe, affordable and sustainable manner. Significant progress in the process toof diversifydiversifying gas supplies away from Russiathe wasRussian Federation has been achieved since then. As the remaining volumes of Russian natural gas entering the Union are still significant, the Commission announced▌ in its REPowerREPowerEU Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports of 6 May 2025 announced a legislative proposal to fully phase out Russian gas imports and to improve the existing framework for addressing energy dependencies. In order to achieve fullensure independenceEU fromenergy Russiansecurity energyand imports,resilience, it is equally urgent and strategically needed to phase-outaddress Russianall nuclearremaining energy imports, independencies linementioned within the REPowerEURepowerEU Plan.roadmap.

(2) Multiple examples of unannounced and unjustified supply reductions and interruptions already before the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, andas well as the weaponisation of energy by the Russian Federation since then, showdemonstrate that the Russian Federation has systematically usedexploited existing dependencies on Russian gas supplies as a political weapon to harm the Union’s economy. This leadshas led to serious negative effects on Member States single market stability,and the Union’s consumers,economic security, and also single market stability, the Union’s economic securityconsumers and competitiveness in general. The Russian Federation and its energy companies can therefore no longer be considered reliable energy trading partners by the Union.

(3) In January 2006, Russiathe Russian Federation stopped its natural gas supplies to Bulgaria and othersome countries in South East and Central Europe in the middle of a cold spell, driving up prices increases▌ and causing or threatening harm to citizens. On 6 January 2009, Russiathe Russian Federation again fully cut off gas transiting through Ukraine, affecting 18 Member States, especiallyin particular those in Central and Eastern Europe. TheThis supply disruption led to serious disturbances of gas markets in the region and in the whole of the Union. Some Member States had zero natural gas flows for nearly 14 days, forcing lasting shutdowns of heating in schools and factories, and requiring them to declare the state of emergency. In 2014, the Russian Federation invaded and illegally annexed Crimea, ceasedseized Ukrainian gas production assets in Crimea and reduced gas supplies to several Member States which had announced tothat they would supply Ukraine with gas, leadingwhich led to market disturbances and price increases and harmingharmed economic security. In the past, Russia’sthe Russian Federation’s State-controlled monopoly exporter Gazprom has been the subject toof several Commission investigations for a possible breach of the EUUnion competition rules and has subsequently modifiedchanged its conduct on the market in order to address the Commission’s competition concerns. ▌TheIn several cases, the competition issues at stake concerned, in severalconcerned cases,▌ so-called ‘territorial restrictions’ in Gazprom’s gas supply contracts, prohibiting the resale of gas outside the owndestination country,country ▌ , as well as evidence that Gazprom was engaged in unfair pricing practices and made energy supplies dependent on political concessions from participation in Russian pipeline projects or acquiring control over Union energy assets.

(4) Russia’sThe Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified war against Ukraine since February 2022 and subsequent weaponised reductions of gas supplies in conjunction with the manipulation of the markets through intentional disruptions of gas flows have laid bare vulnerabilities and dependencies in the Union and its Member States, with the clear potential of a direct and serious impact on the functioning of the Union gas market, the Union’s economy and its essential security interests, as well as of direct harm to Union citizens because energy supply disruptions can harm citizens’ health or life. Evidence shows that the State-controlled company Gazprom intentionally manipulated the Union’s energy markets in order to drive up energy prices. Large underground storages in the Union controlled by Gazprom were left at an unprecedentedly low level,levels, and Russian companies reduced sales at Union gas hubs ▌ and fully discontinued the use of their own sales platform before the invasion, affectingwhich affected short-term markets and aggravatingaggravated the already tight supply situation after Russia’sthe Russian Federation’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine. As of March 2022, Russiathe Russian Federation systematically halted or reduced deliveries of natural gas to Member States, leading to significant disturbances on the Union gas market. This affected notablyin theparticular supplies to the Union via the Yamal pipeline, the▌ supplies to Finland as well as the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, where Gazprom first reduced flows and eventually shut down supplies via the pipeline entirely.

(5) Russia’sThe Russian Federation’s weaponisation of gas supply and market manipulation through intentional disruptions of gas flows led to skyrocketing energy prices in the Union, reaching unprecedented levels, up to eight times above▌ the average of previous years, in 2022. The resulting need to find alternative gas supply sources, to change supply routes, to fill storages for the winter, and to find solutions for congestion problems in the Union’s gas infrastructure contributed to high price volatility and the unprecedented price hikes in 2022.

(6) The exceptionally high gas prices translated into high electricity prices and price increases for other energy products, leading to sustained high inflation. A deep economic crisis with negative growth rates in many Member States, caused by the high energy prices and volatility, endangered the economy of the Union, undermined consumer purchasing power and raised the cost of manufacturing, particularly in energy,▌ leading to risks forto social cohesion and stability, and even to human life or health. The supply interruptions also led to very seriouslyserious problems forconcerning the security of energy supply in the Union and forced eleven11 Member States to declare an energy crisis level under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Benefitting from the Union’s dependency during that crisis, Russia’sthe Russian Federation’s manipulations of the market allowed it to achieve record-high profits from the remaining energy trade with Europe, with revenues from gas imports still accounting still▌ for EUR 15bn in 2024. Those revenues could be used to finance further economic attacks against the Union, undermining economic security. They could also be used to finance the war of aggression against the▌ Ukraine which constitutes a major threat to political and economic stability in Europe.

(7) The recent crisis provided evidence that trustful trade relations with partners supplying energy products are crucial to preservepreserving market stability,stability toand protectprotecting human life and health as well as the essential security interests of the Union, including not the▌ least because the Union depends to a large extent on energy imports from third countries. Maintaining energy supplies from Russiathe Russian Federation would expose the Union to continued economic and security risks; it would therefore notdecrease, increaserather butthan decreaseincrease, its supplysecurity security.of energy supply. Even dependencies on smaller import volumes of Russian gas can, if abused by Russia,the Russian Federation, significantly distort the price dynamic, even if justonly temporarily, and disrupt energy markets, especiallyin particular in those regions which are still significantly reliant on imports from Russia.the TakingRussian intoFederation. accountIn view of the long standing and consistent pattern of market manipulations and supply disruptions, andas well as of the fact that the Russian▌ government of the Russian Federation has consistently used gas trade as a weapon to achieve policy insteadgoals ofrather than trade goals, it is therefore▌ appropriate to take legally binding measures to eliminate all remaining vulnerabilities of the Union resulting from natural gas imports from the Russian Federation, both via pipelines and liquified natural gas (LNG) with the Russian▌ Federation..

(7a) In their Versailles Declaration, the Heads of Member States committed not only to phase out natural gas supplies from Russia, but also other energy supplies, notably oil supplies. Russia has a history of using oil as a means of exerting coercion and manipulation. For example, in July 2006, Russia’s oil pipeline monopoly, Transneft, permanently halted deliveries, citing alleged technical reasons, to Lithuania’s Mazeikiai refinery, the largest economic entity in the country, and the only refinery in the Baltic states. This move appeared to be a response to the Polish company PKN Orlen acquiring a majority stake in the refinery, instead of Russian firms Lukoil or Rosneft. In addition, in April 2019, amidst deteriorating relations between Russia and Belarus, mounting Russian economic pressure on Ukraine, and growing tensions with several Central European countries, the chloride contamination of 5 million tonnes of Russian oil transported through the “Druzhba” pipeline caused severe disruption. The incident caused significant damage to the Mozyr refinery in Belarus, led to the suspension of deliveries to Poland and Ukraine, and forced the shutdown of refineries in Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which lasted many weeks. It is also imperative to close loopholes that allow the indirect import of Russian oil in the form of refined products, such as gasoline, via third countries. For example, certain countries have emerged as major exporters of refined oil products to the European Union, largely due to a significant increase in their imports of discounted Russian crude for processing in their refineries.

(8) The restrictions on international transactions provided for in Article 3 of this Regulation are consistent with the Union’s external action in other areas, as required by Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The state of relations between the Union and the Russian Federation has greatly deteriorated in recent years and in particular since 2022. That deterioration of relations is due to the Russian Federation’s blatant disregard for international law and, in particular, its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. Since July 2014, the Union has progressively imposed restrictive measures on trade with the Russian Federation in response to the Russian Federation’s actions against Ukraine. The Union is allowed, by virtue of the exceptions that apply under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and in particular Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (security exceptions) and analogous exceptions under the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the Russian Federation, to not ▌ accord to goods imported from the Russian Federation the advantages granted to like products imported from other countries (most-favoured-nation treatment). Therefore, the Union is not prevented from imposing prohibitions or restrictions on the import of goods from the Russian Federation, if the Union considers such measures, taken at the time of the ongoing emergency in international relations between the Union and the Russian Federation, to be necessary for the protection of the Union’s essential security interests.

(7b) In order to prevent Russia from continuing to use the Union’s oil imports as a tool for coercion and to cease further disruption to the internal market arising from such coercion, it is essential to complement existing measures with a permanent prohibition of oil imports from the Russian Federation from 1 January 2026. These measures should also include a ban on the import of refined oil products derived from crude oil of Russian origin. While the impact on the internal market is expected to be stabilising, the impact on prices is expected to be minimal. As crude oil is traded globally, the additional seaborne supply needed to replace Druzhba pipeline volumes (about 11.4 mt/year) represents only 0.5% of global seaborne trade, an amount that is unlikely to affect prices significantly. Czechia’s shift from Russian to seaborne crude in April 2025 (approx. 4.3 mt/year) had no noticeable effect on international prices. While oil imports have decreased significantly, a further phase out of Russian oil is fully feasible for countries who are still supplying Russian oil, but may require specific preparatory steps and coordination with neighbouring countries. Member States should therefore prepare national diversification plans also for oil, with a possibility for the Commission to adopt decisions on those plans.

(9) Diversifying the LNG import ▌ is essential for strengthening and maintaining energy security within the Union. To avoid any risk that long-term reservations of LNG terminal capacity held by Russian companies ▌ could be used to obstruct imports from alternative sources through capacity hoarding practices, such as practices to book liquification or storage capacities without actually using them or with the purpose to prevent competitors from using the infrastructure, national regulators and competition authorities are to make full use of the robust legal instruments which are available under national and European energy and competition law where appropriate. In case customs authorities identify risks for safety or security resulting from Russian gas before entering the Union customs territory, they should make use of the provisions concerning risk management in the Union Customs Code to avoid such risks.

(8) The restrictions on international transactions provided for in ▌of this Regulation are consistent with the Union’s external action in other areas, as required by Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The state of relations between the Union and the Russian Federation has greatly deteriorated in recent years and particularly since 2022. That deterioration of relations is due to the Russian Federation’s blatant disregard for international law and, in particular, its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. Since July 2014, the Union has progressively imposed restrictive measures on trade with the Russian Federation in response to the Russian Federation’s actions against Ukraine. The Union is allowed, by virtue of the exceptions that apply under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and in particular Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (security exceptions) and analogous exceptions under the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the Russian Federation, not to accord to goods imported from the Russian Federation the advantages granted to like products imported from other countries (most-favoured-nation treatment). Therefore, the Union is not prevented from imposing prohibitions or restrictions on the import of goods of the territory of the Russian Federation, if the Union considers such measures, taken in time of the existing emergency in international relations between the Union and the Russian Federation, to be necessary for the protection of the Union’s essential security interests.

(10) The Commission has carefully assessed the impact on the Union and on its Member States of a possible prohibition of ▌ imports of Russian natural gas ▌ . In fact, preparatory work and several detailed analyses of the consequences of a total phase-out of Russian gas have been conducted and published since 2022 ▌ , and the Commission could also draw upon a multitude of consultations with stakeholders, external experts and agencies, and studies on the effects of the phase-out of Russian gas. The Commission’s analysis showed that a phase-out of Russian natural gas imports, if introduced in a stepwise, coordinated and well-prepared manner and in a spirit of solidarity, is likely to have limited impact on energy prices in the Union, and that it will enhance and not endanger the ▌ security of the Union’s energy supply, due to the exit of an unreliable trading partner from the Union markets. As set out in the REPowerEU Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already reduced the Union’s dependencies on supplies from the Russian Federation, for instance by introducing measures to reduce gas demand or to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources, as well as by actively supporting the diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the ▌ bargaining power of the Union via joint gas purchasing. The Assessment of Impacts also showed that upfront coordination of diversification policies can avoid harmful effects on prices or supplies ▌.

(8a) In order to safeguard the Union’s security of gas supply and prevent circumvention of the prohibition on the import of Russian natural gas, the scope of that prohibition should also extend to the temporary storage of Russian origin gas in the EU storage facilities located on the territory of the Union. The Union’s gas storage facilities are critical security assets, covering some 30% of winter consumption across the Union. Well-filled storage facilities, along with voluntary demand reduction, have proven essential in periods of tight supply and market stress. Past instances of gas storage hoarding have further led to substantial market distortions, increased prices, and threats to critical security measures. Allowing third-country entities to book capacity to temporarily store Russian origin gas in the Union for later withdrawal or re-export undermines the Union’s objective to phase out dependency on Russian fossil fuels and uses up capacity needed for ensuring the Union’s energy security. For the purposes of achieving the goals of this Regulation, temporary storage of Russian gas should therefore be prohibited.

(11) The proposed Regulation is fully compatible with the Union’s strategy to reduce its reliance on fossil fuel imports by enhancing decarbonisation and rapidly expanding domestically produced clean energy. As set out in the REPowerEU Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already resulted in substantial gas savings of more than 60 billion cubic metres annually in gas imports between 2022 and 2024, allowing the Union to reduce ▌ dependencies on supplies from the Russian Federation. This reduction of dependencies could be achieved by measures to reduce gas demand, to increase energy efficiency, or to accelerate the green transition by an accelerated deployment of wind and solar generation capacity, which would significantly increase the share of renewables in the energy mix, as well as by active support to diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the ▌ bargaining power of the Union via joint gas purchasing. Moreover, the full implementation of the energy transition, the recent Action Plan for Affordable Energy and other measures, in particular investments in the production of low-carbon alternatives for energy intensive products, such as fertilisers, are expected to replace up to 100 billion cubic metres of natural gas by 2030. These combined efforts will strengthen the Union’s resilience, competitiveness, and open strategic autonomy, support European industries, SMEs and citizens and facilitate the phase-out of gas imports from the Russian Federation.

(9) Diversifying LNG import capacity is essential for strengthening and maintaining energy security within the Union. A significant portion of that capacity is controlled by Russian companies via long-term contracts of more than 10 years, creating a risk that the capacity rights reserved in those contracts could be used to obstruct imports from alternative sources through capacity hoarding practices. Similar practices could make Union energy markets subject to the prolonged influence of Russian companies, which have previously demonstrated a significant capacity to distort markets in the Union, using existing dependencies. ▌Given the essential role that LNG is expected to play in securing alternative energy supplies ▌it is essential to complement the gas import ban with a prohibition on providing LNG terminal services to Russian entities. To assist Member States in ending their dependency on Russian gas supplies, and to ensure the effective delivery of LNG imports from alternative sources, it is important to prevent Russian customers of LNG terminal services from blocking the necessary import infrastructure▌. The provision of long-term LNG terminal services to entities from Russia or to entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly via various frameworks, such as intermediate structures or subsidiaries, by Russian Federation, or under significant influence from the Russian Federation should be therefore prohibited as of 1 January 2026. Those provided under a contract concluded before 17 June 2025, should be prohibited as of 1 January 2027. This should enable the reallocation of terminal capacity to alternative LNG suppliers and strengthen the resilience of the energy market in the Union.

(12) While preparing the diversification plans, the Commission should, in a coordinated manner and in spirit of solidarity, work with Member States, in particular in Central and South-Eastern Europe, to identify alternative deliveries of natural gas. In addition to improving the security of supply, new supplies could also compensate for lost revenues through utilising the existing infrastructure that has been previously used for transporting Russian gas.

(10) The Commission has carefully assessed the impact on the Union and on its Member States of a possible prohibition of Russian imports of natural gas and of the provision of LNG terminal services to Russian entities. In fact, preparatory work and several detailed analyses of the consequences of a total phase out of Russian gas have been conducted and published since 2022, and the Commission could also draw upon a multitude of consultations with stakeholders, external experts and agencies, and studies on the effects of the phase out of Russian gas. The Commission’s analysis showed that a phase out of Russian natural gas imports, if introduced in a stepwise, coordinated and well-prepared manner in a spirit of solidarity, is likely to have limited impact on energy prices in the Union, and that it will enhance and not endanger the Union’s security of supply, due to the exit of an unreliable trading partner from the Union markets. As set out in the REPower Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already reduced supply dependencies from Russia, for instance by measures to reduce gas demand or to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources, as well as active support to diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the EU bargaining power via Joint gas purchasing. The Assessment of Impact also showed that upfront coordination of diversification policies can avoid harmful effects on prices or supplies. Moreover, the global LNG supply is growing rapidly, while gas demand in the Union is in steady decline. Since 2021, gas consumption in the Union has dropped by 80 bcm/y and it is now down by 17% on average, compared to the period before February 2022. As the projected reduction in consumption by 2027 is larger than the current imports from Russia, only a small part of the Russian gas imports would need to be replaced with alternative suppliers. Therefore, setting 1 January 2027 as the end date for Russian gas imports is both feasible and well-timed.

(13) In line with the Versailles Declaration and the REPowerEU Communication, a large number of gas importers have already terminated or significantly reduced their gas supplies from the Russian Federation. As set out in the Assessment of Impacts, the remaining gas volumes under existing supply contracts can ▌ be phased out without significant economic impact or risks for the security of supply, due to the availability of sufficient alternative suppliers on the gas world market, a well-interconnected Union gas market and the availability of sufficient import infrastructure ▌ . The related measures need to be in line with the current energy framework of the Union.

(11) The proposed Regulation is fully compatible with the Union’s strategy to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels imports by enhancing decarbonisation and rapidly expanding domestically produced clean energy. As set out in the REPower Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already resulted in substantial gas savings of more than 60 billion cubic meters annually in gas imports between 2022 and 2024, allowing the Union to reduce supply dependencies from Russia. This could be achieved by measures to reduce gas demand, to increase energy efficiency or to accelerate the green transition by an accelerated deployment of wind and solar generation capacity, which significantly increased the share of renewables in the energy mix, as well as by active support to diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the EU bargaining power via joint gas purchasing. Moreover, the full implementation of the energy transition, the recent Action Plan for Affordable Energy and other measures, notably investments in the production of low-carbon alternatives for energy intensive products, such as fertilisers, are expected to replace up to 100 bcm of natural gas by 2030. These combined efforts will strengthen the Union’s resilience, competitiveness, and open strategic autonomy, support European industries, SMEs and citizens facilitate the phase out of gas imports from the Russian Federation.

(14) In some cases, LNG cargoes carry gas produced in different countries and mixed together. The prohibition should also apply to the amounts of gas in such cargoes that are produced in Russia. Where importers can unambiguously document the respective shares of LNG produced outside Russia, it should be possible to import the non-Russian LNG amounts contained in an LNG cargo.

(12) In line with the Versailles Declaration and the REPowerEU Communication, a large number of gas importers have already terminated or significantly reduced their gas supplies from Russia. As set out in the Assessment of Impacts, the remaining gas volumes under existing supply contracts can, be phased out without significant economic impact or risks for security of supply, due to the availability of sufficient alternative suppliers on the gas world market, a well-interconnected Union gas market and the availability of sufficient import infrastructure. The related measures need to be in line with the current energy framework of the Union.

(15) Short-term supply contracts ▌ concern smaller volumes than the large long-term supply contracts importers hold with Russian companies. Those existing short-term supply contracts will in any event be close to expiration by the time this Regulation enters into force. Accordingly, the risk to economic security resulting from existing short-term supply contracts appears to be low. It is therefore appropriate to exempt existing short-term supply contracts from the immediate application of the import prohibition allowing for a transition phase until 25 April 2026 for LNG imports, taking into account Article 3ra of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and until 17 June 2026 for pipeline gas.

(13) Short-term contracts, that is contracts on individual or multiple natural gas supplies of a duration of less than one year, concern smaller volumes than the large multi-year supply contracts importers hold with Russian companies. These existing contracts will in any event be close to expiration when this Regulation will enter into force. Accordingly, the risk for economic security resulting from existing short term-contracts appears to be low. It is therefore appropriate to exempt existing short-term contracts from the immediate application of the import allowing for a transition phase until 17 June 2026.

(16) An exemption from the prohibition on gas imports ▌ should also be granted for existing long-term supply contracts. ▌ Importers holding long-term supply contracts will usually need more time to find alternative supply routes and sources than short-term contract holders, also because long-term supply contracts usually concern significantly larger volumes over time than short-term supply contracts. A transition time should therefore be introduced to give holders of long-term supply contracts sufficient time to diversify their supplies in an orderly manner. While LNG can be sourced world-wide and LNG customers usually face no physical barriers in switching to alternative suppliers on the LNG world-market, diversification for pipelines gas customers, notably in countries without LNG infrastructure, may be more complex. A longer transition time should therefore be granted for gas supplies under existing long-term pipeline contracts.

(14) An exemption from the prohibition of gas imports as of 1 January 2026 should also be granted for existing long term supply contracts. Indeed, importers holding long-term contracts will usually need more time to find alternative supply routes and sources than short-term contract holders, also as long-term contracts usually concern significantly larger volumes over time than short-term contracts. A transition time should therefore be introduced to give holders of long-term contracts sufficient time to diversify their supplies in an orderly manner. A legal prohibition of imports of natural gas under a Union trade measure constitutes ‘force majeure’, a sovereign act of the Union beyond the control of gas importers, rendering the performance of natural gas imports from Russia unlawful, with direct legal effect and without any discretion for Member States concerning its application. The Commission should provide information and technical assistance to EU companies, including through best practices and training sessions, to facilitate the effective implementation of the Regulation.

(17) Specific situations have occurred where a country which is currently still supplied under existing long-term supply contracts for Russian pipeline gas is specifically affected by recent changes of supply routes from the Russian Federation, removing the possibility to import gas via the previous supply route, due to limited or no alternative routes for the transport of the contracted gas to it. To remedy the situation, suppliers from other Member States currently ensure the delivery of pipeline gas under short-term supply contracts with suppliers from the Russian Federation via uncongested interconnection points. Due to this very specific situation, the transition time necessary to find new suppliers should also apply to those short-term supply contracts with suppliers from the Russian Federation which serve to supply landlock countries affected by changes of supply routes for Russian gas.

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(18) While it appears justified to exempt existing “legacy” contracts from the immediate application of the prohibition on imports of Russian gas, not all contracts concluded before the entry into force of this Regulation should benefit from such an exemption. Indeed, there may be an incentive for Russian suppliers to use the time between the publication of the Commission proposal of this Regulation and the entry into force of the prohibition to increase current supplies, by concluding new contracts, increasing volumes by changing existing contracts or using flexibilities under existing contracts. In order to ensure that imports from the Russian Federation decrease, rather than increase, as a result of this prohibition, this Regulation should avoid incentives for companies to conclude new Russian gas import contracts in the time between the publication of the Commission proposal of this Regulation and the entry into force of the prohibition. Indeed, the commitment from Heads of State or Government to phase out Russian gas supplies was already made in March 2022; the Commission built on this commitment by proposing the REPowerEU Strategy, the REPowerEU Plan and the REPowerEU Roadmap. At the latest with the publication of the proposal for this Regulation, it was no longer appropriate to consider contracts concluded after that date as “legacy” contracts. Contracts concluded after 17 June 2025 should therefore not benefit from the exceptional transition provisions for existing short-term and long-term supply contracts.

(16) While it appears justified to exempt existing “legacy” contracts from the immediate application, not all contracts entered into before the entry into force of this Regulation should benefit from such exemption. Indeed, there may be an incentive by Russian suppliers to use the time between the publication of this proposal until the entry into force of the ban to increase current supplies, by concluding new contracts, increasing volumes by changing existing contracts or using flexibilities under existing contracts. In order to ensure that imports from Russia do not increase but decrease as a result of the proposed Regulation, measures should be included in the Regulation to avoid a “rush” for new Russian gas imports in the time between the adoption of this proposal and the entry into force of the ban. Indeed, the commitment from Heads of State to phase out gas supplies was already made in March 2022; it was renewed in the REPowerEU Strategy, the REPowerEU Plan and the REPowerEU Roadmap. At the latest with the publication of the proposal for this Regulation, it is no longer appropriate consider contracts concluded after that date as “legacy” contracts. Contracts concluded after 17 June 2025 should therefore not benefit from the exceptional transition provisions for existing short and long-term contracts.

(19) In order to avoid ▌ import volumes provided for in existing supply contracts from being increased ▌ , amendments to existing supply contracts should be considered ▌ new contracts for the purposes of this Regulation, and increases of import volumes by using contractual flexibilities should not benefit from the transition period. Exceptions should be provided for certain cases of necessary amendments to existing contracts, provided they do not increase contracted quantities or the timing of delivery. Price variations resulting from price indexation already provided for in existing supply contracts do not constitute an amendment to existing supply contracts.

(17) In order to avoid that import volumes provided for in existing supply contracts are increased and not decreased, amendments to existing supply contracts should be considered as new contracts for the purposes of this Regulation, and increases of import volumes by using contractual flexibilities should not benefit from the transition period.

(20) This Regulation creates a clear legal prohibition on importing Russian natural gas, constituting a sovereign act of the Union beyond the control of gas importers and rendering the performance of natural gas imports from the Russian Federation unlawful, with direct legal effect and without any discretion for Member States concerning its application.

(18) This Regulation creates a clear legal prohibition to import and temporarily store Russian natural gas and oil, including petroleum products, constituting a sovereign act of the Union beyond the control of respective importers and rendering the performance of natural gas and oil, including petroleum products, imports from Russia and the temporary storage unlawful, with direct legal effect and without any discretion for Member States concerning its application.

(21) Unlike other goods, natural gas is a homogeneous commodity which is traded in large volumes and often resold multiple times between traders at wholesale level. Taking into account the particular complexity of tracing the origin of natural gas, and bearing in mind that Russian suppliers might seek to circumvent this Regulation, for example by sales via intermediaries, via transshipments or via transport through other countries, this Regulation should provide for an effective framework to avoid circumvention of the prohibition. Relevant authorities should therefore be enabled to take the necessary actions to identify whether natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation are brought into the Union customs territory through schemes created for circumventing the rules of this Regulation. When determining whether natural gas is released for free circulation in the Union, customs authorities should not only depend on information provided in the customs declaration, but be allowed, on the basis of other relevant information, to assess, where they deem relevant, whether a good brought into the Union is actually meant to be released into free circulation. The Regulation should also require the establishment of the country of production and the supply chain of natural gas imported into the Union.

(19) Unlike other goods, natural gas is a homogeneous commodity which is traded in large volumes and often resold multiple times between traders at wholesale level. Taking into account the particular complexity of tracing the country of production of natural gas, and bearing in mind that Russian suppliers might seek to circumvent this Regulation, for example by sales via intermediaries, via transshipments or transport through other countries, this Regulation should provide for an effective framework to establish the actual origin and the point of export of natural gas imported into the Union.

(22) In particular, importers of natural gas should be obliged to provide ▌ authorities with all information necessary to establish the country of production of natural gas imported into the Union and to determine whether the imported gas is subject to the general prohibition or one of its exceptions. The concept of ‘origin’ under Union customs law may not always allow for the identification of the country of production of the imported gas, for example when the gas was processed (e.g. liquified or regasified) after leaving the Russian Federation. The Regulation should therefore also cover cases where the country of ‘origin’ under Union custom law differs from the country of production of the gas and provide for a mechanism to verify whether the natural gas was extracted or liquified in the Russian Federation. Any gas which, before its import into the EU, was exported from the Russian Federation, either via direct export from Russia to the EU or via indirect export through a third country, should, except in case of transit, be subject to the prohibition.

(20) In particular, importers of natural gas, and/or natural gas undertakings planning to temporarily store, should be obliged to provide customs authorities with all information necessary to establish the country of production and the point of export of natural gas imported into the Union and to decide whether the imported gas falls under the general prohibition or one of its exceptions. The concept of country of production allows customs authorities to determine the origin of the imported gas which remains the country of extraction even if the natural gas is liquified or regasified in another country. As the contractual conditions determining the elements relevant for the assessment of the customs authorities are often complex, customs authorities should be given the power to ask importers for detailed contract information, including entire supply contracts, excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other contractual provisions. However, the level of information required should depend on the origin of the natural gas and be based on the risk of circumvention. For gas originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, a prior authorisation from customs authorities should be required and to this end, importers should submit detailed evidence, such as evidence related to delivery points, quantities, information on liquefaction and loading ports. For gas originating in countries other than the Russian Federation, importers should provide evidence to establish the country of production. The Commission should determine the minimum standards for such evidence, including the type, format and authentication requirements, in order to ensure uniform application across Member States. No prior authorisation or evidence should be required for imports from countries prohibiting Russian gas imports, in a manner equivalent to the obligations laid down in this Regulation, and the Commission should establish a list of such countries. The Regulation should include rules to ensure an effective protection of business secrets of concerned undertakings.

(23) Due to the specific characteristics of pipeline gas and LNG, and in order to allow for a smooth verification process of the country of production and the conditions for possible exemptions before the gas enters the Union customs territory, a prior authorisation process should be introduced. Imports should be refused in the absence of an authorisation. Authorising authorities, or customs authorities, when they are not the same, should be informed in advance about intended imports into the Union, and the information should be submitted to them which is necessary to verify the country of production or whether the conditions for an exemption under this Regulation are met. While authorising authorities should strive to issue an authorisation within the period between submission of information by the importer and the planned entry into the customs territory in order to facilitate imports of gas to the EU, they may also decide at a later stage, in particular, in case there are doubts concerning the information provided. The prior authorisation is without prejudice to existing enforcement powers of customs authorities. Imports of natural gas from gas producing countries should be exempted from that obligation if the Union has imported significant volumes from these countries in the past and if these countries either have shown that they do not want to support the Russian gas sector by a prohibition of the import of Russian gas, restrictive measures targeting Russian gas infrastructure, Russian gas companies or persons managing such companies, or if these countries do not dispose of the necessary infrastructure to import natural gas via pipelines or LNG. The Commission should establish the list of such countries.

(20a) Importers of oil, including petroleum products, should be required to submit to the customs authorities an application for prior authorisation of imports accompanied by all information necessary to establish the country of origin of the imported crude oil, the country of origin of the imported petroleum product or the country of origin of crude oil on the basis of which the petroleum product was obtained. The Commission should determine the minimum standards for such evidence, including the type, format and authentication requirements, in order to ensure uniform application across Member States. The Regulation should also establish obligations for oil pipeline operators, regarding the verification of origin. A requirement to verify and certify the origin of oil at the point of entry will provide an essential safeguard against the unauthorised import of restricted commodities and will complement existing import controls.

(24) Authorising authorities and, where they are not identical, customs authorities should be able to request all information necessary to assess the legality of imports. They should also be able to rely on information from other sources. As the contractual conditions determining the elements relevant for the assessment are often complex, the authorities should be empowered to ask importers for detailed contract information, including entire supply contracts, where that is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other contractual provisions. This Regulation should include rules to ensure an effective protection of business secrets of concerned undertakings.

(20b) In order to establish the minimum standards for evidence which importers need to present to customs authorities to prove the origin of natural gas, oil and petroleum products, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. The Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts where, in duly justified cases relating to the significant risks for trade and security stemming from possible circumvention of this Regulation, imperative grounds of urgency so require. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

(25) In exercising their powers, authorising authorities and customs authorities should put a particular focus of their enforcement at interconnection points, LNG facilities or transit pipelines where the risk of circumvention is high. Practices of using so-called “shadow fleets” for the circumvention of the sanctions have been observed in oil transport, and they could also pose risks for LNG imports, undermining the objectives of this Regulation. In close cooperation with each other, authorities should adapt their enforcement priorities where necessary to address potential circumvention practices identified during the implementation of this Regulation. The Commission should also constantly monitor the flows of Russian natural gas transiting through third countries.

(21) Customs authorities should cooperate with regulatory authorities, competent authorities, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the Commission to implement the provisions of this Regulation and exchange relevant information, notably when it comes to the assessment of exemptions allowing imports of Russian natural gas after 1.1.2026. Customs authorities, regulatory authorities, competent authorities and ACER should have the necessary tools and databases in place to ensure that relevant information can be exchanged between national authorities and authorities in different Member States where necessary. Customs authorities and relevant authorities should access, use and exchange the relevant information gathered pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 ("Methane Regulation"), in particular data related to gas supply chain traceability, to support the detection and prevention of circumvention. Member States should ensure that customs authorities and other relevant authorities have adequate powers, functional independence, and the capabilities to fulfil the obligations set out in this Regulation. ACER should contribute with its expertise to the process of monitoring the implementation. To facilitate the creation of the necessary interoperable joint information systems, the Commission and Member States may explore possibilities to make use of budget under the Internal Security Fund (ISF). Customs authorities should notify regulatory authorities, the national competent authority and the Commission on a monthly basis regarding key elements concerning the development of imports of Russian gas (such as quantities imported under long-term or short-term contracts, entry points, or contract partners). Where the Commission has doubts as to the effectiveness of monitoring at the Member State level, the Commission should request the necessary information from customs authorities and other relevant authorities.

(21a) There is increasing evidence that certain suppliers may resort to opaque maritime transport practices, including the use of so-called dark or shadow fleets that disable tracking systems, reflag vessels or conduct ship-to-ship transfers to obscure the origin, ownership and destination of energy shipments. Although such practices have been predominantly observed in oil transport, they could also pose risks for LNG imports, undermining the objectives of this Regulation. It is therefore necessary that Member States monitor maritime transport practices in their territorial waters, including by requesting any relevant documentation.

(21b) The Union has created a robust legal framework to ensure security of gas supply at all times, and to deal with possible supply crises in a coordinated manner, including obligations on Member States to provide for effective and operational solidarity to neighbours in need of gas. The Commission should constantly monitor the development of market risks for gas supply resulting from gas trade with Russia at Union, regional and Member State level. To avoid indirect circumvention of the prohibitions set out in this Regulation, the Commission should also constantly monitor the flows of Russian natural gas transiting through third countries, particularly Türkiye and Azerbaijan and carry out a risk-based analysis of LNG terminals to identify those for which there are reasonable grounds to suspect imports of Russian natural gas. The Commission should establish a list of such terminals, and could propose appropriate measures, including legislative proposals, to mitigate identified risks. The Commission should also publish an annual report on natural gas flows from third countries, including an assessment of risks of circumvention.

(21c) The petrochemical industry is closely linked to the oil and gas industry, as its feedstocks are derived directly from oil refining and natural gas processing. To prevent circumvention of the ban on Russian crude oil and petroleum products, it is essential to closely monitor imports of petrochemical products CN Code 39 obtained in third countries from Russian crude oil. Failure to address these imports could risk the effectiveness of this Regulation. The Commission should therefore assess their impact and, where disruptions are confirmed, take appropriate measures, which may include a legislative proposal.

(22) Russia is a major gas exporter and has not played any noticeable role as gas transit country in the past. This is due to several factors, such as the lack of regasification infrastructure, the organisation of gas trade in Russia via a pipeline export monopoly, business models of Russian gas companies which are not based on organising transits, or Russia’s geographical location. Therefore, imports of natural gas arriving via interconnection points between the Russian Federation and the Union are usually originating in, or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation. The same consideration applies to gas imported via interconnection points between the Union and Serbia, as Serbia can, for technical reasons, only export gas of Russian origin towards the Union. In order to ensure that the measures to prevent the import of gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation are kept up to date, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission to amend the list of interconnection points where gas is presumed to be exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making*. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council should receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(23) Experience with the announced phase out of gas supplies via Ukraine has shown that good preparation and coordination in a spirit of solidarity can effectively avoid market disruptions or security of supply problems potentially resulting from changing gas suppliers. To prepare for the full phase out of Russian gas in 2027 in a coordinated manner and to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk for security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices, Member States should prepare national diversification plans and present them by 1 March 2026. Those plans should describe intended measures at national or regional level to reduce demand, foster renewable energy production and ensure alternative supplies, as well as possible technical or regulatory barriers which may complicate the diversification process, and measures to ensure full transparency and actual control preventing possible circumvention. As the diversification process may require coordination of measures at national, regional or Union level, the Commission should assess the national diversification plans, with the possibility to issue decisions to adapt those plans where necessary.

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(25) Experience during the gas crisis of 2022 and 2023 has shown ▌that comprehensive information on the supply situation and possible supply dependencies is crucial to monitor gas supply in the Union. Therefore importers of Russian gas making use of the exemptions laid down in this Regulation should submit to the Commission all information which is necessary to effectively evaluate possible risks for gas trade. That information should include key parameters, or even whole text parts, of the relevant gas supply contracts, excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other provisions in the contract. When monitoring gas supply in the Union, the Commission should also take into account information on imports provided by customs authorities and information included in national diversification plans. The Commission should regularly inform the Gas Coordination Group established by Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 about the phase-out process at the Union level and submit an annual report on the Russian gas phase-out, which may be accompanied by specific Union recommendations and actions to accelerate the phase-out process.

(26) Member States and Union should cooperate closely in the implementation of this Regulation. With a view to the recent practice of the Russian Federation to unilaterally change agreed court and arbitration procedures in a manner not compatible with international customary law or bilateral investment treaties entered between Member States and Russia, it follows from international law that affected companies and Member States cannot be held liable for any judgments, arbitral awards, including investor-State arbitral awards, or other judicial decisions adopted under procedures which are illegal under international customary law or under a bilateral investment treaty, and against which the person or Member State concerned does not have effective access to the remedies under the relevant jurisdiction. With respect to financial responsibilities concerning possible investor-to-state dispute settlement resolution cases, reference is made, to Regulation (EU) 912/2014, where applicable.

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(27a) To ensure compliance with this Regulation, Member States should establish penalties that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. These penalties should take into account the seriousness and duration of the infringement, any advantages gained, cooperation with authorities, past conduct, and other relevant circumstances. A harmonised provision of penalties, when applying administrative fines, should be introduced, to ensure consistent application of this Regulation across the Member States. By one month from the entry into force of this Regulation, Member States should inform the Commission of the penalty rules they adopt and of any later changes without undue delay.

(26) Some of the Russian gas transmission infrastructure is directly connected to the Union, and some transit pipelines connecting Russia with the Union are running through third countries without currently having any entry points between the Russian Federation and the Union. The Regulation should therefore presume that natural gas imported into the Union via borders, interconnectors, or interconnection points between the Russian Federation and the Union, Belarus and the Union or arriving via pipelines such as TurkStream at the interconnection point Strandzha 2 / Malkoclar originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, thus replacing the requirement to submit proof of the country of production. In case it is claimed that natural gas arriving at these borders, interconnectors, or interconnection points is under a ‘transit’ procedure through the Russian Federation, strict controls should apply. The Russian Federation is a major gas exporter and has not played any noticeable role as a gas transit country in the past, due to several factors, such as the lack of regasification infrastructure, the organisation of gas trade in the Russian Federation via a pipeline export monopoly, business models of Russian gas companies which are not based on organising transits, and the Russian Federation’s geographical location ▌ . Therefore, and taking into account incentives of Russian suppliers to circumvent the import prohibition, customs authorities should refuse the import of volumes of natural gas allegedly in transit unless unequivocal evidence can be provided which proves that the gas has been in transit through the Russian Federation and that it was produced in a country other than the Russian Federation. The necessary evidence should be provided to the authorising authorities sufficiently in advance, that is no later than one month before the entry into the customs territory, to allow for the traceability of the imported gas up to the place of production.

(28) The proposed measures fully reflect the principle of energy solidarity. Indeed, the level of exposure to Russian gas imports differs between Member States, and many Member States have already taken measures to phase out Russian gas. The proposal for this Regulation will ensure an EU-wide harmonised approach to the phase out of Russian gas, preserving solidarity between Member States.

(27) The interconnection point Strandzha 1 connects the Union to a pipeline system which transports not only gas from Azerbaijan or Türkiye, but also significant volumes of gas from the Russian Federation. Unambiguous evidence to establish the non-Russian country of production should therefore be required, and sufficient verification time should be granted to authorities to ensure that gas imported via Strandzha 1 does not originate in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation. In case other interconnector points should be linked to systems transporting significant volumes of Russian gas in future, the same standard of control should apply.

(29) Since the objectives of this Regulation relating to the monitoring of possible gas dependencies cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States in a coordinated manner and without risk of market fragmentation, but can be better and more efficiently achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

(28) Furthermore, significant volumes of natural gas may also enter the Union under a ‘transit’ procedure. As the strict monitoring rules for gas imports such as the prior authorisation do not apply to gas crossing the Union or being stored under customs warehousing rules under a ‘transit’ procedure, it is appropriate to provide for specific safeguards in the form of a transit monitoring regime, which enables customs to effectively monitor gas flows under a ‘transit’ procedure, to ensure that natural gas which crosses the Union under a ‘transit’ procedure is not ultimately entering into free circulation in the Union. In case third country operators store gas under a transit, temporary storage or customs warehousing procedure under the Union Customs Code, Member States should have appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure that the use of domestic storage by third countries does not pose any risk to national or regional security of supply and the fulfilment of storage obligations, and provide relevant information to the Commission.

(30) In view of the importance for the Union to phase out further economic dependence of the Union on gas imports from the Russian Federation without any delay, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

(29) In line with the principle of sincere cooperation, authorising authorities, customs authorities, regulatory authorities, competent authorities, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the Commission should cooperate to implement the provisions of this Regulation and exchange relevant information, in particular regarding the assessment of exemptions allowing imports of Russian natural gas after the entry into force of this Regulation. Customs authorities, regulatory authorities, competent authorities and ACER should have the necessary tools and databases in place to ensure, where necessary, that relevant information can be exchanged between national authorities and authorities in different Member States. ACER should contribute with its expertise to the process of monitoring the implementation. To facilitate the creation of the necessary interoperable joint information systems, the Commission and Member States may explore possibilities to make use of the budget available under the Internal Security Fund (ISF). Customs authorities should update regulatory authorities, the competent authorities and the Commission on a monthly basis on the key elements concerning the development of imports of Russian gas, such as quantities imported under long-term or short-term supply contracts, entry points, or contract partners. The Commission should include this information, where relevant, in the report on the implementation of this Regulation. The Commission should also assess the effectiveness of the exchange of information and cooperation among the relevant authorities, and where appropriate, set out recommendations for their improvement in that report.

(30) The experience with the phase-out of Russian gas supplies via Ukraine has shown that good preparation and coordination in a spirit of solidarity can effectively avoid market disruptions or security of supply problems potentially resulting from changing gas suppliers. To prepare for the full phase-out of Russian gas ▌ in a coordinated manner, and to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk to the security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices, Member States should prepare national diversification plans and present them by 1 March 2026. Those plans should be subject to the rules of professional secrecy and not be disclosed without the agreement of the respective Member State. They should describe intended measures at national or regional level to reduce demand, foster renewable energy production and ensure alternative supplies, as well as possible technical, contractual or regulatory barriers which may complicate the diversification process. As the diversification process may require coordination of measures at national, regional or Union level, the Commission should assess the national diversification plans, with the possibility to issue recommendations suggesting adaptations where necessary.

(31) In their Versailles Declaration, the Heads of State or Government committed not only to phase out natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation, but also other energy supplies, in particular oil supplies. The Russian Federation has applied similar practices as in the field of gas, where Russia has a history of using gas as a means of exerting coercion and manipulation, also when trading oil with the Union. This has been evidenced, for example, by past interruptions of oil supplies. Existing oil supply relations with the Russian Federation create dependencies and risks for security in the Union. In order to prevent Russia from using the Union’s oil imports as a tool for coercion, it is therefore essential to prepare a timely phase out also of oil imports from the Russian Federation. While restrictive measures to ensure the phase-out of oil imports from the Russian Federation are already in place ▌ and oil imports have decreased significantly, a further phase-out of Russian oil may require specific preparatory steps and coordination with neighbours. ▌

(32) Member States should therefore also prepare national diversification plans for crude oil and petroleum products which should include measures in place and planned at national level to ensure transparency and traceability of oil imports from the Russian Federation. The Commission should provide recommendations on those plans. Those plans should be subject to the rules of professional secrecy and not be disclosed without the agreement of the respective Member State. The Commission should, in parallel, continue addressing the problem of circumvention of EU oil sanctions by using so-called “shadow fleets”, in particular by pursuing the actions set out in its Communication “Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports” of 6 May 2025.

(33) The experience during the gas crisis of 2022 and 2023 ▌ showed that comprehensive information on the supply situation and possible supply dependencies is crucial for monitoring gas supply in the Union. Therefore, importers of Russian gas making use of the exemptions set out in this Regulation should submit to the Commission all information ▌ necessary to effectively evaluate possible risks for gas trade. That information should include key parameters, or even ▌ text parts in full, of the relevant gas supply contracts, excluding price information, where that is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other provisions in the contract. When monitoring gas supply in the Union, the Commission should also take into account information on imports provided by customs authorities and information included in national diversification plans. The Commission should regularly inform the Gas Coordination Group established by Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 about the phase-out process at the Union level and submit an annual report on the Russian gas phase-out, which may be accompanied by specific Union recommendations and actions to accelerate the phase-out process.

(34) Member States and the Union should cooperate closely on the implementation of this Regulation ▌ , including in relation to possible dispute settlement procedures. Where applicable, Regulations (EU) 1219/2012 and (EU) 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council set out further details on cooperation and allocation of financial responsibilities between the Member States and the Union concerning possible investor-to-state dispute settlement resolution cases related to this Regulation.

(35) In view of the recent practice of the Russian Federation to unilaterally change and impede agreed court and arbitration procedures, neither affected persons, nor the Union and Member States can be held liable for any judgments, arbitral awards, or other judicial decisions adopted under illegal procedures against which no remedies are effectively accessible under the relevant jurisdiction.

(36) The Union has created a robust legal framework to ensure the security of gas supply at all times, and to deal with possible supply crises in a coordinated manner, including obligations for Member States to provide for effective and operational solidarity to neighbours in need of gas. The Commission should constantly monitor the development of market risks for gas supply resulting from gas trade with the Russian Federation at Union, regional and Member State level. In case of sudden and significant developments, which seriously threaten the security of supply of one or more Member States, and after an emergency in accordance with Article 11 or 12 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 has been declared, it is appropriate to empower the Commission to take the necessary emergency measures by adopting the decision regarding the import prohibitions concerning natural gas or LNG imports set out in this Regulation in one or more Member States. The Commission should, in such a situation, also be able to suspend the obligation to submit proof of the country of production prior to the entry into the Union’s customs territory, in order to facilitate additional imports on short notice. Such a decision by the Commission should be limited in time and not be granted for more than 4 weeks and renewed only if the conditions for the emergency pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 still apply. The Commission implementing decision should impose certain additional conditions, to ensure that any such suspension is strictly limited to addressing the threat. The Commission should inform the Gas Coordination Group and shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council justifying the suspension and any extension, and should closely monitor the application of any such temporary suspension.

(37) To avoid “penalty shopping” and to ensure consistent application of this Regulation, Member States should lay down harmonised rules on penalties for infringements of this Regulation. However, since infringements of this Regulation could also infringe other Union legislation closely linked to the prohibitions and obligations in this Regulation, such as customs legislation, restrictive measures or Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, the imposition of penalties should not lead to a breach of the principle of ne bis in idem, in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the jurisprudence of the right as interpreted by the Court of Justice. This Regulation is without prejudice to the imposition of criminal penalties under national law.

(38) The ▌ measures introduced with this Regulation fully reflect the principle of energy solidarity. Indeed, the level of exposure to Russian gas imports differs between Member States, and many Member States have already taken measures to phase out Russian gas. ▌This Regulation will ensure an EU-wide harmonised approach to the phase-out of Russian gas, preserving solidarity between Member States.

(39) Since the objectives of this Regulation relating to the monitoring of possible gas dependencies cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States in a coordinated manner and without risk of market fragmentation, but can be better and more efficiently achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

(40) In view of the importance for the Union to phase out further economic dependence of the Union on gas imports from the Russian Federation without any delay, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Market participants had significant time to adapt their supply portfolio after the Versailles Declaration of March 2022 and the adoption of the proposal for this Regulation on 17 June 2025. Nevertheless, it appears appropriate to provide for a transition period to allow gas suppliers which have not yet adapted their supply strategies to make the necessary arrangements to comply with this Regulation. The prohibition to import gas from the Russian Federation should therefore only apply as of [6 weeks after entry into force of this Regulation]. In order to allow importers with existing supply contracts and importers concluding new contracts to carry out the necessary prior authorisation in a timely manner and without disruptions for planned gas imports, the different authorisation processes provided for in this Regulation should already apply before the prohibition of imports of gas from the Russian Federation becomes applicable.

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1 Subject matter

Article 1

This Regulation provides a framework for effectively eliminating the Union’s remaining exposure to the significant risks for trade and security of supply, resulting from gas trade with the Russian Federation and preparing the effective and timely phasing out of oil imports from the Russian Federation by laying down:

Subject matter

(a) a stepwise prohibition of imports of natural gas from the Russian Federation;

This Regulation provides a framework for effectively eliminating the Union’s remaining exposure to the significant risks for trade and security, resulting from gas and oil trade with the Russian Federation by laying down:

(b) rules to effectively implement and monitor that prohibition as well as the phase-out of oil imports from the Russian Federation;

(a) a stepwise prohibition of imports and temporary storage of natural gas from the Russian Federation and of the provision of LNG terminal services;

(aa) a prohibition of oil imports, including petroleum product imports, from the Russian Federation;

(b) rules to effectively implement and monitor those prohibitions;

(c) provisions to better assess the security of energy supplies in the Union.

Article 2 Definitions

Definitions

For the purpose of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

(1) ‘natural gas’ means natural gas as defined in Article 2, point (1), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council and as referred to in Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes 2711 11 00 and 2711 21 00;

(2) ‘LNG’ means liquefied natural gas as referred to in CN code 2711 11 00;

(3) ‘natural gas in gaseous state’ means natural gas as referred to in CN code 2711 21 00;

(4) ‘long-term supply contract’ means a contract for the supply of natural gas, excluding a natural gas derivative, exceeding one year;

(4) ‘mixtures’ means mixtures of LNG volumes from different countries of origin;

(5) ‘short-term‘long-term supply contract’ means a contract for the supply of natural gas, excluding a natural gas derivative, not exceeding one year;

(6) ‘short-term supply contract’ means a contract for the supply of natural gas, excluding a natural gas derivative, not exceeding one year;

(7) ‘landlocked country’ means a country that is entirely surrounded by land and has no direct access to the sea;

(8) ‘import’ means the placing of goods under release for free circulation, as referred to in Article 201 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

(9) ‘importer’ means the natural or legal person that is the declarant in the relevant customs declaration as defined in Article 5, point (15), of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, or otherwise a natural or legal person, including affiliated undertakings, that brings the goods into the Union customs territory ▌ or otherwise placed on the Union market;

(10) ‘affiliated undertaking’ means an undertaking as defined in Article 2, point (12), of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council;

(11) ‘customs authority’ means a customs authority as defined in Article 5, point (1), of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013;

(12) ‘authorising authority’ means the authority which is competent to examine the authorisation requests made pursuant to Article 5(1) and (2);

(13) ‘competent authority’ means a competent authority as defined in Article 2, point (7), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

(14) ‘regulatory authority’ means a regulatory authority designated pursuant to Article 76(1) of Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

(15) ‘control’ means control as defined in Article 2, point (55), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

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(7) ‘importer’ means a natural or legal person who has the power to determine and has determined that natural gas from a third country is to be brought into the customs territory of or otherwise placed on the Union market;

(16) ‘interconnection point’ means an interconnection point as defined in Article 2, point (63), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

(8) ‘customs(17) authority’‘interconnector’ means a customsan authorityinterconnector as defined in Article 5,2, point (1),(39), of RegulationDirective (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council;2024/1788;

(9)(18) ‘competent‘entry authority’point’ means aan competententry authoritypoint as defined in Article 2, point (7),(61), of RegulationDirective (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council;2024/1788;

(10) ‘regulatory authority’ means a regulatory authority designated in accordance with Article 76(1) of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

(19) ‘delivery point’ means the physical or virtual location specified in a gas supply contract at which natural gas is to be delivered by a seller and received by a buyer;

(11) ‘control’ means control as defined in Article 2, point (55), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

(12) ‘long-term LNG terminal services’ means services provided by LNG system operators to customers, in particular offloading, storage, sending out, berthing (loading and unloading), regassification, backhaul liquefaction, truck loading, bunkering of LNG, and including ancillary services and temporary storage necessary for the re-gasification process and subsequent delivery to the transmission system under contracts with a duration of more than one year;

(13) ‘interconnection point’ means an interconnection point as defined in Article 2, point (63), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

(14) ‘entry point’ means an entry point as defined in Article 2, point (61), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

(15) ‘virtual trading point’ means virtual trading point as defined in Article 2, point (59), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

(16) ’contracted quantities’ means the quantities of natural gas that the buyer or the importer is obligated to purchase and the seller or the exporter is obligated to provide, as specified in the supply contract, excluding volumes arising from adjustments to the contract, such as make-up quantities, shortfall recoveries, or other volumetric modifications under the terms of the contract; for long-term supply contracts, it means the annual contracted quantities;

(17) ‘make-up quantities’ mean the volumes of natural gas which a purchaser or the importer is entitled or obligated to take delivery of and pay for in subsequent periods, in compliance with minimum take-or-pay requirements and in order to compensate for any shortfall in the quantities contracted but not taken in prior periods, as provided for in a long-term supply contract;

(18) ‘delivery schedule’ means the timetable or plan agreed between the parties to a gas supply contract, specifying the quantities of gas to be delivered by the seller or the exporter and received by the buyer or the importer over defined time intervals, including the timing, location, and conditions of delivery, as set forth in a supply contract or any related operational procedures;

(19) ‘nomination’ means a nomination as defined in Article 2, point (8), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

(20) ‘oil’ means crude oil, natural gas liquids, refinery feedstocks, additives and oxygenates and other hydrocarbons and oil products falling under CN codes 2709 and 2710.

(20a) ‘import’ means the placing of goods under release for free circulation, as referred to in Article 201 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

(20b) 'temporary storage' means temporary storage as defined in Article 5, point (17) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

(20c) ‘country of production’ means the country where the natural gas is extracted; in cases where the natural gas is extracted in one country, but liquified or re-gasified in another country, the country of production is considered to be the country of extraction;

(20d) ‘natural gas undertakings’ means natural gas undertakings as defined in Article 2 point 15 of Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

(20e) ‘pipeline operator’ means a natural or legal person responsible for planning, organising, supervising or conducting activities associated with the operation of the pipeline;

(20f) ‘significant influence’ means significant influence as defined in Article 1 point (5) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/676.

CHAPTER II

STEPWISE BAN OF NATURAL GAS IMPORTS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Article 3

Prohibition of natural gas imports from the Russian Federation

1. The import of natural gas in gaseous state via pipelines, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, and temporary storage of such gas shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2026 unless one of the exceptions in Article 4 applies.

2. The import and the temporary storage of LNG, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2026, unless one of the exceptions in Article 4 applies.

Article 4

Transition phase for existing supply contracts

1. Where the importer can demonstrate to customs authorities that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a short-term supply contract concluded before 17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, Article 3 shall apply as of 17 June 2026.

▌

3. Where the importer can demonstrate to customs authorities that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a long-term supply contract concluded before 17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, Article 3 shall apply as of 1 January 2027.

(20) ’contracted quantities’ means the quantities of natural gas that a buyer ▌ is obligated to purchase and a seller ▌ is obligated to provide, as specified in the original supply contract, but excluding volumes arising from contractual provisions providing for quantity changes to baseline quantities, such as round-up quantities, fractional quantities, upward quantities or other volumetric modifications under the terms of the contract except for paid make-up quantities paid before 17 June 2025;

4. The quantities of imports made in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not exceed the contracted quantities.

(21) ‘round-up quantities’ means volumes of natural gas added to the annual contracted quantity in a given year to provide for the last cargo to be rounded-up to a whole cargo;

Article 5

(22) ‘fractional quantities’ means volumes of natural gas carried forward to following contract years if the quantity delivered during a year is more or less than the adjusted annual contracted quantity after adjustments; these volumes can be both positive and negative;

Prohibition to provide LNG long-term terminal services to Russian customers

(23) ‘upward quantities’ means volumes of natural gas to be added optionally to the annual contracted quantity based on supply contracts at the discretion of a contract party;

The provision of long-term LNG terminal services in the Union to entities established in the Russian Federation or to entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly via various frameworks, such as intermediate structures or subsidiaries, by natural persons or legal entities established in the Russian Federation or under significant influence of the Russian Federation shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2026.

(24) ‘paid make-up quantities’ mean the volumes of natural gas which a buyer is entitled or obligated to take delivery of and pay for in subsequent periods, in compliance with minimum take-or-pay requirements and in order to compensate for any shortfall in the quantities contracted but not taken in prior periods, as provided for in a long-term supply contract;

Article 6

(25) ‘delivery schedule’ means the timetable or plan agreed between the parties to a gas supply contract, specifying the quantities of gas to be delivered by a seller ▌ and received by a buyer ▌ over defined time intervals, including the timing, location, and conditions of delivery, as set out in a supply contract or any related operational procedures;

Transition phase for LNG terminal services under existing contracts

(26) ‘nomination’ means a nomination as defined in Article 2, point (8), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

Where the provider of long-term LNG terminal services referred to in Article 5 can demonstrate to customs authorities that those services are provided under a contract concluded before 17 June 2025 and not amended thereafter, Article 5 shall apply as of 1 January 2027.

(27) ‘oil’ means crude oil, natural gas condensates, refinery feedstocks, additives and oxygenates, and other hydrocarbons and oil products falling under CN codes 2709 and 2710.

CHAPTER IIa

(28) ‘country of production’ means the country where the natural gas is extracted, regardless of whether that natural gas has been subsequently liquified or re-gasified in another country. Where natural gas extracted in other countries than the Russian Federation is liquified or re-gasified in the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation shall be considered to be the country of production;

BANCHAPTER II STEPWISE PROHIBITION OF OILNATURAL GAS IMPORTS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Article 6a

Article 3 Prohibition of natural gas imports from the Russian Federation

Prohibition of oil imports, including petroleum product imports, from the Russian Federation

1. The import of natural gas in gaseous state via pipelines, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, shall be prohibited ▌ unless one of the exemptions provided for in Article 4 applies.

2. The import and temporary storage of oil, including petroleum products,LNG, which originateoriginates in or areis exportedexported, directly or indirectlyindirectly, from the Russian Federation as well asFederation, ofor petroleumwhich productsis obtained in afrom thirdnatural countrygas fromin crudegaseous oilstate originatingextracted in the Russian Federation, shall be prohibited as▌ , unless one of 1the Januaryexemptions 2026.provided for in Article 4 applies. This prohibition shall also apply to LNG which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation contained in mixtures.

Article 6b

Article 4 Transition phase for existing supply contracts

Submission and verification of relevant information

1. The prohibition pursuant to Article 3 paragraph 1 shall apply as of 17 June 2026, and the prohibition pursuant Article 3 paragraph 2 shall apply as of 25 April 2026, where it can be demonstrated to the authorising authorities that the respective imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a short-term supply contract, concluded before 17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, unless the amendment is covered by paragraph 4.

(1) Importers of the products referred to in Article 6a shall provide customs authorities with relevant information and evidence necessary to implement that Article.

▌

(2) The information and evidence referred to in paragraph 1 shall allow the customs authorities to establish:

2. Article 3 paragraph 2 shall apply as of 1 January 2027, where it can be demonstrated to the authorising authorities that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a long-term supply contract concluded before 17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, unless the amendment is covered by paragraph 4.

(a) in the case of crude oil: the country of origin of that oil;

3. The prohibition pursuant to Article 3 paragraph 1 shall apply as of 30 September 2027, where it can be demonstrated to the authorising authorities that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a long-term supply contract concluded before 17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, unless the amendment is covered by paragraph 4.

(b) in the case of petroleum products: the country of origin of the product or, where the product is imported from a third country, the country of origin of the crude oil on the basis of which the product was obtained.

Where the Commission identifies a risk that the filling target for 2027 for underground storage of a Member State pursuant to Art 6a of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 might not be reached, taking into account the circumstances for the risk of missing the target, it shall confirm this risk by way of an implementing decision no later than 15 September 2027.

By means of an implementing act, the Commission shall, by no later than 5 days after entry into force of this Regulation, determine the minimum standards for such evidence, including the type, format and authentication requirements, in order to ensure uniform application across Member States.

In case an implementing decision is taken pursuant to subparagraph 2, the prohibition for existing contracts pursuant to Article 3 paragraph 1 shall apply only as of 1 November 2027 in that Member State. The Commission shall inform, without any delay, the Gas Coordination Group, the European Parliament and the Council.

In case where customs authorities consider that the evidence provided in relation to a good as referred to in Article 6a is not conclusive, they shall refuse the release for free circulation or the temporary storage of that good.

4. The exemptions provided for in paragraphs 1, 3 and 5 shall also apply with regard to existing supply contracts with the following amendments:

(3) Operators of oil pipelines transporting crude oil into the territory of the Union shall analyse and verify the geographic origin of all oil volumes entering the Union at border entry points.

(a) lowering contracted quantities;

Pipeline operators shall submit, on a quarterly basis, the following to the competent national authority of the Member State where the entry point is located:

(b) lowering prices and fees;

(a) a summary report of origin certifications for all imported oil volumes;

(c) amending confidentiality clauses;

(b) copies of all corresponding countries of origin;

(d) amending operational procedures, such as communication procedures;

(c) notification of any discrepancies or suspected falsifications.

(e) changes of addresses of contract parties;

Competent authorities of the Member States shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections and audits of pipeline entry points, to request full documentation relating to the origin of imported oil and to require enforcement measures in cases of non-compliance.

(f) transfers of contractual obligations between affiliated undertakings;

Pipeline operators shall retain all records and origin certifications for a minimum of five years and make them available for inspection upon request.

(g) changes required by judicial or arbitration procedures; or

CHAPTER III

(h) for landlocked countries, changes between national delivery points.

SUBMISSION AND EXCHANGE OF RELEVANT INFORMATION

5. The prohibition pursuant to Article 3 shall apply as of 30 September 2027 or, where the Commission has adopted an implementing decision in accordance with subparagraph 2 of paragraph 3, as of 1 November 2027, where it can be demonstrated to the authorising authorities:

Article 7

(a) that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a short-term supply contract with delivery to ▌ a landlocked country which is necessary to fulfil the long-term supply contract under point (b), and,

Submission of relevant information ▌

(b) that a long-term supply contract, with delivery to a landlocked country for the import of natural gas in gaseous state via pipelines exists:

1. Importers of natural gas, and/or natural gas undertakings where appropriate, shall provide customs authorities with all relevant information necessary to implement Articles 3 and 4, in particular appropriate evidence, such as evidence of independent verification of the country of production, which may include upstream delivery documentation and satellite tracking of LNG tankers to verify whether the natural gas originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

(i) which was concluded before 17 June 2025 and not amended thereafter, unless the amendment is covered by paragraph 4,

For the purposes of application of Article 4, importers of natural gas shall provide customs authorities and other authorities involved in the monitoring pursuant to Article 9 and 10, with appropriate evidence to assess whether the conditions set out in ▌Article 4 are met.

(ii) and which concerns gas supplies which originate in or are exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, and

2. Where natural gas, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, is imported or temporarily stored pursuant to Article 4, that import or temporary storage shall be subject to prior authorisation from customs authorities. Importers shall provide to the customs authorities, no later than one month before the planned date of import or temporary storage, at least the following information:

(iii) for which the delivery at the original delivery point at an EU border with a third country can no longer be executed.

6. Authorising authorities or customs authorities, where they are not identical, shall provide relevant information to the Commission allowing it to monitor if the specific conditions described in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 continue to be fulfilled. In doing so, the Commission shall in particular monitor whether this provision is not used for circumvention.

▌

7. The quantities of imports made in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall not exceed the contracted quantities.

▌

CHAPTER III AUTHORISATION, SUBMISSION AND EXCHANGE OF RELEVANT INFORMATION

Article 5 Authorisation and submission of relevant information ▌

▌

1. Where an exemption is requested for imports of natural gas which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation pursuant to Article 4, imports shall be subject to prior authorisation. Authorising authorities shall be provided with all information necessary to assess whether the conditions set out in ▌ Article 4 are met.

2. That information ▌ shall include at least ▌ the following:

(a) the date of the conclusion of the gas supply contract;

(b) the duration of the gas supply contract;

(c) the contracted gas▌ quantities, including all upward or downward flexibility rights;

(d) the identity of the parties to the gas supply contract, including, for parties registered in the EU, the Economic Operator Registration and Identification (EORI) number;

(e) the producer of the gas and the country of production, and, as appropriate, the country where the gas was further processed;

▌

(f) for LNG imports, the place of liquefaction and the port of first loading, as well as all the evidence needed to prevent flag of convenience and shadow fleets;

(e) in the case of LNG mixtures, documentation proving the respective quantities of Russian and non-Russian gas in the mixture and establishing the mixing process;

(g) the delivery points, including possible flexibilities concerning the delivery point.

(f) for LNG imports, the place of liquefaction and the port of first loading;

(h) any modification of the gas supply contract, indicating content and date of the modification, with the exception of modifications which relate solely to the gas price;

(g) the delivery points, including possible flexibilities concerning the delivery point; and

2a. Imports of natural gas produced in countries other than the Russian Federation shall be subject to prior authorisation, except in the cases set out in paragraph 2b. Importers shall provide the customs authorities and other authorities in the Member State where the gas is to be imported or temporarily stored, no later than one month before the planned date of import or temporary storage, with unambiguous evidence to establish the country of production of the natural gas.

(h) any amendment of the gas supply contract, indicating the content and the date of the amendment, with the exception of amendments which relate solely to the gas price.

In order to ensure uniform application of paragraph 1 across Member States, the Commission shall, by ... [5 days after entry into force of this Regulation], adopt implementing acts determining the minimum standards for evidence referred to in that paragraph, including the type, format and authentication requirements. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 15a(2).

Where an exemption under Article 4 is requested and the price of the gas was amended on 17 June 2025 or later, information on the price amendment shall be provided.

On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency relating to significant risks for trade and security stemming from possible circumvention of this Regulation, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 15a(3).

The required information shall be submitted to the authorising authority no later than one month before the entry into the customs territory. The same deadline shall apply to mixtures containing gas which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation.

Member States shall cooperate with one another and with the Commission in the assessment of applications for prior authorisation. Where there are indications of falsification, fraud or circumvention, OLAF, in line with its mandate, shall provide support to the customs and other competent authorities.

3. Imports of natural gas where the country of production is not the Russian Federation shall be subject to prior authorisation, except in case those imports fall under paragraph 5. The authorising authorities in the Member State where the gas is to be released for free circulation shall be provided with evidence establishing the country of production of that natural gas, no later than 5 working days before its entry into the customs territory.

Information on authorisations granted, refused or revoked shall be transmitted without delay to the Commission and shared within the Gas Coordination Group, in order to enhance transparency and assist Member States in preventing circumvention, minimising risk and combating fraud.

4. No prior authorisation shall be required where gas is imported from a country which produces gas and has exported more than 5 bcm of natural gas to the Union in 2024 and has either prohibited the import of Russian gas or is applying other restrictive measures concerning Russian gas, or has no gas infrastructure in place which allows to import LNG or pipeline gas. No later than 5 working days after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall, by means of an implementing decision, draw up the list of such countries. The Commission shall monitor whether the criteria for an exemption from prior authorisation remain fulfilled and shall update the list accordingly and without undue delay on the basis of the information provided by authorising authorities, or customs authorities, when they are not the same, and by Union bodies pursuant to Article 7(2). The Commission may, by means of an implementing decision, revoke the exemption from prior authorisation if authorising authorities, or customs authorities, when they are not the same, identify one or more cases of circumvention of the prohibitions set out in Article 3 by exporters from an exempted country or if the Commission has reasons to assume that authorities from exporting countries do not intervene appropriately against practices of circumvention. The report pursuant to Article 13 shall include an assessment of the effectiveness of the prior authorisation process pursuant to Article 5(2).

On its own initiative, or following a notification from a Member State, the Commission may request additional information from the customs authorities for the purpose of ensuring a uniform application of the criteria used for the authorisation procedure.

5. Authorising authorities, customs authorities, where they are not identical or other authorities involved in the monitoring referred to in Article 6 and 7 ▌ may request more detailed information, if that information is deemed necessary to assess whether the conditions set out in Articles 3 and 4 are fulfilled. They may also rely on information from other sources. Authorising authorities may, in particular, require submitting the text of certain provisions of the gas supply contract in full or the entire text of the gas supply contract, except price information, in particular where certain contractual provisions are interrelated, or where the full knowledge of the formulation of the contractual provisions is crucial for that assessment. Where the information provided is not conclusive, the customs authorities shall refuse the release for free circulation of the goods. The Commission, shall, in close cooperation with authorising authorities, or custom authorities, where they are not identical, publish guidance on further details concerning the prior authorisation process and adequate types of documents and evidence to be submitted.

2b. No prior authorisation shall be required where the gas is imported from a gas-producing country which prohibits the import of natural gas produced in the Russian Federation.

6. Authorising authorities or, where relevant, customs authorities shall, where appropriate, verify the evidence submitted to establish the country of production by providing further information, which may include but not be limited to upstream delivery documentation, such as publicly available satellite tracking of LNG cargoes or tracking information from the European Maritime Safety Agency.

In order to facilitate the application of paragraph 1 across Member States, the Commission shall, by ... [5 days after entry into force of this Regulation], adopt implementing acts setting out the list of countries which prohibit the import of natural gas produced in the Russian Federation. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 15a(2). The Commission shall review that list every three months and, where appropriate, amend it.

7. Natural gas ▌ to be imported into the Union through borders or interconnectors or interconnection points between the Union and the Russian Federation or Belarus, or via pipelines which connect the Russian Federation with the Union and are running through third countries without having entry points between the Russian Federation and the Union shall be presumed to be exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation ▌ .

On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency relating to significant risks for trade and security stemming from possible circumvention of this Regulation, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 15a(3).

▌

3. Customs authorities or other authorities involved in the monitoring pursuant to Article 9 and 10, may request more detailed information, except price information, if the required information is necessary to assess whether the conditions set out in Article 3 and 4 are fulfilled. Customs authorities may, in particular, require importers to submit the text of certain provisions of the gas supply contract in full or the text of entire gas supply contract, except price information, especially where certain contractual provisions are interrelated, or where the full knowledge of the formulation of the contractual provisions is crucial for the assessment. In cases where the customs authorities consider that the evidence provided is not conclusive, they shall refuse the release for free circulation or the temporary storage of the goods.

8. Natural gas to be imported into the Union via Strandzha 1 shall be presumed to be exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, unless unambiguous evidence can be provided to the authorising authorities, no later than 7 working days before the entry into the customs territory, establishing that the country of production of the natural gas is not the Russian Federation.

4. Natural gas entering ▌the Union through the following interconnection points shall be presumed to be exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation▌.

9. In case changes relating to gas infrastructure or trading patterns lead to a situation where other interconnector points link the Union to systems transporting significant volumes of Russian gas, the Commission shall identify those interconnector points by means of Commission implementing decision. In that case the time to submit unambiguous evidence for the country of production shall be 7 working days.

(a) Imatra (FI/RU);

10. Where natural gas is transported through the EU from third country to third country under a transit procedure under the Union Customs Code, including for the purpose of storage under customs warehousing rules, the authorising and customs authorities, where they are not identical, shall be informed no later than 5 working days before the planned transit about:

(b) Narva (EE/RU);

(a) the country of production of the natural gas to be transiting, unless such information is not available;

(c) Värska (EE/RU);

(b) the planned or actual nomination schedules specifying volume, timing, and entry and exit points of the gas in transit, with daily granularity where applicable;

(d) Luhamaa (EE/RU);

(c) volumes and delivery points in the gas supply contracts; and

(e) Šakiai (LT/RU);

(d) the contract between the seller or buyer or any intermediary entity and the relevant Transmission System Operators in the Union, where applicable.

(f) Kotlovka (LT/BY);

Authorising authorities shall verify the consistency of the data and share the information received with customs authorities, where they are not the same, without delay.

(g) Kondratki (PL/BY);

11. In case operators store Russian gas under a transit, temporary storage or customs warehousing procedure under the Union Customs Code on Union territory, Member States shall have appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure that the use of domestic storage by third countries does not pose any risk to national or regional security of supply and the fulfilment of the storage obligations provided for in Articles 6a to 6d of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, and provide relevant information to the Commission. The Commission shall include information on possible security of supply issues related to Russian gas in Union storages in its annual report pursuant to Article 11(3).

(h) Wysokoje (PL/BY);

▌

(i) Tieterowka (PL/BY);

Article 6 Effective monitoring and reporting

(j) Kobryń (PL/BY);

Customs authorities, and, where relevant, competent authorities and regulatory authorities, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) and the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), shall ensure effective monitoring of the provisions in Chapter II, and when necessary, make full use of their enforcement powers, and cooperate closely with other relevant national authorities, authorities from other Member States, Union authorities and the Commission. Authorising authorities and, where relevant, customs authorities shall, where appropriate, verify the evidence submitted to establish the country of production by requiring further information, which may include but not be limited to upstream delivery documentation, such as publicly available satellite tracking of LNG cargoes or tracking information from the European Maritime Safety Agency.

(k) Greifswald (DE/RU);

In exercising their powers, authorising authorities and customs authorities shall put a particular focus of their enforcement at interconnection points, LNG facilities or transit pipelines where the risk of circumvention is high, for instance in case imports arrive from third countries who also trade Russian gas or who export gas from production facilities which are partly owned by companies from the Russian Federation. Using the cooperation mechanism between authorities pursuant to Article 7 of this Regulation, authorities shall adapt their enforcement priorities where necessary to address potential circumvention practices identified during the implementation of this Regulation. The Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, shall monitor the total volumes of natural gas imported through third countries in order to assess potential risks of circumvention of Articles 3 and 4.

(ka) Strandzha 1 (BG) - Malkoclar (TR)

Article 7 Cooperation and exchange of information

(l) Strandzha 2 (BG)/Malkoclar (TR) – TurkStream

1. The authorising authority is the customs authority, unless the Member State designates another authority for that purpose. Member States shall inform the Commission in case they designate another authority than the customs authority as authorising authority.

(m) Kiskundorozsma-2 (HU) / Horgos (RS)

2. Authorising authorities shall cooperate and exchange the information received on imports of natural gas ▌ with regulatory authorities, competent authorities, and where applicable, customs authorities, as well as OLAF, EPPO, ACER and the Commission in line with their tasks, responsibilities and competences, and to the extent possible, to ensure effective assessment of whether the conditions set out in Articles 3 and 4 of this Regulation are fulfilled. They shall notably share information concerning potential circumvention practices identified during the implementation of this Regulation.

(n) Kiskundorozsma (HU/RS)

3. Authorising authorities or, where applicable, customs authorities, shall update regulatory authorities, competent authorities, ACER and the Commission, on a monthly basis, on the key elements concerning the development of imports of natural gas which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, such as quantities imported under long-term or short-term supply contracts, entry points, or contract partners. These updates shall also cover key developments concerning Russian gas entering the Union under a transit procedure as referred to in Article 5(10).

(o) Kireevo (BG) / Zaychar (RS)

4 Authorising authorities and, where applicable, customs authorities, from different Member States, shall exchange, to the extent necessary, information received on natural gas imports and cooperate with one another in order to ensure efficient enforcement and avoid circumvention. They shall make use of existing tools and databases allowing for the effective exchange of relevant information between national authorities in their Member State and authorities in other Member States, or put such tools in place where necessary. The report pursuant to Article 13 shall include an evaluation of the effectiveness of the exchange of information and cooperation among the relevant authorities pursuant paragraph 2 and 4 and Article 6, and, where appropriate, shall set out recommendations for their improvement.

(p) Kalotina (BG)/ Dimitrovgrad (RS)

5. By 1 July 2026 and 1 July 2027, ACER shall, based on the data received under this Regulation and on own information, publish a report providing an overview of contracts for the supply of natural gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, and assessing the impact of diversification on energy markets. Where relevant, the report shall also cover data on Russian gas entering the Union under a transit procedure as referred to in Article 5(10).

4a. The Commission shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 15b to amend the list of interconnection points set out in paragraph 4, where there is evidence that such revision and updating are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the implementation of Articles 3 and 4.

6. The Commission and ACER shall, where appropriate, share relevant information ▌ in their possession on contracts for the import of natural gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation with authorising authorities and, where applicable, customs authorities ▌ to facilitate the enforcement of this Regulation.

Article 8

7. Where relevant for the fulfilment of the obligation under the first subparagraph of this paragraph, Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Submission of relevant information by providers of LNG terminal services

Article 8 Penalties

Providers of LNG terminal services to customers established in the Russian Federation or owned or controlled directly or indirectly via various frameworks, such as intermediate structures or subsidiaries, by natural persons or legal entities established in the Russian Federation or under significant influence of the Russian Federation, shall provide customs authorities with relevant information for the implementation of Articles 5 and 6.

1. Member States shall provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for failure to comply with Articles 3, 4 or 5 of this Regulation.

Article 9

2. The maximum penalty for legal persons shall be at least:

Effective monitoring

- 3,5% of the undertaking’s total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year, or

1. Customs authorities, and, where relevant, competent authorities and regulatory authorities, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) and the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), shall ensure effective monitoring of the provisions in Chapter II and [IIa], and when necessary, make full use of their enforcement powers, and cooperate closely with other relevant national authorities, authorities from other Member States, international authorities and the Commission.

- 40 million EUR, or

The monitoring of Chapters II and IIa referred to in the first subparagraph shall include monitoring of any maritime transport practices in the territorial waters of Member States that may obscure the true origin of LNG or oil shipments and of the so called shadow fleets, including by requesting any relevant documentation, which could be employed to supply LNG or oil of Russian origin to the Union.

- 300% of the estimated transaction turnover, which shall be calculated on the basis of the volume of the natural gas involved and the “day-ahead” contract prices on the TTF market.

Member States shall ensure that the customs authorities and other relevant authorities have adequate powers, functional independence and the capabilities to fulfil the obligations set out in this Regulation.

With regard to natural persons, the maximum penalty shall not be lower than 2,5 million EUR.

Where the Commission has doubts as to the effectiveness of monitoring at the national level, it shall request the necessary information from the customs authorities.

3. Where the legal system of the Member State does not provide power for competent authorities to independently impose administrative fines, this Article may be applied in such a manner that the fining procedure is initiated by the competent authority and imposed by competent national courts, while ensuring that those legal remedies are effective and have an effect equivalent to the administrative fines imposed by supervisory authorities. In any event, the fines imposed shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

2. The Commission shall continuously monitor the development of the Union’s energy security of supply risks in relation to energy imports from the Russian Federation.

4. Member States shall notify the Commission no later than 2 years from the entry into force of this Regulation of the national provisions in force, as envisaged in this Article, and shall also notify the Commission without delay of any subsequent amendment affecting those provisions.

3. The Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, shall monitor the total volumes of natural gas imported through third countries, especially those suspected of enabling circumvention, regardless of the declared origin of the imported natural gas, in order to assess potential risks of circumvention of Articles 3 and 5.

CHAPTER IV NATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION PLANS

In addition, the Commission shall provide, within the framework of its annual State of the Energy Union report to the European Parliament and the Council, a dedicated annex on natural gas flows from the third countries, including an assessment of identified risks of circumvention, as well as the implementation and effectiveness of framework for verifying the origin of oil, including petroleum products.

Article 9 National diversification plans for natural gas

4. The Commission shall carry out a risk-based analysis of LNG terminals, in order to identify those for which there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there is a risk that the natural gas being imported is wholly or partially of Russian origin. Based on that analysis, the Commission shall, by three months after the entry into force of this Regulation, establish a list of such LNG terminals. That list shall be reviewed at least three months and, where necessary, updated. Where appropriate, the Commission shall propose measures, including legislative proposals, to mitigate those risks.

1. Each Member State shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversifying their gas supplies, in order to discontinue all imports of natural gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, within the deadline for the full prohibition of ▌ imports from the Russian Federation pursuant to Articles 3 and 4.

5. By 1 March 2026, the Commission shall analyse imports into the Union of petrochemical products falling under CN Code 39 obtained in third countries from crude oil originating in Russia and assess their impact on the Union market. Where that analysis confirms market disruptions, the Commission shall take appropriate measures, which may include a legislative proposal.

2. The national diversification plan for natural gas shall include all of the following:

Article 10

(a) available information on the volume of imports of natural gas which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation under existing supply contracts;

Transparency and exchange of information

(b) a clear description of supporting measures in place and supporting measures planned at national level to replace natural gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, including the quantities expected to be phased out, milestones and a timeline for implementation and, where available, envisaged options for alternative supplies and supply routes. Such measures may ▌ include the use of the Aggregate EU Platform pursuant to Article 42 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789, support measures for diversification efforts of energy companies, cooperation in regional groups such as the CESEC High-Level Group, the identification of alternatives to natural gas imports via electrification, energy sufficiency, energy efficiency measures, boosting the production of biogas, biomethane and clean hydrogen, renewable energy deployment, voluntary demand reduction measures or possibilities of other Member States to facilitate diversification of supply;

Customs authorities shall exchange the information received from natural gas importers with regulatory authorities, competent authorities, OLAF, EPPO, ACER and the Commission to the extent necessary to ensure effective assessment whether the conditions set out in Articles 3 to 6 of this Regulation are fulfilled. Customs authorities from different Member States shall exchange information received from natural gas importers to the extent necessary, and cooperate with each other in order to ensure effective enforcement in accordance with the requirements of this Regulation and to avoid circumvention. They shall make use of existing tools and databases allowing that relevant information can be effectively exchanged between national authorities in their Member State and authorities in other Member States, or put such tools in place where necessary.

(c) the identification of any potential technical, contractual or regulatory barriers to replacing natural gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, and options to overcome those barriers.

By 31 March 2026 and 31 March 2027, ACER shall, based on the data received under this Regulation and own information, publish a report providing an overview of contracts on the supply of gas originating in or directly or indirectly exported from Russia, and assessing the impact of diversification on energy markets.

3. By 1 March 2026, Member States shall submit to the Commission their national diversification plans using the template set out in Annex I.

The Commission and ACER shall share relevant information on contracts on the import of Russian gas in their possession with customs authorities where appropriate to facilitate the enforcement of this Regulation.

4. The Commission shall, where appropriate, facilitate the preparation and implementation of the national diversification plans for natural gas, including by providing best practices and technical assistance. During the transition phase for existing supply contracts pursuant to Article 4, the Commission shall coordinate with Member States in their diversification efforts to identify alternative supply sources. New supplies could also compensate for lost revenues by using existing infrastructure previously utilised to transit Russian gas. Member States shall report regularly to the Gas Coordination Group established by Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 on the progress achieved with the preparation, adoption and implementation of those plans. On the basis of the national diversification plans, the Commission shall assess the implementation of the phase-out of gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation and report it to the Gas Coordination Group, as per Article 11 of this Regulation.

Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the exchange of information referred to in the first subparagraph.

Article 10 National diversification plans for oil (crude oil and petroleum products)

The Commission shall, on the basis of information received from customs authorities of the Member States pursuant to Articles 7 and 10, publish on a quarterly basis non-confidential and aggregated information, including the entry point, volume, and stated origin of all gas imported into the Union. The Commission shall ensure the information is made publicly accessible in a clear and timely manner.

1. A Member State that receives imports of oil originating in or exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, ▌ shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversifying their oil supplies, in order to discontinue, by the end of 2027, imports of oil, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation.

Article 10a

2. A national diversification plan for oil shall include all of the following:

Penalties

(a) available information on the volume of direct or indirect imports of oil imports from the Russian Federation under existing supply contracts;

1. Notwithstanding provisions in Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, the Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of Chapter II, Articles 7 and 8 and Chapter IIIa and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented.

(b) measures planned at national level to replace oil, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, including the quantities expected to be phased out, milestones and a timeline for implementation, and options for alternative supplies, supply routes and energy sources, as well as possibilities of other Member States to facilitate diversification of supply;

The penalties provided for shall be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, and shall include administrative fines. In determining the penalties, Member States shall take into account the nature, gravity, and duration of the infringement, the degree of cooperation with the competent authorities, any financial benefits gained or losses avoided by the company as a result of the infringement, any previous infringements by the company, and any mitigating or aggravating circumstances applicable to the case.

(c) measures in place and planned at national level to ensure transparency and traceability of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, to the extent possible, including measures on verification of possible re-labelled imports;

The minimum administrative fines shall be 5% of the undertaking’s total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year.

(d) possible prohibitions at national level of imports of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

2. Member States shall, by one month after the enter into force of this Regulation, notify the Commission of those rules, and shall notify it, without delay, of any subsequent amendment affecting them.

(e) potential technical, contractual or regulatory barriers to replacing oil, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, and options to overcome those barriers.

CHAPTER IV

3. By 1 March 2026, Member States shall notify the Commission of their national diversification plans ▌ using the template set out in Annex II. The Commission publishes a non-confidential version of the plans received from Member States no later than one month after the submission of the plans.

NATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION PLANS

4. The Commission shall, where appropriate, facilitate the preparation and implementation of the national diversification plans for oil, including by providing best practices and technical assistance. The Commission shall assist in the cooperation between Member States when they implement the national diversification plans. The Commission shall assess the impact of a possible accelerated termination of oil imports on the Member States most affected by a full phase out of Russian oil supplies. It shall work actively with the directly affected and other relevant Member States on solutions to minimise possible risks identified in the assessment. Member States shall report regularly to the Oil Coordination Group established by Article 17 of Council Directive 2009/119/EC on the progress achieved on the preparation, adoption and implementation of those national diversification plans.

Article 11

5. Where the national diversification plan for oil identifies a risk that the ▌ phasing out of oil, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation, by the end of 2027 might not be achieved, the Commission shall, after assessing the national diversification plan and within 3 months of the submission of the national diversification plan, issue a recommendation ▌ to the ▌ Member State concerned on how to achieve the phase-out in a timely manner. The Commission shall publish the recommendations no later than three months after the submission of the diversification plan. Following that recommendation, the Member State shall update its diversification plan within three months, taking into consideration the Commission’s recommendation.

National diversification plans for natural gas

CHAPTER V MONITORING ▌ SECURITY OF GAS SUPPLY

1. Member States shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their gas supplies, to discontinue all imports and temporary storage, where applicable, of natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation within the deadline for the full prohibition of Russian imports on 1 January 2027.

Article 11 Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

2. The national diversification plan for natural gas shall include all the following:

(a) available information on the volume of imports of natural gas, as well as a breakdown of the volumes of natural gas consumed on the national territory of the Member State, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation under existing supply contracts, as well as on LNG terminal services contracted by natural or legal persons established in the Russian Federation, where applicable;

(b) ▌ measures in place and planned at national level to replace natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, including the quantities expected to be phased out, milestones and timeline of implementation and, insofar as available, envisaged options for alternative supplies and supply routes. Such measures may notably include the use of the Aggregate EU Platform pursuant to Article 43 of Directive (EU) 2024/718, support measures for diversification efforts of energy companies, cooperation in regional groups such as the CESEC High-Level Group, identifying alternatives to natural gas imports via electrification, energy sufficiency, energy efficiency measures, boosting the production of biogas, biomethane and clean hydrogen, renewable energy deployment or voluntary demand reduction measures;

(ba) measures in place and planned at national level to ensure full transparency, traceability of natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, including measures on verification of possible re-labelled imports;

(bb) measures in place to ensure that natural gas traded on spot markets is traceable to its country of production;

(c) identification of any potential technical, contractual or regulatory barriers to replace natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, and options to overcome those barriers.

3. By 1 March 2026, Member States shall submit to the Commission ▌ their national diversification plans using the template set out in Annex I.

3a. For the purpose of paragraph 2 point (a), importers shall report to the competent authorities of the Member States the origin and quantities of imported natural gas. The relevant competent authorities shall verify the accuracy of the submitted information, and importers shall fully cooperate with the authorities during this verification process. In justified cases, the Commission may carry out additional verifications to ensure the quality and consistency of the data.

4. The Commission shall facilitate the preparation and implementation of the national diversification plans for natural gas where appropriate, including by providing best practices and technical assistance. Member States shall report regularly to the Gas Coordination Group established by Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 on the progress achieved with the preparation, adoption and implementation of those plans. On the basis of the national diversification plans, the Commission shall assess the implementation of the phase out of Russian gas and report it to the Gas Coordination Group, as per Article 13 of this Regulation.

Article 12

National diversification plans for oil, including petroleum products

1. In order to ensure the implementation of the prohibition on imports of oil, including petroleum products, referred to in Article 6a, without disruption, Member States ▌shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their oil supplies, ▌by 1 January 2026.

2. The national diversification plan for oil, including petroleum products, shall include all the following:

(a) available information on the volume of direct or indirect imports of oil, including petroleum products, imports from Russia under existing supply contracts;

(b) measures planned at national level to replace oil, including petroleum products, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, including the quantities expected to be phased out, milestones and timeline of implementation, and options for alternative supplies, ▌ supply routes and energy sources;

(ba) measures in place and planned at national level to ensure full transparency, traceability of oil, including petroleum products, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, including measures on verification of possible re-labelled imports;

(bb) measures in place and planned at national level for implementation of framework for verifying the country of origin of oil, including petroleum products;

(bc) where introduced by the Member State concerned, measures taken in order to prevent the Russia’ shadow fleets from entering its territorial waters or using its ports;

(c) potential technical or regulatory barriers to replace oil, including petroleum products, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, and options to overcome those barriers.

3. By 1 March 2026, Member States shall notify the Commission of their national diversification plans in accordance with / using the template set out in Annex II.

4. The Commission shall facilitate the preparation and implementation of the national diversification plans for oil, including by providing best practices and technical assistance where appropriate. Member States shall report regularly to the Oil Coordination Group established by Article 17 of Council Directive 2009/119/EC on the progress achieved with the preparation, adoption and implementation of those national diversification plans.

5. Where the national diversification plan for oil identifies a risk that the objective of implementing the prohibition of Russian oil by 1 January 2026 may not be achieved, the Commission may issue a decision, after assessing the plan, to the respective Member State on how to achieve the implementation in a timely manner. Following that decision, the Member State shall update its diversification plan within three months, taking into consideration the Commission’s decision.

CHAPTER V

MONITORING OF SECURITY OF GAS SUPPLY

Article 13

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is amended as follows:

(1) in Article 2, the following points (32)(33) and (33)(34) are added:

‘(33) ‘take-or-pay provision’ means a contractual provision which obliges the buyer to either take delivery of, or alternatively pay for a specified minimum quantity of gas within a given period, regardless of whether the gas is actually received;

(34) deliver-or-pay‘deliver-or-pay provisions’ means a contractual provision which obliges the seller to pay a contractual fine in the case of non-delivery of gas.’;gas.;’

(2) Article 14(6) is amended as follows:

(a) in the first subparagraph, the following point (c) is added:

‘(c) to the Commission and to the concerned▌ competent authorityauthorities concerned the following information relating to supply contracts for natural gasgas, which originates in or is exportedexported, directly or indirectlyindirectly, from the Russian Federation:

(i) the information referred to in Article 7(2)7(1) of Regulation (EU) XX/2025 - this Regulation;…/…*+;

(ii) information on the quantities to be supplied and taken, including possible flexibilities under take-or-payundertake-or-pay provisions or deliver-or-pay provisions;

(iii) delivery schedules (LNG) or nominations (pipeline gas);

(v) conditions for the suspension or termination of gas deliveries, including force majeure provisions;

(vi) information on which law is governinggoverns the contract and which arbitration mechanism is chosen;

(vii) key elements of other commercial agreements that are relevant for the execution of the gas supply contract, excluding price information.’;information.;

(b) the following third and fourth subparagraphs are added:

___________________

‘The information referred to in point (c) shall be provided for each contract in a disaggregated format, including the full relevant text parts, excluding price information, notably where the full knowledge of the formulation of the contractual provisions is crucial for the security of supply assessment or where certain contractual provisions are interrelated.

* Regulation (EU) …/… of the European Parliament and of the Council of … on phasing out Russian natural gas imports and preparing the phase out of oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 (OJ …, ELI: …).’

Providers of LNG terminal services shall provide the Commission with information concerning services booked by customers from the Russian Federation,’ customers controlled by undertakings from the Russian Federation, including contracted services, affected quantities and contract duration.’;

(b) the following subparagraph is added:

‘The information referred to in point (c) shall be provided no later than 4 weeks after the entry into force of Regulation (EU) …./…. + and for each contract in a disaggregated format, including the ▌ relevant text parts in full, excluding price information, in particular where the full knowledge of the formulation of the contractual provisions is crucial for the assessment of the security of gas supply ▌ or where certain contractual provisions are interrelated.

Providers of LNG terminal services shall provide the Commission with information concerning services booked by customers from the Russian Federation,’ customers controlled by undertakings from the Russian Federation, including contracted services, affected quantities and contract duration.;’

(3) in Article 17, the second paragraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Commission shall carry a continuous monitoringcontinuously ofmonitor anthe exposure of the Union’s energy system to Russian gas▌ supplies, also via third countriescountries, notablyof gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation in particular on the basis of information notified to the Commission and the competent authorities pursuantin toaccordance with Article 14(6), point (c).

The Commission shall assess the implementation of the phase outphase-out of Russiangas, gaswhich pursuantoriginates toin or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation under Regulation (EU) XX/2025…/…* at national, regional and Union level on the basis of the national diversification plans pursuantreferred to in Article 119 of that Regulation. This assessment shall be reported to the Gas Coordination Group.

On the basis of the conclusions▌ of the assessment referred to in the third paragraph, the Commission shall publish an annual report, which shall provide a comprehensive overview of the progress achieved by Member States in implementing their national diversification plans.

Where relevant, the report referred▌ toCommission inmay theissue, fourthwithin paragraphthree maymonths beof accompaniednotification byof a Commissiondiversification decisionplan, a recommendation which identifies possible actions and measures to ensure a secure supply▌ diversification of gas supply and a timely phase outphase-out of gas, which originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian gas.Federation.

The Member States concerned shall update their national diversification plan within three months, taking into consideration the Commission’s decision.’.recommendation.

CHAPTER VI

___________________

FINAL PROVISIONS

* Regulation (EU) …/… of the European Parliament and of the Council of … on phasing out Russian natural gas imports and preparing the phase out of oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 (OJ …, ELI: …).’

Article 14

CHAPTER VI FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 12 Professional secrecy

1. Any confidential information received, exchanged, or transmitted pursuantin toaccordance with this Regulation shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy laid down in this Article.

2. The obligation of professional secrecy shall apply to all persons who work or who have worked for authorities involved in the implementation of this Regulation orand to any natural or legal person to whom the relevant authorities have delegated itstheir powers, including auditors and experts contracted by the competentthese authorities.

3. Information covered by professional secrecy shall not be disclosed to any other person or authority except by virtue of provisions laid down by Union or national law.

4. All information exchanged between the relevant authorities or Member States under this Regulation that concerns business conditions or operational conditions,conditions andor other economic or personal affairs shall be considered confidential and shall be subject to the requirements of professional secrecy, except where the competentrelevant authority states at the time of the communication that such information may be discloseddisclosed, is required by virtue of Union or national law or where such disclosure is necessary for legal proceedings.

▌

Article 13 Monitoring ▌

Article 15a

The Commission shall continuously monitor the development of the Union’s energy market, in particular with respect to potential gas supply dependencies or other risks to the security of energy supply ▌ in relation to energy imports from the Russian Federation. By [two years after entry into force of this Regulation], the Commission shall submit a report on the implementation of this Regulation to the European Parliament and the Council.

Committee Procedure

In the case of sudden and significant developments, seriously threatening the security of energy supply of one or more Member States, and after an emergency in accordance with Article 11 or 12 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 has been declared, the Commission may temporarily suspend the application of Chapter II of this Regulation in one or more Member States, in whole or in part. The Commission may, in such a situation, also suspend the requirement of prior authorisation pursuant to Article 5(2). The Commission’s decision shall contain certain conditions, in particular to ensure that any suspension is strictly limited to addressing the threat. The suspension shall be limited to a duration which is strictly necessary to bridge the time until there are sufficient supplies from other countries than the Russian Federation to meet Union demand. It shall not be granted for more than 4 weeks and shall only be renewed if the conditions for the emergency pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 still apply. Only short-term supply contracts shall be allowed under a temporary suspension pursuant to this paragraph. The Commission shall inform the Member States and the Gas Coordination Group of any suspensions, and shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council justifying the suspension and any extension. The Commission shall present the report to Parliament if invited to do so.

1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

Article 14 Entry into force and application

2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, in conjunction with Article 4 thereof, shall apply.

Article 15b

Exercise of the delegation

1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.

2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 7 shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from … [date of entry into force].

3. The delegation of power referred to in Article 7 may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.

4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making.

5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council.

6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 7 shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by [two months] at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.

Article 16

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 3 shall apply from [6 weeks after entry into force of this Regulation], except where otherwise specified in Article 4.

Article 5 shall apply from [6 weeks minus one month after the entry into force of this Regulation].

This Regulation is without prejudice to the application of the prohibition related to LNG established in Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council which shall apply and be complied with regardless of the provisions of this Regulation.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Strasbourg,…,

The President

For the European Parliament For the Council

The President The President

ANNEX I

Template for national diversification plans for natural gas

This template is designed for national authorities drafting a national diversification plan as provided for in Article 11.9. It shall include the following:

General information

(ii) the supply mix considering the dependence on Russian supply.

Main information about the import or temporary storage of gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation to the Member State

Reference of the individual contracts as communicated by the importers to the competent authorities and the Commission.

Where applicable, LNG terminal services booked by natural personscompanies or legalaffiliated entitiesundertakings from the Russian Federation or by legal entities directly or indirectly owned, controlled or under significant influence by the Russian Federation

Overall contracted quantities of Russian gas▌gas forwhich deliveryoriginates in theor Memberis State,exported, includingdirectly aor breakdownindirectly, offrom the volumes ofRussian naturalFederation gasfor consumeddelivery in the Member State.

Include contractual flexibilities and point of delivery (interconnection point, import point, LNG terminal, etc).

(iii) demand aggregation.

TheDescription of the measure and its objectives, including quantities expected to be phase out and intermediate steps in case of a multi-stage measure.

Measures to trace and verify potential re-labelled imports.

Measures to trace country of production of gas traded on spot markets.

Other measures referred to in Article 11 paragraph 2(b)

Implementation timeline

Impact on neighbouring Member States.

TechnicalTechnical, contractual or regulatory barriers to replace gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

TechnicalTechnical, andcontractual or ▌ regulatory barriers

Options to overcome barriers and timeline

Template for national diversification plans for oil

This template is designed for national authorities drafting a detailed national diversification plan as provided for in Article 12.10. It shall include:

General information

(ii) the supply mix considering the dependence on Russian supply.

Main information about the import or temporaryof storageoil of(crude oil,oil includingand petroliumpetroleum products,products) which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation to the Member State

Overall contracted quantities of Russian oil for delivery in the Member State.

Include overall contracted quantities of petroleum products obtained from Russian origin oil for delivery in the Member State.

Include expiry date of contractual obligations.

Information about the identity of the different stakeholders (seller, importer, and buyer).

Description of the measures to replace oil, including petrolium products,oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

The description shall include the following elements:

(ii) alternative supply routes.

TheDescription of the measure and its objectives, including quantities expected to be phased out and intermediate steps in case of a multi-stage measure. Measures in place and planned at national level to ensure transparency, traceability of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, to the extent possible, including measures on verification of possible re-labelled imports.

Measures to trace and verify potential re-labelled imports.

Measure to verify the country of origin of oil, including petroleum products.

Measures to prevent shadow fleets, where applicable.

Implementation timeline

Impact on neighbouring Member States.

TechnicalTechnical, contractual or regulatory barriers to replace oil, including petrolium products,oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

Technical and▌, contractual or regulatory barriers

Options to overcome reach barrier▌barrier and timeline

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

ANNEX II

This proposal for a Regulation on the phasing out of Russian natural gas, the improvement of monitoring of potential energy dependencies, and the amendment of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 represents a very necessary advancement within the REPowerEU plan. It reflects the conviction of the co-rapporteurs that the European Union must not allow itself to remain dependent on unreliable external energy supplier. Ensuring the Union’s energy independence is essential to safeguarding its economic stability and strategic resilience.

‘Statement from the European Commission on future action regarding Russian oil

Russia has shown itself to be an unreliable partner, treating energy not as a commodity for fair trade but as a tool for manipulation. It cannot be trusted in the future as a trade partner in energy.

In order to avoid essential security risks and energy dependencies resulting from continued energy trade with the Russian Federation, the European Commission remains committed to ensuring the phase out of all remaining oil imports from the Russian Federation by end of 2027, in line with the Versailles Declaration.

The co-rapporteurs welcome the initiative, particularly, the proposal to permanently ban the import of Russian gas through a formal legislative process – an objective the European Parliament has consistently supported through various calls and initiatives. The proposed framework contributes meaningfully to the Union’s objective of gradually eliminating all Russian energy imports from the EU market, while enhancing collective awareness and oversight of potential vulnerabilities stemming from external energy dependencies. However, the co-rapporteurs also highlight areas where the proposal could be further enhanced.

The Commission intends to table a legislative proposal at the beginning of 2026 to ban oil imports from the Russian Federation as soon as possible, but not later than by end 2027.

Given the complexity of the legislative file, the co-rapporteurs refrain from submitting joint amendments at this early drafting stage and will elaborate their proposals in due course.

The Commission will carefully assess the potential impact of an accelerated termination of oil imports on the security of supply, economy and competitiveness of the most affected Member States.

Some of the key priorities that the co-rapporteurs share are the following. First, setting clear and ambitious dates for the phase-out of Russian energy imports. The deadline for phasing out Russian gas should be considered for shortening by one year, to 1 January 2027. The global LNG supply is set to grow rapidly, in the next few years massively exceeding current imports of Russian gas. Moreover, the EU demand for gas is on a steady downward path although gas consumption has remained relatively stable in 2024. Thus, only a small part of the Russian gas imports would need to be replaced with alternative suppliers.

The Commission will work actively, in a spirit of solidarity, with the directly affected and other relevant Member States, in order to identify appropriate measures to minimise possible risks identified in the assessment, facilitating access to alternative supplies.’

The co-rapporteurs welcome the Commission’s proposal to discontinue not only gas but also oil imports, proposing to establish the National diversification plans leading to Member States achieving this goal.

Finally, it is critical that the regulation remains robust and that the regulation’s goal – to eliminate reliance on an untrustworthy trade partner for the sake of supply security – must not be compromised or its legal strength weakened. The co-rapporteurs concur that any provisions introducing ambiguity or potentially undermining the overall objective should be revised or omitted.

This regulation is, in the view of the co-rapporteurs, not merely a technical exercise, but a reflection of a broader and deeper belief: that the European Union must take decisive steps to protect its interests, reinforce its independence, intra-EU solidarity and ensure that no third country can exert undue influence over its energy supply, unduly distort trade and, by extension, its economy and security.

DECLARATION OF INPUT FROM INESE VAIDERE

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she included in her report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that she received, in the preparation of the draft report, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

European Commission, DG ENER, Unit F2 Relation with the Member States and the Energy community (Head of Unit, Deputy Head of Unit, Policy Officer)

European Commission, DG ENER, Unit A3 Legal affairs (Deputy Head of Unit)

European Commission, DG TRADE, F2 Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of Trade Policy (Senior Expert - Legal Officer)

European Commission, DG TAXUD, Unit B5 Customs Tariffs (Head of Unit)

Belgium customs authorities

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Latvia to the EU (Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative, Councelor - energy policy)

European Commission, Cabinet of Dan Jørgensen, Commissioner responsible for energy and housing

European Commission, DG ENER, Unit A1 Strategy, Policy Coordination and Planning, Inter-institutional Relations, Policy Coordinator - Interinstitutional coordinator

2. Representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

DECLARATION OF INPUT FROM VILLE NIINISTÖ

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the draft report, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

European Commission, DG ENER, Unit F2 Relation with the Member States and the Energy community (Head of Unit, Deputy Head of Unit, Policy Officer)

European Commission, DG ENER, Unit A3 Legal affairs (Deputy Head of Unit)

European Commission, DG TRADE, F2 Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of Trade Policy (Senior Expert - Legal Officer)

European Commission, DG TAXUD, Unit B5 Customs Tariffs (Head of Unit)

Belgium customs authorities

European Commission, DG ENER, Unit A1 Strategy, Policy Coordination and Planning, Inter-institutional Relations, Policy Coordinator - Interinstitutional coordinator

European Commission, Cabinet of Dan Jørgensen, Commissioner responsible for energy and housing

Polish Presidency

Razom We Stand

Bon Beter Leef Milieu

Can Europe

2. Representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

25.9.2025

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNAL MARKET AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

for the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

(COM(2025)0828 – C100123/2025 – 2025/0180(COD)(COD))

Rapporteur for opinion: Paulius Saudargas

(Simplified procedure – Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure)

AMENDMENTS

The Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection submits the following to the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, as the committee responsible:

Amendment 1

Proposal for a regulation

Title 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Proposal for a

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

on phasing out Russian natural gas and oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

Amendment 2

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1a) The Draghi Report also highlights that a reduction in dependency on fossil fuel imports would enhance the competitiveness of the Union and the affordability and security of supply.

Amendment 3

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2) Multiple examples of unannounced and unjustified supply reductions and interruptions already before the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, and the weaponisation of energy by the Russian Federation since then, show that the Russian Federation systematically used existing dependencies on Russian gas supplies to harm the Union’s economy. This leads to serious negative effects on Member States and the Union’s economic security in general. The Russian Federation and its energy companies can therefore no longer be considered reliable energy trading partners by the Union.

(2) Multiple examples of unannounced and unjustified supply reductions and interruptions already before the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, and the weaponisation of energy by the Russian Federation since then, show that the Russian Federation systematically used existing dependencies on Russian gas supplies as a political weapon to harm the Union’s economy. This leads to serious negative effects on Member States, single market stability, the Union’s consumers, and the Union’s economic security and competitiveness in general. The Russian Federation and its energy companies can therefore no longer be considered reliable energy trading partners by the Union.

Amendment 4

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5) Russia’s weaponisation of gas supply and market manipulation through intentional disruptions of gas flows led to skyrocketing energy prices in the Union, reaching unprecedented levels, up to eight times above the average of previous years, in 2022. The resulting need to find alternative gas supply sources, to change supply routes, to fill storages for the winter, and to find solutions for congestion problems in the Union’s gas infrastructure contributed to high price volatility and the unprecedented price hikes in 2022.

(5) Russia’s weaponisation of gas supply and market manipulation through intentional disruptions of gas flows led to skyrocketing energy prices in the Union, reaching unprecedented levels, up to eight times above the average of previous years, in 2022. The resulting need to find alternative gas supply sources, to change supply routes, to fill storages for the winter, and to find solutions for congestion problems in the Union’s gas infrastructure contributed to high price volatility and the unprecedented price hikes in 2022. In the context of the Union’s efforts to ensure a secure and resilient energy supply and well functioning internal market, the continued operation of gas pipelines directly connecting the European Union with the Russian Federation such as Nord Stream 1 and 2 presents strategic and security challenges that are inconsistent with the Union’s priorities. In light of the need to uphold energy security, resilience and integrity of the internal market, prevent the future weaponisation of energy, and reinforce European solidarity, it would be appropriate that these pipelines remain non-operational.

Amendment 5

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6) The exceptionally high gas prices translated into high electricity prices and price increases for other energy products, leading to sustained high inflation. A deep economic crisis with negative growth rates in many Member States, caused by the high energy prices, endangered the economy of the Union, undermined consumer purchasing power and raised the cost of manufacturing, particularly in energy, leading to risks for social cohesion and stability, and even to human life or health. The supply interruptions also led to very seriously problems for the security of energy supply in the Union and forced eleven Member States to declare an energy crisis level under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council8 . Benefitting from the Union’s dependency during that crisis, Russia’s manipulations of the market allowed it to achieve record-high profits from remaining energy trade with Europe, with revenues from gas imports accounting still for EUR 15bn in 2024. Those revenues could be used to finance further economic attacks against the Union, undermining economic security. They could also be used to finance the war of aggression against the Ukraine which constitutes a major threat to political and economic stability in Europe.

(6) The exceptionally high gas prices translated into high electricity prices and price increases for other energy products, leading to sustained high inflation. A deep economic crisis with negative growth rates in many Member States, caused by the high energy prices and volatility, endangered the economy of the Union, undermined consumer purchasing power and raised the cost of manufacturing, particularly in energy, leading to risks for social cohesion and stability, and even to human life or health. The supply interruptions also led to very seriously problems for the security of energy supply in the Union and forced eleven Member States to declare an energy crisis level under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council8 . Benefitting from the Union’s dependency during that crisis, Russia’s manipulations of the market allowed it to achieve record-high profits from remaining energy trade with Europe, with revenues from gas imports accounting still for EUR 15bn in 2024. Those revenues could be used to finance further economic attacks against the Union, undermining economic security and thus creating a major threat to political and economic stability of the Single Market and individual consumers. They could also be used to finance the war of aggression against the Ukraine which constitutes a major threat to political and economic stability in Europe.

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8 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 (OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1938/oj).

8 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 (OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1938/oj).

Amendment 6

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(7) The recent crisis provided evidence that trustful trade relations with partners supplying energy products are crucial to preserve market stability, to protect human life and health as well as the essential security interests of the Union, not the least because the Union depends to a large extent on energy imports from third countries. Maintaining energy supplies from Russia would expose the Union to continued economic and security risks; it would therefore not increase but decrease its supply security. Even dependencies on smaller import volumes of Russian gas can, if abused by Russia, significantly distort the price dynamic, even if just temporarily, and disrupt energy markets, especially in those regions which are still significantly reliant on imports from Russia. Taking into account the long standing and consistent pattern of market manipulations and supply disruptions, and the fact that the Russian government has consistently used gas trade as a weapon to achieve policy instead of trade goals, it is therefore appropriate to take measures to address the continued vulnerability of the Union resulting from natural gas imports both via pipelines and liquified natural gas (LNG) with the Russian Federation.

(7) The recent crisis provided evidence that trustful trade relations with partners supplying energy products are crucial to preserve market stability, to protect human life and health as well as the essential security interests of the Union, not the least because the Union depends to a large extent on energy imports from third countries. Maintaining energy supplies from Russia would expose the Union to continued economic and security risks; it would therefore not increase but decrease its supply security. Even dependencies on smaller import volumes of Russian gas can, if abused by Russia, significantly distort the price dynamic, even if just temporarily, and disrupt energy markets, especially in those regions which are still significantly reliant on imports from Russia. Taking into account the long standing and consistent pattern of market manipulations and supply disruptions, and the fact that the Russian government has consistently used gas trade as a weapon to achieve policy instead of trade goals, it is therefore appropriate to take legally binding measures to address the continued vulnerability of the Union resulting from natural gas imports both via pipelines and liquified natural gas (LNG) with the Russian Federation.

Amendment 7

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 9

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(9) Diversifying LNG import capacity is essential for strengthening and maintaining energy security within the Union. A significant portion of that capacity is controlled by Russian companies via long-term contracts of more than 10 years, creating a risk that the capacity rights reserved in those contracts could be used to obstruct imports from alternative sources through capacity hoarding practices. Similar practices could make Union energy markets subject to the prolonged influence of Russian companies, which have previously demonstrated a significant capacity to distort markets in the Union, using existing dependencies. Past instances of gas storage hoarding have further led to substantial market distortions, increased prices, and threats to critical security measures9 . Given the essential role that LNG is expected to play in securing alternative energy supplies in the it is essential to complement the gas import ban with a prohibition on providing LNG terminal services to Russian entities. To assist Member States in ending their dependency on Russian gas supplies, and to ensure the effective delivery of LNG imports from alternative sources, it is important to avoid that the necessary import infrastructure can be blocked by Russian customers of LNG terminal services. The provision of long-term LNG terminal services to entities from Russia or controlled by Russian should be therefore prohibited as of 1 January 2026. Those provided under a contract concluded before 17 June 2025, should be prohibited as of 1 January 2028. This should enable the reallocation of terminal capacity to alternative LNG suppliers and strengthen the resilience of the energy market in the Union.

(9) Diversifying LNG import capacity is essential for strengthening and maintaining energy security within the Union. A significant portion of that capacity is controlled by Russian companies via long-term contracts of more than 10 years, creating a risk that the capacity rights reserved in those contracts could be used to obstruct imports from alternative sources through capacity hoarding practices. Similar practices could make Union energy markets subject to the prolonged influence of Russian companies, which have previously demonstrated a significant capacity to distort markets in the Union, using existing dependencies. Past instances of gas storage hoarding have further led to substantial market distortions, increased prices, and threats to critical security measures9 . Given the essential role that LNG is expected to play in securing alternative energy supplies in the it is essential to complement the gas import ban with a prohibition on providing LNG terminal services to Russian entities. To assist Member States in ending their dependency on Russian gas supplies, and to ensure the effective delivery of LNG imports from alternative sources, it is important to avoid that the necessary import infrastructure can be blocked by Russian customers of LNG terminal services. The provision of long-term LNG terminal services to entities from Russia or controlled by Russian should be therefore prohibited as of 1 January 2026. Those provided under a contract concluded before 17 June 2025, should be prohibited as of 1 January 2027. This should enable the reallocation of terminal capacity to alternative LNG suppliers and strengthen the resilience of the energy market in the Union.

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9 See Assessment of Impact, page 4.

9 See Assessment of Impact, page 4.

Amendment 8

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10) The Commission has carefully assessed the impact on the Union and on its Member States of a possible prohibition of Russian imports of natural gas and of the provision of LNG terminal services to Russian entities. In fact, preparatory work and several detailed analyses of the consequences of a total phase out of Russian gas have been conducted and published since 202210 , and the Commission could also draw upon a multitude of consultations with stakeholders, external experts and agencies, and studies on the effects of the phase out of Russian gas. The Commission’s analysis showed that a phase out of Russian natural gas imports, if introduced in a stepwise, coordinated and well-prepared manner in a spirit of solidarity, is likely to have limited impact on energy prices in the Union, and that it will enhance and not endanger the Union’s security of supply, due to the exit of an unreliable trading partner from the Union markets. As set out in the REPower Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already reduced supply dependencies from Russia, for instance by measures to reduce gas demand or to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources, as well as active support to diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the EU bargaining power via Joint gas purchasing. The Assessment of Impact also showed that upfront coordination of diversification policies can avoid harmful effects on prices or supplies11 .

(10) The Commission has carefully assessed the impact on the Union and on its Member States of a possible prohibition of Russian imports of natural gas and of the provision of LNG terminal services to Russian entities. In fact, preparatory work and several detailed analyses of the consequences of a total phase out of Russian gas have been conducted and published since 202210 , and the Commission could also draw upon a multitude of consultations with stakeholders, external experts and agencies, and studies on the effects of the phase out of Russian gas. The Commission’s analysis showed that a phase out of Russian natural gas imports, if introduced in a stepwise, coordinated and well-prepared manner in a spirit of solidarity, is likely to have limited or no impact on energy prices in the Union, and that it will substantially strengthen the Union’s security of supply, due to the exit of an unreliable trading partner from the Union markets. This conclusion is evidenced by the successful implementation of several gas diversification projects in the Union. As set out in the REPower Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already reduced supply dependencies from Russia, for instance by measures to reduce gas demand or to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources, as well as active support to diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the Union bargaining power via Joint gas purchasing. The Assessment of Impact also showed that upfront coordination of diversification policies can avoid harmful effects on prices or supplies11. Moreover, the Union demand for gas is on a steady downward path. Since 2021, the gas consumption in the Union has dropped by 80 bcm/y and it is now down by 17% on average, compared to pre-crisis. Thus, only a small part of the Russian gas imports would need to be replaced with alternative suppliers as the projected reduction in consumption by 2027 is larger than the current imports from Russia.

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10 See, for example, Commission Staff Working Document Implementing the REPower EU Action Plan: Investment Needs, Hydrogen Accelerator and Achieving the Bio-Methane Targets, SWD(2022) 230 final, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, REPowerEU Plan, COM(2022) 230 final, 18 May 2022.

10 See, for example, Commission Staff Working Document Implementing the REPower EU Action Plan: Investment Needs, Hydrogen Accelerator and Achieving the Bio-Methane Targets, SWD(2022) 230 final, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, REPowerEU Plan, COM(2022) 230 final, 18 May 2022.

11 See Assessment of Impacts, page 35.

11 See Assessment of Impacts, page 35.

Amendment 9

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 12

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(12) In line with the Versailles Declaration and the REPowerEU Communication, a large number of gas importers have already terminated or significantly reduced their gas supplies from Russia. As set out in the Assessment of Impacts, the remaining gas volumes under existing supply contracts can, be phased out without significant economic impact or risks for security of supply, due to the availability of sufficient alternative suppliers on the gas world market, a well-interconnected Union gas market and the availability of sufficient import infrastructure12 .

(12) In line with the Versailles Declaration and the REPowerEU Communication, a large number of gas importers have already terminated or significantly reduced their gas supplies from Russia. As set out in the Assessment of Impacts, the remaining gas volumes under existing supply contracts can, be phased out without significant economic impact or risks for security of supply, due to the availability of sufficient alternative suppliers on the gas world market, new investments into energy efficiency, a well-interconnected Union gas market and the availability of sufficient import infrastructure12 . This also reflects the general trend of decrease of gas consumption across the Union.

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12 See Assessment of Impact, pages 15 to 36.

12 See Assessment of Impact, pages 15 to 36.

Amendment 10

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14) An exemption from the prohibition of gas imports as of 1 January 2026 should also be granted for existing long term supply contracts. Indeed, importers holding long-term contracts will usually need more time to find alternative supply routes and sources than short-term contract holders, also as long-term contracts usually concern significantly larger volumes over time than short-term contracts. A transition time should therefore be introduced to give holders of long-term contracts sufficient time to diversify their supplies in an orderly manner.

(14) An exemption from the prohibition of gas imports as of 1 January 2026 should also be granted for existing long term supply contracts. Indeed, importers holding long-term contracts will usually need more time to find alternative supply routes and sources than short-term contract holders, also as long-term contracts usually concern significantly larger volumes over time than short-term contracts. A transition time should therefore be introduced to give holders of long-term contracts sufficient time to diversify their supplies in an orderly manner. The Commission should provide Union companies with effective and legally sound toolkits to facilitate their efforts to get out of long-term contracts with Russian suppliers without incurring penalties.

Amendment 11

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(15) Some landlocked countries which are currently still supplied under existing long-term supply contracts for Russian pipeline gas are specifically affected by recent changes of supply routes from the Russian Federation, due to limited or no alternative routes for the transport of the contracted gas to them. To remedy the situation, suppliers from other Member States currently ensure the delivery of pipeline gas under short-term supply contracts with suppliers from the Russian Federation via uncongested interconnection points. Due to this very specific situation, the transition time necessary to find new suppliers should also apply to those short-term supply contracts with suppliers from the Russian Federation which serve to supply landlock countries affected by changes of supply routes for Russian gas.

deleted

Amendment 12

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 16

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(16) While it appears justified to exempt existing “legacy” contracts from the immediate application, not all contracts entered into before the entry into force of this Regulation should benefit from such exemption. Indeed, there may be an incentive by Russian suppliers to use the time between the publication of this proposal until the entry into force of the ban to increase current supplies, by concluding new contracts, increasing volumes by changing existing contracts or using flexibilities under existing contracts. In order to ensure that imports from Russia do not increase but decrease as a result of the proposed Regulation, measures should be included in the Regulation to avoid a “rush” for new Russian gas imports in the time between the adoption of this proposal and the entry into force of the ban. Indeed, the commitment from Heads of State to phase out gas supplies was already made in March 2022; it was renewed in the REPowerEU Strategy, the REPowerEU Plan and the REPowerEU Roadmap. At the latest with the publication of the proposal for this Regulation, it is no longer appropriate consider contracts concluded after that date as “legacy” contracts. Contracts concluded after 17 June 2025 should therefore not benefit from the exceptional transition provisions for existing short and long-term contracts.

(16) While it appears justified to exempt existing “legacy” contracts from the immediate application, not all contracts entered into before the entry into force of this Regulation should benefit from such exemption. Indeed, there may be an incentive by Russian suppliers to use the time between the publication of this proposal until the entry into force of the ban to increase current supplies, by concluding new contracts, increasing volumes by changing existing contracts or using flexibilities under existing contracts. In order to ensure that imports from Russia do not increase but decrease as a result of the proposed Regulation, measures should be included in the Regulation to avoid a “rush” for new Russian gas imports in the time between the adoption of this proposal and the entry into force of the ban. Indeed, the commitment from Heads of State to phase out gas supplies was already made in March 2022; it was renewed in the REPowerEU Strategy, the REPowerEU Plan and the REPowerEU Roadmap. At the latest with the publication of the proposal for this Regulation, it is no longer appropriate consider contracts concluded after that date as “legacy” contracts. Contracts concluded after 17 June 2025 should therefore not benefit from the exceptional transition provisions for existing short and long-term contracts. Furthermore, to prevent any attempts to stockpile Russian gas under existing contracts, the annual volume of imports made after 17 June 2025 should remain comparable or be lower to the volumes imported during an appropriate reference period preceding that date.

Amendment 13

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(19) Unlike other goods, natural gas is a homogeneous commodity which is traded in large volumes and often resold multiple times between traders at wholesale level. Taking into account the particular complexity of tracing the origin of natural gas, and bearing in mind that Russian suppliers might seek to circumvent this Regulation, for example by sales via intermediaries, via transshipments or transport through other countries, this Regulation should provide for an effective framework to establish the actual origin and the point of export of natural gas imported into the Union.

(19) Unlike other goods, natural gas is a homogeneous commodity which is traded in large volumes and often resold multiple times between traders at wholesale level. Taking into account the particular complexity of tracing the origin of natural gas, and bearing in mind that Russian suppliers as well as intermediaries might seek to circumvent this Regulation, through practices such as relabelling, sales via intermediaries, via transshipments or transport through other countries, this Regulation should provide for an effective framework to establish the actual origin and the point of export of natural gas imported into the Union.

Amendment 14

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(20) In particular, importers of natural gas should be obliged to provide customs authorities with all information necessary to establish the origin and the point of export of natural gas imported into the Union and to decide whether the imported gas falls under the general prohibition or one of its exceptions. As the contractual conditions determining the elements relevant for the assessment of the customs authorities are often complex, customs authorities should be given the power to ask importers for detailed contract information, including entire supply contracts, excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other contractual provisions. The Regulation should include rules to ensure an effective protection of business secrets of concerned undertakings.

(20) Member states should appoint customs or other competent authority to receive, assess the information received from gas or oil importers and issue a decision on the compliance with the import prohibitions set out in this regulation. All importers of natural gas and oil should be obliged to provide the appointed competent authority with all information necessary to establish the origin and the point of export of natural gas and oil imported into the Union and to decide whether the imported oil and gas falls under the general prohibition or, in case of natural gas, one of its exceptions. As the contractual conditions determining the elements relevant for the assessment of the customs authorities are often complex, competent authorities should be given the power to ask importers for detailed contract information, including entire supply contracts, excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other contractual provisions. The Regulation should include rules to ensure an effective protection of business secrets of concerned undertakings.

Amendment 15

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(21) Customs authorities should cooperate with regulatory authorities, competent authorities, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the Commission to implement the provisions of this Regulation and exchange relevant information, notably when it comes to the assessment of exemptions allowing imports of Russian natural gas after 1.1.2026. Customs authorities, regulatory authorities, competent authorities and ACER should have the necessary tools and databases in place to ensure that relevant information can be exchanged between national authorities and authorities in different Member States where necessary. ACER should contribute with its expertise to the process of monitoring the implementation. To facilitate the creation of the necessary interoperable joint information systems, the Commission and Member States may explore possibilities to make use of budget under the Internal Security Fund (ISF). Customs authorities should notify regulatory authorities, the national competent authority and the Commission on a monthly basis regarding key elements concerning the development of imports of Russian gas (such as quantities imported under long-term or short-term contracts, entry points, or contract partners).

(21) Customs authorities and other competent authorities should cooperate with regulatory authorities, competent authorities, national security institutions, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the Commission to implement the provisions of this Regulation and exchange relevant information, notably when it comes to the assessment of exemptions allowing imports of Russian natural gas after 1.1.2026. Customs authorities, regulatory authorities, competent authorities and ACER should have the necessary tools and databases in place to ensure that relevant information can be exchanged between national authorities and authorities in different Member States where necessary. ACER should contribute with its expertise to the process of monitoring the implementation. To facilitate the creation of the necessary interoperable joint information systems, the Commission and Member States should allocate appropriate resources, including via the Internal Security Fund (ISF). Customs authorities should notify regulatory authorities, the national competent authority and the Commission on a monthly basis regarding key elements concerning the development of imports of Russian gas (such as quantities imported under long-term or short-term contracts, entry points, or contract partners). With a view to the economic importance of reducing risks resulting from Russian gas imports and the risks of circumvention of the prohibition of gas, customs authorities, regulators and competent authorities should make use all available monitoring and enforcement instruments at their disposal and provide for sufficient resources for monitoring and customs risk management, to ensure effective and systematic supervision of gas imports.

Amendment 16

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 22

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(22) Russia is a major gas exporter and has not played any noticeable role as gas transit country in the past. This is due to several factors, such as the lack of regasification infrastructure, the organisation of gas trade in Russia via a pipeline export monopoly, business models of Russian gas companies which are not based on organising transits, or Russia’s geographical location. Therefore, imports of natural gas arriving via interconnection points between the Russian Federation and the Union are usually originating in, or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation. The same consideration applies to gas imported via interconnection points between the Union and Serbia, as Serbia can, for technical reasons, only export gas of Russian origin towards the Union. Therefore, and taking into account incentives of Russian suppliers to circumvent the import ban, customs authorities should, where gas is imported via Russian or Serbian entry points, require clear and unambiguous equivocal evidence to prove the non-Russian origin or the point of export of the gas. The submitted documents should allow the traceability of the imported gas up to the place of production.

(22) Russia is a major gas exporter and has not played any noticeable role as gas transit country in the past. This is due to several factors, such as the lack of regasification infrastructure, the organisation of gas trade in Russia via a pipeline export monopoly, business models of Russian gas companies which are not based on organising transits, or Russia’s geographical location. Therefore, imports of natural gas arriving via interconnection points between the Russian Federation and the Union are usually originating in, or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation. The same consideration applies to gas imported via interconnection points between the Union and Serbia, as Serbia can, for technical reasons, only export gas of Russian origin towards the Union. Therefore, gas imported via those interconnection points shall be presumed as exported from the Russian Federation.

Amendment 17

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23) Experience with the announced phase out of gas supplies via Ukraine has shown that good preparation and coordination in a spirit of solidarity can effectively avoid market disruptions or security of supply problems potentially resulting from changing gas suppliers. To prepare for the full phase out of Russian gas in 2028 in a coordinated manner and to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk for security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices, Member States should prepare national diversification plans and present them by 1 March 2026. Those plans should describe intended measures at national or regional level to reduce demand, foster renewable energy production and ensure alternative supplies, as well as possible technical or regulatory barriers which may complicate the diversification process. As the diversification process may require coordination of measures at national, regional or Union level, the Commission should assess the national diversification plans, with the possibility to issue recommendations suggesting adaptations where necessary.

(23) Experience with the announced phase out of gas supplies via Ukraine has shown that good preparation and coordination in a spirit of solidarity can effectively avoid market disruptions or security of supply problems potentially resulting from changing gas suppliers. To prepare for the full phase out of Russian gas in 2027 in a coordinated manner and to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk for security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices, Member States should prepare national diversification plans and present them by 1 March 2026. Those plans should describe intended measures at national or regional level to reduce demand, foster renewable energy production and ensure alternative supplies, and measures to ensure full transparency and actual control preventing possible circumvention of sanctions by Russian and other entities. possible technical or regulatory barriers which may complicate the diversification process. As the diversification process may require coordination of measures at national, regional or Union level, the Commission should assess the national diversification plans, with the possibility to issue recommendations suggesting adaptations where necessary.

Amendment 18

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 24

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(24) In their Versailles Declaration, the Heads of Member States committed not only to phase out natural gas supplies from Russia, but also other energy supplies, notably oil supplies. While restrictive measures to ensure the phase out of oil imports from Russia are already in place, and oil imports have decreased significantly, a further phase out of Russian oil may require specific preparatory steps and coordination with neighbours. Member States should therefore prepare national diversification plans also for oil, with a possibility for the Commission to provide recommendations on those plans.

(24) In their Versailles Declaration, the Heads of Member States committed not only to phase out natural gas supplies from Russia, but also other energy supplies, notably oil supplies. While restrictive measures to ensure the phase out of crude oil and petroleum product imports from Russia are already in place, and oil imports reflected in official statistics have decreased significantly, they demonstrated their insufficiency. It is essential to complement those measures with a permanent prohibition of oil imports from Russian Federation from 1 January 2027. A further phase out of Russian oil, will require clear decisive actions by the Council and specific preparatory steps and coordination with neighbours. Member States should therefore prepare national diversification plans also for oil, with a possibility for the Commission to provide recommendations on those plans.

Amendment 19

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 25

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(25) Experience during the gas crisis of 2022 and 2023 has shown that showed that comprehensive information on the supply situation and possible supply dependencies is crucial to monitor gas supply in the Union. Therefore importers of Russian gas making use of the exemptions laid down in this Regulation should submit to the Commission all information which is necessary to effectively evaluate possible risks for gas trade. That information should include key parameters, or even whole text parts, of the relevant gas supply contracts, excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other provisions in the contract. When monitoring gas supply in the Union, the Commission should also take into account information on imports provided by customs authorities and information included in national diversification plans. The Commission should regularly inform the Gas Coordination Group established by Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 about the phase-out process at the Union level and submit an annual report on the Russian gas phase-out, which may be accompanied by specific Union recommendations and actions to accelerate the phase-out process.

(25) In order to ensure that crude oil and petroleum products entering the Union do not originate from or contain sanctioned Russian inputs, it is necessary to establish a comprehensive framework to verify the true origin of oil, petroleum and petrochemical products imported into the Union, particularly from countries that process or blend Russian-origin crude oil. The persistent use of Russia’s shadow fleet to reroute and relabel embargoed oil via non-sanctioning third countries constitutes a systematic circumvention mechanism. To identify and fight such circumvention attempts Commission shall regularly conduct the risk based country assessments. Experience during the gas crisis of 2022 and 2023 has shown that showed that comprehensive information on the supply situation and possible supply dependencies is crucial to monitor gas supply in the Union. Therefore importers of Russian gas making use of the exemptions laid down in this Regulation should submit to the Commission all information which is necessary to effectively evaluate possible risks for gas trade. That information should include key parameters, or even whole text parts, of the relevant gas supply contracts, excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other provisions in the contract. When monitoring gas supply in the Union, the Commission should also take into account information on imports provided by customs authorities and information included in national diversification plans. The Commission should regularly inform the Gas Coordination Group established by Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 about the phase-out process at the Union level and submit an annual report on the Russian gas phase-out, which may be accompanied by specific Union recommendations and actions to accelerate the phase-out process.

Amendment 20

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(27) The Union has created a robust legal framework to ensure security of gas supply at all times, and to deal with possible supply crises in a coordinated manner, including obligations on Member States to provide for effective and operational solidarity to neighbours in need of gas. The Commission should constantly monitor the development of market risks for gas supply resulting from gas trade with Russia at Union, regional and Member State level. In case of sudden and significant developments, which seriously threaten the security of supply of one or more Member States, it is appropriate to empower the Commission to take the necessary emergency measures by authorising one or more Member States not to apply the import prohibitions concerning natural gas or LNG imports set out in this Regulation. Such an authorisation should be limited in time and the Commission implementing decision may impose certain additional conditions, to ensure that any suspension is strictly limited to addressing the threat. The Commission should closely monitor the application of any such temporary authorisation.

(27) The Union has created a robust legal framework to ensure security of gas supply at all times, and to deal with possible supply crises in a coordinated manner, including obligations on Member States to provide for effective and operational solidarity to neighbours in need of gas. The Commission should constantly monitor the development of market risks for gas supply resulting from gas trade with Russia at Union, regional and Member State level. For this purpose, the Gas Coordination Group could be used to facilitate exchange of all relevant information.

Amendment 21

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

This Regulation provides a framework for effectively removing the Union’s exposure to the significant risks for trade and security, resulting from gas trade with the Russian Federation by laying down:

This Regulation provides a framework of binding measures for effectively removing the Union’s exposure to the significant risks for trade and security, resulting from gas and oil trade with the Russian Federation by laying down:

Amendment 22

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) rules to effectively implement and monitor that prohibition as well as the phase out of oil imports from Russia;

(b) a prohibition of imports of oil, including refined petroleum products, directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation and rules to effectively implement and monitor that prohibition as well as the phase out of oil imports from Russia;

Amendment 23

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6) ‘landlocked country’ means a country that is entirely surrounded by land and has not direct access to the sea;

deleted

Amendment 24

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – title

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Prohibition of natural gas imports from the Russian Federation

Prohibition of natural gas and oil imports from the Russian Federation

Amendment 25

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2 a. The import of oil, including petroleum products, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, including refined oil products derived from Russian-origin crude, shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2027. Any attempt to circumvent the prohibition is a direct violation of this Regulation.

Amendment 26

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Where the importer can demonstrate to customs authorities that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are:

deleted

Amendment 27

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) executed under a short-term supply contract with delivery to an interconnection point with a landlocked country and,

deleted

Amendment 28

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) that a long-term supply contract with delivery at the virtual trading point of that landlocked country for the import of natural gas in gaseous state via pipelines exists, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, and which was concluded before 17 June 2025 and not amended thereafter, Article 3 shall apply as of 1 January 2028.

deleted

Amendment 29

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. Where the importer can demonstrate to customs authorities that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a long-term supply contract concluded before 17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, Article 3 shall apply as of 1 January 2028.

3. Where the importer can demonstrate to customs authorities that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a long-term supply contract concluded before 17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, Article 3 shall apply as of 1 January 2027.

Amendment 30

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 – paragraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. The quantities of imports made in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed the contracted quantities.

4. The quantities of imports per Member State made in accordance with paragraphs 1 shall not exceed the contracted quantities before 17 June 2025.

Amendment 31

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Where the provider of long-term LNG terminal services can demonstrate to customs authorities that those services are provided under a contract concluded before 17 June 2025 and not amended thereafter, Article 5 shall apply as of 1 January 2028.

Where the provider of long-term LNG terminal services can demonstrate to customs authorities that those services are provided under a contract concluded before 17 June 2025 and not amended thereafter, Article 5 shall apply as of 1 January 2027.

Amendment 32

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 – paragraph -1 (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

-1. Member States shall appoint a competent authority to receive, assess the information required under this Article and issue a decision on the compliance with Articles 3 and 4.

Amendment 33

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Importers of natural gas shall provide customs authorities with all relevant information necessary to implement Articles 3 and 4, in particular appropriate evidence to verify whether the natural gas originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

All importers of natural gas shall provide the appointed competent authority one month prior to the planned import with all relevant information necessary to implement Articles 3 and 4, in particular appropriate evidence to verify whether the natural gas originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

Amendment 34

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

For the purposes of application of Article 4, importers of natural gas shall provide customs authorities and other authorities involved in the monitoring pursuant to Article 9 and 10, with appropriate evidence to assess whether the conditions set out in that Article are met.

For the purposes of application of Article 4, importers of natural gas shall provide the appointed competent authority, with appropriate evidence to assess whether the conditions for the exemption set out in that Article are met.

Amendment 35

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 – paragraph 2 – point f

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(f) for LNG imports, the port of first loading;

(f) for LNG imports, the place of liquefaction and the port of first loading;

Amendment 36

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 – paragraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2a. All importers of oil, including refined petroleum products, shall provide the appointed competent authority prior to the planed import with all relevant information necessary to implement Article 3 and verify the origin of the oil, such as certificate of origin and bill of lading number(s) and entry number(s).

Amendment 37

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 – paragraph 2 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2b. Importers of natural gas and oil originating from gas or oil producing countries that have adopted and effectively implemented measures prohibiting both direct and indirect imports of natural gas or oil from the Russian Federation, in a manner equivalent to the obligations laid down in this Regulation, shall follow the simplified procedure regarding the documentation referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. By 1 January 2026, the Commission shall by means of implementing acts establish the simplified procedure and a list of such countries based on verified information. The Commission shall update that list every six months.

Amendment 38

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3. Customs authorities or other authorities involved in the monitoring pursuant to Article 9 and 10, may request more detailed information, except price information, if the required information is necessary to assess whether the conditions set out in Article 3 and 4 are fulfilled. Customs authorities may, in particular, require importers to submit the text of certain provisions of the gas supply contract in full or the text of entire gas supply contract, except price information, especially where certain contractual provisions are interrelated, or where the full knowledge of the formulation of the contractual provisions is crucial for the assessment. In case customs authorities consider that the evidence provided is not conclusive, they may refuse the release for free circulation of the goods.

3. Customs authorities or the appointed competent authority, may request more detailed information, except price information, if the required information is necessary to assess whether the conditions set out in Article 3 and 4 are fulfilled. Customs authorities or the appointed competent authority may, in particular, require importers to submit the text of certain provisions of the gas supply contract in full or the text of entire gas supply contract, except price information, especially where certain contractual provisions are interrelated, or where the full knowledge of the formulation of the contractual provisions is crucial for the assessment. Customs authorities and the appointed competent authority can request expertise and any other information from national regulatory authorities, competent authorities, ACER and the Commission for the purpose of this article. The appointed competent authority shall issue a decision to authorise or not the gas imports. In case the appointed competent authority decides not to authorise the gas imports or consider that the evidence provided is not conclusive, the customs authorities shall refuse the release for free circulation of the goods.

Amendment 39

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 – paragraph 3 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3a. To ensure uniform implementation across Member States, customs authorities and the appointed competent authorities shall apply harmonised criteria for the assessment of the documents received. The Commission may specify by means of implementing acts the minimum standards and evidence requirements for verifying the origin and point of export of imported natural gas.

Amendment 40

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 – paragraph 4 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. Natural gas entering to the Union through the following interconnection points shall be presumed to be exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, unless the importer can provide unambiguous evidence to customs authorities that the imported natural gas originates in a country other than the Russian Federation that has been in transit through the Russian Federation.

4. Natural gas entering to the Union through the following interconnection points shall be presumed to be exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, and shall therefore be subject to the prohibition under Article 3

Amendment 41

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 – paragraph 4 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) Luhamaa (LV/RU);

(d) Luhamaa (EE/RU);

Amendment 42

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 – paragraph 4 – point l

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(l) Strandzha 2 (BG)/Malkoclar (TR) – TurkStream

(l) Strandzha 2 (BG) - Malkoclar (TR)

Amendment 43

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 – paragraph 4 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4a. In case of natural gas transported through the Union under a transit regime, the appointed competent authority shall be informed one month prior to the planned transit about the origin, volume and destination of the natural gas transit. This information shall be shared with the authorities involved in the monitoring pursuant to Articles 9 and 10.

Amendment 44

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – title

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Effective monitoring

Effective monitoring and enforcement

Amendment 45

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Customs authorities, and, where relevant, competent authorities and regulatory authorities and the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), shall ensure effective monitoring of the provisions in Chapter II, if necessary by making full use of their enforcement powers, and cooperate closely with relevant national authorities, authorities from other Member States, ACER or the Commission.

Customs authorities, the appointed competent authority and, where relevant, other competent authorities and regulatory authorities, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), shall ensure effective monitoring of the provisions in Chapter II, if necessary by making full use of their enforcement powers, and cooperate closely with relevant national authorities, authorities from other Member States, ACER or the Commission.

Amendment 46

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Member States shall ensure that the customs authorities and other relevant authorities have adequate powers, functional independence and the resources to fulfil the obligations provided under this Article.

Amendment 47

Proposal for a regulation

Article 10 – title

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Exchange of information

Transparency and exchange of information

Amendment 48

Proposal for a regulation

Article 10 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Customs authorities shall exchange the information received from natural gas importers with regulatory authorities, competent authorities, ACER and the Commission to the extent necessary to ensure effective assessment whether the conditions set out in Articles 3 to 6 of this Regulation are fulfilled. Customs authorities from different Member States shall exchange information received from natural gas importers to the extent necessary, and cooperate with each other in order to avoid circumvention. They shall make use of existing tools and databases allowing that relevant information can be effectively exchanged between national authorities in their Member State and authorities in other Member States, or put such tools in place where necessary.

Customs authorities and appointed relevant authorities shall cooperate and on a regular basis exchange the information received on natural gas imports with regulatory authorities, national security institutions and other competent authorities, ACER and the Commission to the extent necessary to ensure effective assessment whether the conditions set out in Articles 3 to 6 of this Regulation are fulfilled. The exchange of information shall also cover any relevant developments concerning the direct or indirect imports of Russian gas, including quantities imported, entry points and contract partners, as well as any significant change in the pattern of trade of Russian gas that can lead to the circumvention of this Regulation.

Customs authorities and appointed relevant authorities from different Member States shall exchange information received from natural gas importers, and cooperate with each other in order to ensure proper enforcement of this Regulation and avoid circumvention. They shall make use of existing tools and databases allowing that relevant information can be effectively exchanged between national authorities in their Member State and authorities in other Member States, or put such tools in place where necessary. Customs authorities and appointed relevant authorities shall access, use and exchange the relevant information gathered pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2024/1787, in particular data related to gas supply chain traceability, to support the detection and prevention of circumvention.

Amendment 49

Proposal for a regulation

Article 10 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

By 31 August 2026 and 31 August 2027, ACER shall, based on the data received under this Regulation and own information, publish a report providing an overview of contracts on the supply of gas originating in or directly or indirectly exported from Russia, and assessing the impact of diversification on energy markets.

By 31 August 2026 and 31 August 2027, ACER shall, based on the data received under this Regulation and own information, publish a report providing an overview of contracts on the supply and consumption per Member State of gas originating in or directly or indirectly exported from Russia, assessing the impact of diversification of suppliers on energy markets, and the effectiveness of the cooperation and exchange of information required under this article with recommendations for improvements where relevant.

Amendment 50

Proposal for a regulation

Article 10 – paragraph 3 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission shall, on the basis of information received from customs authorities of the Member States pursuant to Articles 7 and 10, publish on quarterly basis non-confidential and aggregated information, including entry point, volume, and stated origin of all imported gas into the Union. In addition, the Commission shall carry out a risk-based analysis of all cross-border gas interconnection points and LNG terminals through which natural gas is physically imported into the territory of the Union from third countries, with the objective of identifying infrastructure for which there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the imported gas is wholly or partially of Russian origin and establish a list of such high-risk gas infrastructure. The Commission shall ensure the information is made publicly accessible in a clear and timely manner. The Commission, in coordination ACER, shall conduct a continuous risk assessment of global trade patterns in crude oil, petroleum products, to identify third countries reasonably suspected of processing, blending, or transhipping Russian-origin inputs into export products, engaging in circumvention practices, or displaying trade flow anomalies. The risk assessment shall be made public every six months.

Amendment 51

Proposal for a regulation

Article 10 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article10a

Penalties

Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to the importers for the non-respect of the prohibitions, infringements of Article 7 or non-compliance with a decision issued by the appointed competent authority. The penalties provided for shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Member States shall notify the Commission of those rules without delay.

Amendment 52

Proposal for a regulation

Article 11 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Member States shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their gas supplies, to discontinue all imports of natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation within the deadline for the full prohibition of Russian imports on 1 January 2028.

1. Member States shall establish and implement binding national diversification plans describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their gas supplies, to discontinue all imports of natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation within the deadline for the full prohibition of Russian imports on 1 January 2027.

Amendment 53

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Where Member States receive imports of oil originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian federation, they shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their oil supplies, to discontinue, by 1 January 2028, imports of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

1. Where Member States receive imports of oil originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian federation, including refined oil products derived from Russian-origin crude, they shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their oil supplies, to discontinue, by 1 January 2027, imports of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

Amendment 54

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 – paragraph 2 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) available information on the volume of direct or indirect imports of oil imports from Russia under existing supply contracts;

(a) available information on the volume of direct or indirect imports of oil imports from Russia including refined oil products derived from Russian-origin crude, under existing supply contracts;

Amendment 55

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(ca) a clear description of measures in place and planned at the national level to ensure full transparency and traceability of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

Amendment 56

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 – paragraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. The Commission shall facilitate the preparation and implementation of the national diversification plans for oil where appropriate. Member States shall report regularly to the Oil Coordination Group established by Article 17 of Council Directive 2009/119/EC18 on the progress achieved with the preparation, adoption and implementation of those national diversification plans.

4. The Commission shall facilitate the preparation and implementation of the national diversification plans for oil where appropriate, assisting Member States in overcoming barriers referred in paragraph 2, point (c). Member States shall report regularly to the Oil Coordination Group established by Article 17 of Council Directive 2009/119/EC18 on the progress achieved with the preparation, adoption and implementation of those national diversification plans.

__________________

__________________

18 Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products (OJ L 265, 9.10.2009, p. 9, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/119/oj).

18 Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products (OJ L 265, 9.10.2009, p. 9, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/119/oj).

Amendment 57

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5. Where the national diversification plan for oil identifies a risk that the objective of phasing out Russian oil by 1 January 2028 may not be achieved, the Commission may issue a recommendation, after assessing the plan, to the respective Member State on how to achieve the phase out in a timely manner. Following that recommendation, the Member State shall update its diversification plan within three months, taking into consideration the Commission’s recommendation.

5. Where the national diversification plan for oil identifies a risk that the objective of phasing out Russian oil by 1 January 2027 may not be achieved, the Commission may issue a recommendation, after assessing the plan, to the respective Member State on how to achieve the phase out in a timely manner. Following that recommendation, the Member State shall update its diversification plan within three months, taking into consideration the Commission’s recommendation.

Amendment 58

Proposal for a regulation

Article 15 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The Commission shall continuously monitor the development of the Union’s energy market, notably with respect to potential gas supply dependencies or other security of supply risks in relation to energy imports from the Russian Federation. In the case of sudden and significant developments, seriously threatening the security of supply of one or more Member States, the Commission may authorise one or more Member States to temporarily suspend the application of Chapter Two of this Regulation, in whole or in part. The Commission decision may contain certain conditions, in particular, to ensure that any suspension is strictly limited to addressing the threat.

The Commission shall continuously monitor the development of the Union’s energy market, notably with respect to potential gas and oil supply dependencies or other security of supply risks in relation to energy imports from the Russian Federation, including those constituted by Russia's shadow fleets.

Amendment 59

Proposal for a regulation

Annex III – point 1 – point 1.3 – point 1.3.2 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

To reinforce the ban on Russian natural gas imports, the proposed Regulation establishes that starting 1 January 2026, entities from the Russian Federation or controlled by Russian persons are prohibited from obtaining long-term LNG terminal services in the EU for contracts made or amended after 17 June 2025, with contracts established prior to this date facing the prohibition from 1 January 2028. This would make accessible the corresponding import capacity to alternative suppliers within EU LNG terminals.

To reinforce the ban on Russian natural gas imports, the proposed Regulation establishes that starting 1 January 2026, entities from the Russian Federation or controlled by Russian persons are prohibited from obtaining long-term LNG terminal services in the EU for contracts made or amended after 17 June 2025, with contracts established prior to this date facing the prohibition from 1 January 2027. This would make accessible the corresponding import capacity to alternative suppliers within EU LNG terminals.

Amendment 60

Proposal for a regulation

Annex III – point 1 – point 1.3 – point 1.3.2 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

To prepare for the full phase out of Russian gas in 2028 in a coordinated manner and to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk for security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices, the proposed Regulation compels Member States to undertake a proactive role by developing and implementing national diversification plans geared towards phasing out Russian natural gas. These plans must delineate precise measures and establish milestones for the gradual elimination of direct or indirect Russian gas imports. Together with the enhanced cooperation with national customs authorities, this comprehensive dataset will enable the Commission to fill existing gaps concerning details of Russian supply contracts. The national diversification plans will allow the Commission to coordinate, and, where necessary, provide advice on diversification measures. The Commission's analysis of national diversification plans should culminate in a report and, if needed, recommendations for EU-wide measures to accelerate the reduction of dependence on Russian gas.

To prepare for the full phase out of Russian gas in 2027 in a coordinated manner and to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk for security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices, the proposed Regulation compels Member States to undertake a proactive role by developing and implementing national diversification plans geared towards phasing out Russian natural gas. These plans must delineate precise measures and establish milestones for the gradual elimination of direct or indirect Russian gas imports. Together with the enhanced cooperation with national customs authorities, this comprehensive dataset will enable the Commission to fill existing gaps concerning details of Russian supply contracts. The national diversification plans will allow the Commission to coordinate, and, where necessary, provide advice on diversification measures. The Commission's analysis of national diversification plans should culminate in a report and, if needed, recommendations for EU-wide measures to accelerate the reduction of dependence on Russian gas.

Amendment 61

Proposal for a regulation

Annex III – point 1 – point 1.3 – point 1.3.2 – paragraph 7

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The proposed Regulation mandates that Member States also draft diversification plans to phase out Russian oil imports, aiming for information and coordination concerning the complete cessation of oil supplies by the end of 2027, as envisaged by the Versailles Declaration.

The proposed Regulation mandates that Member States also draft diversification plans to phase out Russian oil imports, aiming for information and coordination concerning the complete cessation of oil supplies by the 1 January 2027, as envisaged by the Versailles Declaration.

Amendment 62

Proposal for a regulation

Annex III – point 1 – point 1.5 – point 1.5.1 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Such plans are supposed to help preparing the Member States for the full phase out of Russian gas in 2028 in a coordinated manner, to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk for security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices.

Such plans are supposed to help preparing the Member States for the full phase out of Russian gas in 2027 in a coordinated manner, to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk for security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

The rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not include in his opinion input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

Title

Phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

References

COM(2025)0828 – C10-0123/2025 – 2025/0180(COD)

Committee(s) responsible

Date announced in plenary

INTA

8.9.2025

ITRE

8.9.2025

Opinion by

Date announced in plenary

IMCO

8.9.2025

Rapporteur for the opinion

Date appointed

Paulius Saudargas

25.8.2025

Rule 59 – Joint committee procedure

Date announced in plenary

8.9.2025

Date adopted

25.9.2025

Result of final vote

+:

–:

0:

37

4

0

Members present for the final vote

Peter Agius, Alex Agius Saliba, Pablo Arias Echeverría, Jeannette Baljeu, Katarina Barley, Biljana Borzan, Petr Bystron, Anna Cavazzini, Stefano Cavedagna, Henrik Dahl, Adnan Dibrani, Elisabeth Dieringer, Regina Doherty, Klara Dostalova, Hanna Gedin, Elisabeth Grossmann, Svenja Hahn, Anna-Maja Henriksson, Pierfrancesco Maran, Nikola Minchev, Gheorghe Piperea, Reinis Pozņaks, Christel Schaldemose, Tomislav Sokol, Kim Van Sparrentak, Marion Walsmann

Substitutes present for the final vote

Marc Angel, Saskia Bricmont, Andrzej Buła, José Cepeda, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, François Kalfon, Sophia Kircher, Judita Laššáková, Gaetano Pedulla’, Paulius Saudargas, Sabine Verheyen, Mariateresa Vivaldini

Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

Pär Holmgren, Liudas Mažylis, Sven Simon

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

Key to symbols:

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Title

Phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

References

COM(2025)0828 – C10-0123/2025 – 2025/0180(COD)

Date submitted to Parliament

18.6.2025

Committee(s) responsible

Date announced in plenary

INTA

8.9.2025

ITRE

8.9.2025

Committees asked for opinions

Date announced in plenary

IMCO

8.9.2025

Rapporteurs

Date appointed

Inese Vaidere

23.6.2025

Ville Niinistö

23.6.2025

Rule 59 – Joint committee procedure

Date announced in plenary

8.9.2025

Discussed in committee

15.7.2025

Date adopted

16.10.2025

Result of final vote

+:

–:

0:

83

9

1

Members present for the final vote

René Aust, Wouter Beke, Hildegard Bentele, Michael Bloss, Borys Budka, Raúl de la Hoz Quintano, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Matthias Ecke, Christian Ehler, Sofie Eriksson, Jan Farský, Sigrid Friis, Alexandra Geese, Jens Geier, Nicolás González Casares, Christophe Grudler, Elisabetta Gualmini, Svenja Hahn, Niels Flemming Hansen, Eero Heinäluoma, Ivars Ijabs, Adam Jarubas, Karin Karlsbro, Seán Kelly, Rudi Kennes, Rihards Kols, Bernd Lange, Ilia Lazarov, Jaak Madison, Yannis Maniatis, Sara Matthieu, Eva Maydell, Letizia Moratti, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Jana Nagyová, Dan Nica, Ville Niinistö, Mirosława Nykiel, Daniel Obajtek, Thomas Pellerin-Carlin, Daniele Polato, Jüri Ratas, Aura Salla, Elena Sancho Murillo, Jussi Saramo, Paulius Saudargas, Lukas Sieper, Diego Solier, Dominik Tarczyński, Bruno Tobback, Francesco Torselli, Inese Vaidere, Kathleen Van Brempt, Yvan Verougstraete, Catarina Vieira, Andrea Wechsler, Iuliu Winkler, Angelika Winzig, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Nicola Zingaretti, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

Substitutes present for the final vote

Mika Aaltola, François-Xavier Bellamy, Nina Carberry, Per Clausen, Danilo Della Valle, Pietro Fiocchi, Lina Gálvez, Hanna Gedin, Michalis Hadjipantela, Radan Kanev, Ľubica Karvašová, Katri Kulmuni, András László, Marina Mesure, Branislav Ondruš, Jutta Paulus, Gaetano Pedulla’, Irene Tinagli, Adina Vălean, Kris Van Dijck

Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

Anja Arndt, Jeannette Baljeu, Csaba Dömötör, Christophe Gomart, Evin Incir, Stefan Köhler, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Lena Schilling, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Lucia Yar, Kosma Złotowski

Date tabled

17.10.2025

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Key to symbols: